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

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The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430

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Introduction

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Abstract and Keywords

The Introduction examines the narrative of doctrinal development at play in the history of the ecumenical councils, in their refinement of the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Trinity. It highlights the contested theology of Origen, and his place in a broader Christian Platonism, in the negotiation of orthodoxy through the fourth and fifth centuries. Origen's controversial understanding of human origins and personal freedom is then related to the reappearance of the same issues in the later Pelagian controversy. The Introduction closes by situating the beginning of Augustine's maturity in the 390s, the point of intersection between the Origenist and Pelagian crises.

Keywords: Nicaea, Ephesus, Constantinople, council, Nestorian, Platonism, method

Christianity is the religion of history. It is concerned with the story of a people, Israel, to whom a divine promise has been entrusted. That people, it proclaims, finds that promise fulfilled in a single person, living in a discrete place and time but exceeding it because he possesses a divine nature. His resurrection and ascension, and continuing life in the Church, l as the way of human where the line is finally

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The story of the early Church is therefore fittingly told in a linear way. Dominant among these lines are the parallel

histories of the Christological and Trinitarian controversies: those protracted debates spanning the fourth and fifth centuries, in which people of differing cultures in the Church came to forge a common language to talk about God, who had become a person, both human and divine; and God, three divine persons sharing a single nature. The character of those debates, marked by slow advance and regress at successive Church councils, aids the linearity of their histories. They are neatly datable; each yields a list of terms variously excluded from and included in orthodox Christian discourse, and each features the vividly recorded and remembered guardians of a more exactly defined Truth, alongside its opponents.

The Christological and Trinitarian debates were both concerned with creating a consistent Christian language, as effective to convert the philosophy of the classical world to a growing faith as it was good be used in the prayer of the liturgy. This explains the intense focus on *person* and *nature* in both controversies: as singular and universal, they represented the whole spread of the theological lexicon, allowing the Church to talk about God and man together, and with a precise specificity. The question, what is God, and how can humans relate to him, found its answer in a God–man. But explaining that startling fact, and explaining humans to themselves as the ones who asked the question, required a set of commensurate words. These human words were vital, because God spoke through them with a divine Word, the final source of all human comprehension.

(p.2) In 381, the first council of Constantinople reaffirmed the language used to describe Christ at the council of Nicaea fifty-six years before. Christ was of one being with the Father, begotten and not made, and the council also confirmed after long discussion that the Spirit was God, proceeding from the Father. In the following fifty years leading up to the council of Ephesus, Christians in the East attempted to describe how two completely different natures could be a single man in history. This required unprecedented anthropological definition to decide how far the history of the Fall affected humanity as something to be united to divinity. The council in 431 condemned what it called Nestorianism, and with it any suggestion that history can change what makes a thing what it is. Mary was to be called the Mother of God, because the human she bore was pristine, original, and perfect, and therefore not repugnant to the God who mysteriously united it to himself. However, ambiguities in the language of the council failed to secure what was being incarnated: the Logos, in a unique new nature, or the divine and human natures, in a unique new person? That question had to wait for its partial resolution at Constantinople, in 451.

The period from 381 to 431 therefore saw theological debate in the East begin to focus on two key issues: what a person is and how it possesses a thing called a nature; and how the corporate history of persons can affect the nature they possess. The counterweights in that argument were the theological dispositions of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, and Cyril of Alexandria's thought coupled with the traditional devotion to Mary of Constantinople.

The Nestorian controversy falls as a backdrop behind a debate at once more niche and yet as intimately connected to the direction of Christian theology between the 380s and 430. This touched on the same issues, of the relationship of God to his creation, and particularly the configuration between the human body, the soul, and the divine nature. It asked how far the philosophical inheritance of Plato could be used in Christian language and the Christian narrative, and found its stadium in the theology of Origen. More than anyone spanning the third and fourth centuries, he had given Christian theology a consistency by converting Platonism to its use. His was a theology of ascent to God through the presence of the divine in all the goods of creation; of the intelligibility of God through the indwelling of the Logos in created things; of the purpose of history seen in hindsight by reading it as a shadowy figure of eternal realities. This first Origenist controversy confronted his method in an argument about what it might mean for God not to have a body. It led naturally to the subsequent question, of why human souls have bodies, when their origin and end are without one. Origen had offered an ambiguous answer, and left the Church with a Christian myth of souls falling from an original state to bodily life, a simultaneous good from the Creator and a curse to be escaped. Theophilus and Epiphanius led this debate in the East, but **(p.3)** Origen had also impacted on the West. Here, Jerome and his friend Rufinus of Aquileia brought the issue to the attention of a Church looking for a theological identity of its own, yet mindful of its roots in the Greek East. The papal proscription of Origen's works in 400 marked a decisive turning point in the story of Christian Platonism away from

Origen's creative synthesis, and formalized in a new way the authority of episcopal judgement over the formation of doctrine.

The Pelagian controversy rode on the crest of this controversial wave, surfacing in the 390s in Rome from the teachings of an itinerant ascetic and his companion, Caelestius. Pelagius' work lay in spiritual direction and commentary on Scripture. The two combined, resulting in what was perceived to be a gospel of autonomy for the pursuit of holiness. Genesis and Paul, at delicate issue in a Western milieu testing the limits of its distinctive theological voice, were Pelagius' point of departure. Both texts gave him the platform to speak in a scriptural way about human historicity, the effects of the Fall on volition, and the life lived under grace. The questions at stake were close to those being fought in the East over Origen: of the nature of creaturely freedom and the place of the body in a fallen world. To Pelagius' foremost onlooker, Augustine, his theology severed the dependence of creature on his maker, and threatened to remove the purpose of the Incarnation in saving a fallen world, no longer fallen in Pelagius' eyes.

The two turning points in Augustine's ecclesiastical career—his conversion in the 380s and successive ordinations in the 390s—took place exactly in the middle of this complex of interlocking controversies. By the time of his death, Nestorianism, Origenism, and Pelagianism had been defined, and were on their way to resolution. Augustine's exhaustive output, and the entirely novel concentration of self-reflection in his work, make his corpus an extraordinary window on that fifty-year period. What they reveal of the piecemeal, often fragmentary, and personally driven character of theological debate raises acute questions about the neatness of the Church's history as told to later generations.

What follows is in places a speculative account of Augustine's theological reorientations as they surfaced in his writing on the person of Christ, set against a broader picture of the theological development of the Church from the fourth into the fifth centuries. It is revisionary without trying to be self-consciously revisionist. I have not tried to rewrite history in a fanciful way for its own sake, but I have tried to tell an alternative story out of what our sources permit, even though they may not demand it. My purpose is very definitely not to suggest a triumphantly new narrative to replace old and false ones. It is rather to offer a novel reading of real history, which should test our commitment to older narratives and signal the difficulty of writing Christian history all together. This book is therefore an experimentation with method as much as it is a serious attempt to engage with Augustine and his context. If the **(p.4)** story it offers is refuted from an honest re-engagement with the sources at hand and a critical approach to the process of historical research, it will have been successful. If it is accepted in whole or in part, it will give a fresh window on Augustine the theologian and churchman, and invite us to reconsider his place in the creation of the Western theological sensibility.

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

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Recovering an Augustinian Christology

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Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 1 opens with an overview of Augustine's Christology, highlighting its relationship to broader themes in Augustine's theology, and its reception in scholarship to date. The chapter turns to the Pelagian controversy, first offering a synthetic summary of Augustine's anti-Pelagian teaching on the nature of freedom and sin after the Fall, and on the humanity of Christ. Highlighting the historical and theological connections between the Origenist and Pelagian controversies, it then discusses recent reassessments of Augustine's intellectual development. Carol Harrison's argument for continuity in Augustine's thought provides the critical springboard for the book's subsequent depiction of Augustine's theological development in the 390s, in which his reading of Origen is taken as a major factor, and which can be seen to have had lasting effect in his later attack on Pelagianism.

Keywords: conciliar Christology, Augustinianism, sinful flesh, grace, free will, Fall, Pelagian controversy, Origenist controversy, Carol Harrison, Peter Brown

This study is dominated by two central concerns: redrawing the map of Augustine's Christology, and specifically his handling of the humanity of Christ, through his engagement in the Pelagian controversy; and establishing his use of the work of Origen of Alexandria in elaborating that Christology. As I intend to prove in the body of the book that follows, Augustine received from his early reading of Origen's great commentary on the letter to the Romans a distinctive conception of Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' (Rom. 8:3). As a key point of Pauline exegesis, Augustine projected

this text into his broad treatment of the sinlessness of Christ, the Christological counterpoint to his developing teaching on sin and grace. Where the Pelagian controversy challenged Augustine to pronounce clearly on his understanding of Original Sin and its effects in the life of grace, this resulted in a parallel consideration of Christ's human nature, the antidote to the contagion of sin. As I will argue, the internal inconsistencies of Augustine's theory of propagated, sinful nature are closely reflected in his uneven treatment of Christ's assumption of a humanity in need of redemption, which must, however, remain sinless. This theological problem cannot be viewed apart from Augustine's understanding of the nature of heresy and orthodoxy, worked out in his own construction of the teachings of Pelagius and Caelestius of Carthage as a single, coherent 'Pelagianism'. In turn, this polemical project must be set against Augustine's early engagement with the Origenist controversy,[1] during which he procured, read, and admired the works of Origen from within the acquaintance network of Rufinus of Aquileia. He had been sympathetic to the pro-Origenist cause in this earlier doctrinal debate. I argue here that his later critique of Pelagianism worked in part to draw attention away from Caelestius' attack on Origen and the construal of his own theology of the Fall as essentially Origenist in character. This is essentially to offer a rewriting of Augustine's intellectual **(p.6)** development in the years following his episcopal ordination and throughout the Pelagian controversy; hence the time span of my enquiry, 396–430.

From the outset, this study has been driven by the apparent lacuna in scholarly representations of the theology of Augustine, for the Doctor of Grace is a Father seemingly without a Christology. While any suggestion that Augustine failed to place the proclamation of the Incarnate God at the heart of his preaching and teaching is obviously facile, it is undoubtedly true that he thinks Christologically in a very different way from an Athanasius, a Cyril of Alexandria, or an Ambrose of Milan. The conciliar refinement of the language to be applied to the God–Human is simply not a discourse in which he found himself involved, or to which he applied himself. I shall say more of this in what follows, but note here what should be a surprising fact: that Augustine, to whom Western theology owes more than to anyone else, has almost no place in the narrative of Christological debate, which has for so long defined the self-representation of the Christian Church.

This observation forms the context for my interest in Augustine's reception of Origen. Where a figure of theological authority as weighty as Augustine is found to be outside the apparently crucial negotiation of the limits of orthodoxy within his own time, the question arises of what his own understanding of these limits might be. Once again, this surfaces as another relatively unquestioned area of Augustinian study, with the bare assumption that Augustine must reflect the conciliar consensus (whatever that might be) ruling the field. As his highly discreet but evidently enthusiastic involvement in the Origenist controversy shows, this is not the case: Augustine, along with Rufinus of Aquileia and their mutual friends, had little interest in the papal ban on reading Origen's works in 400, continuing to use them long afterwards.[2] Coupled with Augustine's personal investment in the destruction of 'Pelagianism', this points to a far more measured regard on his part for the judgement of bishops in council than would first seem to be the case. From this arises a picture of Augustine as a theologically eclectic, self-authorizing and thus ecclesiologically unfamiliar figure. In this introductory chapter, I shall lay out the place of this book in scholarly research to date, and sketch a number of themes centrifugal to it, which nonetheless form the basis for my method and the theological presuppositions behind it.

The character of Augustine's Christology

The first problem facing any student of Augustine in search of his Christology is finding it. Throughout the Augustinian corpus, Christ is the wood among **(p.7)** the trees, everywhere and nowhere in particular. A very few of Augustine's works are specifically Christological in character, but they still fall outside the precedent set in the Patristic corpus by Athansius' *De Incarnatione*, Ambrose's *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, and the Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, to name but three examples. This is to say that none of his works gives detailed and equal consideration to the divinity and humanity of Christ, hypostasized in one person, in the manner demanded by the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, for the obvious reason that Augustine was never involved in those debates. In large part, this is due to accidents of history and geography.

Augustine was appointed to teach rhetoric in Milan in 384, close to the denouement of Ambrose's conflict with the Arian

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imperial family. Having challenged the right of Arian congregations to worship i…374, in 386 Ambrose organized the peaceful sit-in of Catholics in the basilica requisitioned by the emp…tina. While Augustine records being present at this event at *Confessiones* 9.7.15, his attention focuses o…roduction of hymn singing during the protest above any Christological issue underlying the dispute.[3] …ne's devotion to Ambrose, it is striking that this is the only allusion to the Arian controversy in the *Confessiones*; the council of Constantinople, of crucial importance to the vindication of the anti-Arian party in 381, is not mentioned at all. Augustine's anti-Arian works of the late 410s, issued in response to the arrival of Gothic invaders in North Africa, suggest that his knowledge of the conciliar process behind the condemnation of Arianism was in fact very slight, and he was certainly ignorant of the varieties of Arianism represented variously in Greek and Germanic form.[4] Whether from theological immaturity during his time in Milan, or from a lack of genuine interest, his understanding of Arianism can only ever have been general and polemically informed. This remains true even of *De Trinitate*, which relies more on Augustine's original Trinitarian speculation than any sustained and forensic examination of Arianism.

Although Augustine remained active in his episcopal ministry through to 430, it is similarly apparent that he remained aloof from, or simply ignorant of, the run-up to the council of Ephesus in 431. While Augustine wrote to Cyril of Alexandria in around 418,[5] the letter is concerned solely with Cyril's knowledge of Pelagius' movements in the East, and with acquiring the acts of the synod of Diospolis in 415, at which Pelagius' theology was vindicated as orthodox.[6] In the next chapter of this book, I show that Augustine was more **(p.8)** than capable of obtaining information about controversies in the East, as his correspondence concerning the Origenist controversy makes clear. I suggest that a live interest in Greek theology in the years preceding 400 gave way to a more sanguine provincialism in Augustine's later years, his attention being focused on theological controversy in Gaul (with the Semi-Pelagians) and Italy (with Julian of Eclanum), in defence of his own interpretation of orthodoxy on the issues of Original Sin and grace. It is an irony of history that Augustine was prevented by his death in 430 from attending the council of Ephesus, to which he was invited by Theodosius II, the following year.

Augustine's theological priorities must, in light of this, be situated outside the sweep of the great Christological and Trinitarian struggles that surrounded him. This gives his Christology a distinctive character. As Joanne McWilliam describes it: 'His writing on Christ was occasional or episodic—a mosaic composed over at least a quarter of a century—and consequently harder to control than other aspects of his thought.'[7] The major works in which Christology is treated as a discrete issue are very few. Epistle 137, written to Volusianus in 412, explains how it is possible for the Incarnate God to maintain his sovereignty over creation while in the womb of the Virgin, and contains the most extended treatment of the nature of Christ's human soul as the mediating faculty between his human and divine natures in the Augustinian corpus. Epistle 187 to Dardanus, of 416, treats the Incarnation in terms of grace, received by all humanity for its salvation, but in the case of Christ, for his assumption by the divine nature. This theme also underlies the anti-Pelagian Epistle 140, *De Gratia Novi Testamenti*, of 412. Epistle 219 of 426 relates the case of Leporius, who had been sent to Augustine to be corrected in his understanding of the Incarnation; his *Libellus Emendationis* therefore constitutes a mediated source of evidence for Augustine's Christology. *De Magistro*, of many years earlier (389), handles the …n and Wisdom in all true …ne formally Christological …l, and contains similar

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Other important discussions of a Christological character are found in many of Augustine's works whose primary intention is not to explicate the Incarnation. The first thirty-two *Enarrationes in Psalmos* (before 396) are an important source for his early conception of the relationship between the eschatological Christ and his Church (the *totus Christus*), although the theme is by no means restricted to these expositions. The twenty-two *Tractatus de Evangelio Iohannis*, written between 406 and 420, naturally focus on the **(p.9)** Christological in their exegesis of the gospel, but this is largely driven by the text rather than technical Christological discourse outside the homiletic structure of the works. *De*

Trinitate books 4 and 13 handle Christology with a heavily soteriological slant, balancing the redemption of humanity through faith with the necessity of the Incarnation. More specific is *De Civitate* 10, in which the mediating spirits (*daemones*) of Porphyrian cosmology are contrasted with the all-encompassing mediation of Christ, a theme prefigured in *Confessiones* 10.67.42–end. To end the list of Christological works in the Augustinian corpus here is, in a sense, justified: these constitute the most extended, sustained, and detailed treatments of the Incarnation in all of Augustine's many works. In another, equally justified, sense, this list does no service to the full extent of Augustine's teaching about Christ. Every sermon and letter, each treatise on the nature of the Church or of grace, refers to and has its basis in the faith of the Incarnation. This remains true of the 'philosophical' treatises of Augustine's early theological career, although their classically oriented mode of discussion may appear to obscure the Christological within them from the first glance of a modern readership.

Issues of periodization and thematics

In the light of the highly syncretistic nature of Augustine's Christology, a number of attempts to periodize its theological themes have been put forward in recent scholarship. In his important article of 1990, John McGuckin proposed a threefold development in Augustine's Christology, which is 'all the more interesting' because it 'did not need to be forged in the exigencies of any apologetic as was the case with his later doctrine of grace and predestination'.[9] The first period is to be found in the early 'philosophical' works, written soon after Augustine's conversion, which emphasize the pedagogical role of Christ, 'a somewhat remote exemplar of virtuous living.'[10] The second spans the period 391–412. Here, Augustine first discovers the soul–body union as a model for speaking about the union of God and human in the one person of Christ; this runs in parallel with treatments of the divinity of Christ as an 'indwelling' of the divine nature along with the human. In similarly contradictory fashion, Augustine can use the language traditional to Antioch in referring to the Incarnation as a *susceptio hominis* (the assumption of a human *qua* individual) alongside a Cyrilline vocabulary in which Christ 'possesses' (perhaps better translated as 'is') the person of Wisdom (*naturaliter habere personam sapientiae*) *qua* individual.[11] In the years following 412, Augustine **(p.10)** emphasizes more and more the relationship between ordinary grace and that of the Incarnation, by which the humanity of Christ is assumptively created by a 'singular grace' for the salvation of all.[12]

I want to accept the broad outlines of McGuckin's analysis, with some important provisos. While it is true that the emphasis on Christ as the indwelling teacher is marked in the early works, this theme never entirely disappears from Augustine's repertoire.[13] McGuckin's suggestion that this Christ is 'distant' points to the much-reduced content of imitation in current theology, rather than to any fault in Augustine's Christology. Crucial to a Platonist conception of moral progress by assimilation to the ideal forms that underlie earthly goods, *mimesis* finds its natural home in a Christian Platonism in which imitation of the Incarnate Christ leads to union with the eternal Word. Similarly, the themes McGuckin highlights in the second period are present through to the end of Augustine's career: he never settles on a single theological lexicon to describe the Incarnation, whether Alexandrian, Antiochene, or 'traditionalist Latin.'[14] Further, the falsity of his contention that this development was unprompted by apologetic requirements is clear from his outline of the third period, whose emphasis on the 'singular grace' of the Incarnation is manifestly part of Augustine's anti-Pelagian project. Added to this, McGuckin makes no attempt to consider the theological complementarity between each of the typologies he details. I wish to suggest that a line of continuity runs between the depiction of Christ as the teacher of the inner man, his divine *susceptio hominis*, that human's graced possession of a mediating soul, *and* his description in strongly Alexandrian terms, which simultaneously obfuscate the human aspects of his Incarnate person. This argues against viewing each of these themes in isolation from one another, and instead suggests an overarching Christological narrative rooted in another, latent, element of Augustine's thought.

While Augustine's Christology cannot readily be assigned a chronology on the basis of marked stylistic or theological tropes, detailing some of the repeated and often vivid terms Augustine uses to describe Christ will be useful in the context of this chapter, not least because many of them recur in the body of the book that follows. In the course of my outline, I shall indicate some of the scholarly responses to these themes to date.

Christ is the divinely sent physician of sinful souls (*Christus Medicus*). In the process of healing humanity, he causes pain; in his humility, he finally experiences the pain of human salvation on the cross.[15]

(p.11) Christ is the way (*via*) by which the Church journeys to its salvation and also its final destination and heavenly homeland (*patria*) (cf. John 14.6).[16]

Christ is humble and, most importantly, the humble mediator between God and humanity; he inverts the pride of the Fall in his sinless humanity.[17] Christ is referred to as the mediator of God (*mediator dei*) 289 times in the Augustinian corpus. The predominance of this designation cannot be underestimated.

Christ is the heavenly merchant (*mercator*) who effects the exchange of rights over humanity from the powers of sin to the good providence of God.[18]

Christ is the milk of infants (*lac paruulorum*) and bread of the angels (*panis angelorum*), the eternal Word whom Christians consume by intellectual communion.[19]

Christ is an example (*exemplum*) in his humble life and fearless death; the gift of grace enables the sanctifying adoption of this example in the life of the Church. The efficacious nature of all exemplary acts, typified by those of Christ, is another major concern in Augustine's writing; in all cases, *exemplum* appears 1,278 times in the extant corpus, although this is not always in a Christological context.[20]

Christ is whole in his Church (*totus Christus*), to whom he transfers the attributes of his divine nature by adoption through grace.[21] Augustine frequently expresses the same idea by contrasting the ascended Head with his Body militant and redeemed (cf. Rom. 12:4–5; 1 Cor. 10:17).

Christ is the dominical human (*homo dominicus*), assumed by the Word and resurrected to glory.[22] Augustine's use of the phrase does not make clear whether a nature or a person is being taken up here. After 395, he rejected the use of this expression in a Christological context, explaining later in the *Retractationes* that it could be applied to all the redeemed.[23]

Christ is the human taken up (*homo susceptus*) by the divine Son.[24] He is also where the Word personally is.[25] Augustine's parallel use of these **(p.12)** two incarnational models remains a topic of scholarly enquiry. Augustine appears not to have viewed them as mutually exclusive; cf. Epistle 187: 'It is clear that he was made one person with the Word by a certain unique taking up of humanity.'[26] The Incarnation is thus properly seen as a work of grace.[27] The language of two natures in one person is also widely present in his work.[28]

Christ is one who comes in the likeness of sinful flesh (*in similitudine carnis peccati* (Rom. 8:3)). Accepting the punishment for sin by taking mortal flesh, he nonetheless avoids the contagion of sin by being conceived of a Virgin without carnal concupiscence.[29]

Finally, Christ is the first predestined human, from whose salvation all human redemption comes.[30]

As should be clear from even this brief summary, the language in which Augustine couches his Christology is strongly soteriological, scriptural, and often figurative. The lack of consistency with which he approaches the relationship between person and nature in the Incarnation is the corollary of his preference for 'softer', though predominantly traditional, ways of describing Christ. The partial exception to this rule is his description of Christ as the first predestined human, whose content is specific to his mature teaching on election and grace.

Dominant trajections in scholarship

As I have shown in the bibliographical references given above, the richness and variety of Augustine's description of the

Incarnation has given rise to a wide range of scholarship on those themes. However, a distinctive confessional narrative within this scholarship remains to be told. This centres on the relationship between Augustine's Christology and broader conceptions of Christological orthodoxy in both the Patristic corpus and the contemporary Church. In large part, it cannot be understood apart from the self-definition of Roman Catholic theology brought about through the First Vatican Council, the struggle with Modernism, and, at length, Vatican 2. This story, both complex and fiercely contended, cannot be told in depth here, not least **(p.13)** because research on Augustine's Christology is also shared with Protestant scholars, and those without a confession.

As in many areas of early Church history, the debate about Augustine's Christology can be seen to begin with the publication of Adolph von Harnack's *History of Dogma*.[31] Although the entry on Augustine's theology of the Incarnation is short, it argued that his use of *assumptus/susceptus homo* language situates him within the tradition represented by Diodore of Tarsus, Nestorius, and Theodore of Mopsuestia better than that confirmed at Ephesus and Chalcedon.[32] (It should be remembered that the 'rehabilitation'[33] of both Nestorius and Theodore was not to be effected until the publication of J. F. Bethune Baker's *Nestorius and his Teachings: A Fresh Examination of the Evidence*, in 1908.) At the turn of the twentieth century, this prompted the critical response of the Lutheran Otto Scheel, who offered a positive appraisal both of Augustine's dependence on Neoplatonic modes of thought and the Chalcedonian 'orthodoxy' of his Christology.[34] His findings were swiftly canonized by condensed inclusion in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* by Portalié in 1903, beginning the Roman Catholic defence of Augustine's Christology.[35] This was followed by the 1904 article of van Crombrugghe, in criticism of Scheel's positive analysis of Augustine's Christological adaptation of Platonism, and finding in his Christology the roots of an Anselmian doctrine of substitutionary atonement.[36] Twenty years hence, Jouassard attempted a reading of Augustine's treatment of the death of Christ, methodologically fairer to the exegetical and contextual character of his Christology, though still under the critical lens of Chalcedon and even Scholastic presuppositions.[37] Rivière contributed a dual Christological–Soteriological perspective in 1933,[38] and 1936 saw the appearance of Schlitz's analysis of the place of Augustine's Christology in the tradition pre-dating it.[39] All these studies are to a greater or lesser degree grounded on a belief that doctrine, as a thing always held in germ by the Church, has been protected by the judgement of ecumenical councils, and that, where Augustine differs in his expressions from Chalcedon, this is an accident of parlance to be reconciled to recognizably orthodox statements elsewhere in his work. More positively, they laid claim to the existence of an Augustinian Christology worth researching.

A critical turning point in the study of Augustine's Christology came in van Bavel's 1954 monograph *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin*. This broke new ground in probing Augustine's treatment of the intellection **(p.14)** and emotional life of Christ, suggesting that his Christology exhibits broadly Docetic tendencies. His findings, not yet superseded, are integral to Chapter 5 of this book. Further, van Bavel approached his research from within the characteristics of Augustine's Christology, attending to its imagery and broader theological contexts, rather than simply the Chalcedonian conception of Christ as one person in two natures. Although such a connection is not made explicit, the renewal of Roman Catholic thought on the development of doctrine and ecclesiology in the immediate post-war period must underlie the originality of van Bavel's study.

The year of the closure of the Second Vatican Council, 1965, saw the publication of Bernard's analysis of the predestination of Christ's humanity and its relationship to the salvation of the Church.[40] This short but important study was soon followed by Marravee's work on the Ascension of Christ in Augustine's thought, the first significant English language contribution to the field.[41] The first survey of Christology within the *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, focusing on their handling of the themes of mediation and the *totus Christus*, was added by Babcock in 1971.[42] Activity returned to continental Europe in 1976, with the pneumatological study of Verhees,[43] two years before the appearance of Geerlings' monograph, *Christus Exemplum*.[44] Attentive to the distinctiveness of Augustine's Christology and with exceptional thoroughness, this investigated the relationship between salvation and the 'effective example' of Christ elaborated from within Augustine's pedagogical theory. In 1989, Goulven Madec's *La Patrie et la voie* innovated by integrating a survey of Augustine's personal conversion to Christ mediated through Christian Platonism, his understanding of the Christological

identity of the Church's liturgy, and his response to controversies using Christological doctrine.[45] The most recent full-scale study remains that of Drobner, whose examination of the use of the word *persona* in a Christological context sees a return to the issues dominating scholarship in this field at the beginning of the century.[46] Though not a Christological study as such, mention should finally be made of Dodaro's recent work examining the mediation of righteousness through the Incarnation in *De Civitate Dei*: *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine*.[47]

The context of this study: the Pelagian controversy

Given the rising tide of interest in Augustine's Christology through the twentieth century, and the perennial importance of his engagement with **(p.15)** Pelagianism, it is surprising that the only substantial study of the intersection between the two is the short article by Joanne McWilliam Dewart, 'The Christology of the Pelagian Controversy'.[48] More limited still is the enquiry of Lamberigts, 'Competing Christologies: Julian and Augustine on Jesus Christ', which concentrates solely on Augustine's works against Julian.[49] The justification for Dewart's paper is somewhat underwhelming: 'Augustine's Christology in particular was increasingly shaped in those years of the Pelagian Controversy by his developing theology of grace.'[50] I believe we can do better than this. Augustinianism as a system of interconnected propositions about human salvation, beginning with Original Sin, guilt, and contagion, and ending with the unsearchable divine judgement to elect to salvation or damnation, is finally the product of Augustine's struggle against Pelagianism. This was recognized by John Cassian in the fifth century and Cornelius Jansen in the seventeenth. It is essential to every renegotiation of Augustine's works in the present, including those that seek to show the essential consistency of Augustine's early works with his mature theology. As a reading of 'Augustinianism' it has privileged status, because it is the narrative of theological development given by Augustine himself in the opening chapters of both *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono Perseverantiae*. His Christological reflection in the years following the arrival of Caelestius and Pelagius on African soil therefore demands a proper hearing. Madec makes the point forcefully: 'All of Augustine's argumentation against Pelagius is founded on the "double insertion" of humanity in Adam and in Christ; all his doctrine of original sin, of grace, and of predestination is, likewise, profoundly Christological.'[51] Each of the separate aspects of Augustine's anti-Pelagian thought raises complex questions for Christological solution. Considered together, they cover almost all of the theological anthropological aspects of salvation history. I shall deal here briefly with each in turn.

In both *De Genesi adversus Manichaeos* and *De Genesi ad Litteram Liber Imperfectus*, Augustine had considered human nature in its Paradisal state, gradually moving from an allegorical to a literal interpretation of his text. Faced with Caelestius of Carthage's denial of Original Sin, and alongside his positive assessment of human mortality in Eden, Augustine was pressed to treat the text of Genesis once again. Conflating his exegesis of Romans 5:12, 'in Adam all die' (*in Adam omnes moriuntur*) with his observation of human ignorance and difficulty (*ignorantia, difficultas*) resulted in a new, historicized account of sin's origin and its present, persistent outcome. As a result of Adam's proud conversion from love of God to love of self, humanity stands condemned to the twofold punishment of mortality and concupiscent volition. Unable to reverse this of his own will, the human must endure the erosion of **(p.16)** her deepest identity, the image of freedom bound to self-slavery. Where the parents of humankind had enjoyed complete and free obedience to God, the unreasoned movement of the genital members now typify the bondage of all under sin. The groundwork of Augustine's synthesis had been laid before the advance of the Pelagian controversy, in his works of Pauline commentary and the *Ad Simplicianum* of the 390s; it would be extended and embedded through the course of that crisis, and come to fruition in the works against Julian of Eclanum, on the eve of his death.

Before fully accounting for the historical progression of sinfulness in human history, Augustine had treated the words of Paul at Romans 7:25 ('Wretched man that I am; who will liberate me from this body of death?') as a sympathetic impersonation of the human under sin by a saint under grace.[52] With the publication of the *Ad Simplicianum*, Augustine's interpretation shifted: quite to the contrary, Paul exemplifies the persistence of sin even in his own life of grace (*in propria persona*), where the capacity of the will to love the good lies entirely in God's gift. This renegotiation of the limits of virtue in the Christian life Augustine integrated into his earlier fourfold typology of salvation history. Before the Law, humans endure their sinful nature in ignorance; under the Law, they come to know their depravity, and may call

on the grace of Christ for aid. Under grace this aid may be granted, but always in the context of the continued struggle against sin. Only in the life at peace can humankind hope for complete freedom from the divided will, and this remains an object of eschatological hope. Thus the psychological fragmentation of individuals through the punishment for sin stands as a microcosm of the whole providential order. The redeeming divine initiative behind all human goodness, and most particularly the will, forms the backbone of Augustine's middle period anti-Pelagian treatises, notably *De Natura et Gratia*.

In his exegesis of Romans 9:6–18 before 396, Augustine had initially accounted for the differing elections of Jacob and Esau on the basis of their somewhat elliptically put 'hidden merits' (*occultissima merita*).[53] Shortly afterwards, his position moved: Jacob was rather elected to God's favour because of his foreseen faith. The *Ad Simplicianum* saw a third and decisive shift, in parallel with Augustine's new reading of Romans 7:25. Because the human will is divided and unable to raise itself to holiness, Jacob cannot have been elected on the basis of his faith, which is always God's gift and never a purely human work.[54] Thus the judgement to elect to salvation, or permit the punishment for sin to be continued into eternity, is to be put down to the inscrutable discernment of God. This would form a central point of contention in Augustine's argument with the Semi-Pelagians, the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles.

(p.17) The final core aspect of Augustine's anti-Pelagianism lies not so much in his teaching positively stated, but in the absence of any clear pronouncement on the origin of the soul. Implicit in Caelestius' rejection of Original Sin lay a critique of an Origenist doctrine of the soul's 'mission' or fall to embodiment in recompense for its sin in a premundane life. Added to this, the general discussion of the soul's origin in the circle surrounding Augustine gained pace in the years following Caelestius' condemnation in 412. Where a consensus within the Church had yet to be reached on an issue properly belonging to Classical physics, Augustine's teaching on propagated, 'sinful nature' called for precise protological justification. In spite of frequent requests to explain how a sinful soul could be transmitted from parent to child without the soul also being a physical entity, Augustine maintained a diplomatic silence on the topic through to the final collapse of his dialogue with Julian of Eclanum. This constitutes the most significant aporia in all of Augustine's anti-Pelagian writing.

An attempt to describe how God could take the human nature of unfallen humanity without infringing his illimitable knowledge and goodness would be difficult enough. Classical Christology takes as axiomatic that the Incarnation must assume what is to be redeemed, and is therefore challenged to articulate how the fallenness of human nature can be owned by the eternal Son without injury to his divinity. This is complicated further by the suggestion in many Patristic Christologies that aspects of the prelapsarian Adam are revived alongside fallen nature in the God–Human; where a Patristic theologian maximizes the gap between fallen and unfallen natures, this Christological tension is similarly increased.

From his mature account of the relationship between grace and free will, Augustine must justify how the human Christ can typify the complete dependence of the fallen will on the divine initiative for all its goodness in the process of its salvation. Here his use of 'Alexandrian' tropes comes into its own, where the Word is depicted as the root cause of personal agency for the assumed human nature. The side effect of this, however, is to obscure the specifically human aspects of Christ's will, knowledge, and agency. Language used alongside such a typology that emphasizes the individuality of the humanity assumed tips the scale in the opposite direction, by frontloading the fallenness of that humanity into the place occupied by the active Word; this runs the risk of making the Son the possessor of personal vice. Two outcomes therefore arise from these tendencies: to make Augustine's defence of human freedom in the life of grace appear disingenuous, and to threaten the effectiveness of the Incarnation as he conceives it *tout court*.

From his theologically prior account of Original Sin, Augustine must explain how Christ can assume a human nature that is formally postlapsarian, but to which none of the ongoing effects of Original Sin adhere. It is unclear how this can be convincingly done, however, as the definition of carnal **(p.18)** concupiscence (*concupiscentia carnalis*) is that it precipitates a descent into lust that cannot be halted, even in the life of grace: the punishment for sin is sin itself.

Augustine's emphasis on the virginal conception of Christ as the means by which he assumes a body condemned to the mortality of sinful nature, but free from sin, answers only half this problem. While Christ's human flesh may be 'neutralized' from the contagion of concupiscence and empowered by the indwelling Word to overcome death, the origin of his soul remains unclear even in Augustine's latest works. Without accounting for the manner in which this soul is released from the bondage of sinful desire, both the compromised agency consequent on sinful nature and its guilt remain potentially attached to the humanity assumed. To return to the previous point, such a Christology endangers both the completeness and the active enfranchisement of the humanity taken into the hypostatic union. As should be clear, I do not believe that Augustine ever fully resolved these major fault lines in his Christology; I offer this judgement with humility, doubting whether any Christology is capable of doing justice to the sinlessness of a Christ sent to redeem sinful humanity. Nonetheless, these inconsistencies in Augustine's thought must be admitted as part of the ongoing process of evaluating the character of his theology, in both its theological–anthropological and Christological aspects.

Pelagiani adversus Origenistas?

Augustine's involvement in the Pelagian controversy has been a major area of study in Western Patristics throughout the twentieth century, and much of this interest has come from an Anglo-American context, as befits this stereotypically 'British' heresy.[55] The key historical argument of this book is that the whole controversy, and particularly Augustine's reaction to the writings of Caelestius and Pelagius, cannot be viewed apart from the Origenist controversy, which dominated theological discourse from the beginning of the 390s to the condemnation of Origen's works by Anastasius of Rome in 400. As such it must be considered a pan-Imperial debate, in which Western theologians were implicated as much as Epiphanius of Salamis, Theophilus of Alexandria, and John of Jerusalem in the East.

The relationship between Origenism and Pelagianism was highlighted as long ago as 1968, in Robert Evans's *Pelagius: Enquiries and Reappraisals*.[56] **(p.19)** Here, Evans focused on Jerome's anti-Pelagianism as the locus for his continued self-defence against earlier allegations of Origenism in his own theology. This is most clearly displayed in his Epistle 133 to Ctesiphon, identifying Pelagianism with Origenism in their shared teaching on the affective perfectibility of humankind, in the passionless state of *apatheia* (ἀπαθεια, *impassibilitas*). Rees's monograph *Pelagius: A Reluctant Heretic* pressed the connection further, drawing attention to the anti-Origenism of the source document for Caelestius' denial of Original Sin, Rufinus of Syria's *Liber de Fide*.[57] Only since the publication of Elizabeth Clark's *The Origenist Controversy*[58] has it been possible to synthesize these two insights against the background of a study that integrates the Eastern and Western discussions of Origen's legacy at the end of the fourth century. Crucial to my argument here is Clark's survey of the spread of the social networks underlying the literary defence (and excoriation) of Origen in the Latin West, in which Augustine is found to have a significant place as an acquaintance of both Jerome and Rufinus of Aquileia. Through a fresh reading of Augustine's correspondence with Jerome, I argue further that he is better positioned as an ally of Rufinus and a highly provocative critic of Jerome. From the circles surrounding both, it can be soundly established that he received a considerable number of translations of the Origenian corpus.

The significance of Augustine's reception of Origen's works through the 390s, alongside his friendly traffic with friends of Rufinus of Aquileia, lies not only in his developing early theology, but also in his later reaction to Pelagian teaching on sin and grace. Among the most recognizably 'Origenian' elements of this early theology, the allegorical interpretation of Genesis 1–3 is to be counted the most notable and, with the inception of *De Genesi ad Litteram Liber Imperfectus*, the most swiftly displaced. However, his initial treatment of both Romans 7:25 and the narrative of the election of Jacob and Esau are also broadly reconcilable to an Origenian reading. Studies of Augustine's reception of Origen to date have been content to see his move away from these scriptural exegeses in the mid-390s as an index of his self-dissociation from the Origenist controversy.

Quite to the contrary, I argue that his sustained use of Origen's interpretation of Romans 8:3 at the heart of his Christology, together with his attack on Jerome in the 390s and 410s, should be taken to indicate a deeper, unflinching appreciation of Origen's work and influence. Because his handling of Romans 8:3 is consistent from 396 to 430, I argue

further that portions (at least) of Rufinus of Aquileia's translation of Origen's commentary on Romans were available to him from the mid-390s, in contrast to the conventional dating of its publication to 405–10. I believe that Augustine was forced to hold his **(p.20)** admiration of Origen in tension with his personal reputation for orthodox teaching when confronted by Caelestius' revival of Rufinus the Syrian's *Liber*, in which the doctrine of inherited Original Sin is criticized as the corollary of Origen's teaching on the fall of souls from a premundane state. With the open publication of Jerome's Epistle 133 in 415, Augustine's own earlier teaching on the theoretical perfectibility of the affective life stood to expose his own debt to Origen further. For this reason, I argue that Augustine's investment in creating and defeating Pelagianism as a single *panhairesis*, including all forms of error, should be seen in large part as a diversion from the issue of his own 'Origenism', a reading confirmed by his unwillingness to advance a positive doctrine of the origin of the soul. While the work of O'Connell has situated the intellectual development of Augustine around the twin issues of the origin of the soul and his debt to Neoplatonism, I believe this book is the first study to isolate Origen as a major source of Augustine's protological ambivalence and as a decisive factor in his theological growth. It is also the first to argue that the contradictions in Augustine's Christology can be resolved only by following Origen, and fixing the sinlessness of Christ in his soul's perpetual embrace of the eternal Word from eternity, in unfallen possession of its primal state.

Narratives of development and change: Augustine and Brown's lost future

Because this thesis argues for the importance of Origen in Augustine's intellectual growth, it cannot ignore the most noteworthy English language reassessment of this key issue recently published by Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity*.[59] The object of Harrison's criticism throughout the work is chapter 15 of Peter Brown's biography of Augustine, headed 'The Lost Future'.[60] This is taken as the formative and exemplary exposition of Augustine's change of intellectual orientation in the mid-390s from the optimistic mysticism of Christian Neoplatonism, to a much darker Christianity preoccupied with the Fall and its debilitation of the will. Thereafter debated as the 'Two Augustines Controversy',[61] Brown's emphasis on Augustine's second conversion to a Pauline pessimism has won widespread acceptance.

At the narrative heart of this shift, Brown depicts a slowly cooling Augustine nearing middle age in the mid-390s, coming to terms with his own limitations and relinquishing some of his early idealism in the concrete challenges (and **(p.21)** disappointments) of pastoral ministry. 'A new tone has come to suffuse Augustine's life. He is a man who has realized that he was doomed to remain incomplete in his present existence, that what he had wished for most ardently would never be more than a hope, postponed to a final resolution of all tensions, far beyond this life.'[62] Augustine's theological negativity is its corollary, concentrated in his new emphasis on the intractability of carnal habit (*consuetudo carnalis)*, experienced—as Paul's cry of despair at Romans 7:25 proves—even in the life of grace. The *Ad Simplicianum* reveals the fruition of this new outlook, where grace is seen to precede even the will to love God, and the divine choice to give or withhold that grace is held at invisible, eschatological length. Here the contagion of inherited sin continues to blind humanity from its relationship to God, even where he makes himself present in the heart, drawing it to himself through the ascent of delight: thus the pious Christian and the ardent sinner continue to exist within the same morally ambiguous universe while in this life. Through his re-engagement with the Pauline corpus in 396, the sinward trajectory of Augustine's theology would be set on its collision course with Pelagius' optimism, to be permanently divorced from the confidence of his own early thought. Brown bases his reading on Augustine's own account, given late in life. In both the *Retractationes* and *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, the request to comment on Romans 7–9 by Simplicianus of Milan is presented as a near providential fait accompli, the final stage of Augustine's own conversion by grace:

> In resolving this question I indeed laboured hard on behalf of the free choice of the human will, but the grace of God conquered; nor was I otherwise able to understand with true clarity what the apostle had said: For who sets you apart? And what do you possess which you have not received?
>
> *in cuius quaestionis solutione laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia; nec nisi ad illud potuit peruenire, ut liquidissima ueritate dixisse intellegatur apostolus: quis enim te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti?*[63]

Brown thus reinforced the perception of the mature, anti-Pelagian Augustine as exclusively and authentically Augustinian for a very large contemporary readership, both scholarly and popular. Only with the review of *Augustine of Hippo* in 2000 did he retract his earlier characterization, conceding: 'As a thinker, Augustine was, perhaps, more a man *aus einem Guß*, all of a piece, and less riven by fateful discontinuities, than I had thought.'[64]

In reaction against Brown's bifurcated Augustine, 'the rationalist and perfectionist transformed into Augustine the Romantic',[65] Harrison urges several related revisions. She begins by affirming the place of Neoplatonic philosophy **(p.22)** in Augustine's formation throughout the 380s, as that which gave his return to Christian faith and practice intellectual integrity. The Platonic books, the *libri pleni*, 'enhanced his understanding of the Christian faith', which he perceived as 'the true philosophy', in common with his Christian–Platonist contemporaries.[66] From it, Augustine took 'the idea of a transcendent, spiritual reality, beyond temporal, created, mutable existence, in which human beings find their ultimate origin and being, and discover eternal truth…[This was] expressed practically in the attempt of human beings to move towards the One by moral and intellectual purification, by introversion and ascent.'[67] God's absolute transcendence, and humanity's ascent to him, combined with the data of scriptural exegesis to place *creatio ex nihilo* at the centre of his early thought. Proceeding from this doctrine are his trademark theologies of the Fall and sin, grace and redemption, recognizable some ten years before his engagement with the Pauline epistles.

'*Creatio ex nihilo*', Harrison writes, 'is the ground for man's fall'.[68] As creatures given intellect and will, and therefore moral autonomy, humans have the capacity to turn away from 'the source of their existence towards created, temporal, mutable reality and therefore towards non-being and nothingness'.[69] This is experienced as 'alienation and fragmentation',[70] a disintegration that is at once moral and ontological. This early theology of 'inevitable' aversion from God is 'not far' from Augustine's theology of humanity subjected to Original Sin, but it is expressed in a different lexicon. Running in parallel with this idea of aversion is a clear conception of creation's absolute dependence on God for its truthfulness and goodness; the language of Scripture merely clarifies the realization, already present, that 'Creation is both the work of grace and the way in which grace works'.[71] And it is within the context of this 'semiotic' and 'sacramental' creation that salvation through a God who bears matter into transcendence is both assumed and conclusive.[72]

Arguing that the basis for Augustine's depiction of the Fall and Original Sin are present in the 380s, Harrison offers a much attenuated depiction of his absorption of Paul in the 390s. She reads the ethical optimism of his first commentaries on Romans and Galatians as an attempt to 'retrieve some fragment of human autonomy from the rubble' of the Fall.[73] Crucially, the **(p.23)** *Ad Simplicianum* is seen as the restoration of Augustine's earlier position, already settled in his theology of *creatio ex nihilo*: it 'corrects the mistakes he had made in trying to interpret Romans in the years 394–6'.[74] The language of the epistles merely gave to this work a new way of expressing what he had already advanced in his anti-Manichaean works, so that 'Augustine was simply coming full circle and returning to what he had always, deep down, believed: that without grace, a person can do no good work'.[75] Its description of the *initium fidei* as the gracious gift of God to his unmeriting creatures is of a piece with his earliest conviction, that the creation's collapse into nothingness can only ever be remedied by its Creator. His intellectual development in this period is therefore marked by 'a profound continuity and progressive evolution…rather than a startlingly new and revolutionary transformation'.[76]

While the groundwork for Augustine's doctrine of the Fall is found in the 380s, Harrison maintains that his language becomes explicit and technical only later: Original Sin; mass of sin; concupiscence and original guilt (*peccatum originale, massa peccati, concupiscentia, originalis reatus*) as fixed terms develop through the 390s and, definitively, in the Pelagian controversy.[77] This is the arena in which 'questions of seminal identity and the role of sexual concupiscence' are also worked out.[78] Nonetheless, what Augustine describes in language that is 'existential, rather than doctrinal' in the early works is essentially consistent with this mature synthesis.

A great deal of Harrison's argument is welcome in the context of this book. Her sympathetic picture of Christian Platonism as the crucible of Augustine's theology is central to my own case, although she discounts any possibility that

this was mediated through a reception of Origen, or a connection with a broader Origenian readership.[79] Likewise, her rejection of hyperbole in describing the shifts in Augustine's theology through the 380s and 390s is surely right. Augustine was unarguably Christian from the point of his return to the Church, and 'evolution' labels the subtle processes of change in his thought more adequately than the language of multiple 'conversions'. Likewise, her exposition of Augustine's doctrine of creation as the precondition for his account of the Fall is hugely illuminating.

However, this book parts company with hers on a key point of emphasis, which allows me to argue for the importance of Origen in Augustine's theological development. Where Harrison reads the new vocabulary of Augustine's Pauline exegesis in the 390s as a natural evolution from a pre-existing platform, I maintain that it begins something new: a scripturally oriented and consistent **(p.24)** theology of sin and redemption that is deeply concerned with the nature of history.

By Harrison's own admission, the concept of a historical Fall is not central to Augustine's thought in his early works. His experimentation with the literal exegesis of the first books of Scripture in *De Genesi ad Litteram Liber Imperfectus* shows how much of a new venture this was for a man conditioned to consider the creation in the allegorical terms of Christian Platonism. It is likewise not insignificant that Augustine began to consider fully the nature of scriptural authority only after his accession to the episcopate, with the writing of *De Doctrina Christiana*. After this, any prioritizing of the 'existential' over the scriptural and doctrinal would, at least consciously, be unthinkable. This is why his anti-Pelagian treatises go to such lengths to show the scriptural basis and Patristic tradition of his own understanding of Adam's Fall and its effects in the present. Already in the 'four-stages' typology of *De Diversis Quaestionibus*, Augustine had begun his forensic attention to historicizing the narrative of sin, a shift embedded in the Pauline language of the *Ad Simplicianum* and harvested in *De Civitate Dei* 14. This is why the emergence of the terms of the 390s—*concupiscentia*; *peccatum originale*; *massa peccati*—is so significant. Augustine's handling of the Fall in the 380s in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 is of a different order all together. To compare his mature teaching on the necessity of grace for the descendants of Adam with his early understanding of the divinely aided ascent to God is not, strictly, to compare like with like, because that mature teaching is elaborated out of a 'history of fallenness', even though his theology of creation is its precondition. This is not to argue for a return to a radically transformed, Brownian Augustine, the scales of Platonism crashing from his inner eyes in 396; but to suggest that his re-engagement with Scripture in the 390s did result in a real education, the walking-again of mental pathways that saw a genuine renewal of thought and language.

Maintaining the renewal of Augustine's theology in the 390s is essential to this book for a number of reasons. In the first chapter, I argue that Augustine maintained a lively interest in the Origenist controversy and the works of Origen throughout the 390s—that is, before and after the evolution of 395–6. I argue more specifically that receiving at least parts of the text of Origen's commentary on Romans in or just before 396 was crucial to the refinement of his doctrine of sin and grace, and most importantly his exegesis of Romans 8:3. This entails an irony typical of Augustine, who always receives tradition critically: in broad terms, the *Ad Simplicianum* sees him reject an interpretation of Romans 7:25 and the election of Jacob and Esau on the basis of their 'hidden merits' (*occultissima merita*) and, later, Jacob's foreseen faith (in *De Diversis Quaestionibus* and the *Expositio Quarundam Propositionum* respectively) broadly consistent with Origen's exegesis of Romans, and perhaps rooted in an aural reception of Origen's teaching. In place of this, it advances a truly 'Augustinian' treatment of those texts, alongside a **(p.25)** historicized account of the Fall and its outworking in concupiscent reproduction. However, these ideas are also partly receptions from the theology of Origen, as the Mariology of his homilies on Luke and *Homilia in Leviticum* 8 shows.[80] More concretely, the Christology Augustine employs to set against the Fall and its effects is thoroughly indebted to Origen, once again through his close reading of the Romans commentary and the Lucan homilies in around 396. While the subtle changes in Augustine's theological profile during that decade cannot be assigned in full to his reception of Origen (again, he is too independent a thinker for this to be true), they are nonetheless true reorientations, in which Origen has a place. That Augustine carried the theology of the *Ad Simplicianum* into the Pelagian controversy as the badge of his mature orthodoxy should not be underestimated, marking that work out as the beginning of a lasting continuity that would culminate in the anti-Pelagianism of the Doctor of

Grace.

Synopsis

In Chapter 2, I offer a new reading of Augustine's engagement in the politics and theology of the Origenist controversy, to provide a new critical backdrop to his later role in the Pelagian crisis. Beginning with an overview of Augustine's general approach to the relationship between orthodoxy and heresy in his late *De Haeresibus*, I highlight his unwillingness to define either in the abstract, and contrast this with his highly polemical treatment of Pelagianism and more measured handling of Origenism in the same text. This sets the stage for an examination of the different narratives of Pelagianism laid out in the works of Marius Mercator, Jerome, and Augustine. I observe that Augustine conflates the errors of Caelestius and Pelagius to form a single *panhairesis*, which threatens the whole of Catholic truth; and that this account of Pelagianism reaches its full dimensions only in 415, with the publication of *De Natura et Gratia*. Prior to this date, Augustine's better acquaintance with the thought of Caelestius had led him to emphasize the nature of the Fall and Original Sin in the early anti-Pelagian works. His reading of Pelagius' *De Natura* launched his final attack on Pelagianism as a complex of interrelated errors touching not only on the nature of human birth but also of that of human redemption.

Questioning this scholarly chronology, I step back to the 390s and the dispute between Rufinus and Jerome arising from the Origenist controversy **(p.26)** in the East. Taking up the findings of Peter Brown's important article of 1970, I first situate Augustine and Pelagius within the social circle of Rufinus of Aquileia and Melania the Elder, the network from which Rufinus' translations of Origen were distributed to a Western readership. I then offer a new interpretation of Augustine's highly contested correspondence with Jerome, in which I redraw Augustine as a covert critic of Jerome's rejection of Origenian theology following Epiphanius' campaign against Origenism in Palestine. Gathering up the disparate scholarly assessments of Augustine's reception of Origen, I argue that his knowledge of Origen's theology was in fact sound, and maintained with lively interest throughout the Origenist controversy and his mature career. This social–historical and literary survey is crucial to the finale of the chapter. Taking the publication of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* (412–13) and *De Natura et Gratia* (415) as the two milestones in Augustine's construction of Pelagianism, I underline Jerome's activity in the composition of both. Sending his emissary Rufinus the Syrian to Italy in the 390s, Jerome is identified as the impetus behind Rufinus' *Liber de Fide*, which would become the basis of Caelestius' denial of Original Sin. In its correction of Caelestius, *De Peccatorum et Remissione* answers not only the *Liber*'s rejection of Adam's penal Fall, but also its identification of the doctrine of Original Sin with Origen's account of the Fall of souls to embodiment from a premundane life. Likewise, Jerome's letter to Ctesiphon (Epistle 133, of 415) is taken as the unacknowledged reason for Augustine's new emphasis on the necessity of unmerited grace for salvation in *De Natura et Gratia*, in its identification of Pelagius' teaching on ἀπαθεια as a permutation of the Origenist heresy. I therefore propose that Augustine confected the heresy of Pelagianism in order to draw attention away from his own earlier consideration of Origen's teaching, both on the Fall of souls and on the practical attainment of perfection in the present life. Jerome's influential hubris thus becomes the impetus behind Augustine's self-protection from the accusation of Origenism, to which Pelagius and Caelestius finally fell victim.

Chapter 3 opens my study of Augustine's Christology, in which I run an investigation of Augustine's developing theology of Original Sin and its enduring effects on human life alongside a survey of his maturing account of Christ's humanity. Beginning with *De Libero Arbitrio*, I observe that this work shows Augustine's move from an abstract, voluntarist account of sin, to a fully historicized and scripturally grounded description of Adam's Fall and the Original Sin propagated from it to all humankind. Where the former configured sin around the experiential terms *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, the latter pivots on the designations *concupiscentia carnis* and *caro peccati* (flesh of sin); combining physical and voluntary categories in an apparently Scriptural terminology, I suggest that a conception of embodiment as a consequence of the Fall is unconsciously present in this development. Within the same timeframe, I highlight Augustine's changing exegesis of Romans 8:3, turning **(p.27)** from a soteriological to a fully Christological reading of the passage, in which Christ's conception of a virgin without sin (*sine concupiscentia*) is at the fore.

The second part of the chapter takes in Augustine's theological anthropology from 411 to 420, thus spanning the paradigm shifts embedded in both *De Peccatorum Meritis* and *De Natura et Gratia*. Both works reveal Augustine's changing polemical priorities, the emphasis on Original Sin in the former giving way to a holistic treatment of Pelagianism as a heresy touching on sin and grace in the latter. In both works, and in Sermon 183 of 416–17, Augustine's treatment of Romans 8:3 in terms of the virginal conception remains constant, and is deployed against the presumed tendency of Pelagianism to reduce the Incarnation to the level of pedagogic exemplarism. In its place, the 'likeness of sinful flesh' is taken to prove the reality of *caro peccati*, and to promise its eschatological healing through the mystery of the Incarnation. I therefore identify Romans 8:3 as the key text in Augustine's Christological refutation of Pelagianism. In the closing section of the chapter, I review the now established anti-Pelagian anthropology of Augustine's works against Julian of Eclanum, and underline the consistency of his Christology within the same period.

In Chapter 4 I offer an analysis of Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3, rooting it ultimately in the works of Origen. In order to establish a framework for this reception-critical examination, I begin by reviewing the debate surrounding his use of the term *massa peccati*. Now commonly accepted as a reception from Ambrosiaster's commentary on Romans, the scholarly discussion of this important term is marked by the absence of any shared or explicit methodology for discerning textual and theological receptions in Patristic works. Working from the assumption that the reception of ideas conveyed by text can be expressed in multiple levels of subsequent textual reproduction, I accept the ascription of the term in the Augustinian corpus to an Ambrosiastran source. Discounting the latter as the basis for Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3, I investigate the works of Ambrose of Milan for similar treatments of the text. Finding few that closely reflect Augustine at the level either of underlying thought or of explicit textual parallel, I concede the place of Ambrose's *Explanatio Psalmi 37* as a likely source for Augustine's early Christology configured around the text. Turning to the work of Origen, I find demonstrably closer similarities to Augustine's exegesis in his homilies on Luke, exposition of Psalm 28, and commentary on Romans. This results in the surprising conclusion: the Christology Augustine uses to combat Pelagianism is in fact Origen's, and functions as a subtextual apologia for Origen's theology from within an anti-heretical project construed as a self-defence against a perceived accusation of heretical Origenism. Because Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3 is consistent from the mid-390s to his final works, I argue that the conventional dating of Rufinus' translation of Origen's Romans commentary must be repositioned in the final decade of the fourth century. The chapter closes by suggesting that Augustine may have received **(p.28)** this translation among others from Simplicianus, or from a close circle of readers gathered around him at Milan.

In Chapter 5 I return to the theological analysis of Augustine's anti-Pelagian Christology, first attending to Julian of Eclanum's accusation that a latent Apollinarianism underlies Augustine's depiction of Christ's humanity. By his reading, Augustine's characterization of *concupiscentia carnalis* must necessarily implicate a Christ bearing mortal flesh in the effects of Original Sin, where sinful flesh is conceived as enthralling the soul to sinful acts in the *massa peccati*; simply to exclude Christ from the denaturing of the will through his virginal conception elides the consequences of embodiment on moral agency in Augustine's own synthesis. Augustine's Christ must therefore act as God, the divine nature taking the place of his compromised human soul. I begin my investigation of Julian's claim by reviewing Augustine's understanding of Apollinarianism. I argue that this reflects a common weakness in contemporary Latin thought, of failing to account for the integrity of the human soul of Christ held within a single person of two natures. Stepping behind Augustine's Christology, I examine his broader understanding of the nature of human will and knowledge through a reading of *Confessiones* 10 and *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14. I propose that this is problematic, where Augustine reproduces Origen's confusion between fully intentional acts and the first stirrings of sinful desire; further still, Augustine's own conception of *concupiscentia* pushes these first movements into the realm of the body, when genital autonomy over reason is taken to exemplify the bondage of humanity under sin. I close the chapter by examining Augustine's explicit treatments of Christ's will and intellection. Lending weight to Julian's argument, I observe that he characterizes Christ as a human with a perfect divine will, who is omniscient throughout his earthly life; by contrast, Augustine intimates that Christ exercises a distinctively human will that requires salvation, and is similar to the will of sinful humanity labouring under sin in the life of grace. Without offering a final judgement on Julian's description of these tendencies as a form of Apollinarianism,

I note that they are akin to contemporaneous developments in Alexandrian Christology, in which the transforming presence of the Word in the hypostatic union results in an obscuring of the human characteristics of Christ.

My final chapter aims to fulfil my earlier promise, that Julian's criticism can be answered fully only by investigating Augustine's treatment of the origin of Christ's soul. I begin by reviewing this issue in his wider theological anthropology. With R. J. O'Connell, I note that Augustine consistently refuses throughout his mature works to offer any one protology current in Christian discourse as a complement to his theology of creation; and that this public position is coupled with a persistent private and subtextual hearing of a model of the soul's origin in a fall from a premundane existence. I propose that this personal approval of a broadly Platonist theory of human origins underlies **(p.29)** Augustine's literary construction (if not the surface argument) of his late work, *De Anima et eius Origine*. In contrast to O'Connell, I suggest that this preference can be attributed, not only to Augustine's reading of Plotinus, but also to his reception of Origen.

The infrequency with which Augustine turns the question of the soul's origin to a Christological end forces my study to access the issue through a number of other facets of his Christology. I first revisit his description of Christ as 'dominical human' (*homo dominicus*), noting the instances in which this expression suggests the existence of Christ's personal human life before the Incarnation. Finding the ultimate precedent for the term in Origen's commentary on the gospel of John, I argue that Augustine's abandonment of the expression in the mid-390s is best interpreted as another example of his discreet avoidance of the charge of heresy in the early stages of the Origenist controversy. I then examine his closely related handling of the Incarnation as an *assumptio* or *susceptio hominis*. Where scholarship on this subject has traditionally focused on Augustine's place within the narrative of Nestorianism and the unexamined habits of Latin Christological phraseology, I suggest that this is fundamentally misguided. Far from conceiving of Christ as a single being in two persons, Augustine rather conceives of the *homo* assumed in the Incarnation as a remnant of a heavenly community of unfallen souls. To substantiate this claim, I submit a fresh reading of his description of creation 'in Adam' as a confused inversion of an Origenian theology of creation, developed as a late addition to his anti-Pelagian polemic. I then attend to Augustine's depiction of Christ as one Incarnate without any foregoing merits (*sine meritis praecedentibus*), and argue that this makes no sense unless Augustine first presumes the existence of a person to whom merit can be attributed in advance of the Incarnation. I conclude my study by highlighting two key texts in which Augustine begins to offer an exposition of Wisdom 8.19 ('I received a good soul by lot') with reference to the soul of Christ, only to stop short of fully extrapolating the consequences of this exegesis for his Christology. Taken together, all of these factors point towards a latent understanding of the humanity of Christ along the lines suggested in *De Principiis*, in which the sinlessness of Christ's soul is preserved from the taint of propagated sinful nature by virtue of its pre-existent unity with the eternal Word. In the wake of the Origenist controversy, Augustine was denied the freedom openly to discuss and develop this vital counterpart to his teaching on the Fall, Original Sin, and redemption. In my conclusion, I suggest some of the ways in which this new picture of Augustine's intellectual development might affect our present reception of his theology.

Notes:

([1]) I refer, of course, to the first Origenist controversy, and not the second culminating in the Justinian proscription of Origen's works in 553. Hereafter I shall refer to the first Origenist controversy simply as 'the Origenist controversy'.

([2]) Cf. Anastasius, *Ep*. 2, preserved as Jerome, *Ep*. 95.

([3]) Brown (1967: 81) notes that the affair was 'an issue of "court" against "city"', but the theological context for the civic argument is clear enough from Ambrose's preaching and writing of the period, which cannot have been entirely lost on Augustine.

([4]) I discuss the genesis and theology of these works more fully in Chapter 5.

([5]) *Ep*. 4*.

([6]) For an analysis of the correspondence, see Dunn (2006).

([7]) McWilliam (1992: 183).

([8]) Madec (1989: 63) describes it as 'a sort of Christian *Meno*'.

([9]) McGuckin (1990: 42).

([10]) McGuckin (1990: 44).

([11]) *S.* 214.6 and *Exp. Ep. Gal.* 27; cf. McGuckin (1990: 44 and 51 nn. 17 and 18).

([12]) Cf. *Ep.* 187.40.13; McGuckin (1990: 46 and 51 n. 26).

([13]) Cf. *Retr. Prol.* 2.

([14]) McGuckin (1990: 45).

([15]) Cf. *En. Ps.* 18.II.15; *Tr. Ioh.* 25.6; and Arbesmann (1954).

([16]) Cf. *Quaest. Evang.* 1. 28; *En. Ps.* 66.5; *S.* 123 *passim*; *S.* 123.3.3; van Bavel (1957) and Madec (1989).

([17]) *Christus, Mediator Humilis*: *S.* 142; *S.* 169; *S.* 285; *Trin.* 4.10; *An. Orig.* 3.18.12; S. Dolb. 26D. 38–44; *Mediator Dei*: *Cons. Ev.* 1.35.53; *Ep.* 137.3; *Pecc. Orig.* 29.25; *Ep.* 149.2; *Perf. Iust. Hom.* 44.21, etc. See Schaffner (1959), Madec (1989: 287–312), and Drecoll (2007a).

([18]) *En. Ps.* 21.II.28; *S.* 37; *S.* 130; *S.* 233.

([19]) *En. Ps.* 109.12; *Tr. Ioh.* 13.4; cf. van Bavel (1957) and Madec (1989: 155–65).

([20]) The most important study here is: Geerlings (1978). For an analysis of Christ's saving exchange (*commercium*) together with his character as Mediator, see Babcock (1971).

([21]) *En. Ps.* 17.2; *Tr. Ioh.* 23.6; *C. Faust.* 2.5; *Doct. Chr.* 3.55.37; *Civ. Dei* 22.18. Cf. Franz (1956), the only monograph on this crucial theme. I have unfortunately been unable to source this book in Great Britain. See also Madec (1989: 178–89).

([22]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 36.2; *Serm. Dom.* 2.20.6; *En. Ps.* 1.1, 4.1–2, 7.13, 7. 20, 8.11, 8.13; *Prop. Rom.* 48. For further general bibliography on the phrase, see Ch. 6.

([23]) *Retr.* 1.19.8.

([24]) *Ep.* 169.2–8 and *Don. Pers.* 67.24; *Ag. Christ.* 23.25; *Adnot. Iob.* 16; *Quaest. Evang.* 1.31; *Div. Quaest. 83* 11.

([25]) *Tr. Ioh.* 60.5.

([26]) *Ep.* 187.4: *Est plane, quod singulari quadam susceptione hominis illius, una facta persona est cum uerbo.*

([27]) Cf. Madec (1989: 274 n. 79): 'The hypostatic union is the most eminent kind of gratuitous grace.'

([28]) Cf. Drobner (1986).

([29]) Augustine's treatment of this issue will form the backbone of Chapters 3 and 4. See also Lamberigts (2005).

([30]) *Praed. Sanct*. 31.15; *Don. Pers*. 67.24.

([31]) Harnack (1894–99: v. 125–34).

([32]) Harnack (1894–99: v. 129): 'The uniqueness and power of the Person Jesus Christ were to be derived from the receptiveness with which the man Jesus met the *operatio divina*...The Incarnation thus appeared to be parallel to the grace which makes us willing who were unwilling, and is independent of every historical fact.'

([33]) The expression is that of Casiday (2007: 254).

([34]) Scheel (1901).

([35]) Portalié (1903).

([36]) Van Crombrugghe (1904).

([37]) Jouassard (1924).

([38]) Rivière (1933).

([39]) Schlitz (1936).

([40]) Bernard (1965).

([41]) Marravee (1967).

([42]) Babcock (1971).

([43]) Verhees (1976).

([44]) Geerlings (1978). The monograph is helpfully condensed in his entry on the same theme in the *Augustin Handbuch* (Drecoll 2007c: 434–8).

([45]) Madec (1989, 2001).

([46]) Drobner (1986).

([47]) Dodaro (2004).

([48]) McWilliam Dewart (1982).

([49]) Lamberigts (2005).

([50]) McWilliam Dewart (1979: 121).

([51]) Madec (1989: 272).

([52]) *Prop. Rom.* 65–6.

([53]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 68.

([54]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.2.

([55]) Cf. Bruce (1958): 'Although he lived before the settlement of southern Britain, he is the spiritual father of all those who profess the popular English creed of justification by decency.'

([56]) Robert F. Evans (1968); see esp. ch. 2; 'In differing ways…Pelagius appears upon the scene of controversy in the second decade of the fifth century as a representation to the two great doctors of still troublesome issues related to their own theological past. To be behind the times was part of Pelagius' lamentable fate' (1968: 22).

([57]) Rees (1988: 10).

([58]) Elizabeth Clark (1992).

([59]) Carol Harrison (2006).

([60]) Brown (1967).

([61]) Carol Harrison (2006: 16).

([62]) Brown (1967: 157).

([63]) *Retr.* 2.1; cf. the very similar account given at *Praed. Sanct.* 8.4.

([64]) From *New Directions*, cit. Carol Harrison (2006: 17).

([65]) Carol Harrison (2006: 15).

([66]) Carol Harrison (2006: 28).

([67]) Carol Harrison (2006: 38–9).

([68]) Carol Harrison (2006: 98).

([69]) Carol Harrison (2006: 94).

([70]) Carol Harrison (2006: 97).

([71]) Carol Harrison (2006: 100).

([72]) Carol Harrison follows in outline the connection between the creature's aversion from the Creator and Christology highlighted by Madec (1989: 65) in discussion of Augustine's early theology: 'In the regime of exteriority which follows sin, the human is centred on inferior, sensible realities, which is to say he is de-centred, disoriented…The incarnation, and the whole economy of salvation, effectively adapts itself to the condition of exteriority where humanity is to be found, to return it to a region of interiority.'

([73]) Carol Harrison (2006: 141).

([74]) Carol Harrison (2006: 153).

([75]) Carol Harrison (2006: 151).

([76]) Carol Harrison (2006: 128).

([77]) Carol Harrison (2006: 169).

([78]) Carol Harrison (2006: 182).

([79]) Carol Harrison (2006: 120 n. 24): 'Although Augustine may have read [Origen] by 394–5, his influence in [respect of his interpretation of Paul in the 390s] was not great.'

([80]) Cf. *Hom. Lev.* 8.3.

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

поменять прокси

The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430

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Augustine and Origen: Fathers of Pelagianism

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Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 2 reassesses Augustine's engagement in the Origenist controversy, to provide a new critical backdrop to his role in the Pelagian crisis. Comparing divergent, contemporary accounts of Pelagianism, it identifies the first synthetic condemnation of that heresy in Augustine's *De Natura et Gratia* of 415. Augustine's construction of Pelagianism is then read as a response to accusations of his own latent Origenism. Ultimately traceable to Jerome, these emerge first through his emissary, Rufinus of Syria, the inspiration for Caelestius' denial of Original Sin (resulting in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*); and in Jerome's implicit attack on Augustine's moral theology in his Epistle 133 (resulting in *De Natura et Gratia*). Jerome's vendetta is explained by situating Augustine within Rufinus of Aquileia's pro-Origenist circle in the 390s, through which he had knowledge of Origen's works; and by reading Augustine's correspondence with Jerome as an attack on his alliance with Epiphanius against Origen.

Keywords: De Haeresibus, De Peccatorum Meritis, Natura et Gratia, Marius Mercator, Rufinus of Syria, Caelestius of Carthage, Jerome, Rufinus of Aquileia, impassibility, heresiology

In this chapter, I argue that Augustine's literary construction of the Pelagian heresy was motivated by a desire to obscure his theological debt to Origen of Alexandria. I begin by outlining his general approach to heresiology, noting his unwillingness to disclose his own, early experience of Manichaeism, and the reluctance of his late work *De Haeresibus* to pronounce on the precise nature of heterodoxy. While this work refuses to give any abstract definition of heresy, its very

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involved appears only in 415, with the publication of *De Natura et Gratia*. To date, scholarship has argued that Augustine's reception of Pelagius' *De Natura* formed the decisive impulse behind this work. Adding to this observation, I argue that Jerome's Epistle 133, which identifies Origen as the originator of Pelagius' teaching on sinlessness, forced Augustine to move away from his earlier pronouncements on that topic, reconstructing Pelagianism as a uniform heresy concerning the nature of grace. Substantiating this conclusion, I highlight Augustine's situation within the pro-Origenist circle of Rufinus of Aquileia and his reception of Origen's works from within it. Alongside this, I offer a fresh reading of his correspondence with Jerome, which, I shall argue, Jerome received as a criticism of his volte-face on the orthodoxy of Origen. I will propose that Jerome's first attack on Augustine's debt to Origen surfaced in the *Liber de Fide* of his emissary, Rufinus of Syria, in which Origen's doctrine of the origin of souls is identified with the teaching of Augustine on the Fall. While Augustine was able to avoid the implicit accusation of the work in his early anti-Pelagian treatises, Jerome's letter of 415 posed too great a threat to be ignored. Subsequently, Augustine **(p.31)** recast Pelagianism, yet without openly condemning Origen or purging his influence on his own thought.

Augustine: a heretic; reluctant

Of all Patristic authors equipped to write with a critical eye about the nature of heresy, Augustine must be counted among the best. Few bishops could claim actually to have been a heretic, and one of the most colourful sort at that. Brown describes the Manichaeans as

> a small sect with a sinister reputation. They were illegal; later, they would be savagely persecuted. They had the aura of a secret society…Pagans regarded them with horror, orthodox Christians with fear and hatred. They were the 'Bolsheviks' of the fourth century: a 'fifth column' of foreign origin bent on infiltrating the Christian church, the bearers of a uniquely radical solution to the religious problems of their age.[1]

While he never received full initiation as a Manichee, Augustine was a Manichee catechumen, an *auditor*, for around nine years. Manichaeism, he wrote in the *Confessiones*, gave the illusion of being substantial: like dreaming of eating, it seemed to taste of real religion.[2] Its error lay in an absence of critical self-reflection. For a religious system that relied so heavily on speculation about the material order, it was singularly ill-equipped to harness human reason in the advancement of its spiritual claims. Augustine retells the story of his meeting with the Manichaean bishop Faustus, the final stage of his disillusionment with the group. Faustus he is unwilling to damn, being a modest and moderate man who, however, lacked education. Here was the inconsistent rub: in ignorance of the liberal arts, 'their books are full of the tallest tales, about heaven, the stars, the sun and moon…'.[3] He depicts Faustus as somewhat pathetically declining to answer his questions about the coherence of Manichaean cosmology. Augustine records quietly taking leave of the group on the pretext of a career move to Rome.

This account in the *Confessiones* is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, it is dealt with sparingly: nine years' belief is condensed into a very few paragraphs. A detailed examination of his personal involvement with such a suspicious group would perhaps have been imprudent for a newly ordained Catholic bishop. Secondly, there is no denunciation of the Manichees as 'mad', 'crazed', or 'demented', words that had and would be so readily applied to other heretics by other authors. Thirdly, Augustine's chief objection: the **(p.32)** Manichees could not give a convincing account of their system. He does not even refer to them as heretics; they are simply dull-witted and mistaken.

This should not suggest that Augustine had no interest in the issue of heresy, but rather that he was not interested in exalting an abstract concept of 'heresy' to a place of prominence in his own writing. While he wrote prolifically against those things he perceived to be less than fully true, in his works against Donatism, Manichaeism, and Pelagianism, these are reasoned arguments against propositional claims, heightened intratextual dialogues tailored for the education of the

reader. Writing to a friend in 391, Augustine had already come to the conclusion he would express again in the *Confessiones*: heresy denotes most fully a false orientation of the heart, a state of deception and dreaming. At its basis, it constitutes a moral problem, best described in the subjective case of the singular heretic:

> Now, there is between these two a great difference, in my opinion: inasmuch as one person is a heretic, who either gives birth to or follows false and novel opinions for the benefit of some temporal benefit, and most of all his own glory and pre-eminence; there is yet another, who believes these sort of people, and is a person deceived by a kind of fantasy of truth and piety.
>
> *Nunc uero cum inter haec duo plurimum intersit, quandoquidem haereticus est, ut mea fert opinio, qui alicuius temporalis commodi et maxime gloriae principatusque sui gratia, falsas ac nouas opiniones uel gignit uel sequitur; ille autem, qui huiusmodi hominibus credit, homo est imaginatione quadam ueritatis ac pietatis inlusus*.[4]

Alongside this analysis of the inner working of heresy as an ally of personal pride, Augustine could assign the phenomenon a positive place in the whole providential economy, its purpose falling within God's intention for the Church, to move it to define better its positive belief and encourage its faithful to discover that faith better.[5] The result is an altogether more subtle and nuanced account of the relationship between right and wrong belief.

Augustine's careful approach to heresy is nowhere more evident than in his late work, *De Haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum*. The back-story behind the work is as interesting as its content. In around 428, Quodvultdeus wrote to Augustine asking for a heresiological manual for the clergy of Carthage.[6] Quodvultdeus **(p.33)** wrote as one politely acquainted with Augustine, perhaps through his responsibilities as deacon of Bishop Aurelius, Augustine's friend, colleague, and clerical superior. He asked for a book laid out on very clear lines, a request Augustine quotes fully at the beginning of the work he finally returned to Carthage: 'I beseech you…that you would deign to explain to me, from the time the Christian religion received the name of "heir to the promise", what heresies have been and continue to exist; what errors they introduced and continue to introduce, and what they hold against the Church Catholic…'.[7] Augustine's initial reply was reluctant, referring Quodvultdeus to the heresiological manuals of Philastrius of Brescia and Epiphanius of Salamis, and protesting the difficulty of writing such a work. Augustine warned Quodvultdeus that neither Philastrius nor Epiphanius would fully satisfy his desire for a definition of heresy:

> Clearly, where they discuss the question of what heresy is, they do not see it in the same way. In point of fact, it is extremely difficult to define, and therefore you should be on your guard when we try to reduce heresies all to one number. The risk is that we omit some, which are nonetheless heresies; or add others, which are not.
>
> *Sed procul dubio in ea quaestione, ubi disceptatur quid sit haeresis, non idem uidebatur ambobus. et re uera hoc omnino definire difficile est et ideo cauendum, cum omnes in numerum redigere conamur, ne praetermittamus aliquas, quamuis haereses sint; aut adnumeremus aliquas, cum haereses non sint*.[8]

The final note here should be emphasized: Augustine did not want his pen to be pressed on a summary list of heresies and orthodoxies or a definition of the nature of heterodoxy. Quodvultdeus persisted, apologizing that the promised books of Epiphanius and Philastrius had never reached him, and asked once again that Augustine write the book himself. Augustine's final letter of reply was sent with *De Haeresibus*, explaining the delay in composition on the grounds of his preoccupation not only with the *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectum*, but also with the *Retractationes*, whose purpose was to review 'if what my works contain could offend myself or others'.[9] Evidently, the question of Augustine's own orthodoxy, however broadly considered, was in the air at Hippo. We cannot rule out the probability that news of his self-evaluation had reached the cathedral community at Carthage, in part prompting the seemingly innocent request for a heresiology by a minor deacon whose own diocese (and bishop) stood in the shade of Augustine's personal fame, with all it implied.

(p.34) *De Haeresibus* is a remarkable work, not for any stylistic finesse or synthesis of erudition, but for revealing Augustine at his least comfortable and poised. He begins by drawing attention several times to the importunity of Quodvultdeus' request, made 'again and again most insistently',[10] and quoting the words of his own letters back at him.[11] He refers again to Epiphanius' heresiology, though with the wry remark that he wrote in six books, 'recording everything in his historical narrative; fighting for truth against falsehood without any argumentation'.[12] The text contained no dialogue, and thus missed the point of polemical constructions of false belief. At the end of the preface, he responds to Quodvultdeus' request for a definition of heresy. While not every error is heresy, every heresy is error; however, to isolate 'what makes a thing heretical' (*quid…faciat haereticum*) is difficult, if not impossible, otherwise its usefulness would surely have been seized on by others in the past. The preface ends with a promise to bear the question in mind through the individual articles of the treatise that follows, and to return to the point in its concluding remarks.

The body of *De Haeresibus* catalogues eighty-eight heresies, beginning with the Simonian Gnostics and ending with *Pelagiani, qui et Coelestiani*. However, Augustine fails to deliver on his earlier promise in the closing chapters of the first book, leaving the question hanging with a terse refusal to continue: 'We should ask what makes something heretical by steps, so that we may avoid heretical poisons; not only those things which we already know, but indeed also those we do not; whether they have recently arisen, or could yet arise; with the Lord's help, we shall avoid them. But now, let this volume end here…'.[13] In one of the very few articles dealing with this important text, Roland Teske considers the work to have been left unfinished on account of Augustine's death, remarking wistfully: 'Had Augustine lived to complete the work, his discussion of the nature of heresy and schism would have been an extremely valuable contribution to his ecclesiology.'[14] I would question this reading. The book is dated to 428, two years before Augustine's death; even were the dating inaccurate, the tone of the work is reluctant: 'we should ask' should be taken as **(p.35)** an evasion, 'volume' taken to indicate the end of the whole work, not simply its first book. I do not believe Augustine ever intended to add a second volume to his first; he was not prepared to do injustice to orthodoxy by offering a one-size-fits-all description of heresy.[15]

Novi haeretici ueteres haeretici?

While *De Haeresibus* might have disappointed Quodvultdeus' desire for a heresiological panacea, the book would have left him in no doubt about Augustine's understanding of the faults of individual heresies, not least that of the Pelagians and Origenists.

Augustine gives more space to Pelagianism in *De Haeresibus* than to any other heresy. The entry is dense, enclosing a catena of Augustinian teaching on the nature of grace and election within each description of Pelagianism's errors. Pelagians, Augustine begins, are to be identified with Caelestians. They are enemies of the grace of God, and all it implies: predestination to adoption, liberation from darkness, the gifts of faith and love, the fruition of faith in good works. By contrast, they teach the capacity of humanity to obey these commands by the freedom of the will. Thus they render prayer, and the Church it constitutes, obsolete. Faith, they hold, is a human work, accruing merit that wins God's salvation. Likewise, they deny that infants are born of Adam's fallen flesh and without the infection of mortality. Thus their theology of baptism proclaims entry into the Kingdom, not a cleansing from evil; accordingly, they assign the unbaptized to a secondary realm outside the Kingdom that is nonetheless not punitive. Even if he had not sinned, their Adam would have died, death being a condition of his first-created nature. So Augustine sums up: 'They object to other things, but these are the ones on which, for the greatest part, the rest, or almost all the rest, are understood to depend.'[16] On this account, Pelagianism is a unified complex of errors, logically rooted in a misconceived protology and resulting in a fatal soteriology.

(p.36) Augustine's account of Origenism is markedly different. He begins by quoting from the *Anakephaleosis*, the anonymous summary of Epiphanius' *Panarion*:[17] the *Origeniani* are those who follow the writer Origen; they deny the resurrection of the dead, teach that Son and Spirit are creatures, and allegorize the physical world 'and everything else' found in Scripture. This, comments Augustine, is what Epiphanius says of them. However, 'those who defend him say that he taught that the Father, Son and Spirit are of one and the same substance, and that he did not reject the

resurrection of the dead; those who read more of his works are eager to persuade in such matters as these'.[18] Other doctrines of Origen have been definitively rejected by the Catholic Church concerning purgation and liberation, the cyclical nature of history in which conscious beings rise and fall again through states of good and evil, and the promise of final redemption for the devil and his angels.[19] Augustine ends by referring his readers to his earlier treatment of these issues in *De Civitate Dei*.

Whilst the 'Pelagiani' are treated as reprobate enemies of the truth, agglomerated without examination of the difference between the teaching of Pelagius and Caelestius and stitched together by fiery polemic, the *Origeniani* are held at a non-committal, critical distance. What is in question here are *dogmata* condemned by the Catholic Church and a number of readings of Origen, whose writings Augustine indicates should be listened to fairly: the dialogue here that must be borne in mind is fundamentally unresolved, and so cannot be construed as heresy with the same confidence. Finally, Augustine's less than enthusiastic appraisal of Epiphanius' analysis (though not enumeration) of heresy underlines his caution on the issue. Taking *De Haeresibus* together with *De Civitate Dei* 21.17 reveals a more consistent picture still. Here Augustine signals his acceptance of the Church's condemnation of Origen's cosmology and soteriology, but his tone is reconciliatory. Origen and those who with him cast doubt on the eternal punishment of sinners had intended to be 'more merciful' (*misericordior*) in their teaching, which is to be 'disputed peacefully' (*pacifice disputandum*). Augustine's choice of words is especially interesting here: the Church has 'reproved' (*reprobauit*) Origen on this score. There is no **(p.37)** mention of condemnation, anathematization, or proscription, and the 'poisons' of Pelagianism are absent.[20]

Here, I believe, is a point of entry into a crucial aspect of Augustine's mature theology. The *Retractationes*, of 426–7, show an Augustine coming to terms with his life and thought, in its development and incompleteness. Committing the reflection to text and relinquishing it, he again and finally confessed the contingency of that which is told, because no text can do complete justice to the truth. A text in the process of being written at the same time, *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectum* makes the same statement with fitting irony, in an obverse way: it shows a discourse collapsing under the effort of expressing the truth against error, and, like all texts, it is both unfinished and imperfect. Between these two works stands *De Haeresibus*. Its hesitancy about transcribing a rubric to cover all error highlights the limits attendant on fully describing what orthodoxy might be. Yet, from the outset, the work was never entirely Augustine's. It was required and extracted, not issued or created to be given to dialogue with its recipient. In this respect, it shows an Augustine reliving his in-the-moment investment with Pelagianism as a process in his own experience, an engagement from which he had not yet released himself. *De Haeresibus* 88 forms a codicil to his twenty-year construction of Pelagianism as an arch-heresy. Of central importance in that project was, I believe, his persistent approval of the orthodoxy of Origen. Once this had been successively exposed to public view by Rufinus of Syria and Jerome, Augustine was required to re-create his polemical account of Pelagianism afresh, safely obscuring his admiration of Origen in the process.

Pelagius and Pelagianisms

It is not my purpose in this chapter to survey the whole of the Pelagian controversy, either as it appears in the works of those who were contemporaneous **(p.38)** with it, or as it has been examined in modern scholarship. The secondary literature dealing with it is simply too ample to be covered with justice in such a confined space, not least because this chapter is concerned with a specific facet of that controversy and not its entirety.

I submit here the skeleton of Pelagius' and Caelestius' movements as an aide-mémoire for what will follow. Most probably from Britain, Pelagius came to Rome at some point in the mid-380s, where he gathered around himself a circle of the Roman elite, to whom he tailored his preaching of lay asceticism, and among whom he formed an alliance with Caelestius. Both men suffered the same fate as their aristocratic patrons and were forced to flee the siege of Rome by Alaric in 410, sailing first to Sicily, thence briefly stopping at Hippo before settling in Carthage. Pelagius' path narrowly failed to cross that of Augustine, who was attending a synod in Carthage while Pelagius was in Hippo. Augustine afterwards sent Pelagius a response to an earlier letter of self-introduction, wishing him well and thanking him for his communication (Epistle 146). Not long after arriving in Carthage, Pelagius set out for Palestine, leaving Caelestius behind. Having petitioned the city's bishop Aurelius for ordination to the presbyterate, he found himself brought before a

council in 411 on charges of heresy. These were brought against him by Paulinus, deacon of Milan, under the chairmanship of Aurelius. The proceedings were recorded in Marius Mercator's two *Commonitoria*, and again by Augustine in *De Gestis Pelagii,* of 417. The case centred on the six (in Mercator's second account, eight) 'breviates' levelled against Caelestius.[21] After his condemnation, he travelled to Ephesus. In the meantime, Pelagius had been establishing himself in the East.

Augustine's first reaction to what he would later define as the twinned heresy of Caelestius and Pelagius arose in the aftermath of the council of 411. From Carthage, the tribune Marcellinus wrote to Augustine requesting an exposition of the doctrine of Original Sin and its bearing on infant baptism, which was being debated there in the wake of Caelestius' trial. Augustine replied with the first two books of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* in 412. Having received the work, Marcellinus asked for further explanation; Augustine promised he would attend to this in Epistle 139, and completed the third book of the work in 413. It is important to note that the *De Peccatorum Meritis* deals with the origin, effects, and transmission of sin, and its remedy in a baptism that is valid for infants as well as for confessing adults. Its specific remit was to respond not only to the breviates but also to the *Liber de Fide* of Rufinus the Syrian, whom Caelestius had quoted as authority for his views **(p.39)** before Aurelius and whose book Augustine consulted in drafting his reply to Marcellinus.[22] It is not about the distinction between the grace given at creation, its decrease through the Fall, and potential increase by the gift of the Holy Spirit; these issues would become live only after 415. The release of the work prompted further public debate, resulting in two important sermons, 293 and 294, given in the summer of 413. In the same year, Marcellinus once again wrote to Augustine for his developing thoughts on the debate, to which Augustine replied with *De Spiritu et Littera*.

The 'Caelestian' controversy might have stopped there, had Augustine not been contacted in 414 by two of Pelagius' former circle, Timasius and James, who sent him a copy of Pelagius' work *De Natura*, for which they sought a response. Augustine began to formulate his treatise, *De Natura et Gratia*, the courteous but pivotal birth of his critique of Pelagius' theology of grace. At the same time Jerome began his own assault on Pelagius, who was still in Palestine, issuing his Epistle 133 to Ctesiphon and the longer *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos*. Paul Orosius, who had been staying with the community at Hippo after arriving from his native Spain, was simultaneously despatched by Augustine to Pelagius, to warn him of the extent to which his works were now compromising him in the West. Whether or not the meeting took place or was successful is unknown. However, Orosius was instrumental in assisting John of Jerusalem to convene a synod in the city, at which the views of the Latin clergy against Pelagius could be presented, and to which he could be called to account for himself. In a state of indecision about Pelagius' orthodoxy, and unwilling to be seen to contradict the council of Carthage's judgement on Caelestius, John referred the case to Pope Innocent at Rome on the suggestion of Orosius.[23] To complicate matters further, Jerome pressed the exiled bishops of Aix and Provence, Lazarus and Heros, to write a *Libellus Accusationis* detailing Pelagius' errors; this they did, and in turn persuaded the Primate of Palestine, Eulogius of Caesarea, to convene another synod at Diospolis to review the case. While Pelagius was present, Heros and Lazarus failed to appear. The uneasy council, quite out of its natural sphere, accepted Pelagius' self-defence, which he shortly afterwards published in his *Cartula Defensionis*. This was sent to Rome, and at length found its way to Augustine.

Hearing of the synod at Diospolis, Augustine marshalled support to petition Innocent to review Eulogius' decision.[24] This was successful, and resulted in three papal letters of excommunication (Epistles 181–3 in **(p.40)** the Augustinian corpus), published on 27 January 417. On the death of Innocent shortly thereafter, Zosimus acceded to the papacy, and received Pelagius' and Caelestius' letters of self-defence—the *Libellus Fidei* and *Epistula Purgationis*—sympathetically. After a hearing in the late summer of 417 at which Caelestius was present, Zosimus reinstated both to communion. However, in November the African bishops met once again, this time taking their complaint to the emperor Honorius. This was successful, and an edict of both excommunication and exile ensued. Pelagius at this point disappears from the record of history. Caelestius attempted an appeal before Zosimus' successor Boniface, and was deported from Italy. Although he finally surfaced in Constantinople in 429, the repetition of Honorius' edict by the council of Ephesus finally

silenced him. Caelestius' career after this is unknown. In a summary response to the whole affair, Augustine and his colleagues met the day after the imperial edict and produced a series of canons condemning Pelagianism. Although a literary debate about the nature of grace and Original Sin would continue to flow between Augustine and the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles, and Julian of Eclanum, the Pelagian controversy as a trans-Mediterranean ecclesial hiatus had run its course.

Augustine's Pelagianism

The proposition that Augustine may have misrepresented the ascetical and theological movement set in motion by Pelagius has now been on the table for some time. Already in 1972, Gerald Bonner was advising that 'the historian must be prepared to consider incidents and disputes which may, at first sight, appear to have little relevance to the heresy which is traditionally held to deny the need for grace'.[25] As his lecture made clear, the implicit re-evaluation of Pelagianism has gone hand in hand with the reception and critical edition of the texts of all those involved in the dispute (not least those of Pelagius), beginning with Jacques Sirmond's 1650 publication of Rufinus of Syria's *Liber de Fide*. Michael Rackett's contribution to this debate, 'What's Wrong with Pelagianism?',[26] very clearly sets out the building blocks of this issue, identifying three dominant narratives of the Pelagian heresy.

The first account of Pelagianism is rooted in Caelestius' trial in 411. The crucial texts at issue are the earlier six and later eight breviates, which were recorded by Mercator in his *Commonitoria* and by Augustine in *De Gestis* ***(p.41)*** *Pelagii*, of 417.[27] In the light of the council's judgement, Caelestius' heresy was to have denied the effects of sin, broadly conceived as a mortality forfeiting entrance to the Kingdom and necessitating baptism, along with its origin in the Fall of Adam. While the council focused on the ramifications of the Fall, Rackett argues that Caelestius also held that humans could attain sinlessness as the corollary of their birth of an unfallen race. He bases this claim on the insertion of the final breviate into Mercator's later *Commonitorium*, and on the excerpts Augustine lifted from Caelestius' *Liber de 13 Capitula* and inserted into *De Gestis Pelagii*, that 'humans can be without sin and easily keep the commandments of God…'.[28] Rackett suggests that, although Paulinus of Milan and the council deliberately avoided the issue of potential human sinlessness, their condemnation of Caelestius implied a rejection of the proposition that any human other than Christ had up until that point been sinless. However, Rackett fails to offer any good reason why both council and prosecutor should have been uneasy about this issue.

The second account of Pelagianism is that found in Jerome's Epistle 133, written to Ctesiphon. Composed in 415[29] in ignorance of Augustine's recent attack on Caelestius in Africa, the letter focuses on precisely the issue of sinlessness avoided at Carthage. By Rackett's reading, Jerome's knowledge of Pelagianism was mediated to him by a prior letter from Ctesiphon, warning him of the heresy promoted by Pelagius, who had newly moved into his ambit in Palestine.[30] While Jerome shows an awareness that Pelagius upheld the possibility of sinlessness only on the basis of grace,[31] the letter briskly rejects his understanding of grace as inadequate. Instead, Jerome conflates the Pelagian position with Origen's now condemned teaching that humans **(p.42)** can attain the (by Jerome's reading, divine) *apatheia* (ἀπαθεια), freedom from the passions.

The third account of the debate is that of Augustine. Although absent from the council of Carthage, he was aware of its judgement on Caelestius, his eventual response to it resulting in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*. As I remarked above, that work does not bear specifically on the nature of grace, but instead confines its discussion to the Fall of Adam, the effects of his sin on humankind, and the tradition of infant baptism as proof of both. Crucially, *De Peccatorum Meritis* and *De Spiritu et Littera*, which followed it, both concede the possibility that the Christian might hope to be sinless; such a state was enjoyed by Christ, although no other human being has yet reached it, and might only ever do so through the outpouring of grace. In Rackett's argument, Augustine turned his attention to Pelagius' teaching on grace (as opposed to Caelestius' on Original Sin) only after his reception of Pelagius' *De Natura* in 415.

Rackett is, I believe, extremely accurate in his description of the threefold construction of Pelagianism current in the first twenty years of the fifth century. Crucially, however, he fails to connect Jerome's characterization of Pelagian teaching on

ἀπαθεια as a form of Origenism with Augustine's change of tack in 415, epitomized in the new concern of *De Natura et Gratia* with the nature of grace. Winrich Löhr has convincingly reconstructed as much as can be pieced together from Pelagius' *De Natura,* showing that Augustine's critique of Pelagius' doctrine of grace was grounded carefully in his text.[32] However, as I hope to show, such diverting attention to the detail of Pelagius' text is only to be expected on the part of Augustine, whose avoidance of the charge of Origenism was more subtle, but quite as conscious, as that of Jerome.

Three distinct stages of the Pelagian controversy brought Augustine into contact with the debate about Origen, which climaxed in 400, but continued to rumble in the East into the sixth century. The first takes in the years of his presbyterate and early episcopate, which were marked not only by a scheme of intentionally rigorous study, but also by an expansion of his position within the important literary and ecclesial networks of North Africa and Italy. Through a succession of polite meetings, friendly letters, and the exchange of books, Augustine came to know not only Pelagius' supporters, but also the works of Origen being circulated among them. The second stage hinges on his encounter with the teaching of Rufinus the Syrian and realization that this formed the basis of Caelestius' critique of Original Sin. Twelve years after the proscription of Origen's books, Augustine carefully defended this doctrine without explicit reference to Origen, and subtly used his exegesis to combat its detractors, above all Rufinus the Syrian. The third stage centres on Jerome's **(p.43)** personally motivated description of Pelagianism as a mutant form of Origenism, in its claim that humans could attain to a sinless life through free will. Once Jerome had exposed the common ground between the two heresies, Augustine reacted first by distancing himself from any charge of holding to an Origenist account of ἀπαθεια, and then recast Pelagianism as a single complex embracing grace and Original Sin opposed not to Origen, but to orthodoxy itself. In order to understand these careful moves on Augustine's part, it will be necessary first to outline the Origenist controversy and his place within it.

Jerome, Rufinus, and the Origenist controversy

While the 410s saw Augustine and Jerome engage in an intense literary and judicial attack on the heresy of Pelagianism, fifteen years earlier the story had been very different. During the time of his presbyterate and early years as bishop of Hippo, Augustine had manœuvered himself carefully into contact with the circle of Roman nobles, fellow-bishops, and ascetical writers that constituted the elite of the Latin church, and whose limits included the whole of the Mediterranean, from Italy to Palestine, Egypt to North Africa. By piecing together the now-obvious jigsaw of social interrelations underlying the epistolary remains of Augustine, Paulinus of Nola, and Jerome, Peter Brown's important article of 1970 initiated a significant revision of the history of the Pelagian controversy, in its central claim that 'it may well be that up until 410 Augustine knew Roman society only through circles well disposed to Pelagius'.[33] As Brown made clear, one unifying topic of conversation within this circle throughout the 390s was the work and status of Origen. Viewing the same talking-point from both an Eastern and a Western angle in 1992, Elizabeth Clark integrated within her study the perspective of 'network theory' in reconstructing the ties between the players of both the Pelagian and Origenist controversies.[34]

(p.44) Augustine's position within this circle is best described from the perspective of its two dominant 'poles', Jerome and Rufinus of Aquileia. Both had contact with Pelagius, both translated the works of Origen, and both shared common social ties with Augustine. Their friendship immediately brings us to the heart of the Origenist controversy. Stretching back into the late 360s, it began when they were perhaps both students at Rome.[35] In around 371–2, Jerome departed from Italy to Antioch, the first stage of his long stay in the East; around the same time, Rufinus travelled to Egypt. His relationship with his most important patron, Melania the Elder, began shortly after his farewell to Aquileia. In Egypt they made the acquaintance of the Evagrius of Pontus, whose interpretation of Origen would so inflame Epiphanius of Salamis by the end of the century.[36] In 381, they moved on to Jerusalem, founding monasteries for both men and women on the Mount of Olives at Melania's expense.[37] Their episcopal ordinary and close friend was John of Jerusalem. Jerome, similarly subsidized by Paula, was established in a community at Bethlehem by 386.

The origins of the Origenist controversy that soon surrounded them both are very difficult to pinpoint in any one time,

place, or person.[38] Needless to say, the volume and extensiveness of the Origenian corpus, coupled with the diffusion of doctrinal authority in the Church before the middle of the fourth century, did not elicit easy consensus on his multi-layered theology. No one issue or work was ever the central bone of contention in the transmission of his thought by those who admired or sought to detract from his theology. However, of prime importance in the role Rufinus and Jerome were to play in the sifting of right from wrong in this theology, in the 390s and beyond, was the figure of Epiphanius of Salamis.

(p.45) Epiphanius' earliest attack on Origen was launched in his *Ancoratus* of 374;[39] closely following on this, Epiphanius broadened and sharpened his assault in the *Panarion* of 376.[40] His critique of Origen might have rested at the level of textual polemic, had not a conflict between the monks of the Nitrian desert and Theophilus of Alexandria prompted him to put it to political use. Within the Egyptian communities, according to both Socrates and Sozomen, argument had arisen as to whether the image of God referred to in Scripture denoted the physical form of man, and whether this in turn indicated that God himself had some kind of physical form. The 'Anthropomorphite' faction, it appears, denounced the work of Origen for its classic account of an 'imageless' God.[41] Among those monks who disagreed with the proposition were the three 'Tall Brothers' and, initially, Theophilus himself.[42] After his residence was besieged by angry monks, he quickly changed tack:[43] the Tall Brothers were imprisoned, before fleeing to Jerusalem and the protection of John Chrysostom.[44] On both political and theological grounds, Theophilus joined forces with Epiphanius to launch a full-scale attack on Origen and his works, indirectly levelled against their common rival in Constantinople.[45] The long-term outcome of this alliance was the deposition, exile, and death of Chrysostom. In the short term, Epiphanius and Theophilus together convened a synod in Cyprus, where they condemned the writings of Origen.[46] The riots, synod, and condemnation took place within a short period of time in 399; by 400, the anathema agreed in Cyprus was repeated at Rome, under the aegis of Pope Anastasius.[47]

(p.46) Jerome's shift from an alliance with Rufinus, to siding with Epiphanius against Origen's work, is rooted in a further back-story that must briefly be related. In 393, Jerome was situated in his monastery at Bethlehem, supported by the generosity of his noble donor, Paula. At this point in time, he maintained good relations with Rufinus and Melania at Jerusalem; likewise, he owed Epiphanius a debt of gratitude for the hospitality that the bishop had shown him and Paula in Cyprus in 385. Now, during a relatively calm stage of the debate about Origen, Epiphanius sent his emissary Atarbius to the monasteries of Palestine, to drum up support for his literary campaign against Origen's teaching.[48] Rufinus, according to Jerome, refused to entertain Atarbius and his agenda. Jerome, however, signed Atarbius' petition, a decision Kelly puts down to pure political expediency.[49] Certainly, Jerome's rapturous inclusion of Origen in his *De Viris Illustribus* of the same year raises a question mark over his integrity in the affair.[50] In 394, John of Jerusalem invited Epiphanius to preach in his cathedral, where he railed against the heresies of Origen; in retaliation, John preached later that day against the 'Anthropomorphite' suggestion that God possessed physical form akin to that of humans, a clear defence of Origen.[51] A battleline had been drawn.

In the same year, Epiphanius returned to Palestine, and was received at Jerome's monastery; here, he irregularly ordained Jerome's brother, Paulinianus, to the presbyterate, in what can only be viewed as a further calculated snub towards John.[52] Epiphanius wrote to John to explain himself and state once again his grievances against Origenist teaching, not least that it was being propagated by Rufinus, implicitly under John's tutelage.[53] Jerome translated the letter into Latin, casting the die: his previous credentials as a critical but committed translator of Origen were quietly brushed aside in favour of a **(p.47)** calculated alliance with Epiphanius against John and Rufinus. The letter was apparently copied for Jerome's non-Graecophone friend, Eusebius of Cremona; however, once he returned to Rome, it was mysteriously stolen from his desk, and reached Rufinus in 395.[54] He, Melania, and John of Jerusalem stood on the opposite side of the dispute. Jerome and Rufinus' friendship had reached a stalemate.

Rufinus returned to Rome in the summer of 397, where he began to substantiate his long-standing admiration of Origen by translating his works; his bruising at the knuckle of Jerome was never far from this new venture. In his Apology of 400, Rufinus recalls that a certain Macarius had written to him on his return, asking for Latin versions of Origen with

which to combat the errors of astrological determinism;[55] in response, he translated Pamphilus' *Defence of Origen*. Very soon afterwards, in Lent of the same year, he had begun translating what would become the first Latin *De Principiis*, a project that would end his friendship with Jerome for good. His decision to continue the work of making Origen available to a Latin audience coincided with Melania's return to Italy, and her initial reception by her relative, Paulinus of Nola. At this point, it will be useful to halt the historical narrative and examine Augustine's activities during the events that have been related.

Augustine's dispute with Jerome

In Lent 391, Augustine was ordained to the presbyterate. His first request of his bishop Valerius was to be given leave to study the Scriptures.[56] There followed a succession of commentaries from his pen: *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* was completed in 391; *De Genesi ad Litteram liber imperfectus* in around 394; the *Expositio 84 Propositionum ex Epistula Apostoli ad Romanos* in the same year; the *Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas* around 395, at the same time as the *Epistulae ad Romanos Inchoata Expositio*. The year after his consecration (396) saw him collate the exegetical and philosophical fragments that would make up *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, and by 398 he had written the crucial *Ad Simplicianum*. In all of this, Augustine was not reading the Scriptures alone or unsupported; on the contrary, he sought out commentaries and invited engagement about the interpretation of Scripture. The single most important exegetical dispute Augustine stirred began in 393, and produced the famous exchange of letters between himself and Jerome. These are vital for understanding not only **(p.48)** Augustine's relationship with Jerome, Rufinus, and—eventually—Pelagius, but also for gauging his interest in Origen.[57]

The exchange between Augustine and Jerome has been the topic of considerable scholarly interest, not least because it provides the philologist, theologian, and late antique literary and social historian with such rich material. It is incomplete, with five of the letters exchanged missing from the extant corpus; moreover, the communication between the two was significantly disrupted on several occasions, leading to a complex of misunderstandings, both wilful and unintentional, though mostly wilful on the part of Jerome. The two phases of the correspondence hinged on slightly different issues. The first, dating from 393 to 404, pivoted on Jerome's interpretation of Galatians 2.11–14, his fresh translation of the Old Testament, and the work of Origen. The second phase centred on the origin of the soul and the progress of the edicts against Pelagius. I will sketch as briefly as possible the passage of the first phase. The confusion and delay in the transmission of these letters, as much as their content, are vital to understanding Jerome's hostile response to Augustine's queries about his relationship to Origen; on this account, I beg the patience of my reader to follow this complex narrative.[58]

Augustine's Epistle 28 was sent out to Jerome in 393, the year of Atarbius' campaign in Palestine. The letter's first purpose was self-introduction. Secondly, it asked Jerome not to stop translating the work of Origen:

> We and the whole scholarly community of the African churches beseech you not to desist from your care and work in translating the books of those who have so well interpreted our Scriptures in Greek. For then you can let us have such men as well, and one in particular, whom you sound forth with keen pleasure in your works.[59]

A number of things here are noteworthy: Augustine indicates that he was not alone in reading Jerome's commentaries on Scripture in Africa, and that he was aware of Jerome's long-standing admiration of Origen; taken together, these point to a recognition of Jerome's translations of Origen's commentaries and their wider significance. Augustine then petitioned Jerome to alter his most recent method of translating the Old Testament, and instead to repeat what he had done in his earlier version of Job, laying out his text in parallel with the Septuagint, in fact after the manner of Origen's *Hexapla*. He **(p.49)** concluded the letter by questioning what in Jerome's now lost Commentary on Galatians was a direct reception of Origen's exegesis, in which Paul's actions were interpreted as a *simulatio utilis*, a conscious lie made for a greater good. On the basis of his repeated references to Origen throughout the letter, it is reasonable to suppose that he saw the Origenian roots of Jerome's exegesis of the passage.[60]

Epistle 28 was 'lost' on its way to Jerome.[61] Augustine sent him another brief letter in 394, to which Jerome replied with a merely polite salutation.[62] Realizing from this that Epistle 28 must have gone missing, Augustine sent Jerome his Epistle 40 in 397; chapter 9 of the letter suggests that his previous, short attempt had persisted on the subject of Origen. Kelly observes that, by 394, news of the Origenist controversy must have reached Africa.[63] Perhaps Augustine had heard of Jerome's recent alliance with Epiphanius, and his breach of friendship with Rufinus; perhaps too he had heard about the verbal brawl between Epiphanius and John of Jerusalem. Though impossible to prove, this might in part explain Augustine's tenacity about verifying Origen's heterodoxy in conversation with Jerome. Restating the issues of Epistle 28 in Epistle 40, Augustine ended the letter with what is presumably a paraphrase of part of Jerome's polite note: he knows very well that truth is to be commended and falsehood rejected in ecclesiastical writers; he had asked for something much more specific: 'What, in your judgement and teaching, I was desirous of and still yearn for is that you tell me what his errors were, on account of which he—so great a man—has been found guilty of falling away from the true faith.'[64] While Augustine may have heard about the furore in Egypt, he was evidently undecided (or dissembling indecision) about Origen's orthodoxy himself.

As with Epistle 28, Epistle 40 was lost in transmission, but resurfaced to be circulated openly in Italy. A public given access to Jerome's translation of Epiphanius' attack on John of Jerusalem in 395 was now reminded of the pro-Origenist stance of Jerome's youth, in the form of Augustine's persistent and critical enquiries. Hearing of this mishap, Augustine wrote to Jerome[65] to explain that he had not intended this second letter to be published as an attack on him out of his sight. In his response,[66] Jerome confessed that he had finally **(p.50)** received the offending work but, refusing to believe it was the product of Augustine, angrily demanded an explanation. Augustine was not to receive this letter until 404. While waiting for a reply, he wrote two further letters,[67] restating the questions at stake, and enclosing copies of Epistles 28 and 40 along with them.

Receiving these, and realizing that his prior letter had not yet reached Augustine, Jerome replied with characteristic intemperance in 404:[68] Augustine was sending him a flurry of letters; he had already read a copy of Epistle 40 and was astounded that it should have been published behind his back; Augustine should either disown it, or admit his authorship. The letter contains a stinging postscript, but one revealing nonetheless: is Augustine surprised that Scripture is difficult to interpret, and that commentaries can contain mistakes? He cannot justly criticize Augustine's own exegesis, as he has seen so little of it; were he inclined to examine it, 'I would not speak my own opinion, for I am nobody; but I might show you how it differs from the interpretation of the older Greek writers.'[69] Five years after the ban of Origen's work at Cyprus, four after Anastasius' seconding of the judgement at Rome, and two after his *Apologia contra Rufinum*, Jerome could once more dangle the commentaries of the 'older Greek writers' before Augustine as a silencing authority; yet the sting of Augustine's letters, circulated during the height of the Origenist controversy, remained. At some point in 404 Augustine received Jerome's earlier letter, and with it his demand for an explanation, two years after it had been written. Augustine then initiated a reconciliation, apologizing for any misunderstanding on Jerome's part,[70] but rehearsing his questions again.[71]

Later still in 405, Augustine received Jerome's Epistle 112, a reply to a much earlier epistle[72] that had been long delayed. Finally he had a proper response, after so many misfired messages. Jerome began by informing Augustine of the proper title of his *De Viris Illustribus*, which Augustine had mistaken.[73] Secondly, he defended his interpretation of Galatians, protesting that Origen's exegesis had been accepted as standard, but that Augustine was at liberty to disagree with the tradition, should he so wish.[74] Having upheld the authority of Origen's exegesis, Jerome then changed tack: Augustine has misunderstood his translation of Job, whose obelisks indicate Septuagintal additions to the Hebrew, and whose asterisks show additions taken from Theodotion's Greek translation of the Hebrew, both noted by Origen; his more recent translations were, by contrast, simple verbatim translations of the Hebrew. Importantly, **(p.51)** he reads Augustine's criticism of his whole Vulgate project as a preference for Origen, implying once again Augustine's acquaintance with the *Hexapla*.[75] The letter closes with further defence of the Vulgate, and an entreaty that Augustine lay his dispute down. Whether further letters were exchanged between Augustine and Jerome before 415 is unknown.

The standard scholarly reading of this correspondence takes it as an exegetical dispute hinging on Jerome's interpretation of Galatians and his new Vulgate, a showcase example of late-antique manners communicated by letter, and as raw material for accurate vignettes of two very different personalities.[76] What appears to have eluded scholarship on the exchange is its situation within the Origenist controversy. In 394, Jerome performed a dramatic about-turn, aligning himself with Epiphanius against Origenism. This was the very same year in which Augustine's Epistle 28, with its initial criticism of Jerome's interpretation of Galatians, and move away from a *Hexapla*-based format for his new translations, became public. In the same letter, Augustine had repeated his demand that Jerome define the points by which Origen be defined heterodox.[77] Jerome cannot but have read the enquiry, so tenaciously repeated and publicly circulated thereafter, as anything other than a veiled criticism of his move away from Origen.

Importantly, Kelly's observation that Augustine may have heard of the beginning of the controversy in 394[78] omits to mention that there had already been personal communication between Jerome and North Africa beforehand: perhaps as early as 392, Jerome had responded to a prior letter from Aurelius of Carthage, in which he had signaled his interest in receiving translations of Origen. *Ep*. 27* conveys Jerome's good wishes on Aurelius' recent accession to the episcopate and repeats the list of his works Aurelius already possessed: a number of homilies on Jeremiah and two books on the Song of Songs, both translations of Origen. He enclosed with the letter two further works, this time his own: the *Quaestiones in Genesim* and a commentary on Ps. 10.[79] Owing to a lack of copyists, Jerome explained, he could not enclose more; would Aurelius like to send someone from Carthage to join in the work of the scriptorium and return with further volumes?[80] Tantalizingly, we do not know whether Aurelius took up the offer. However, the friendly commerce **(p.52)** between Carthage and Bethlehem does suggest that Augustine could have been informed about Jerome's public vacillations before writing even Epistle 28, through his ties with Aurelius; this in turn makes sense of his elliptical reference to 'the whole scholarly community of the African churches' in that letter.

Epistle 40, which closely repeated the content of Epistle 28, is neatly datable to the same year that Rufinus returned to Italy from Palestine. Although Augustine made no mention of Rufinus' estrangement from Jerome until 402,[81] he was certainly by that time on very good terms with Paulinus of Nola, who could claim connection with Rufinus through his relative Melania.[82] If Jerome was aware of Augustine's connection with Paulinus (and thus, by extension, Rufinus and Melania), the open publication of Epistle 28 in 394 and Epistle 40 in 397 must have seemed very suspicious indeed. Peter Brown confirms the conjecture in his sketch of the entourage that surrounded Melania and her protegé after her return to Rome in 399: 'newcomers [to that circle] would find themselves on a watershed, the side of which very definitely sloped *away* from Jerome. Augustine immediately found himself on that side.'[83] In fact, Augustine was no newcomer: his friendship with Paulinus dates from at least 395.[84] Further, his letters to Jerome 'implicated himself with the faction'.[85] To Jerome, this must have been obvious, but no commentator on the letters has yet suggested that siding with Rufinus was precisely Augustine's intention.

Augustine's library

The importance of Brown's observation for a reading of Augustine's place in the Origenist controversy becomes clear once the extent of his knowledge of Origen in the 390s is exposed. Prior surveys of the correspondence with Jerome have failed to probe this question deeply enough, even though there exists a body of scholarship that has chased the issue since the 1940s.[86] Fürst's observation is illustrative of the lacuna: 'What Augustine knew through Latin translations of Greek theology was not very much'; of Origen, he knew only 'fragments'.[87] Kelly (1975) fails to consider the issue, as do the broader studies of Evans (1968), Brown (1967),[88] and Lancel (2002).[89] Hennings's 1994 **(p.53)** analysis of the correspondence confines the question to a footnote, referring his readers to the standard studies of the topic and repeating O'Connell's judgement on the matter: 'St Augustine's repeated pleas in his letters to Jerome for illumination of the specifics of Jerome's developing opposition to Origen's views show two things quite clearly: Augustine's own ignorance in respect to Origen's views, and Jerome's near total unresponsiveness to requests for that information.'[90] Bonnadière's analysis of Jerome's part in Augustine's knowledge of Origen concurs with this: 'Augustine knew about some disconnected elements of Origenism; he never reached Origen's true substance.'[91] Similarly, Altaner, in his seminal

article of 1950 (reprinted in 1967), is uncertain whether Augustine had read any of Origen before 400.[92] However, he leaves some room for manœuvre, which, combined with the results of several more recent studies, allows for a maximal assessment of Augustine's reception of Origen from an early stage in his career. In sum, this argues strongly against seeing Augustine as an ignorant bystander in an affair confined to Rufinus and his contacts in the Holy Land.

I begin with Altaner. For ease of reading, I will abbreviate numbered references in what follows. On the basis of Augustine's critique of Origen in *Civ. Dei* 11.23, within which Altaner detects a direct citation of *De Principiis*, he suggests that Augustine may have received a copy of Rufinus' translation of this text after 399, though he declines to conjecture exactly when. Origen's exegesis of '*In principio*' (Gen. 1:1; cf. *Hom. Gen.* 1) as a reference to creation in the Son he reads not only in *Gen. Litt.* 1.1.1–2.1, 6.2 and 12.6 and *Civ. Dei* 11.4, 6, and 32 (both post-410), but also in *Gen. Man* 1.3.2 and *Gen. Litt. Lib. Imp.* 6.3 (391 and 393–4 respectively). Further, *Gen. Man.* 2.21.2 deploys Origen's exegesis of the coats of skins (Gen. 31:21; cf. *Hom. Lev.* 6.2) as an allegory of mortality. As Rufinus' translation of the *Homiliae in Genesim* and *in Leviticum* were not completed before 404, Altaner suggests that Augustine must have been indirectly influenced by the text. Supposing that he may also have possessed copies of Eusebius of Vercelli's translation of Origen's commentaries on the Psalms and Hilary of Poitiers's translation of his *Homiliae in Hiob* (both now lost), Altaner leaves room for the idea that he may have had access to the Leviticus and Genesis homilies in the 390s through other Latin versions.

The theme of the 'five spiritual senses', particularly as it surfaces in *Conf.* 10.38.27, Altaner believes may be an echo of Origen's commentary and homilies on the Song of Songs; in the light of *Ep.* 27*, we now know that **(p.54)** Aurelius had a copy of the latter in the early 390s, in Jerome's translation of 383, to which Augustine would have had access.[93] Augustine's exegesis of 'I am a worm and no man' (Ps. 22:6), found earliest in Epistle 140 (of 412),[94] indicates that Augustine had read Jerome's 390 version of the *Hom. Luc.* by then.[95] Finally, his citation of *Hom. Gen.* 2 in *Quaest. Hept.* 14 is further evidence that he continued to refer to the Old Testament exegesis of Origen even as late as 419.

In 1992, Bammel argued that Augustine had received Rufinus' translation of Origen's commentary on Romans by 411, leading to the inclusion of his exegesis of Romans 8:3, Job 14:4–5, and Psalm 51:5 in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*; likewise, he engaged with Origen's theology of salvation and its relation to works found in the commentary in *De Spiritu et Littera.*[96] As I will argue later in the chapter, and will substantiate in Chapter 3, his reception of this text was crucial to his initial attack on Caelestius, and remained integral to his anti-Pelagian theology in the years that followed. I will also argue in Chapter 4 that Augustine had access to Origen's exegesis of Romans 8:3 in the mid-390s, far in advance of the publication of Rufinus' version. In the light of this, I note Bammel's conjecture in the same article, that Augustine probably had access to Jerome's translations of the homilies on Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the Song of Songs, and Isaiah throughout the 390s, and her general observation that Augustine's thought shows itself most similar to Origen during that decade. She highlights in particular a shared approach to soteriology: 'Origen would indeed agree with Augustine to the extent of maintaining that the conditions of this mortal life are an obstacle to the attainment of virtue, and indeed they make complete virtue impossible, and that these conditions are the result of the Fall of Adam.'[97] More precisely, Bammel holds that Augustine shared with Origen before the mid-390s a common narrative of the Fall and return of the soul, elaborated in *De Principiis* and the *Confessiones* respectively, but erased by Augustine at the level of exegetical discourse through his successive attempts to comment on the letter to the Romans.[98]

(p.55) Heidl's study of 2003 offers a thoroughgoing, book-length appraisal of Augustine's reception of Origen. Many of his highlighted textual parallels are persuasive, although the same cannot be said for his broader conclusions about Augustine's earliest acquaintance with Origen. The first part of his book attempts to prove that the *libri pleni* of *C. Acad.* 2.5.2 (identified with the *libri Platonicorum* of *Conf.* 7.14.11 and 26.20), which prompted Augustine's study of Scripture, were in fact the works of Origen. In *Contra Academicos*, Augustine describes them as 'rejoicing in the good things of Arabia' (*bonas res arabicas exhilara[ans]*), which Heidl takes as a reception of *Hom. Cant.* 1.2 and 2.3, with its description of the fragrant scent of Christ's divinity. Further, *Contra Academicos* refers to the flight from ambition as an escape from 'the bondage of this mortal life' (*huius mortalis vitae…retinaculum*), which corresponds to 1 *Hom. Cant.* 2.9

and its encouragement that Christians flee the world because Christ has 'subjected himself to the net of the world' (*subiecit se retibus mundi*). The infamous absence of direct references to Christ in the Cassiciacum dialogues he reads as a veiled reference to *Hom. Ier.* 20.5, where Origen discourages using the name of Christ among those not initiated into the faith. *Conf.* 8.28.12–29.12 (Augustine's tears beneath the fig-tree and mysterious command to 'Pick up and read') is read in the light of *Comm. Cant.* 2.4.28–30, in which Origen treats Abraham's vision at Mamre.

While the idea that the *libri* might have contained Origenian material is just conceivable, Heidl's textual parallels are, to my mind, unconvincing. The first two examples lack any parallel of thought, relying only on common vocabulary; the conceit of Christian silence about the precise content of the faith was a commonplace in late antiquity, and not confined to Origen, and *Conf.* 8.28.12 is simply nothing like Origen's reading of Abraham's vision. By contrast, Heidl's subsequent analysis of Augustine's exchange with Jerome is, I believe, accurate in viewing it as a covert exploration of the Origenist controversy on Augustine's part. His general observation must also be close to the truth, putting aside his dubious claims about the *libri pleni*: 'The silence of the Confessions about Origen and the Origenian books which made a great influence on Augustine in Milan is understandable. Augustine was cautious and wanted to avoid accusations of being an Origenist.'[99] Whenever and however he read Origen in the 390s, Augustine would have been careful to keep his interests secluded.

A number of more credible parallels in Part 2 of Heidl's book deserve attention. Here he argues that Augustine's treatment of *In principio* at *Gen. Man.* 1.3.2 must be dependent on *Hom. Gen.* 1.1.24, as Ambrose's *Hexaemeron* 14.16.13 (Augustine's most likely alternative source) contains **(p.56)** a long list of citations from Basil of Caesarea's work of the same name, which Augustine does not reproduce. Adding to Altaner's analysis of *De Genesi adversus Manichaeos*, he notes that 1.28.14 characterizes earth as an allegory of corporeal, visible nature and heaven as that of the spiritual and invisible, closely reflecting *Hom. Gen.* 1.2.28 and *Princ.* 3.6.7 and 4.4.6. Again, the distinction is not mentioned in Ambrose's *Hexaemeron*. Bringing the early Augustine into even closer relationship with Origen's doctrine of the Fall of the soul, Heidl highlights the description of the soul as an intermediary *medius locus* at *Gen. Man.* 2.12.9; explaining the diversity of creation as a result of this pre-mundane Fall in *Mor. Eccl. Cath.* 2.9.7, Augustine thus closely follows *Princ.* 1.6.2 and 2.1.1. The former text of *De Principiis* is also seen to re-echo in the suggestion of *Gen. Man.* 2.32.21 that humans might hope to become angels, and *Lib. Arb.* 3.21.7, where Augustine raises the possibility that they are likewise able to descend to the demonic state. In all these examples, Augustine's assumption of the soul's median status is uncannily close to Origen, as Willy Theiler's article has also made clear.[100] Yet, for both, the lack of concrete evidence for a translation of *De Principiis* pre-dating 399 is a problem. Nonetheless, the lost translations of Hilary and Eusebius, together with the extant, anonymous translation of Origen's Commentary on Matthew, prove that relaying Origen to a Latin readership was never confined to the scriptoria of Rufinus and Jerome alone.

On the basis of these surveys, it is reasonable to conclude that Augustine without doubt had access to the Homilies on Genesis and Leviticus at the turn of the 390s; by the middle of the decade he had read the Commentary and Homilies on the Song of Songs and, I believe, parts—at least—of the Commentary on Romans. At some point in the decade, the homilies on Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the Song of Songs, and Isaiah could have found their way to him. If a non-Rufinian translation of *De Principiis* was extant before 399, Augustine may have read it, along with some commentaries on the Psalms and the Homily on Job. By the 410s, his acquaintance with the Homilies on Luke was made public as these had been published by Jerome in 390, he might well have read them earlier. With the possible exception of the Lucan sermons and *De Principiis*, Augustine had in fact read the bulk of Origen's exegetical work available in Latin by 400. Add to this his possible knowledge of the *Hexapla* and Jerome's scriptural commentaries, and we can no longer view Augustine as ignorant of Origen's work or the people involved in their circulation.

A studiosa societas

Thus far I have laid out the course of the Origenist controversy as it was played out between Rufinus and Jerome; I have argued that Augustine's **(p.57)** correspondence with Jerome signified a critical attack on the monk of Bethlehem from

within the Rufinian circle, and have attempted to substantiate this by demonstrating the 'outer limit' of Augustine's reading of Origen through the 390s. In conclusion, I want to return to Brown's claim that Augustine was tied into a Roman elite that also sponsored Pelagius, and in which a common topic of conversation was the work of Origen.

From 395, Augustine corresponded with Paulinus, relative of Melania the Elder. After the sack of Rome, he received Melania's refugee granddaughter, Melania the Younger, and her husband Pinianus, at Hippo; evidently, they were on friendly terms.[101] Pinianus' friend, Timasius, was also a close associate of Pelagius, which Augustine noted.[102] Pelagius was himself a correspondent with Paulinus of Nola, of which Augustine was aware.[103] He had read at least one of Pelagius' letters to the bishop of Nola, presumably forwarded by Paulinus himself.[104] As Augustine later recorded, Pelagius was acquainted with Rufinus and Pammachius,[105] and could through the latter claim a connection with his friend Jerome. Augustine himself attempted to make contact with Pammachius in 401.[106] By then, Jerome's dispute with Rufinus had claimed Pammachius for his camp alone, and we do not know whether he replied to Augustine's formal self-introduction. Another spoke of the common wheel is evident at Milan, where Augustine had been introduced to the *Gens Anicii* by Ambrose; later, he would write (indirectly) to Anicia Proba's granddaughter, Demetrias, along with Jerome and Pelagius, with all of whom the Anicii associated.[107]

With Melania and Rufinus at the top of the chain, distributing the works of Origen from their studies, it comes as no surprise that Pelagius should draw heavily from Origen's Romans Commentary when writing his own exposition of that book in around 406.[108] Likewise, the little flurry of interest in Romans 7–9 in the mid-390s—Augustine's *Ad Simplicianum* and the Pelagian *De Induratione Cordis Pharaonis*, both of which may have prompted Paulinus of Nola to write in confusion to Jerome for an authoritative judgement on the scriptural texts[109]—all engaged at some level with Origen's theology of grace and free will, exemplified in his Romans Commentary and *De Principiis* 3.[110] In all of this, that Augustine should have been unaware of Origen, the importance of his works and their ambivalent reception in his own times is simply unbelievable. His Roman contacts, to whom he wrote as friends, were **(p.58)** linked to the centre of the Origenian network in Italy; quietly, he digested what translations he could obtain, integrating attractive titbits into his own developing exegesis. From the safe distance of North Africa, he could attempt discussion of the difficult passages of Origen's scriptural interpretation with Jerome, feigning a secure innocence. In reality, his preoccupations closely reflected the literary fashion of the day. Yet, just as he had slipped away from the spectre of his own Manichaean past in his own writing, so he executed the same sleight of hand on his private reading, leaving few tracks and declining to expose his theological commitments, all the time maintaining the posture of an ingénue. Only when the charge of Origenism hovered close to his own cathedral in 412, and again in 415, did Augustine realize that he must perform the same sidestep, at once silently paying his debt to the Alexandrian while rebuffing any accusation of heresy at the same time.

De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione

Augustine's first criticism of what would later be labelled Pelagianism came in the *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* of 412–13. As I have pointed out, the first two books of the work make no explicit reference to Pelagius, who is only infrequently mentioned in the third, it being rather a measured response to Marcellinus' enquiry for clarifications of the council of Carthage's judgement on Caelestius. Augustine's caution doubtless arose from his proximity to friends of Pelagius and Caelestius, not least Melania and Pinianus, then occupying their estate at Thagaste. The breviates against Caelestius underpin Augustine's argument in *De Peccatorum Meritis*, that the Fall of Adam places humanity in a state of concupiscence and hereditary guilt, which can be removed only by baptism. Caelestius' own inspiration, Rufinus of Syria's *Liber de Fide*, also claimed Augustine's attention. Rebutting the book's attack on the doctrine of Original Sin, Augustine did not, however, respond to the platform from which Rufinus launched his critique: a damning review of the heresy of Origen.[111]

The dating, and to a lesser extent the authorship, of this important treatise has been the cause of much scholarly contention, a discussion that bears on my argument here. In his important early article on the *Liber*, Altaner identified its

author as a priest of Jerome's community in Bethlehem, sent to Rome in 399–400,[112] on the basis of Jerome's *Ep*. 81.2 and Marius' Mercator's **(p.59)** parallel evidence in his later *Commonitorium*.[113] This conclusion has been widely accepted. Further, Altaner argued that the *Liber* must date from 413, i.e. *after* the publication of *De Peccatorum Meritis*. Its Pelagianism, he argued, is too highly developed to have preceded Caelestius' condemnation and Augustine's criticism of the breviates; were it earlier, Augustine would have written against it.[114] In 1963, Refoulé responded by pointing out that Augustine's position in *De Peccatorum Meritis*, being consistent with the *Ad Simplicianum*, was no novelty to prompt Rufinus' pen: on the contrary, it makes better sense to view the *Liber de Fide* as (in part) an attack on that earlier work, making it datable to shortly after 399.[115] Later still, Bonner concurred with Refoulé, adding the observation that the chief preoccupation of the *Liber* is Origenism and the doctrine the Fall of the soul resulting in inherited sin, rather than a solely Augustinian conception of Original Sin and guilt. A dating of 399 thus makes perfect sense: as an envoy of Jerome's newfound anti-Origenism, the author of the *Liber* contributed within Italy to his reaction against Rufinus of Aquileia. Where the *Liber* criticized Original Sin, Bonner detects a reading of the *Ad Simplicianum*, in 399 still a relatively recent publication.[116] Accepting a dating of 399 together with Bonner's identification of Rufinus as Jerome's puppet in the West leads to another conclusion on my part. Were Jerome suspicious of Augustine as a creeping Origenist and aide of Rufinus of Aquileia, having by 399 heard only of his leaked epistles and receiving only his persistent questions about the heterodoxy of Origen, Rufinus the Syrian becomes the perfect foil for Jerome to tar Augustine with the brush of an Origenist soteriology. This explains why the *Liber* proceeds to damn the doctrine of Original Sin from the perspective of an Origenist pre-mundane Fall, as I shall demonstrate.

Considered *in toto*, the *Liber de Fide* is an attack not only on Origenism but also on Traducianism and the classic Trinitarian and Christological heresies. The first fifteen chapters of the book lay out the doctrine of the Trinity, finally pinpointing the faults of Arius and Eunomius as the object of its corrective. Only at chapter 16, moving into a consideration of creation, does the *Liber* turn to Origen, *impius…ac nefarius*,[117] who taught that God created only as much as he was able to contain and comprehend,[118] and that the stars are ensouled.[119] It continues by coupling Origen's teaching with astrological determinism, which the Church's belief in free human will rebuts.[120] Considering the origin of the soul, the *Liber* excoriates Origen for teaching that souls **(p.60)** were created before bodies; this is manifestly erroneous, as souls cannot procreate, which God instructs humans to do at Genesis 1.28.[121] It should be noted that this is a protology Augustine considers plausible at *Lib. Arb*. 3.57.20. At chapter 28, the *Liber* condemns those who teach that 'the soul of Eve was taken up from the soul of Adam, the first man', along with those who hold 'that souls are transmitted from Adam alone, once his seed has been cast into all who are to be born from him'.[122] Genesis 2 refers only to Eve's flesh being made of Adam; souls are rather created afresh for each new person.[123] The *Liber* subsequently asserts that Adam and Eve were created with immortal souls, but mortal bodies, which, had they persevered in virtue, would have been granted Enoch's blessing—perpetual longevity.[124] At chapter 32, the *Liber* appears to focus directly on Augustine, in its own positive evaluation of death: 'We do not say that humans suffer death on account of the condition of punishment, as the untutored think; but to take away the indignity of death'; and because it was given 'to take away their indignity, death is said to be a good'.[125] Likewise, redemption comes through the suffering and labours of life.[126] The coats of skins given to Adam and Eve were a gift of God's mercy, not mortal, punitive flesh as Origen teaches.[127] Augustine's reception of Origen's exegesis on this point at *De Genesi adversus Manichaeos* 2.31.21. leaves open the possibility that the *Liber* intended to identify Augustine's conception of punitive mortality with that of Origen, had Rufinus read Augustine's commentary.

From chapter 38, the *Liber* puts forth the classic Pelagian tenets, that children are not affected by the sins of their parents: 'Those who condemn the world of sin and shame through the one human, Adam, are raving mad,' as each person is responsible for his own sins.[128] Were the race condemned in Adam, the children of baptized parents would not require baptism themselves, as that of their parents would surely lead to holy offspring; this leads to the conclusion that 'children receive baptism not because of sins, but for spiritual procreation; and so they are created in Christ through baptism, and become partakers of his Kingdom'.[129] Ignorance of the Scriptures has led some to **(p.61)** suggest that unbaptized infants are eternally damned, a position that is *iniustam et nefariam*; rather, these children are surely the

subjects of God's mildest punishment, and as such should be kept in the prayers of the Church.[130] At this point in the work, Rufinus turns to considering the Incarnation, and particularly Apollinarianism, before returning to the issue of the generation of the eternal Word.

My summary of the pertinent sections of the text should show that Rufinus makes no attempt to distinguish sharply between Origen's protological and soteriological faults, and those of the ignorant *indocti* who propose a Fall of all humanity in Adam, and a consequent requirement that children be baptized to avoid the fires of hell. Evidence for a carefully constructed doctrine of a Fall-in-Adam is not difficult to find in Origen's work—it surfaces throughout his commentary on Romans 5, and in the most commonly cited *Homilia in Leviticum* 8.3.[131] As I also indicated above, contemporary readers of the *Ad Simplicianum* would have viewed that work within a broad debate stemming from Origen's position on grace and election, to which Pelagius, Jerome, and Paulinus also contributed. Its reference to a Fall in Adam, *quasi in massa*,[132] **(p.62)** and the propagation of sinful nature from him,[133] together with its designation of enduring concupiscence and mortality as punishment of sin would have been readily amenable to an Origenist interpretation through Rufinus' eyes, the distinctiveness of Augustine's position on election notwithstanding. The *Liber de Fide* should, therefore, be seen as an attempt to conflate Augustine's teaching on the fallen state, and the theological presumptions on which it is founded, with the heresies of Origen.

It is, therefore, of crucial significance that *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* not only defends Original Sin and its remission in baptism, but also refuses to pronounce on the origin of souls, and deploys Origen's exegesis of Romans in support of its Christology. While it is true that at 1.31.22 Augustine specifically refutes any theory of the soul's origin that views embodiment itself as the punishment for sin, he does not retract his earlier allegorical reading of the 'coats of skins', the exegetical corollary of such a theory. On the contrary, at 2.59.36 he returns to the position rejected only in the previous book, asking, 'if [the soul] is not propagated in the same way [as the flesh], we might ask whether, by the fact of it being mixed with the flesh of sin which weighs it down, it still has need of a redemption of its own, and the remission of its own sin'.[134] Whether embodied through a fall or a self-willed descent, the soul's pre-mundane existence is surely subtextually supposed here, to be strengthened by Augustine's praise of Pelagius for his circumspection on the issue of the soul's origin in his commentaries on Romans, at 3.18.10. In the same passage, he refuses to commit himself on the question, conveniently postponing it to another work. In Chapter 6, I shall return to Augustine's reticence on this key topic, arguing that it hides a persistent attraction to a 'fall' model of the soul's origin, a protology never far from the negotiation of Origen's theology at the turn of the fifth century. At 2.38.24, Augustine lifts his exegesis of Romans 8:3 directly from Origen's Romans Commentary, the most important of his citations of that work within *De Peccatorum Meritis*.[135] Setting Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' against the denatured sinful flesh of the *massa peccati*, the passage marks the initiation of Augustine's Christological response to Pelagianism, which would remain a constant through to the **(p.63)** works against Julian. I shall return to this crucial scriptural text in the following chapter.

All of this is extremely surprising, accepting that Augustine levelled *De Peccatorum Meritis* not only at Caelestius, but also at the *Liber*. Well acquainted with the passage of the Origenist controversy from within Rufinus of Aquileia's circle, and by 412 in full knowledge of Jerome's misunderstanding of his epistles, Augustine made no attempt to expose the subtextual accusation of the *Liber*, that his own doctrine of the Fall could be associated with the heresies of Origen. Let the reader understand, the text implies: Augustine was unprepared to compromise his own admiration of sound exegesis —and the theology consequent on it—on the basis of the criticisms of the *indocti*. Only with Jerome's high-profile classification of Pelagius' doctrine of grace as a permutation of Origenist ἀπαθεια in his Epistle 133 was Augustine forced to cover his intellectual tracks.

De Natura et Gratia

I now turn to the years immediately following the council of Carthage, to survey this third and final stage in Augustine's construction of Pelagianism. Between 404 and 411, the passage of correspondence between Jerome and Augustine had fallen silent. Their rapprochement was prompted not by Augustine, but by his friend Marcellinus, to whom *De*

Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione would be dedicated. His letter, which had taken some time to reach Jerome in 411, was an enquiry about the origin of the soul. Jerome responded curtly. Some—including Origen and the Pythagoreans—believe the soul descends from heaven; others, that it is a part of the divine essence. Still others hold that souls are created daily, to be given to fresh bodies, while others—particularly in the West—believe they are propagated from the soul of the parent. In any case, Jerome advised, Marcellinus should ask Augustine: 'To be sure, you have there Augustine the bishop, a holy and learned man, who can teach you *viva voce*, as they say, and explain his opinion; or I should rather say my opinion, put in his own words.'[136] This was a difficult and unresolved issue that he clearly did not want to discuss with Marcellinus. Given Jerome's presence behind the *Liber de Fide*, his redirection of Marcellinus to Augustine veiled both an insult, and a covert attempt to stir trouble.

Three years later, Jerome's advice returned to him, bundled together in a series of events, letters, and books that finally defined Augustine's Pelagianism. In 414, Augustine received a copy of Pelagius' *De Natura* from his contacts Timasius and James, which required a response.[137] The following year, he **(p.64)** wrote to Jerome. His first letter, Epistle 166, appears on first inspection to be a reprise of Marcellinus' letter, asking for Jerome's opinion on the soul's origin. Augustine explained that Orosius had recently arrived in Hippo from Spain, bringing with him news of the Priscillianist heresy and its false teaching on the soul. In the light of his ignorance, he asked Jerome not to refuse engaging him on the topic. The body of the letter, however, is a subtle attack on Jerome's own position, that souls are created daily: infant suffering and death and the variation in intellectual ability between persons, Augustine argued, put in question the goodness of a God who creates souls in a fallen state.

Before he replied to Augustine, Jerome wrote his Epistle 133 in response to a prior letter from its addressee, Ctesiphon. Although the letter was not directed to Augustine, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have had access to it, letter-writing in antiquity being synonymous with open publication.[138] In addition to this, Augustine alludes to the content of the letter in *De Natura et Gratia*.[139] Jerome confirms Ctesiphon's suggestion that the Pelagians have drawn their teaching on the attainment of virtue from the philosophers, particularly the Peripatetics and new Academics: they all hold that the passions can be rooted out of the mind by meditation on virtue and goodness.[140] However, as Romans 7:23 makes clear, even the saints' holiness is one held together with sinfulness.[141] These heretics attempt to distinguish between becoming without sin (*sine peccato*) and being free from sin (*absque peccato*), but the single Greek word covering both, 'sinless' (ἀναμαρτητος), exposes the falsity of the distinction. Evagrius holds to their position, and Rufinus has spread his teaching by translating his *Sententiae*, containing 'opinions concerning ἀπαθεια, which we can call "impassibility", when the soul is never moved by any consideration or vice and—I put it simply—is either a stone, or God'.[142] Jerome's argument ends in the stalemate of the Origenist **(p.65)** controversy: 'your teaching is a branch of Origen's…Where men share an opinion, it is impossible for their ends to be different.'[143] As Kelly observes: 'Some of [Jerome's] allegations of Pelagius' intellectual ancestry were recklessly wide of the mark…He was at fault…in equating Pelagius' doctrine of sinlessness (*impeccantia*) with the Greek notion of ἀπαθεια. Nevertheless, he was entirely right in detecting the influence of Origen, as mediated by Rufinus, in Pelagius' thinking.' In his commentaries on Romans, Pelagius had borrowed from Origen his belief in 'the power of choice implanted by the Creator conceived of as grace, the paralysing effect of evil custom, the possibility of living without sin'.[144]

The accuracy of Jerome's critique is, in a sense, secondary. Its primary importance lies in Augustine's response, which was to move away from his own suggestion that sinlessness might be attained in this life. In *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, his position had been nuanced. *Pecc Mer*. 2.7.6 admits the theoretical possibility that a human may come to be without sin, where free will is assisted by the grace of God. However, such a thing has never been attained.[145] The ignorance and weakness of fallen nature combine to make humans unwilling, so that grace cannot assist them.[146] As a result, the only human ever to have been truly sinless and fully graced was Christ.[147] Nonetheless, *impeccantia* remains a theoretical possibility, because it is the goal of redemption. Augustine's position appears to have confused Marcellinus, who wrote asking that Augustine explain again what he meant. 'It seems to you absurd to say that something can be the case, when an example of such a thing is lacking,' Augustine repeated at the beginning of his reply, *De Spiritu et*

Littera.[148] Explaining 'potential but unrealizable sinlessness' became the platform on which Augustine would advance his most developed and important treatment of the relationship between law (letter) and grace (spirit). The former, unaided by grace, becomes an instrument for death, where the human will is incapable of following its commands; the latter has been given so that the law may rightly be fulfilled by a renewed and sanctified nature. Many things described as possible in the Scriptures have never been executed in reality, although the omnipotence of God could bring them about, Augustine explained. Any human who attained a state of sinlessness would do so through his own human agency, but the work would remain divine, done in human nature.[149] The error of presuming anyone to be sinless is a relatively minor one, prompted by benevolent feeling; it becomes dangerous only when it is believed of oneself.[150] A yet more dangerous error lurks rather in thinking that **(p.66)** human nature as it now stands is capable of following the commands without the reception of grace.[151] At the end of the work, Augustine concluded:

> See: although perfect righteousness has no exemplar among humans, it is nonetheless not impossible. It might come about, if a will great enough applied itself to the task. That will would be great enough, if nothing which belongs to righteousness were hidden from it, and if those things so delighted it, that its delight would overcome whatever else of pleasure or sorrow holds it back. That this is not the case belongs not to impossibility, but to the judgment of God.
>
> *ecce quemadmodum sine exemplo est in hominibus perfecta iustitia et tamen impossibilis non est. fieret enim, si tanta uoluntas adhiberetur, quanta sufficit tantae rei. esset autem tanta, si et nihil eorum quae pertinent ad iustitiam nos lateret et ea sic delectarent animum, ut quicquid aliud uoluptatis dolorisue inpedit, delectatio illa superaret; quod ut non sit, non ad impossibilitatem, sed ad iudicium dei pertinet*.[152]

Sinless righteousness as it can be possessed in this present life amounts to freedom from unlawful lust, although it falls short of the fullness of love promised eschatologically.[153] *De Spiritu et Littera* thus places the attainment of sinlessness, in however qualified a form, at the heart of the Christian pilgrimage of grace. It is precisely the growth in love and casting-off of concupiscence that constitutes a Christian, but this process is always the result of indwelling, divine love, and not a merely human exertion.

When Augustine came to formulating a reply to Pelagius' *De Natura*, Jerome's letter to Ctesiphon stood as a major obstacle to his continuing the anti-Pelagian project in the same vein as *De Peccatorum Meritis* and *De Spiritu et Littera*. As Rackett correctly observes:

> For the most part, Augustine did not want to debate about either the theoretical possibility of living without sin (with which he agreed) or the claim that sinless people have actually existed (with which he disagreed), effectively conceding both of these points to his opponent. Indeed, he marginalized both of these topics, in order to discuss 'the heart of the matter, which in this question is the sole or almost sole point of contention that we have with these people', namely the nature of grace.[154]

Of course, the content of *De Natura* provided the material for Augustine to focus his dispute on the distinction between the grace of creation and that of **(p.67)** redemption; but the motive lay in avoiding the allegation of Epistle 133, that a belief in *impeccantia*, either practical or theoretical, constituted heretical Origenism. Without rejecting his previous position, *De Natura et Gratia* initiated his sidestep on the issue:

> On this matter, there is no need for us to contend against him. For I am not too troubled about whether there has been anyone, or is anyone, or might be anyone who has had, has now or might yet have a perfect love of God, to which nothing need be added: that is, the truest, fullest and most perfect righteousness.
>
> *in qua [quaestione] nec nos aduersus eum certare opus non est. nam neque illud nimis curo, utrum fuerint hic aliqui uel sint uel esse possint, qui perfectam, cui nihil addendum esset, habuerint, uel habeant uel habituri sint*

> *caritatem dei—ipsa est enim uerissima, plenissima perfectissima iustitia.*[155]

At a calmer stage in the controversy, the *Liber de Fide* had sought to co-opt Augustine's doctrine of the Fall into a broader Origenist protology and soteriology. Unprepared to take the bait, Augustine maintained his position on the Fall of Adam, and his ambiguous attitude to the origin of souls, supporting his argument with judicious Alexandrian exegesis. The much more serious threat posed by Jerome, never Augustine's ally, was not something he could avoid so easily. A similarity between Augustine and Origen on matters of origin and Fall would persist throughout the anti-Pelagian works of the late 410s and 420s; after 415, however, the emphasis shifted permanently to arguing the secondary issue of grace.

This final stage in Augustine's construction of Pelagianism has a fitting postscript. Augustine's letters to Bethlehem had been dogged by the force of Jerome's pride from the outset. Augustine's lengthy critique of Jerome's understanding of the soul's origin (Epistle 166) received no response except the indirect, public defamation of *impeccantia* found in Epistle 133. Here, Pelagius was not Jerome's sole object of derision: by 415, he must have been appraised of Augustine's most recent works against Pelagius and Caelestius, not least because they had brought the dispute with them to Palestine.

Shortly after writing Epistle 166, Augustine wrote him another letter that, I believe, would have left Jerome in no doubt that Augustine understood his recent literary games. It opens by referring to his previous effort, urging Jerome to discard his enquiry: a more important matter had arisen on which Augustine sought Jerome's help. Whatever the origin of the soul, it is more important to teach the manner of its salvation, on which they can both agree.[156] The body of the letter is a lengthy and somewhat repetitive exegesis of James 2.10: 'Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.' While it opens by asking Jerome's opinion on the text, Augustine shows little doubt in his own interpretation, at one point breaking off with ironic humility: 'But what am **(p.68)** I doing? As though I have quite forgotten to whom I am talking, I seem to have become a learned man, proposing to you what I would like you to teach me!'[157] The central question, whether all sins are to be counted equal so that an adulterer be considered likewise a murderer and thief, Augustine finally answers with a qualified negative: inasmuch as all sins are an offence against love, they are equal;[158] considered in relation to one another, and inhering in different dispositions of the soul, they are not.[159] This forms the backdrop for Augustine's more important point, levelled directly at Jerome's letter to Ctesiphon. Were all sins equal, there would be no progress in virtue to the goal of holiness. Yet, this progress is just that: progress, which only life eternal sees fulfilled:

> Virtue is the love that loves what should be loved. In some this is greater, in other it is less; in others still, it is absent. At its fullest, as a thing that cannot be increased, it cannot exist in human life on earth…And so the usefulness of the commands is great, if so much freedom is granted to the will to honour more fully the grace of God.
>
> *uirtus est caritas, qua id, quod diligendum est, diligitur. haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor in aliis nulla est, plenissima uero, quae iam non possit augeri, quam diu hic homo uiuit, in nemine…magna est ergo utilitas praeceptorum, si libero arbitrio tantum detur, ut gratia dei amplius honoretur.*[160]

Apologizing for writing so much, Augustine ended the letter with a final swipe, describing Jerome as one who 'does not expect to learn these things, although you approve them, because you are more accustomed to teaching them'.[161] Clearly, Augustine was not willing to allow Jerome the last word on grace, even if his anti-Pelagian treatises thereafter would shift the debate away from the attainment of sinlessness. Unsurprisingly, Jerome's reply (Epistle 134) openly refused to comment on either Epistle 166 or Epistle 167, apparently to avoid further public dispute, adding as a postscript the slimmest apology for not being able to send Augustine further editions of the *Hexapla* owing to a scarcity of copyists. The remainder of their extant correspondence is confined to two further elliptical, barely polite, letters of greeting.

Conclusion and foreword

This chapter began by accessing Augustine's heresiology through his own experience of Manichaeism. Circumspect in

offering a total definition of heresy, his late work *De Haeresibus* reveals his very different treatments of Pelagianism **(p.69)** and Origenism. While reticent in describing the precise faults of Origen, it conflates the errors of Pelagius and Caelestius to form a single, monolithic heresy, a threat to the whole of Catholic orthodoxy. So much might be expected of Augustine, after the heated polemic of his attack on the wandering ascetics in flight from Alaric. However, any clean-cut caricature of the *doctor gratiae* vanquishing the *inimici gratiae* falls down when the hidden ironies behind such a narrative are exposed. Augustine and Pelagius shared friends; their respective works received a hearing in the same fashionable Roman salons. More than this, their common network circled the same pole, the doyen and doyenne of Latin theological and literary fashion: Rufinus and Melania the Elder. Through them, Augustine extensively read the work of Origen in the last decade of the fourth century, drawing from a tradition of exegesis that, by the late 390s, was hotly contested in the Christian East.

For a Western audience, the first Origenist controversy was perceived through the lens of the high-profile conflict between Rufinus and Jerome. Here, I offered a new reading of Augustine's correspondence with the monk of Bethlehem, repositioning him as a probing critic of Jerome's volte-face on the legacy of Origen and his own hand in translating that legacy to the West. In turn, this led to a fresh interpretation of the opening years of the Pelagian controversy, in which Caelestius of Carthage is recast as the foil of Jerome, mediated through Rufinus the Syrian and his anti-Origenist work, the *Liber de Fide*. Unwittingly adopting the theology of this document into his own critique of Original Sin, Caelestius arrived in Africa, bringing Jerome's political anti-Origenism directly to Augustine's door. Recognizing the provenance of Caelestius' views, Augustine launched his defence of Original Sin with another, fitting irony: by drawing on the work of Origen, to defend himself from Rufinus' charge that Origenist heterodoxy and the doctrine of a punitive Fall through Original Sin are to each other root and branch. However, Augustine's positive hearing of the possibility of *impeccantia* in his early anti-Pelagian works was soon to come under the renewed attack of Jerome in his Epistle 133, and its identification of ἀπαθεια with the teaching of Origen. Replying to Epistle 133 in the course of his critique of Pelagius' *De Natura*, Augustine was finally forced to move away from any suggestion of Origenist tendencies, firmly postponing the attainment of sinlessness by the saints to the life hereafter. This cast the die for his anti-Pelagian doctrine of grace; however, his prior recognition of Origen's place within the traditional articulation of the 'history of fallenness' would remain, and with it Origen's characterization of Christ, the remedy to the contagion of sin in 'the likeness of the flesh of sin'. This central aspect of Augustine's anti-Pelagian teaching, and its reception from within the Origenian corpus, will be the focus of my study in the following chapter.

Notes:

([1]) Brown (1967: 46).

([2]) *Conf.* 3.10.6.

([3]) *Conf.* 5.12.7: *libri quippe eorum pleni sunt longissimis fabulis, de coelo, et de sideribus, et sole, et luna…*

([4]) *Util. Cred.* 1.1. Of course, in this analysis, both heretic and follower of heresy are under the sway of inner illusion; one is merely more serious than the other.

([5]) *Conf.* 7.25.19: 'For the refutation of heretics makes more eminent what your Church considers true and what wholesome doctrine is made up of' (*Improbatio quippe haereticorum facit eminere, quid ecclesia tua sentiat et quid habeat sana doctrina*). Ver. Rel. 15.8: 'Thus we make use of heretics not to approve their errors, but so that in asserting Catholic discipline against their treacheries, we might become more watchful and cautious, even though we cannot call them back to salvation' (*utamur ergo haereticis non ut eorum approbemus errores, sed ut catholicam disciplinam aduersus eorum insidias adserentes uigilantiores et cautiores simus, etiamsi eos ad salutem reuocare non possumus*).

([6]) *Ep*. 221.

([7]) *Ep*. 221.2: *Precor…ut, ex quo christiana religio haereditatis promissae nomen accepit, quae haereses fuerint, sint, quos errores intulerint, inferant, quid aduersus catholicam ecclesiam senserint…digneris exponere*.

([8]) *Ep*. 222.2.

([9]) *Ep*. 224.1: *si quid in eis [opusculis meis] me offenderet uel alios posset offendere*.

([10]) *Haer. Praef*.: *saepissime atque instantissime*.

([11]) I cannot but read this as Augustine's attempt to return Quodvultdeus' tedious and unwanted request firmly to him.

([12]) *Haer. Praef*.: *historica narratione commemorans omnia, nulla disputatione aduersus falsitatem pro ueritate decertans*. Augustine's sources for the work are, unsurprisingly, Epiphanius' *Panarion*, read in the condensed version *Anakephaleosis*, and Philastrius of Brescia's *Diversarum Hereseon Liber* already referred to, as well as the Ps-Hieronymean *Indiculus de Haeresibus* and Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*.

([13]) *Haer*. Epil. 3: *quid ergo faciat haereticum deinceps requirendum est ut, cum hoc domino adiuuante uitamus, non solum ea quae scimus, uerum etiam quae nescimus, siue quae iam orta sunt, siue quae adhuc oriri poterunt, haeretica uenena uitemus. huius autem sit iam uoluminis finis…*

([14]) Teske (1999: 413).

([15]) The proposition, taken vice versa, would also be true. Augustine's nuanced attitude to orthodoxy has recently been treated by Carol Harrison (2008: 254), who argues that his scriptural hermeneutics, teaching on Original Sin, and eschatology all amount to a realization of the 'dark side' of right belief: the fact that divine *res* are only ever partially illuminated by fragmentary human *signa*, and that orthodoxy is 'defined by alterity', performance and ecclesial participation. Orthodoxy, in other words, is always beneath dialogue, and never simply the dialogue itself. While Harrison's analysis is convincing, to describe these realities as 'dark' characteristics of theology is perhaps unfortunate, unwittingly playing into the oversimplistic definitions of orthodoxy as an unchanging, propositional monolith her article intends to challenge.

([16]) *Haer*. 88: *obiciuntur ab eis alia nonnulla, sed ista sunt maxime ex quibus intelliguntur etiam illa uel cuncta, uel paene cuncta pendere*.

([17]) The only substantial study of *De Haeresibus* remains that of Müller (1956); more concise is Bardy (1931).

([18]) *Haer*. 43: *qui eum defendunt unius eiusdemque substantiae esse dicunt docuisse patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, neque resurrectionem repulisse mortuorum; quamuis et in istis eum conuincere studeant qui eius plura legerunt*.

([19]) *Haer*. 43. Cf. *Anakephaleosis* in its Latin translation 1.1.18: 'Other Origenists are called after the writer Origen Adamantius. They deny the resurrection of the dead; they count Christ as much as the Holy Spirit among created things; they refer paradise, heaven and everything else to allegories, and teach that the reign of Christ will one day come to an end' (*Origeniani alii ab Origene Adamantio Scriptore. Illi mortuorum resurrectionem negant. Tam Christum quam Spiritum Sanctum creatis in rebus numerant, paradisum ac coelos, caeteraque omnia ad allegorias referent, Christi regnum terminandum esse docent*).

([20]) *Civ. Dei* 21.17. Augustine lifts the reasons for Origen's condemnation here from the *Anakephaleosis*. They are broader (and vaguer) in the official repetition of Theophilus' and Epiphanius' condemnation of Origen announced at the council of Cyprus in 399, conveyed to a Western audience in Anastasius' letter to Simplicianus of Milan (Jerome, *Ep*.

95.1–2, of 400): 'With equal consideration, a man holy and honourable, Theophilus our brother bishop, has not ceased to be watchful in the interests of salvation, lest the people of God in various churches should run into great blasphemies by reading Origen…Whatever is contrary to our faith and was once written by Origen, we have made clear that it is foreign to us and that we condemn it' (*pari animo uir sanctus et honorabilis Theophilus, frater et coepiscopus noster, circa salutis commoda non desinit uigilare, ne dei populus per diuersas ecclesias Origenem legendo in magnas incurrat blasphemias…quicquid est fidei nostrae contrarium ab Origene quondam scriptum, indicauimus a nobis esse alienum atque punitum*). Presuming that Augustine was aware of the letter's content, it is significant that his consideration of Origenism concentrates on doctrinal data, and not an indiscriminately generalized corpus of books.

([21]) Mercator, *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii*, written in Greek in around 427 and translated into Latin in 429; it was published with Mercator's *Prologue* in 430. The *Commonitorium aduersum haeresim Pelagii et Caelestii* was published shortly after Augustine's death (Wermelinger 1980: 611). Cf. *Gest. Pel.* 23.11. The earlier list is repeated in a different order in *Gest. Pel.*, although the content is consistent with Mercator's.

([22]) Cf. *Pecc. Orig.* 3.3 for Caelestius' reference to Rufinus. I will treat the scholarly dispute about the place of Rufinus' *Liber de Fide* in the genesis of Augustine's response to Caelestius further below.

([23]) The proceedings of the synod were recorded later by Orosius in his *Liber Apologeticus contra Pelagianos*.

([24]) Epistles 175 and 176 in the Augustinian corpus detail the minutes of the synods at Carthage and Milevis convoked to discuss the issue; Epistle 177 was sent together with them as a joint statement of the five major bishops involved (Augustine, Possidius of Calama, Evodius of Uzalis, Aurelius of Carthage, Alypius of Thagaste).

([25]) Bonner (1972: 3).

([26]) Rackett (2002).

([27]) Mercator, *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* 1.1: 'Adam was made a mortal, and whether or not he had sinned, he would have died; Adam's sin harmed only himself, and not the human race; children are born in the state in which Adam was before his transgression; the whole human race does not die because of Adam's death or transgression, and neither will the whole race rise because of Christ's resurrection; the Law sends us to the Kingdom of Heaven just as much as the Gospel; and there had been impeccable humans before the coming of the Lord, that is to say, people without sin' (*Adam mortalem factum, qui siue peccaret siue non peccaret, moriturus fuisset; quoniam peccatum Adae ipsum solum laesit et non genus humanum; quoniam paruuli qui nascuntur, in eo statu sunt, in quo Adam fuit ante praeuaricationem; quoniam neque per mortem uel praevaricationem Adae omne genus hominum moriatur neque per resurrectionem Christi omne genus hominum resurgat; quoniam sic lex mittit ad regnum caelorum quomodo et euangelium; quoniam et ante aduentum domini fuerunt homines inpeccabiles, id est, sine peccato*). The earlier list is repeated in a different order in *Gest. Pel.* 23.11.

([28]) Mercator, *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* 1.1; Augustine, *Gest. Pel.* 37.14 and 54.30: *posse hominem sine peccato et facile dei mandata seruare.*

([29]) Kelly (1975: 314 n. 24) suggests the letter was written in 414, on the basis that Orosius spoke of it as 'recent' at the Jerusalem synod in 415. As the council met in July, I see no reason why the conventional dating of 415 need be pushed further back into the previous year.

([30]) The letter is no longer extant, and referred to only in Jerome's Epistle 133.

([31]) *Ep.* 133.5.

([32]) Löhr (1999).

([33]) Brown (1970: 64).

([34]) Her methodological apparatus deserve some consideration. The crucial statement of method in the first chapter of *The Origenist Controversy* (Elizabeth Clark 1992) runs: 'The determining concept of network theory is, as J. Clyde Mitchell explains, that "the variations in behaviour of people in any one role relationship may be traced to the effects of the behaviour of other people, to whom they are linked in one, two or more steps, in some other quite different relationship"' (p. 18). So far so good; yet the statement seems to be more truism than truly insightful. People function in communities whose aims are not uniform, nor always explicitly known to all involved, not least because such communities are fluid and change over time. The second aspect of her template is more questionable still: 'Structures of relationships—who is linked with whom and how, and which persons are linked to each other through third parties—are held to be more decisive than issues of motivation or belief in explaining behaviour' (p. 18). The claim ignores the fact that issues of belief and intellectual/emotional motivation may constitute such networks in the first place, and fails to account for the numerous levels at which belief can be structured within the individual and in her relationships with others. It is clear that even relatively well-defined communities (whose mission statements are explicit and whose membership is exclusive) can nonetheless maintain a variety of opinions within a framework of orthodoxy. Network theory so defined is, I believe, of limited usefulness in positing a framework around which to characterize the activities of individuals within a group, as such a proscriptive framework (of network theory or otherwise) cannot do justice to the multi-layered agendas, consciously and unconsciously held opinions, loves and lies of humans in communication with one another. This is why it is important to retain Brown's proviso 'It may well be' when describing the connection between Augustine, Pelagius, and the many 'admirers' (noting the ambiguity of the word) of Origen in the late fourth century.

([35]) Elizabeth Clark (1992: 20).

([36]) *Hist. Laus*. 38.8.

([37]) *Hist. Laus*. 54–5.

([38]) Perhaps the complexity of the controversy is partly to blame for the unwillingness of Western scholarship to deal with it thoroughly in the twentieth century. To my knowledge, only two substantial monographs exist that attempt the task: Elizabeth Clark (1992) and Franz Diekamp's *Die Origenistischen Streitigkeiten im Sechsten Jahrhundert* (Münster, 1899), whose focus is in any case on the sixth century.

([39]) The *Ancoratus* handles Origenism throughout.

([40]) *Pan*. 64; those who wish to read a full analysis of Epiphanius' complaints should read Elizabeth Clark (1992: 86–104).

([41]) As well they might; cf. Origen, *Hom. Gen*. 1.13.

([42]) His initial statements naysaying the anthropomorphites were conveyed in his Easter encyclical of 399; alluded to by Socrates, *H.E.* 6.7, Sozomen, *H.E.* 8.11; Cassian also refers to it in *Conl*. 10.2.

([43]) Socrates, *H.E.*; Sozomen, *H.E.*

([44]) Sozomen, *H.E.* 8.12–13.

([45]) Socrates, *H.E.* 6.9–21; Sozomen, *H.E.* 8.14–end. The early historians' extreme hostility to Theophilus and their

characterization of his actions as pure power-play have recently been revisited by Norman Russell (2007). By his reading, the Anthropomorphite affair galvanized Theophilus' already dormant suspicion of Origen, a position carefully worked out in his festal letters of 399: 'Modern students of Origen judge most of [their] charges to be unjust. They are probably right to do so, but they are wrong to accuse Theophilus…of a lack of intelligence' (p. 25). While Russell acknowledges the influence of Evagrius on the reception of Origen's works in Theophilus' diocese, he maintains that Theophilus came to view Origen's theology as inimical to the Incarnation and sacramental life of the church through a genuinely independent reading of his works, as demonstrated in his letters (p. 24).

([46]) Socrates, *H.E.* 6.10; Sozomen, *H.E.* 8.14.

([47]) Cf. his Epistle 1 to John of Jerusalem, confirming John's judgement and the subsequent Epistle 2 (Jerome, *Ep*. 95) to Simplician of Milan, prohibiting the reading of Origen's books.

([48]) Jerome records the events in his *Apology* 3.33.

([49]) Kelly (1975: 198).

([50]) *Uir. Ill.* 54: 'Who does not know how great was his study of the Holy Scriptures, so that, contrary to the spirit of his age and people, he learned the Hebrew tongue; and taking the translation of the Septuagint, he brought all the other editions together in a single volume… I shall not keep silence about this aspect of his immortal genius: that he understood dialectics, geometry, arithmetic, music, grammar, rhetoric and the schools of all the philosophers, so that he had most enthusiastic students in secular literature whom he taught every day; and the crowds which flocked to him were astonishing. He received them, so that he could instruct them in the faith of Christ by means of secular literature' (*quis ignorat et quod tantum habuerit in scripturis sanctis studii, ut etiam hebraeam linguam contra aetatis gentis que suae naturam ediscere et exceptis septuaginta interpretibus, alias quoque editiones in unum congregaret…illud de inmortali eius ingenio non tacens, quod dialecticam quoque et geometriam, arithmeticam, musicam, grammaticam et rhetoricam omnium que philosophorum sectas ita didicit, ut studiosos quoque saecularium litterarum sectatores haberet, et interpretaretur eis cottidie, concursus que ad eum miri fierent. quos ille propterea recipiebat, ut sub occasione saecularis litteraturae in fide christi institueret*).

([51]) Jerome, *C. Ioh.* 11.

([52]) Jerome, *Ep*. 51.1, his Latin translation of Epiphanius' letter of 394 to John.

([53]) Jerome, *Ep*. 51.6.

([54]) Jerome, *Ep*. 57.2.

([55]) *Apol.* 1.11.

([56]) *Ep*. 21.3.

([57]) The passage of the correspondence is very clearly reconstructed by Kelly (1975: 217–20); the most recent and very thorough treatments are that of Fürst (1999, 2002); also Hennings (1994).

([58]) Dense footnoting of letter references in this section of this chapter is clarified by explicit ascription to Augustine and Jerome.

([59]) Augustine, *Ep*. 28.2: *Petimus ergo et nobiscum petit omnis Africanarum ecclesiarum studiosa societas, ut interpretandis eorum libris, qui graece scripturas nostras quam optime tractauerunt, curam atque operam inpendere non graueris. potes enim efficere, ut nos quoque habeamus tales illos uiros et unum potissimum, quem tu libentius in*

tuis litteris sonas.

([60]) Also the supposition of Courcelle (1948: 184).

([61]) Its bearer, Profuturus, was ordained as bishop of Cirta en route, where he presumably mislaid it; cf. Augustine, Ep. 40.8 and Ep. 71.2, where Augustine mentions this.

([62]) Fürst's 'Epistle A', the first of Jerome's five replies which no longer survive. Augustine mentions it in Ep. 40.1.

([63]) Kelly, J. N. D., 1975, 218.

([64]) Augustine, *Ep*. 40.9: *illud de prudentia doctrinaque tua desiderabam et adhuc desidero, ut nota nobis facias ea ipsa eius errata, quibus a fide ueritatis ille uir tantus recessisse conuincitur*.

([65]) Augustine, *Ep*. 67, of 402.

([66]) Jerome, *Ep*. 102.

([67]) Augustine, *Ep*. 71 and the now lost 71 (A).

([68]) Jerome, *Ep*. 102.

([69]) Jerome, *Ep*. 105.5.3: *non dicam a me, qui nihil sum, sed a ueterum Graecorum docerem interpretationibus discrepare*.

([70]) Augustine, *Ep*. 73.

([71]) Augustine, *Ep*. 82.

([72]) Augustine, *Ep*. 73.

([73]) Jerome, *Ep*. 112.3.2.

([74]) Jerome, *Ep*. 112.4–6.3.

([75]) Jerome, *Ep*. 112.19.5: 'I wonder why you do not read the books of the seventy translators in the pure form as they were produced by them, but rather as they have been emended, or corrupted, by Origen, with his obelisks and asterisks; and that you do not instead follow the translation of a Christian man' (*sed miror, quomodo septuaginta interpretum libros legas non puros, ut ab eis editi sunt, sed ab Origene emendatos siue corruptos per obelas et asteriscos et Christiani hominis interpretiunculam non sequaris*).

([76]) On which hangs the good advice of Löhr (2007a: 421): 'If someone knew nothing of either Augustine or Jerome, he could well begin by reading these letters to capture a first impression of their different intellectual personalities.'

([77]) Augustine's first lost letter, referred to in Augustine, *Ep*. 40.1.

([78]) Translated almost verbatim, but without much further reflection, by Fürst (1999: 117).

([79]) Jerome, *Ep*. 27*.10.

([80]) Jerome, *Ep*. 27*.3.

([81]) Augustine, *Ep*. 73.3.9.

([82]) Augustine, *Ep*. 42. Cf. Brown (1970: 58).

([83]) Brown (1970: 58).

([84]) Cf. Augustine, *Ep*. 27. The correspondence is fragmentary; Courcelle (1951) attempts to fill in the gaps.

([85]) Brown (1970: 59).

([86]) Cf. Courcelle (1948).

([87]) Fürst (1999: 8).

([88]) For Brown's survey of the correspondence, cf. (1967: 274–5).

([89]) Cf. Lancel (2002: 178) for his brief consideration of the letters.

([90]) Hennings (1994: 33 n. 73). His list includes the study of Altaner (1967e) to which Fürst (1999: 8) also refers. He cites in addition Theiler (1970a), Bonnadière (1974), and O'Connell (1984). An essential bibliography on this topic would also include Trapé (1982), Chadwick (1985), Grossi (1989), Bammel (1992a, 1992b), Theiler (1970b), and Heidl (2003).

([91]) Bonnadière (1974: 52).

([92]) Altaner (1967e).

([93]) Chadwick (1985) argues for Augustine's reception of both the homilies and the Commentary on the basis of the textual parallel alone, without noting Aurelius' possession of the texts; he gives as an additional source for the 'five senses' theme of *Conf*. 10, *Hom. Lev*. 3.7. His general conclusion is worth noting as a call for further reception-analysis: 'I suspect that a really full catalogue of probable echoes of Origen in Augustine would add up to quite a book' (p. 220).

([94]) *Ep*. 140.21.8.

([95]) Ambrose's Commentary on Luke does not contain a parallel exegesis of the verse.

([96]) Bammel (1992; cf. 366–8 for the textual comparisons).

([97]) Bammel (1992: 350).

([98]) Bammel (1992: 348): 'For both Origen and the early Augustine, the endowment of the soul with free will, its fall from God and the divine provision for its return are central to their theodicy.' This resonates with Carol Harrison's description of Augustine's early endorsement of a Christian Platonism in which the soul 'shares many of the characteristics of the divine…Once it has sinned, by turning, in pride, towards itself or lower creation, its being (and I would argue, also, its freedom) is corrupted and diminished' (2006: 96–7); this turning to the lower creation she describes elsewhere as an 'inevitable' (2006: 97) consequence of *creatio ex nihilo*.

([99]) Heidl (2003: 73).

([100]) Theiler (1970).

([101]) Cf. Brown (1967: 294) for the details of their visit to Hippo, and its unfortunate outcome.

([102]) *Ep*. 26.1.

([103]) *Ep*. 186.1.

([104]) Indicated at *Grat. Chr*. 38.35.

([105]) *Pecc. Orig*. 3.3.

([106]) *Ep*. 58.

([107]) Augustine, *Ep*. 130 and 131; Jerome, *Ep*. 130; Pelagius, *Ep. ad Dem.*

([108]) Cf. Souter (1922: 188–92); De Bruyn (1993: 16–24); Bohlin (1957: 47–53, 87–103,106–8).

([109]) Jerome replied, referring Paulinus directly to *De Principiis* (*Ep*. 85.3–4).

([110]) The date and author of *Ind.* are still uncertain; the classic discussion is that of Plinval (1947).

([111]) Cf. Rees (1988: 10): 'The villain of the piece is Origen, who is subject to virulent attacks again and again. It is only after firing a salvo at Origen's theory of the pre-existence of souls that the author turns aside, as it were, to a direct volley at the traducianists, whom he then dismisses as stupid and mad for asserting that "Christ destines unbaptized children to the punishment of everlasting fire" (Lib. 41).'

([112]) Altaner (1967d: 473).

([113]) *Comm. adv. Haer. Pel. Coel. Praef.* 2.

([114]) Altaner (1967d: 480): 'If such an early dating were to be taken seriously, it would subsequently be apparent that Augustine had let this first Latin work—which clearly and distinctly defends the central principles of Pelagianism—go unnoticed; he should have taken up his position against it immediately.'

([115]) Refoulé (1963).

([116]) Bonner (1972).

([117]) *Lib. Fid.* 17.

([118]) *Lib. Fid.* 17.

([119]) *Lib. Fid.* 19.

([120]) *Lib. Fid.* 20–1.

([121]) *Lib. Fid.* 27.

([122]) *Quia igitur nonnulli sunt, qui dementia capti dicunt, quod ex anima primi hominis Adae anima Evae mulieris assumpta sit, nonnulli etiam quod ex solo Adam cum seminis iactu in omnes qui ex eo nati fuerunt animae transmissae sint.*

([123]) *Lib. Fid.* 28.

([124]) *Lib. Fid.* 29–30.

([125]) *Lib. Fid.* 33: *Non igitur hominibus mortem pro malorum vice dicimus, sicut ratiocinantur indocti, sed ad delendam mortis pravitatem…ad delendam eorum pravitatem, bona mors esse dicitur*.

([126]) *Lib. Fid.* 34.

([127]) *Lib. Fid.* 35.

([128]) *Lib. Fid.* 39: *insaniunt qui per unum hominem Adam orbem terrarum iniquitatis flagitiorumque condemnant*.

([129]) *Lib. Fid.* 40: *baptisma igitur infantes non propter peccata percipiunt, sed ut spiritalem procreationem habentes, quasi per baptisma in Christo creentur, et ipsius regni caelestis participes fiant*.

([130]) *Lib. Fid.* 41.

([131]) Cf. *Hom. Lev.* 8.5: 'But if it pleases you to hear also what other saints think about this birthday, hear David speaking: he said, "I was conceived in iniquities, and my mother brought me forth in sins," showing that every soul born in the flesh is polluted by the filth of "iniquity and sin". And on account of this we can say what we have already called to mind above, that "no-one is clean of filth, not even if his life lasts but one day". We can also add to these [proofs] the reason why it is required that, since the baptism of the Church is given for the remission of sins, so also, according to the custom of the Church, baptism is given to infants as well; certainly, if there were nothing in children which ought to be remitted and had no need of indulgence, the grace of baptism would seem to be superfluous' (*Quod si placet audire, quid etiam alii sancti de ista nativitate senserint, audi David dicentem: 'in iniquitatibus' inquit 'conceptus sum, et in peccatis peperit me mater mea', ostendens quod quaecumque anima in carne nascitur, 'iniquitatis et peccati' sorde polluitur; et propterea dictum esse illud, quod iam superius memoravimus quia: 'nemo mundus a sorde, nec si unius diei sit vita eius'. Addi his etiam illud potest, ut requiratur, quid causae sit, cum baptisma ecclesiae pro remissione peccatorum detur, secundum ecclesiae observantiam etiam parvulis baptismum dari; cum utique, si nihil esset in parvulis, quod ad remissionem deberet et indulgentiam pertinere, gratia baptismi superflua videretur*). Norman P. Williams (1927: 208–31) remains an excellent survey of the issue.

([132]) *Ad. Simpl.* 1.2.16: 'Therefore all men are one mass of sin, since, as the apostle says, "In Adam all die." The whole human race draws the origin of its offence against God from him, owing its punishment to the divine and highest justice. Whether that is exacted or remitted, there is no unrighteousness on God's part. It would be a judgement of pride for the debtors to decide on whom it should be exacted, and to whom remitted, just as those who were hired for the vineyard were unjustly indignant, when as much as was duly paid to them was given to others' (*sunt igitur omnes homines—quando quidem, ut apostolus ait, in adam omnes moriuntur, a quo in uniuersum genus humanum origo ducitur offensionis dei—una quaedam massa peccati supplicium debens diuinae summae que iustitiae, quod siue exigatur siue donetur, nulla est iniquitas. a quibus autem exigendum et quibus donandum sit, superbe iudicant debitores, quemadmodum conducti ad illam uineam iniuste indignati sunt, cum tantundem aliis donaretur, quantum illis redderetur*).

([133]) *Ad. Simpl.* 1.2.20: 'Then one mass was made of all, coming from the transmission of sin and from the punishment of mortality, although God formed and created things good…But carnal concupiscence now reigns by the punishment of sin, just as it has disordered the whole human race into a single lump throughout which original guilt remains present' (*tunc facta est una massa omnium, ueniens de traduce peccati et de poena mortalitatis, quamuis deo formante et creante quae bona sunt…sed concupiscentia carnalis de peccati poena iam regnans uniuersum genus humanum tamquam totam et unam consparsionem originali reatu in omnia permanente confuderat*).

([134]) *an etiam non propagata eo ipso, quo carni peccati aggrauanda miscetur, iam ipsius peccati remissione et sua redemptione opus habeat*.

([135]) For an analysis of all the citations found in *Pecc. Mer.* (namely, 1.9.9, 1.34.24, 1.65.35–66.35, 2.11.9, 2.15.10,

2.38.24), see Bammel (1992: 358–65).

([136]) *Ep*. 126.1. *certe habes ibi uirum sanctum et eruditum Augustinum episocopum, qui uiua, ut aiunt, uoce docere et poterit et suam, immo per se nostrum, explicere sententiam.*

([137]) *Nat. Grat*. 1.1.

([138]) Fürst (1999: 170): 'All of Jerome's letters, even the private ones, were meant for public circulation…Sending a letter was simultaneously to publish it.' While the confusion of Augustine's correspondence with Jerome shows that letters could as easily be lost to their addressee as circulated to an unintended public, the importance of Epistle 133's pronouncements on Pelagianism leads me to believe its publication must have been widespread and accessible to Augustine; it is clearly an announcement of Jerome's opinion on the Pelagian heresy, not a private note.

([139]) *Nat. Grat*. 37.33: 'Far be it from me to say to him what he says others say against him: that man is comparable to God if he can be without sin; as if—indeed!—a sinless angel could be compared to God' (*absit autem ut ei dicamus, quod a quibusdam contra se dici ait, conparari hominem deo, si absque peccato esse asseratur; quasi uero angelus, qui absque peccato est, conparetur deo*). It is true that Augustine may simply be quoting from Pelagius' self-defence in his *De Natura* (the opinion of Robert F. Evans 1968: 66); however, this seems to me to be too great a coincidence given the timing of both Epistle 133 and Augustine's composition of *De Natura et Gratia*.

([140]) *Ep*. 133.1.

([141]) *Ep*. 133.2.

([142]) *Ep*. 133.3: *sententias peri apatheias, quam nos 'impassibilitatem' possumus dicere, quando numquam animus ulla cogitatione et uitio commouetur et—ut simpliciter dicam—uel saxum uel deus est*.

([143]) *Ep*. 133.3: *doctrina tua Origenis ramusculus est…nec fieri potest, ut diversis sit eorum exitus, quorum est una sententia.*

([144]) Kelly (1975: 315).

([145]) *Pecc Mer*. 2.8.7.

([146]) *Pecc Mer*. 2.26.17.

([147]) *Pecc Mer*. 2.34.20.

([148]) *Sp. Litt*. 1.1: *absurdum enim tibi uidetur dici aliquid fieri posse, cuius desit exemplum.*

([149]) *Sp. Litt*. 2.2.

([150]) *Sp. Litt*. 3.2.

([151]) *Sp. Litt*. 4.2.

([152]) *Sp. Litt*. 63.35.

([153]) *Sp. Litt*. 65.36.

([154]) Rackett (2002: 222–3, quoting *Nat. Grat*. 44.51–2). Carol Harrison (2006) detects the underlying continuity of Augustine's thought on this point: 'There are a number of passages in the early works which do indeed seem to entertain

the possibility of attaining the truth, but they read more like statements of theory and aspiration—describing an ideal for human beings to aim for, or a state from which they fall short' (p. 64); 'The fleeting glimpses of truth which sinful human beings do attain, are indeed the inspiration and ground for their faith, hope and love, but they most definitely never have the quality in Augustine's work of the serene and wrapt contemplation of the sage. Nor does his thought change on this matter: precisely the same evaluation of the goal and attainment of ascents is presented in *De Trinitate* as in his very earliest works' (p. 66).

([155]) *Nat. Grat.* 49.42.

([156]) *Ep.* 167.1.1–2.1.

([157]) *Ep.* 167.14.4: *sed quid ago? tamquam oblitus, cui loquar, doctori similis factus sum, cum proposuerim, quid abs te discere uelim.*

([158]) *Ep.* 167.16.5–17.5

([159]) *Ep.* 167.14.4.

([160]) *Ep.* 167.15.4.

([161]) *Ep.* 167.21.5: *qui haec, quae tamen adprobas, non expectas discere, quia ea docere consuesti.*

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

поменять прокси

The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430
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A Divine Humanity in Sin's Likeness

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Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 3 examines the development of Augustine's theology of Original Sin alongside his concurrent description of Christ's humanity. It traces his move from an abstract account of sin, to a fully historicized description of Adam's Fall and the Original Sin propagated from it in carnal concupiscence (*concupiscentia carnalis*), and suggests that a conception of embodiment as a consequence of the Fall is subconsciously present in this shift. The chapter then highlights Augustine's maturing exegesis of Romans 8.3, in which Christ's conception of a virgin, without concupiscence (*sine concupiscentia*), emerges as the dominant motif. Surveying the shift in Augustine's anti-Pelagianism embedded in both *De Peccatorum Meritis* and *De Natura et Gratia*, it argues that his treatment of Romans 8.3 remains constant: Christ 'in likeness of sinful flesh' is deployed as proof of the reality of fallen humanity, against Pelagianism's tendency to reduce the Incarnation to the level of pedagogic exemplarism.

Keywords: carnal concupiscence, flesh of sin, Ad Simplicianum, virginal conception, De Libero Arbitrio, De Peccatorum Meritis, Julian of Eclanum, Adam, theological anthropology, Christology

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gical complex in significant
tly shifted his anti-
n 415. The identification of
the doctrine of Original Sin with Origen's account of a pre-mundane Fall found in the *Liber de Fide*, alongside Jerome's

classification of *impeccantia* as Origenist heresy, together forced Augustine to back away from stating his position on both issues. Thus with *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine turned his attention to the gratuity of grace, compressing Caelestius' denial of Original Sin and Pelagius' confidence in the grace of nature into a unified heresy. I promised to prove Augustine's reception of Origen in the course of a Christological study, focusing on Augustine's modelling of Christ's humanity in the context of his anti-Pelagian agenda. In contrast to highlighting the shift of 415 in Chapter 2, it is the central purpose of this chapter to reveal the marked continuity of Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3, in which Christ is described as possessing the 'likeness of sinful flesh', from the mid-390s to 430. As the dominant Christological motif of the anti-Pelagian treatises, sermons, and letters dating from 412 to 430, this exegesis requires careful treatment, not only as it appears in much earlier works that form the platform for Augustine's anti-Pelagian polemic, but also as it relates to his developing theological anthropology. It will be the purpose of Chapter 4 to trace its roots in the works of Ambrose and, most importantly, Origen.

In order to unpack Augustine's treatment of Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh', it will be necessary first to examine his understanding of 'sinful flesh' as it applies to all of humanity. This chapter therefore divides Augustine's work into three key periods: those dating from the mid-390s, spanning *De Libero Arbitrio*, the early Pauline commentaries, and the *Ad Simplicianum*; those arising in the heat of the Pelagian controversy, from 412 to 417; and the later works responding to Julian and the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles. The first period encompasses the shift in Augustine's thought, hinging on his reading of Paul and finding its consummation in the *Ad Simplicianum*; it is, **(p.71)** therefore, given the fullest treatment of all three periods. The second straddles the change of 415 outlined in the previous chapter, and the third includes the mature anti-Pelagianism of Augustine's declining years. Dealing with each period, I first examine Augustine's developing theological anthropology, and subsequently outline his treatment of Romans 8:3 in relation to it. Central to the first period is his gradual rejection of an abstract account of moral agency and its deficiencies, in favour of a scripturally oriented historicization of sin and its effects in the human present. Within this period the vocabulary of *desideria carnis, consupiscentia carnalis*, and *massa peccati* become fully established and settled within his theological lexicon. Likewise, after initially vacillating exegeses of Romans 8:3, the period sees him settle on an interpretation that reads the text primarily with reference to the virginal conception of the Incarnate Son. The second period shows Augustine adapting his already established theological anthropology in a critique of the breviates brought against Caelestius, and a concerted application of Romans 8:3 to the shortfalls of a presumed Pelagian Christology. The third evidences the consistency of Augustine's general theological project after 415, while noting the inconsistency of his Christology under pressure from Julian of Eclanum. This period is thus dealt with more briefly.

A salient feature of both the second and third periods together is Augustine's growing unease about the origin of the soul, and the implications any one doctrine of it might have on his account of Original Sin. As this issue is central to Chapters 5 and 6, I postpone an extended treatment of it here. The overall purpose of my exposition in this chapter is to show the continuity of Augustine's Christological exegesis of Romans 8:3, and to highlight the inconsistencies this exegesis occasions when placed in the context of the broader, shifting project of Augustine's anti-Pelagianism. I do not attempt to deal with the large amount of secondary commentary on each of the texts included in my survey, both with an eye on the patience of my reader, and mindful that my purpose is a detailed reading of Augustine to a specific Christological and, subsequently, reception-historical end.

Early theological anthropology

De Libero Arbitrio

Christ incarnate 'in the likeness of the flesh of sin' presupposes a theological anthropology that gives detailed attention to what humanity 'in the flesh of sin' might be. Augustine first attempted to correlate the two in terms faithful to the letter to the Romans in his early commentaries on the Pauline epistles, written in the mid-390s. However, questions of the nature of man and his **(p.72)** relationship to good and evil had concerned Augustine from his earliest period of writing Christian philosophy. *De Libero Arbitrio*, the major early work in this category, deserves brief treatment here as a prelude to examining the works of Pauline exegesis, as it prepares the way for many of the themes that would be reaffirmed in

those later works.

De Libero Arbitrio was written piecemeal between 387 and 395 as a polemic against Manichaean theodicy. Although the apparent agenda of the work is to answer the Manichaean objection that the Christian God is the source of evil present in the world, the second half of book 2 and almost all of book 3 handles issues of sin and redemption with reference to biblical texts and themes.[1] Augustine argues in the first half of the work that the evil present in the world must be viewed in the context of the good ordering of the whole creation, in the light of which it appears to be a privation of existence rather than any substantive thing. Humans, like other animal creatures, possess mind (*mens*) and spirit (*spiritus*), through which they gain knowledge (*scientia*) of their environment; unlike other animals, their rationality has a self-reflectivity that allows them to discern their position between the finite goods of existence, and their infinitely good source. Choosing to set their desire on the one or the other ultimately leads to a choice between embracing wrongly identified goods (ultimately leading to the evil of non-existence) and true goods. The *motus animae* (movement of the soul) behind the choice for the former Augustine classifies as *libido*, desire left undirected by right reason. However, because he insists on the unimpaired sovereignty of reason throughout, the embrace of inferior goods in an attitude of *libido* remains an open possibility for humans, whose desire otherwise stands under no exterior or interior compulsion.

At the end of book 2, Augustine enlarges on the definition of wrongful human desire set out at the beginning of the work as a turning to inferior goods, here rooting it in the turning-in of the human on himself. It is precisely the median status of the human, poised between knowledge and love of the finite and the eternal, that makes him capable of turning self into an object of *libido*. This development in the work is simultaneous with the use of the vocabulary of sin and sinfulness (otherwise absent in what has come before), alongside the passive construction and a description of *libido* as inappropriate **(p.73)** desire for bodily and intellectual goods: 'The will is turned towards itself when it wishes to be a power of its own; outwards, when it occupies itself with knowing what belongs to other things or whatever does not belong to it; and downwards, when it delights in the pleasure of the body.'[2] The human characterized by evil desire is made 'proud, curious and lascivious' (*superbus et curiosus et lasciuus*).[3] In a threefold movement of sin away from what is truly good. Augustine's previous, unequivocal affirmation of the capacity of humans to turn away from wrongful desire is also absent in what follows: 'Because the human falls thus of its own accord, he cannot as a result rise up again';[4] he must appeal to Christ for help.

However, what is suggested at the end of the book is just that: suggestion, and it remains an impressionistic new venture, to await development in book 3. Here, Augustine opens by arguing that God's foreknowledge of human acts does not compromise their freedom, in a tenor that is highly reminiscent of what has come before in the work: even though God knows the sin humans will commit, the good order of the whole remains. For the first time, the 'first man' is mentioned, but from the mouth of Augustine's interlocutor,[5] after which Augustine continues the discussion with reference to humans in the abstract.[6] The flow of the discussion becomes significantly disrupted at 3.24.9, where Augustine begins to explore the possibility that the presence of evil in the world may in fact be a constitutive part of the well-ordered hierarchy of goods, referring his friend to the analogy of darkness and light. However, he quickly modifies this with more explicit explanation: sinful natures are given fresh dignity when they are purged by the goodness of a concomitant higher nature, and so it is that sinful souls are fitted to bodies that are of a lower nature than themselves, which elevates the body and cancels the sins of the soul at the same time. Here is the first suggestion that embodiment is a divinely decreed punishment, in a clear move away from the general argument of books 2 and 3, that humans punish themselves for their wrongdoing by embracing inferior goods. This is tied into a repeated reference to the first man: 'We are advised to note that the first human adorned the mortality of his flesh, insofar as the punishment of sin was suited to it; and our Lord adorned the mortality of his, so that he would free us from sin by his mercy.'[7] It is at **(p.74)** this point in the text that the flow of the discourse between Augustine and his friend ceases.

Augustine's train of thought is left unresolved, as he turns to the question of the origin of evil within the morally responsible soul, initially proposing pride in chapter ten (in sympathy with his exposition of the love of private goods in book two), then in chapter sixteen suggesting avarice (which he cites alongside the Greek equivalent, φιλαργυρια). The

text shows no attempt to reconcile the two explanations, which appear to belong to two different stages of the development of the work, corresponding with the second half of book two and the first half of books two and one respectively. Turning from the origin of sin to its effects, Augustine comes to a key conclusion: human beings find themselves in a state of *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, not always knowing whether an act is morally right, and finding themselves unable to do that which their good will directs. He quotes St Paul: 'The good that I will I do not do, but the evil that I do not will to do, I do.'[8] No longer, it seems, is the true good so easily praised and attained. Crucially, ignorance and difficulty are accompanied and abetted by *carnalis consuetudo*,[9] which comes about through sin 'almost naturally' (*quodammodo naturaliter*).[10] To be distinguished from the good nature given by God, this secondary denaturing of the embodied will is wrought by humans themselves. In the final chapters of the book, Augustine treats of the first humans in concrete terms, in part to anchor the universality of the *ignorantia/difficultas* punishment in a historical act, thus moving away from his earlier half-suggestion that sin is itself a divinely willed characteristic of the good order of all. This opens the question of how a historically committed past act can affect ensuing generations not only in soul but also in body, a problem insinuated in Augustine's increasingly frequent references to *carnalis consuetudo* as a physical (as well as moral) disposition throughout book 3. The work leaves both issues unresolved.

By the time he had completed *De Libero Arbitrio*, Augustine had established that sin could not be treated of in the abstract, with reference to all individuals within the order of nature, but must be considered in the light of the scriptural account of the Fall. Resulting in a shared sinful nature, itself a substantial perversion of an original state, the sin of Adam and Eve hinders the mind from knowing and wanting God above all other things, simultaneously pitching flesh against soul in a just divine punishment. Though the mechanism of sin's transmission through history would have to wait for Augustine's full consideration, his reading of Paul—already indicated at the end of *De Libero Arbitrio*—would provide him with a complete vocabulary to describe the effect of sin on the embodied soul.

(p.75) Early Exegesis of Paul

At the same time as Augustine was finishing *De Libero Arbitrio*, he was also working on a series of commentaries on Romans and Galatians. Begun in around 394, they are thought to have been finished by 395 or early 396.[11] In addition to these attempts at formal commentary, Augustine addressed problems of Pauline exegesis in the long-running and composite work *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*. In the established format of a series of questions and answers between pupil and teacher, it shows a stylistic kinship with *De Libero Arbitrio*, consistent with its gestation from 388 to 396.[12] Both the *Expositio Quarumdam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos* and *Quaestio 66* are key texts in the development of Augustine's understanding of 'sinful flesh'.

The *Expositio Quarumdam Propositionum* (hereafter simply *Expositio Propositionum*) approaches the relationship between humanity and sin from the new perspective of *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, which is both corporate and rooted in a historical event. Here, humans are defined as creatures set in a progressive salvation history, marked by distinct periods: before the Law, under the Law, under grace, and at peace.[13] In each, they have a different relationship to *concupiscentia carnalis*:

> Before the Law we follow the concupiscence of the flesh; under the Law, we are dragged along by it; under grace we neither follow it nor are subject to it, and in the state of peace there is no concupiscence of the flesh.
>
> *Ante legem sequimur concupiscentiam carnis, sub lege trahimur ab ea, sub gratia nec sequimur eam nec trahimur ab ea, in pace nulla est concupiscentia carnis.*[14]

In the same passage, *concupiscentia carnalis* is equated with *desideria carnis*, which humans 'approve' under the Law; under grace, the agency of this bodily desire is resistible, because the human 'spirit' is rooted in divine love; human identity possesses a kind of integrity in sympathy with the desire of the flesh before the Law, which is then fractured into a state of conflict once the Law has been imposed. At 34.41, to be 'carnal' (Rom. 7:14)[15] is defined in the terms, set out in *De Libero Arbitrio*, of desiring temporal goods and fearing temporal ills. Once given, the Law cannot but elicit the response

of pride from sinful humanity: 'he is conquered by his sins whilst he tries to live justly in his own power, without the help of the liberating grace of God.'[16] This constitutes the 'Law of sin': entrapment in pride and misdirected loves, coupled with the condition of mortality, all seemingly imposed as divine punishment.[17] To the **(p.76)** state of humanity under the Law belongs the cry of Romans 7:24: 'Who will liberate me from this body of death?' as the Law fractures the will in the execution of good moral agency, but does not impair the capacity of humans to desire right desire, and call on God for grace. In a crucial volte-face, Augustine would later reinterpret this passage, as I shall soon make clear.

Once again, two important issues remain unresolved in this new synthesis. The first centres on Augustine's mixed use of physical and voluntary categories to describe the nature of sin: it is live in desire (*desideria*), but this is something that pertains to *caro*. A synechdochal reading of the latter might be presumed, except for Augustine's insistence that sin and its concomitant punishment bring about the mortality of the body. Secondly, although the transmission of this punishment from the primary sin of Adam is assumed, Augustine gives no account of the relationship between fallen desire and reproduction, to justify the propagation of fatal *desideria carnis* from parent to child. He provides no exegesis of Romans 5:12, to become so important in later writings; nor is 1 Corinthians 15:22 related to the argument, as would also be the case in later works. One passage alone contains an explicit treatment of the transmission of sin:

> Because these desires are born of the mortality of the flesh which we bear from the first sin of the first human (whence we are born carnally), they will not end unless we merit that transformation of the body by the resurrection which is promised to us. There, there will be perfect peace, when we will be established in the fourth stage [of our salvation].
>
> *Sed quoniam ista desideria de carnis mortalitate nascuntur, quae trahimus ex primo peccato primi hominis, unde carnaliter nascimur, non finientur haec, nisi resurrectione corporis immutationem illam, quae nobis promittitur, meruerimus, ubi perfecta pax erit, cum in quarto gradu constituemur.*[18]

The Latin *unde carnaliter nascimur* makes quite clear that it is a permanent state of sinfulness from which humans are all born, synonymous with the condemnation of humanity to mortality, outlined in both the commentary and *De Libero Arbitrio*. This is given further refinement in Quaestio 66 of *De Diversis Quaestionibus*.

Because of the composite nature of this work, it is extremely difficult to make definitive assertions about the dating of the individual *Quaestiones* it contains. Editing the English edition in 1977, Mosher attempted to divide the work into chronological blocks of *Quaestiones*, while admitting the tendentiousness of his results; Mutzenbecher, introducing the Latin edition of 1975,[19] is more circumspect still about dating. In the *Retractationes*, Augustine is himself vague about the development of the book, describing it as a prolix **(p.77)** work that was 'scattered about on many little slips' (*dispersae … per cartulas multas*) and collated only after his return to Africa.[20] However, several aspects of its extended treatment of Romans 7 argue for a composition after the *Expositio Propositionum*, placing the composition of *Quaestio* 66 around 395 or 396.

Augustine begins the *Quaestio* by repeating the fourfold scheme characterizing salvation history, this time underlining the parallel between salvation history as a whole, and the history of the human individual, whose life progresses to eternal life through the Law and into the state of grace.[21] Consequently, the four stages, previously 'steps' (*gradus*) are retitled *actiones*, reflecting the implications of each stage for individual moral agency. In addition to this, by ascribing the cry of Romans 7:25 to the man under the Law in the *Expositio Propositionum*, Augustine had implied that the sinful human under the Law might be capable of desiring rightly, to the point of actively seeking God, thus clearing the human under grace from any continued slavery to the desires of the flesh. By contrast, *Quaestio* 66 offers an amended reading of the text. Quoting Romans 7:15–23, Augustine immediately follows it with the comment:

> All these are the words of the human established under the Law and not yet under grace who, even though he does not wish to sin, is nonetheless conquered by sin. For carnal habit and the natural chains of mortality, from which

—from Adam—we have been propagated, are impotent for the task. In this state he begs for help, recognizes that he is one who has fallen, not one who can get up. But now set free, he acknowledges the grace of his liberator and says: Wretched man that I am! Who will liberate me from this body of this death? Even the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Huc usque sunt uerba hominis sub lege constituti nondum sub gratia, qui etiam si nolit peccare, uincitur a peccato. Inualuit enim consuetudo carnalis et naturale uinculum mortalitatis, quo de Adam propagati sumus. Imploret ergo auxilium qui sic positus est, et nouerit suum fuisse quod cecidit, non suum esse quod surgit. Iam enim liberatus, agnoscens gratiam liberatoris sui dicit, Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum.[22]

Man under grace thus retains the character of conflicted desire, which also attaches to human nature under the Law, resolution now being postponed for the state of peace after the resurrection.

The formal commentaries on Romans and *Quaestio* 66 show a considerable move away from Augustine's early understanding of sinful human nature set **(p.78)** out in books 1 and 2 of *De Libero Arbitrio*. Initially treating wrong desire in strictly voluntary terms, Augustine's growing attention to the corporeal language of Scripture to describe sin and the narrative of Adam's historic Fall result in a blurring of the distinction between the will and the flesh, in his account of a divine punishment for Adam's fault in a mortal flesh, whose possessors are bound to *desideria carnis*. These works do not, however, offer a settled synthesis, and their provisionality is reflected in the stylistic incompletion of the three Pauline commentaries: the first on Romans a short, experimental work, the second on Galatians fuller and more confident, and the final Romans commentary left unfinished. Augustine reflected briefly on why he should have left this last work to one side in the *Retractationes*: 'Had this work been finished, it would have contained many more books … I stopped adding further volumes in the middle of explaining the letter as a whole, deterred by the size of that task and the work involved; and then I sank into easier tasks.'[23] Given that his episcopal ministry had begun in the same year, failure to meet the challenge might appear reasonable. That his reading of Romans was undergoing a quiet transformation cannot be ruled out as a further, and more significant, reason for his disinclination to continue the work.

Mature synthesis: De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum

In 396, Augustine received a request from Simplicianus, bishop of Milan, to explain to him a number of passages of Romans. The resulting *De Diversis Questionibus Ad Simplicianum* of 397–8 has received a great deal of scholarly attention, indicating, as it does, the appearance of Augustine's mature doctrine of man and of grace. Fredriksen Landes states the current consensus: 'Augustine's position in *Simpl*. represents a clear point of transition in his exegesis of Paul, as much in relation to [his] understanding of the Pauline epistles in particular, as in the broader context of his development of a doctrine of the grace of God, human freedom and divine justice.'[24] Most recently, Carol Harrison has called into question this reading of the book, arguing for a greater continuity in Augustine's thought from early through to later works as a whole.[25] It should be borne in mind, however, that continuity and development are not mutually exclusive, and, while the *Ad Simplicianum* does appear to innovate with regard to the problem of election suggested in Romans 9, it does so on the basis of an enriched interpretation of Romans 7 that is clearly indebted to Augustine's earlier reflection. The two questions **(p.79)** Augustine seeks to answer in book 1 of the *Ad Simplicianum* can be run together to form a single problem: if under the Law humans find themselves in a state of death and incapacity (cf. Rom. 7:21–5), how is it possible for them to merit the saving love of God (cf. Rom. 9:13–18)?

Augustine opens the first question by collapsing the clear distinction between humanity before and after the Law, dividing humanity into three states, rather than four: prelapsarian, postlapsarian, and saved. The command of God to Adam not to eat of the tree in the garden must be held as equally 'law' together with the Mosaic code; both are given as divine injunction.[26] Coupled with this, Augustine readjusts once again his reading of Romans 7:24–5: Paul had, after all, meant to ascribe the cry for aid to the human under the Law, a cry arising from the anxious guilt of the sinner that it is the purpose of the Law to inspire.[27] Qualifying this, however, is Augustine's continued insistence that humans in a state of

grace remain compromised by the effects of sin, remaining 'in a certain way carnal' (*ad quemdam modum carnales*).[28] Thus humans possess a carnal disposition as a result of divine punishment that is 'not the first nature of humanity, but the punishment of sin, like a second nature…'.[29] The side effect of mortality is *assiduitas uoluptatis* (literally, 'the constant presence of pleasure').[30] In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, the limitations of finite existence afforded humans the open option of preferring the finite in virtue of their median position between finite and absolute goods; here, with death firmly rooted in divine punishment, the human will-made-mortal cannot but prefer inferior objects of desire. In turn, this results in the self-delusion that the fulfilment of sinful desire is itself 'sweeter'[31] than true love of worthy goods: just as sin results in the stasis of physical death, so too it brings about deadness at the heart of human self-knowledge and self-love. Where natural self-reflectivity should issue in the love of God, addiction to second-nature, illusory self-'love' takes place instead. Describing this, Augustine settles on the term, first used in *De Libero Arbitrio*, that will remain a constant: *concupiscentia carnalis*. Out of his new formulation comes the insistence that God must break into the inverted will from without in order to offer even the possibility of conversion to a person: He must present himself as the truly pressing object of desire.[32] This can only ever be the result of his divine will.

Together with this definition of carnal concupiscence, Augustine finally connects three passages of Scripture in *Quaestio* 2 to form the classic 'Augustinian' synthesis:

> **(p.80)** Therefore all humans are one mass of sin, since, as the apostle says, 'In Adam all die.' The whole human race draws the origin of its offence against God from him, owing its punishment to the divine and highest justice. Whether that is exacted or remitted, there is no unrighteousness on God's part.
>
> *Sunt igitur omnes homines---quandoquidem, ut Apostolus ait, in Adam omnes moriuntur, a quo in uniuersum genus humanum origo ducitur offensionis dei---una quaedam massa peccati supplicium debens diuinae summaeque iustitiae, quod siue exigatur siue donetur, nulla est iniquitas.*[33]

This important text comes between an exegesis of Romans 9:16–18, in which the hardening of Pharaoh's heart is justified by its inclusion in the heart-hardening of concupiscence common to all, and an exegesis of Romans 9:19–21, 'Does not the potter have power over the clay, to make from the same mass one thing a vessel for honour, another a vessel for wrath?',[34] whose 'lump … of clay' (*conspersio … luti*) forms the basis for the phrase *massa peccati*.

In the *Expositio Propositionum*, Augustine had commented on the same passage of Romans, referring *conspersio luti* to humanity under the Law, which, through the merit of faith, might attain to the knowledge and friendship of God in grace.[35] In the *Ad Simplicianum*, however, any suggestion of meriting grace by the isolated human will is entirely done away with. Rather, the Adamic inheritance constituting the *massa peccati* becomes the very reason why merit is impossible for humans, whose deserving extends only to condemnation, and who cannot anticipate their predestination as a result. While Augustine cites 1 Corinthians 15:22 in support of his argument, the reference depends more logically on the general content of Romans 5:12, for which *massa peccati* functions as a cipher.[36] 'For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ will all be made alive,' at 1 Corinthians 15:22, hints at a corporate identity shared in common with Adam; however, only Romans 5:12 contains reference to the 'drawing' of a common mortal and sinful origin from Adam, to which Augustine is clearly referring: 'Sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin, and so death spread to all, because all have sinned.'

With the writing of the *Ad Simplicianum*, Augustine had made the decisive move to his mature understanding of the origin and effect of sin on the human race. Sharing a mysterious corporate identity in the person of the first man, the **(p.81)** human *massa peccati* stands indebted to God for its primal self-love. Justly punished under the divine equity, humans must endure their own denaturing, morally disabled by entrapment in the love of self and inferior goods and condemned to mortality, in the double penalty of *concupiscentia carnalis*. Even in the life of grace, humanity must endure the tension between a history of sin and a future of perfection, cleansed of original guilt but dependent on the gift of grace for the execution of righteous acts in a body still bound to mortality.

Early exegesis of Romans 8:3

The last five years of the fourth century saw Augustine experiment with Romans 8:3 as part of his broader programme of addressing the theology of the Pauline epistles. The 'experimental' character of his exegesis of the text appears clearly in the variety of ways he configures its meaning: integrating it within a typological reading of the Old Testament in the anti-Manichaean *Contra Faustum*, as confirmation not only of the reality of Christ's human nature, but also as proof of Moses' ability to prefigure the Incarnation in his own humanity.[37] Elsewhere he situates it within a classic *Christus Victor* Christology, in which the likeness of sinful flesh becomes the means of deceiving Satan, thus nullifying his rights over humanity.[38] Each example of Augustine's exegesis is rich, multi-faceted, and worthy of investigation. Here, however, I shall examine closely only the three earliest examples, which appear in tandem with Augustine's developing conception of *concupiscentia carnalis* and *carnis peccati*, anticipating the crystallization of his theological anthropology in the *Ad Simplicianum* of 397.

Expositio Quarundam Propositionum

Augustine's first short, but nonetheless revealing, exegesis of Romans 8:3 occurs in the *Expositio Propositionum*. Augustine subsumes his reading of the non-fulfilment of the Law into his already well-established conception of sin as the uncontrollable human love for inferior goods: what in *De Libero Arbitrio* appeared in germinal form as *libido*, and in this period properly as *concupiscentia carnalis*. It will be remembered that this constitutes one half of **(p.82)** the Law of sin; coupled with entrapment in this misdirected desire is mortality. As a result, Christ's nature as one who releases humanity from sin's slavery is partly subject to the Law of sin itself:

> And thus the liberator, our Lord Jesus Christ, came in the likeness of the flesh of sin by taking mortal flesh; for death pays the debt of sinful flesh. However, the Lord's death took place simply because he thought it worthy, not to pay a debt; but the apostle calls his taking up of mortal flesh 'sin' (even though it was not the flesh of a sinner). And thus, because he was immortal, it was as if he died the death of sin, when he died.
>
> *ideo liberator noster dominus Iesus Christus suscipiendo mortalem carnem uenit in similitudine carnis peccati. carni enim peccati mors debita est. at uero illa mors domini dignationis fuit, non debiti, et tamen hoc quoque apostolus peccatum uocat susceptionem mortalis carnis quamuis non peccatricis, ideo quia immortalis tamquam peccatum facit, cum moritur.*[39]

In an overturning of the logic of the divine punishment for sin, the divine Son assumes a nature under the penalty of sin in order to operate it with complete freedom. As a result, he can die a death that undoes the mechanics of mortality. Augustine goes on to explain how such a human nature, dying in such a way, can effect salvation for others:

> [Paul] says that, by sin, he condemned sin in the flesh. The death of the Lord accomplished this so that we might no longer fear death and, as a result, no longer desire temporal goods or fear temporal ills. In those desires lay the discernment of the flesh, in which they could not fulfil the commandments of the Law. That discernment has been destroyed and utterly taken away in the Lord's person, and the righteousness of the Law fulfilled, since it was traversed not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit ... The fullness of the Law is love ... this belongs to the grace of the Holy Spirit.
>
> *sed de peccato inquit, damnauit peccatum in carne. id enim egit mors domini, ne mors timeretur et ex eo iam non appeterentur temporalia bona nec metuerentur temporalia mala, in quibus carnalis erat prudentia illa, in qua impleri legis praecepta non poterant. hac autem prudentia in homine dominico destructa et ablata iustitia legis impletur, cum secundum carnem non ambulatur, sed secundum spiritum...plenitudo ergo legis caritas... haec ad gratiam pertinet spiritus sancti.*[40]

Although Augustine would later retract his early use of the term *homo dominicus*,[41] it is used here in a sense that does justice to both the divine and the human natures in Christ: it is in virtue of the divine immortality that the human death of

Christ is empowered to subvert the punishment for sin. Likewise, any suggestion that the manner of Christ's death might be efficacious purely at the level of the reception of a narrative (which might likewise marry well with any adoptionist Christology suggested by the phrase) is **(p.83)** absent: the gift of the Spirit alone provides the context for appropriating both the effect and the meaning of the death of Christ. It is unfortunate, however, that Augustine does not provide more information about the means of acquiring the gift of the Spirit; the subject of baptism, for example, is notably absent from the commentary as a whole.

De Diversis Quaestionibus 83

The Christological content of the passage from the *Expositio Propositionum* is largely formed by soteriological concerns. Augustine's exposition of the same passage in *De Diversis Quaestionibus* contains the earliest detailed articulation of the pure Christological reasoning behind the soteriology. It should be remembered that *Quaestio* 66 advances a rather more nuanced and developed understanding of the transmission of sin than the *Expositio Propositionum*, connecting mortality and carnal habit explicitly with 'our propagation from Adam'.[42] So Augustine writes of Christ:

> His flesh, not born of carnal delight, was not the flesh of sin, although there was in it the likeness of the flesh of sin because it was mortal. By sin alone did Adam deserve death. What then did the Lord do? He condemned sin in the flesh by sin itself, by taking the flesh of man the sinner, and teaching how we should live; he condemned sin in that very flesh, so that it might not be lead captive into conspiracy with libido, but instead burn with a love of things eternal.
>
> *non enim caro peccati erat, quae non de carnali delectatione nata erat, sed tamen inerat in ea similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat. mortem autem non meruit adam nisi peccato. sed quid fecit dominus? de peccato damnauit peccatum in carne, id est suscipiendo carnem hominis peccatoris, et docendo quemadmodum uiueremus, peccatum in ipsa carne damnauit, ut aeternorum caritate spiritus flagrans non duceretur captiuus in consensionem libidinis*.[43]

By his own account, Augustine had never found the concept of the virginal conception of Christ an obstacle of belief.[44] However, I believe that this is the first instance in which he explicitly relates the virginal conception of Christ to the situation of humanity under sin as a whole in a theologically congruent way. Excepted from human conception marked by *carnalis delectatio*, Christ is not himself subject to the divine punishment for sin in the form of sinful desire; however, in virtue of the divine initiative, he does embrace the punishment of sin in mortality. Of particular interest in the passage is the expression that Christ took the flesh *hominis peccatoris*, 'of man the sinner'. The phrase is alarming in its suggestion that Christ assumes not only a nature but also an individual identity (a *homo*) implicated in the effects of the Fall. Consistent **(p.84)** with this expression but somewhat incongruous, again, within the context of Augustine's overall point is his ambiguous phrasing, *ut aeternorum caritate spiritus flagrans non duceretur captiuus in consensionem libidinis*. The syntax does not make it clear whether Augustine is referring to the spirit of Christ or to that of other humans or to both; the first part of the sentence (beginning with the Romans quotation) refers to Christ in his humanity; but the suggestion that Augustine could conceive of Christ's humanity (indeed, his *homo*) being even potentially open to captivity to sin is highly problematic. In isolation, *hominis peccatoris* might be counted a slip of the pen, not least in view of the general fluidity of Augustine's theological vocabulary before the *Ad Simplicianum*. As this study expands, I hope to show that this is not a singular instance, and that the tension between upholding the reality of Christ's humanity alongside his exception from the personal and voluntary aspect of sin's punishment is a persistent problem in Augustine's Christology. This is manifest most clearly in his treatment of Christ's affections, the subject of Chapter 5.

Sermon 273

My third example of Augustine's early exegesis of Romans 8:3 is taken from sermon 273, preached on the 21 January 396.[45] It contains a reading of the text that is at once surprising in its context, and also unexpectedly developed in the light of the two examples of Pauline exegesis I have detailed so far, written perhaps as little as a year before the sermon.

Noting that only a year later Augustine would be innovating on a number of Pauline topics in the *Ad Simplicianum*, I suggest that the sermon marks the beginning of a series of fresh readings of the epistle throughout 396.

Given on St Agnes's day, a feast shared with the martyrs Bishop Fructuosus and his deacons Augurius and Eulogius, the main body of the homily predictably draws out the parallel between the passions of the saints and that of Christ. 'The Lord Jesus instructs his martyrs not only with commandments, but also by example' (*Dominus Jesus martyres suos non solum instruxit praecepto, sed et exemplo*) are its opening words. Two surprises await the reader. First, Augustine draws the contrast between the pagan worship of deified humans and the Christian worship of God offered together with the saints, moving into an explanation of the nature of worship drawn from the Song of Songs 1.3 ('We run in pursuit of the odour of your perfumes'), which he correlates with 2 Corinthians 2:14–16 ('We are the good odour of **(p.85)** Christ in every place'). In light of the style of the first part of the sermon, dealing with the history of the martyrs and turning to anti-pagan polemic, this constitutes a significant digression. A second excursus occurs at the end of the homily, which turns to Romans 8:3, not, however, to reflect on the fearlessness of saintly death in the light of Christ's death, but in a meditation on the virginal conception of Christ:

> Our Lord, who is himself the head of the Church, the only begotten Son of God, Word of God through whom all things have been made, took up a flesh in no way different from our own. For he wished to take humanity from a virgin, to be born from one of the human race … His was flesh in the likeness of the flesh of sin; ours the flesh of sin itself. For he was not born from the seed of man, or from the concupiscence of male and female. But how then? By the annunciation of the Father. And although he was born in a marvellous way, he deigned to be born mortal, to die for us and to redeem us with his blood, according to what in him was human.
>
> *Ipse Dominus noster, ipsum caput Ecclesiae, unigenitus Filius Dei, Verbum Patris per quod facta sunt omnia, non alterius generis carnem habuit quam nos. Ideo voluit de virgine hominem suscipere, de una ex genere humano carne nasci…Sed tamen ille carnem in similitudinem carnis peccati, nos carnem peccati. Non enim ex virili semine, aut ex masculi et feminae concupiscientia: sed quid? Nuntio Patris. Et tamen cum sit mirabiliter natus, mortalis nasci dignatus est, et mori pro nobis, et sanguine suo redimere nos, secundum quod homo est.*[46]

The passage tightly compresses a very broad range of Christological and soteriological themes, centred on Christ's possession of a unique but nonetheless completely real humanity. Romans 8:3 is expanded with reference not only to John 1:3, but also to Luke 1:26–7, implicitly underlining the action of the whole Trinity behind the miraculous work of the Incarnation. Most important, however, is the manner in which Christ comes to obtain a flesh able to die according to the norm of denatured humanity while remaining sinless, by exception from fallen reproduction. He is born *de una carne*—not that of the marital union, but of the Virgin; lacking paternal seed, he is nonetheless born of paternal annunciation. The text shows a careful attention to the paradoxes inherent in the virginal conception and birth, and the subtle ways in which this birth is both akin to, and radically unlike, that shared by other humans. What Augustine does not attempt to account for here, as he does not in any of the exegeses of Romans 8:3 before 411, is why Christ's conception and birth outside of the concupiscent bonds of sex should exclude him only from concupiscent desire, but not from mortality. It would be some time until he could find a rationale to justify this early assertion.

(p.86) The theological anthropology of the anti-Pelagian treatises

In the *Ad Simplicianum*, Augustine's doctrine of human nature had been given its mature proportions. By his own account, his argument with Pelagianism formed an extended vindication of the position he had laid out in that early work. Referring implicitly to his eventual defence of grace against the Pelagians in the *Retractationes*, he remembered of the *Ad Simplicianum*: 'In resolving this question I indeed laboured hard on behalf of the free choice of the human will, but the grace of God conquered; nor was I otherwise able to understand with true clarity what the apostle had said: For who sets you apart? And what do you possess which you have not received?'[47] Any attempt to survey the theological anthropology of the anti-Pelagian treatises issued between 412 and 420 comes up against their sheer mass, density, and repetitiveness. I have already highlighted the fundamental shift of perspective observable in the works after 415, in which

a forensic investigation of the doctrine of Original Sin gives way to an exposition of the dependence of right moral agency on the prior gift of grace. To avoid tardiness in outlining Augustine's thought in this period, I will offer a reading of the single most important anti-Pelagian treatise before 415, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, in which baptism, Original Sin, and the sinlessness of Christ are treated synthetically and at length. Passing over *De Spiritu et Littera* and *De Natura et Gratia*, whose focus is almost exclusively on the nature of grace in the abstract, I will offer a second reading of *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale* of 418, in which the two aspects of Augustine's anti-Pelagian project are brought together. This text is especially worthy of attention for being addressed to Pinianus and Melania the Younger, with whom Augustine was involved along with Pelagius as a member of Rufinus of Aquileia's circle.

De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione

Behind the first two books of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* stand the 'six breviates' brought against Caelestius by the council of Carthage. Augustine's argument is built upon their obverse, which I construe as follows:

1. Adam was not created mortal; he would not have died had he not sinned.
2. The sin of Adam has harmed the whole human race.
3. The Law does not lead to the Kingdom in the same way as the gospel.
(p.87) 4. There were no sinless humans before the Incarnation of Christ.
5. Infants are born into the state of Adam after his transgression.
6. Just as the whole human race dies through the transgression of Adam, so the whole race shall rise through the resurrection of Christ.[48]

Book 1 opens with a discussion of the first proposition: Adam would not have died had he not sinned, but been granted a spiritual body for eternity;[49] he and Eve were created mortal (*mortalis*) but not bound to die (*moriturus*).[50] Although the grace of Christ does not immediately remove the body's condemnation to death, it nonetheless draws the spirit towards that state of immortality promised at the resurrection, and is thus the ground of hope for humanity's eventual life at peace.[51] At 9.9, Augustine turns to the transmission of sin from Adam. Responding to Caelestius' understanding of sin as voluntary imitation of the first transgression, Augustine concedes that every human sin contains an element of imitation, but that this is the case only because humans have inherited a fixed disposition from Adam from which such sinful acts proceed.[52] Chapters 11–19 draw out the parallels between the gift of grace and the inheritance of sin, justifying the latter on the basis of the former: just as righteousness can spring only from incorporation in Christ, so sin results only from human identity 'in' Adam, which is transmitted from parent to child in the process of reproduction.[53] Where Caelestius proposes that baptism 'upgrades' the state of deceased infants from a vague place of blessedness to full entry into the Kingdom, Augustine insists that unbaptized infants must receive eternal punishment, albeit of the mildest kind.[54] The fact that only the baptized are invited to the Eucharistic table is further proof that redemption awaits only the sacramentally cleansed.[55] Why it is that some infants are baptized and others are not brings Augustine to the inscrutability of providence: God alone can judge to whom he will give grace, and this judgement is above the minds of mortals.[56]

Turning to the content of Rufinus the Syrian's *Liber de Fide*, he refutes any suggestion that souls are thrust into bodies as punishment for sins committed in a prior existence: such a theory makes grotesque the justice and goodness of God in the light of the present existence of the disabled alongside the mentally and physically gifted.[57] Following a catena of scriptural testimonies in support **(p.88)** of both Original Sin and its remission in baptism,[58] Augustine touches briefly on the good of marriage in spite of the evil inherent in the mode of begetting children.[59] The book ends in an extended Christological reflection, in which the grace flowing from the Mystical Body is once again underlined as the gate of salvation through baptism, and the appearance of Christ in the 'likeness of sinful flesh' provides the means whereby 'sinful flesh' is liberated. I shall return to this important passage in my discussion of the Christology of the anti-Pelagian works that follows.

The second book advances on the first by arguing that, although God commands nothing impossible, the *ignorantia* and

difficultas wrought in the human through the bond of concupiscence makes fulfilling them an impossibility without grace.[60] From 7.6 to 34.20, Augustine tackles the question, to which I referred in the previous chapter, whether sinlessness in this life is attainable. His position is nuanced: sinlessness as the goal of human life is potentially possible; however, Christ is the only human to have possessed a sinless state thus far, and even the saints have lived in the tension between gradual sanctification and the continued weight of sin. The contrasting obedience and virtue of Adam and Eve before their Fall then forms the backdrop to a description of Christ as the partial inheritor of their fallen nature in the 'likeness of sinful flesh',[61] before Augustine returns to the theme of the necessity of baptism for salvation. Noting the issue of the soul's origin in the final chapter, Augustine promises to deal with it in a subsequent treatise.

Having written books 1 and 2 in 412, Augustine sent them to Marcellinus but shortly afterwards recalled them,[62] in order to add the final book to the work in 413. This was occasioned by his reading of Pelagius' commentary on Romans. Having concealed the identity of his opponent in the first two books, Augustine explicitly names Pelagius in the third in tandem with those 'who say that Adam, even had he not sinned, would have died; and that nothing transferred from his sin to his offspring in propagation'.[63] By Pelagius' reading of Romans 5:12, if Adam's sin had been passed to all by propagation, it must therefore follow that the benefit of Christ's death flows likewise to the whole human race, including non-believers.[64] Pelagius is correct in assuming that the benefits of the passion can be possessed only by believers, Augustine admits, but adds that only the baptized can be considered under such a rubric; and the necessity of baptism, as he has argued in the previous two books, is proof of the sway of Original Sin over all.[65] The discussion thereafter returns to the substance of the two foregoing books, arguing for Original Sin from Scripture **(p.89)** and the tradition. Paragraph 3.18.10 uncomfortably faces Pelagius' protestation that, unless the soul is propagated in the same way as the flesh, its contamination by Original Sin is entirely unjust. Unable to answer the point decisively, Augustine commends it to a reverent silence, in one of the weakest passages of the book. If the mechanics by which the flesh is infected with Original Sin cannot be adequately explained, he avers, it comes as no surprise that the corruption of the soul should also remain a mystery. The work closes with a final commendation of infant baptism, and an exhortation to heed the petition of the Lord's Prayer: 'forgive us our sins, as we forgive those who sin against us,' and its reminder that each day brings with it fresh sins to be remitted by the grace of God.[66]

As should be clear from this brief survey, *De Peccatorum Meritis* builds on the claim of the *Ad Simplicianum* that the drawing of sin from Adam involves all in the double punishment of *concupiscentia carnalis*. Confronting both the acts of the council of Carthage and Pelagius' Romans commentary, it finds a proof for this in both the universal tradition of baptism and the analogy of grace: incorporation in the Body of Christ must also involve disincorporation from the sinful flesh of Adam. The constancy of obedience and virtue enjoyed by Adam and Eve before their Fall is a state to which humankind cannot return, as the process of sanctification now results in the resurrection of mortal flesh. In all of this, Augustine's method is circular. Having worked out his doctrine of Original Sin in *De Libero Arbitrio* by observing present *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, Augustine bolstered his argument in the *Ad Simplicianum* by the addition of a distinctive interpretation of Scripture. In *De Peccatorum Meritis*, Augustine was forced to support his teaching by further citations from earlier authors, particularly Cyprian. In the absence of an explanation of the manner of humanity's propagation from Adam in Scripture, the analogy of grace and the tradition of infant baptism are therefore the principal bases on which Augustine's anti-Pelagian theological anthropology stands.

De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale

De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale was written in 418 in response to a letter from Albina, Pinianus, and Melania the Younger. Having procured a written confession from Pelagius after the synod of Diospolis, in which he anathematized those who deny humankind's constant need of the grace of Christ, 'not only every hour and every moment, but also in every one of our acts',[67] they had asked Augustine for his opinion.

(p.90) Augustine begins *De Gratia Christi* by urging caution: every other piece of evidence available suggests that Pelagius' definition of grace is seriously reductive, amounting only to a belief in the remission of sins, from which the free

will can of itself produce good acts. Human goodness, for Pelagius, is the result of human will and agency; only the possibility so to will and act is the gift of God, and this is granted at creation.[68] Where Pelagius speaks of grace assisting human agency, it is always with the implicit proviso that the human will is able to seek and ask for it beforehand.[69] In order to fulfil the Law, Augustine counters, the heart must heed the commands in love. However, love is only ever the outpouring of the Spirit, which cannot be confected by humans alone.[70] Thus even hope and faith are the prior gifts of God.[71] The danger of Pelagius' system lies in his attribution of merit to humans on the basis of their good willing and ensuing deeds, by which grace becomes a reward for correct choices,[72] among which is the choice to have faith. At worst, Pelagius draws into question the purpose of the Incarnation, by reducing the effectiveness of Christ's death to a sign that humans may or may not choose to inspire their moral choices.[73] Likewise, for Pelagius prayer is nothing more than an internal reflection on the example of Christ and the commandments, and ceases to be a true petition for grace.[74] In spite of calling upon the writings of Ambrose, Pelagius continues to misunderstand what grace is, presupposing that acts that are founded upon it cease to be truly human.[75]

In the work's second book, *De Peccato Originale*, Augustine couples Caelestius and Pelagius as partners in the same heresy, first laying out their movements up to Pelagius' confrontation with Zosimus of Rome.[76] The heart of their mistake, he writes, is to unbalance the relationship between Adam and Christ: the grace-inspired faith of those who lived before the Incarnation comes to nothing if the sin of Adam is found to have no effect on them:

> For their hearts too were cleansed by the faith of the mediator, and love was poured into them by the Holy Spirit; he blows where he wills without following an individual's merits, but creates merit itself.
>
> *et ipsorum enim corda eadem mundabantur mediatoris fide et diffundebatur in eis caritas per spiritum sanctum, qui ubi uult spirat non merita sequens, sed etiam ipsa merita faciens*.[77]

The progress of salvation history, moving from slavery under the law to life at peace, is threatened if the Patriarchs are not exemplars of life under grace. Their faith was in the Incarnate Christ, the Mediator in virtue of his humanity-to-be-assumed; this humanity is salvific for all humankind only because it is taken from the *massa peccati* in order to heal it.[78] Thus to deny Original Sin is **(p.91)** to deny the Incarnation: 'Nobody, absolutely no one at all, has been, is being or will be freed, without the grace of the liberator.'[79] This leads Augustine into an exposition of Romans 8:3, in which he discusses Christ's humanity as an effective sacrifice for sin. Turning from this familiar trope, Augustine once again touches on the topic of marriage—which remains good, even though concupiscence inheres in the marital bond after the forgiveness of sins—completing the book with a final reflection on the unparalleled and immaculate birth of Christ.

As will be clear, *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale* conflates Caelestius' teaching on Original Sin and Pelagius' doctrine of grace, to form a heresy that threatens to deconstruct the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Their mistake begins innocently; '[pelagius] uses the term grace everywhere with ambiguous generality'[80] is Augustine's criticism at its mildest. Beneath Pelagianism's vagueness also lies an inattentive reading of the Scriptures and the Fathers, which undermines the power and goodness of God as the creator and redeemer of all things. Setting aside the veracity of both Augustine's anti-Pelagian polemic and his theology of Original Sin and grace, the central place given to the humanity of Christ in both treatises deserves further detailed comment.

Romans 8:3 from 411 to 420

De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione

De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione set the agenda for a Christological response to Pelagianism that would outlive Augustine's volte-face of 415. The final chapters of the first book form an extended reflection on the relationship between Christology and theological anthropology, and provide a full treatment of the parallel between the life of grace in Christ, and that of sin in Adam. Having enumerated a large number of scriptural texts in support of his position on the transmission both of sin and of grace in the central section of the book, at *Pecc. Mer.* 1.55.28, Augustine moves to

conclude his argument. Access to eternal life, he writes, is given only through baptismal participation in Christ, and there is no middle state between damnation and salvation; although marriage begets sinful offspring, it remains a good in both the restraint of concupiscent desire and the multiplication of the race. Having set out the Pelagian arguments for baptism as reductive, Augustine proceeds to write at length of the nature of the Church as the one body of Christ, extending **(p.92)** from its heavenly perfection into the situation of the Church in the present, conflicted by sin even in a state of increasing grace. He briefly reviews the rite of baptism, repeats his insistence on the necessity of baptizing infants even in their state of ignorance, and finally relates this to Christ's birth in the infant state. The importance and careful execution of the Christological content that follows must be emphasized: it shows Augustine abstracting his argument for the transmission of sin to make it an integrated part of a consistent theological system. The lengthiest section, concerned with the Church as one body with Christ as its head, is flanked by what constitute two extended reflections on Romans 8:3; the first dealing with the virginal conception of Christ, the second with his death and its effects as a result of his possessing the 'likeness' of the flesh of sin.

The central section, on the nature of the Church, proceeds from a reading of John 3:1–21, Jesus's teaching to Nicodemus that a man must be born of water and Spirit to enter the Kingdom. Baptism, contrary to the Pelagian teaching, is nothing other than the beginning of full membership of Christ's humanity:

> All those who have to be transformed and lifted up must come together into unity with Christ, so that Christ, who came down, may also ascend, reckoning his body (which is the Church) as nothing less than himself. For of Christ and his Church the text is most truly understood: there will be two in one flesh; about this he himself said, 'Thus they are now not two, but one flesh.'
>
> *nisi ergo in unitatem christi omnes mutandi leuandique concurrant, ut christus, qui descendit, ipse ascendat, non aliud deputans corpus suum, id est ecclesiam suam, quam se ipsum—quia de christo et ecclesia uerius intellegitur: erunt duo in carne una, de qua re ipse dixit: igitur iam non duo, sed una caro.*[81]

The rationale for this lies in the mechanics of the Incarnation: in the 'unity of the person' Christ remained in heaven as Son of Man, and walked the earth as Son of God.[82] The inversion of the usual categories should be noted here: the Incarnation effects the transfer of the earthly to the heavenly even before the completion of the purpose of the Incarnation in the resurrection. On this basis, Augustine can argue:

> Faith in more credible things arises from believing in things that are more incredible. For, if the divine substance, distant by far and by incomparable difference more sublime, could take up a human substance for us, to become one person (and as such the Son of Man who was on earth in accordance with the weakness of his flesh, at the same time also remaining in heaven by divinity participating in that flesh); how **(p.93)** much more credible is it that other humans, his holy and faithful ones, should also become one Christ with Christ the human?
>
> *fit ergo credibiliorum fides ex incredibilioribus creditis. si enim diuina substantia longe distantior atque incomparabili diuersitate sublimior potuit propter nos ita suscipere humanam substantiam, ut una persona fieret ac sic filius hominis, qui erat in terra per carnis infirmitatem, idem ipse esset in caelo per participatam carni diuinitatem, quanto credibilius alii homines sancti et fideles eius fiunt cum homine christo unus christus.*[83]

Cum homine Christo unus Christus: the participation of the community of the redeemed functions as the refutation of Pelagianism at its highest level. What the Pelagian position does not require to be healed need likewise not be assumed. Pelagianism raises a question against the very necessity of the Incarnation itself.

Augustine makes clear that, just as the baptized (in whom the activity, if not the guilt, of Adam's sin is still present) are truly integrated into the Incarnate humanity, so humanity must also have borne the effects of sinful nature. Prior to setting out the composite nature of the ecclesial Christ, Augustine argues that none is cleansed 'except by the flesh which is like the flesh of sin' (*nisi per carnem similem carni peccati*),[84] who is the one Mediator born of the Virgin, 'who believed the

angel, and thus should bring forth a child without desire' (*quae angelo credidit, ut sine libidine fetaretur*).[85] Behind the good use of marriage to procreate lies the unpalatable fact of lust, 'which moves disobediently in the members of this body of death, and tries to drag down the whole soul to itself',[86] to which alone the conception of the Virgin mother provides the antitype:

> He alone was born without sin, whom the Virgin conceived without the embrace of man and without the concupiscence of the flesh, but by the obedience of her mind; from our wound, she alone gave birth to a shoot of pious stock.
>
> *solus sine peccato natus est, quem sine uirili complexu non concupiscentia carnis, sed oboedientia mentis uirgo concepit; sola nostro uulnere germen piae prolis emisit*.[87]

The corollary of Christ's birth outside the movement of concupiscent desire is, once again, his embrace of the penalty of sin, yet without any of its guilt. Augustine returns to this theme after his central meditation on the ecclesial Christ, by extending the metaphor of Moses lifting up the serpent in the wilderness to cure the Israelites of the serpent's bite (cf. Num. 21:6–9). So he goes on: 'Death came indeed by the serpent, who persuaded humanity to sin, and for which he merited death. However, the Lord did not carry over sin into his flesh like a serpent's poison, but only death, so that there might be in the **(p.94)** likeness of the flesh of sin a punishment without guilt, whereby both guilt and punishment would be dissolved in his flesh.'[88]

The final passages of *De Peccatorum Meritis* 1 provide a coda to Augustine's characterization of sin as *ignorantia* and *difficultas* in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3. It is perhaps no coincidence that, as Augustine was working on *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, he sent a letter to Marcellinus (Epistle 143) to keep him abreast of his progress, including the assertion that his thought had remained consistent since the writing of that early work on the freedom of choice.[89] Infants, he writes at 1.67.36, give clear evidence of their sinful nature by being aliens to reason, the difficulty attendant on which is borne out by the very long period of time that must elapse before they reach the age of conscience. Spotting the potential flaw of his own argument, he anticipates the question: why, if infant life is so clearly marked by ignorance and difficulty as the result of sin, was Christ born as an infant? His response shows the symmetry of the theology he anchors on Romans 8:3 only chapters before:

> To this proposition I respond: Adam was not the sort of creature [born in ignorance and difficulty], because he was not created in the sinful flesh that comes from the sin of a parent. We are that kind of creature, because his sin precedes us, and so we are born in the flesh of sin. On this account Christ is the sort of creature who, in order to condemn sin by sin, was born in the likeness of the flesh of sin.
>
> *huic propositioni respondemus adam propterea non talem creatum, quia nullius parentis praecedente peccato non est creatus in carne peccati, nos ideo tales, quia illius praecedente peccato nati sumus in carne peccati. christus ideo talis, quia, ut de peccato condemnaret peccatum, natus est in similitudine carnis peccati*.[90]

In order for it to be salvific, Christ has to assume a post-Adamic humanity, which is neither the pristine nature enjoyed by Adam at his first creation, nor fully conformed to sinful nature, as in the case of the rest of postlapsarian humanity.

In addition to informing Marcellinus in Epistle 143 that his work on *De Peccatorum Meritis* continued apace, Augustine responded to his request that he explain his views on the origin of the soul. At *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.21, Augustine had posited four possible models of the soul's origin: either they are propagated from a single and primal soul; they are created afresh for each new human; they are sent from pre-existence into fresh bodies by God; or they sink into bodies by their own choice. To Marcellinus he reaffirmed his earlier indecision, brushing it aside in favour of: 'what I am certain of, that after the sin of the first human, other humans have been and are being born in the flesh **(p.95)** of sin, to heal which the Lord came in the likeness of the flesh of sin.'[91] Augustine's self-defence re-echoes in the final chapter of *De Peccatorum Meritis* 2. It is pertinent, he writes, to ask whether the forgiveness required by the soul arises from its propagation in the

same manner as the flesh; if it is not propagated, its guilt may be the result that it 'is mixed' (*miscetur*) with the flesh of sin; if God creates souls afresh, it is valid to ask how he is not properly the author of their sin. Augustine leaves the point with a promise: 'This is a considerable question, and it requires a full discussion elsewhere.'[92] Unable to define the precise way in which sinful flesh is synonymous with a sinful soul, he leaves the subject of Christ's sinlessness untouched. Neither his Epistle 167 to Jerome, arguing against a 'fresh creation' model, nor his treatise *De Anima et eius Origine* of 419–20 would adequately deal with this problem, leaving him open to the attack of Julian of Eclanum, as I shall later show.

De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale

Augustine's treatment of Romans 8:3 in the closing chapters of *De Peccato Originale* attempts to provide a Christological rebuttal of Pelagianism's threat to the whole order of salvation history, enlarging on the remit of *De Peccatorum Meritis* to refute the coupling of Christ's flesh with that of sinless, newborn infants. The central section of the book argues that Pelagius' denial of the necessity of grace for both good works and faith nullifies the prefiguration of the gospel found in the Old Testament. To deny Original Sin's effects on the will is also to deny the 'giftedness' of grace to the undeserving soul; thus the faith of the Patriarchs ceases to anticipate the gratuitousness of the Incarnation and the benefits that proceed from it.

Augustine responds first by quoting Christ: 'Abraham desired to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad' (John 8:56), proof that the Patriarchs were well aware that the salvation of humankind was to come by the sharing of the eternal Son in their own flesh.[93] Melchizedek confirmed his insight, and prophesied the manner of Christ's priesthood as Mediator between God and humanity in virtue of his human nature.[94] What the Patriarchs recognized is damnable for Christians to deny, as Augustine writes:

> Whoever maintains that human nature, in whichever age you care to mention, had no need of the physician who is the second Adam, because it was not vitiated in the first: he is convicted as an enemy of the grace of God, not on any question in which one **(p.96)** could doubt or be in error with a wholesome faith, but by the Rule of Faith by which we are Christians.
>
> *quapropter quisquis humanam contendit in qualibet aetate naturam non indigere medico secundo adam, quia non est uitiata in primo adam, non in aliqua quaestione, in qua dubitare uel errari salua fide potest, sed in ipsa regula fidei, qua christiani sumus, gratiae dei conuincitur inimicus*.[95]

In addition to the faith of the Old Testament Fathers, the rule of circumcision witnesses to the punishment given to Adam, for which it functions as a sign.[96] The following chapter fleetingly returns to the difficult topic of the origin of the soul: the circumcision of infants is not to be attributed to God's judgement on sins committed in a past life, as some of the Platonists have taught; rather, it is because infants belong 'to the mass of perdition, and are rightly understood to have been born from Adam and condemned under the requirement of the ancient debt, unless they are no longer in such debt, having been freed by grace'.[97]

Augustine moves into an exegesis of Romans 8:3 immediately following, at *Pecc. Orig.* 37.32. While the coming of Christ brought with it a change of outward sacramentals—circumcision being superseded by baptism—his healing grace remained the same. Christian circumcision does away with the flesh of sin:

> The propagation of a condemned origin condemns us, unless we are cleansed by the likeness of the flesh of sin, in which he was sent without sin and who condemned sin by sin: for he was made sin for our sake.
>
> *damnatae originis propagatio nos damnat, nisi mundemur similitudine carnis peccati, in qua missus est sine peccato, qui tamen de peccato damnaret peccatum: factus est enim pro nobis peccatum.*

As a latter-day scapegoat, the sinless humanity of Christ was offered as a sacrifice for sin, by which it is designated 'sin'

by representation; baptism is accordingly a circumcision into the flesh of the risen Christ, from whose clean Body the flesh of his Church is purged. Augustine's handling of the text of Romans here is reminiscent of his earlier exegesis in the *Expositio Propositionum*, in which the soteriological outcome of Christ's sinless death is emphasized; however, its Christological basis is not far away. In the penultimate chapter of the book, Augustine cites Ambrose's exposition of Romans 8:3 from *De Poenitentia* 1.3.13 in support of his teaching on Original Sin, and immediately follows this with a gloss from his commentary on Luke:

> Ambrose writes that it was not the embrace of a man that opened the mysterious hiddenness of the Virgin's womb; rather, the Holy Spirit poured a spotless seed into **(p.97)** that inviolate womb. The Lord Jesus alone is holy among those born of woman, who did not feel the contagion of earthly seduction in the novelty of his spotless birth, and expelled it by his heavenly majesty.
>
> *non enim uirilis coitus, inquit, uuluae uirginalis secreta reserauit, sed inmaculatum semen inuiolabili utero spiritus sanctus infudit; solus enim per omnia ex natis de femina sanctus dominus iesus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae inmaculati partus nouitate non senserit et caelesti maiestate depulerit.*[98]

As in *De Peccatorum Meritis*, the conception and birth of Christ from a virgin womb, uninflamed by *concupiscentia carnis*, are the means by which Jesus inherits a humanity that is real and mortal, yet actively sinless.

Sermon 183

Both the treatises I have highlighted show a high level of reflection on the Christological implications of Augustine's anti-Pelagian theological anthropology. While the same cannot be said for either *De Spiritu et Littera* or *De Natura et Gratia,* the years immediately following these important treatises saw Augustine deploy his Christological refutation of Pelagianism, in isolated cases, in a popular homiletic context. As evidence of Augustine's Christological handling of Pelagianism outside the formal treatises addressed to a literary, ecclesial readership, I append brief reference to his sermon 183 here.

Very few homilies directed explicitly at Pelagian teaching are included in the extant collections; those labelled as homilies against the Pelagians by the Benedictine editors in some cases fall outside the dates when Augustine was concerned with Pelagianism, although their theological content runs in parallel with Augustine's anti-Pelagian teaching. However, sermon 183 does fall within the correct time span, having been dated with some reliability to 416–17,[99] thus falling between the composition of *De Natura et Gratia* and *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale*.

In this short sermon, Augustine takes as his text 1 John 4:2 ('Every spirit which confesses that Jesus Christ came in the flesh is from God'), and from it proceeds to show that every condemned heresy functions at some level to deny the Incarnation. So it is that Arians and Eunomians deny the flesh of Christ by denying first the existence of the eternal Son as God himself; Sabellians likewise have an inadequate conception of the hypostatic identity of each of the persons of the Trinity, impairing their conception of the Word's unique assumption of humanity in the Incarnation. The Photinians make explicit the fault of all these heresies, by denying any divinity in Christ whatever. The heresy of the Donatists is 'more subtle' (*subtilior*), in their division of **(p.98)** the glorious Body of Christ by a schismatic ecclesiology. Augustine deals with the Pelagians last, as the most recent and perhaps subtlest heresy of all: the Pelagian 'seems to confess that Christ came in flesh' (*videtur confiteri Christum in carne venisse*), but, after all, is found to deny it as well. Augustine repeats the formula of Romans 8:3 in response: Christ's humanity is to be distinguished from that of all by the category of likeness to sinful flesh. By contrast, Pelagius attempts to equate the flesh of all infants with that of Christ. To the exhortation of the Church that one should be baptized and saved, the Pelagian responds:

> How are infants to be saved? It is not in baptism; our infant has nothing of vice in him, nothing from the transmission of condemnation entices him. If he is equal to Christ, why does he search for Christ? [Augustine responds:] Look; I tell you this now: the groom, the Son of God who came in the flesh, he is the Saviour of the great

> and the small, adults and children, and he is Christ. But you say that Christ is Saviour only of the great, and not the small. That is not Christ. And if it is not him, you deny that Christ came in the flesh.
>
> *Quid salvetur? Non est in eo quod saluetur; nihil habet vitii, nihil ex traduce damnationis attraxit. Si aequalis est Christo, quare quaerit Christum? Ecce dico tibi: Sponsus Filius Dei qui venit in carne, salvator est et maiorum et minorum, salvator est et grandium et infantium, et ipse est Christus: tu autem dicis salvatorem Christum maiorum, non minorum: non est ipse. Si non est ipse, negas tu Christum in carne venisse.*[100]

Because of its inevitable consequences for the humanity of Christ, Pelagianism must be considered alongside the classic Christological heresies condemned by the councils of the whole Church.

Julian of Eclanum and Semi-Pelagianism

By the end of 418, Pelagius and Caelestius ceased to be a present threat to the Church at large. Having been excommunicated by Pope Innocent in 417, they experienced a brief period of reprieve under the papacy of Zosimus, only to have their excommunications reinstated by the same pope under pressure from the African bishops and the emperor Honorius, who exiled them in May of the following year. Pope Zosimus' *Epistola Tractoria*, the apparent volte-face of his own views on the nature of grace and sin, was set to seal once and for all the question of Pelagian teaching.

Once Caelestius and Pelagius had been removed from the hostile gaze of the African episcopate, Augustine's writing branched in three directions. His **(p.99)** long-running but reluctant interest in the origin of the soul had been piqued by his persistent and forced engagement with the theology of the transmission of sin. What had constituted pertinent asides in the composition of *De Genesi ad Litteram* 7 and 10 and polite enquiry between intellectual equals in his correspondence with Jerome and Marcellinus (Epistles 166 and 143) resurfaced as a fully fledged enquiry, addressed to the monk Renatus but in response to Vincentius Victor's misgivings about Augustine's public ambivalence, in *De Anima et eius Origine*, on which Augustine worked from 419 to 420. While this treatise was not directed explicitly at Pelagianism, it was occasioned as a result of the controversy. Its important discussion of the soul's origin will be a central datum of Chapter 6, which explores Augustine's handling of the origin of Christ's soul.

The second area of Augustine's literary activity lay in replying to Julian of Eclanum's indignant response to Zosimus' *Epistola Tractoria*. Together with eighteen other dissident bishops, Julian wrote to Zosimus to protest at the contents of his letter. Noting the substance of their complaint, Augustine wrote the first book of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* in 418–19; having read this, Julian replied to Augustine with four books entitled *Ad Turbantium*. Augustine shortly afterwards received a digest of this work, and completed the second book of *Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* by 421. At the very same time he was working on a second response to Julian for the new pope, Boniface, which was published as the *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, also in 421. By 423, Augustine had read and responded to the full text of *Ad Turbantium* in six books, comprising the *Contra Iulianum*. Not content to let the disagreement lie, Julian submitted one further work against Augustine, the eight books of his *Ad Florum*, to which Augustine began composing his rejoinder in 428, the *Ad Iulianum Liber Imperfectus*. Death stopped him from completing this huge work, which, in the manner of the *Contra Faustum* some twenty-seven years earlier, responded to every one of Julian's propositions sequentially. It promised to be a work to compete in size with *De Civitate Dei*.

Thirdly, Augustine occupied himself in the 420s with the enquiries of the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles, later named the Semi-Pelagians. In 418, a copy of Augustine's Epistle 194 to the future Pope Sixtus reached the monastery at Hadrumetum; in the letter, Augustine had sketched the outlines of his doctrine of grace, merit, and predestination. In response to the questions of a number of the community, Augustine issued two major treatises clarifying his position: *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* and *De Correptione et Gratia* (both 426–7) were followed in 428–9 by *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono Perseverantiae*, addressed to the similarly sceptical monks Hilary and Prosper, at Marseilles. It should be noted that the theological content of both sets of treatises, though related to the protological concerns of the earlier anti-Pelagian works, primarily addresses the outworking of grace in the present Christian life and its relation to

the life to come. However, it is surprising that **(p.100)** in none of these treatises does Augustine return to the Christological themes he had already laid out in the anti-Pelagian works; the Christological exegesis of Romans 8:3, explicit or elliptical, is entirely absent. Augustine's new refrain in these works, which I shall explore in the final chapter, was Christ, *homo praedestinatus*. Having set to one side the relation of the first Adam to the sinful flesh of all, it would appear that Augustine lost faith in the power of Romans 8:3 to carry forward his theology of predestination and election, which were now at the forefront of his agenda.

Whilst the Semi-Pelagian debate of the 420s moved the discussion into a new arena, Augustine's engagement with Julian remained doggedly tied to the nature of the *tradux peccati* and its outworking in the life of grace. Julian's criticism pivoted on finding in Augustine's conception of the denatured postlapsarian human a remnant of Manichaeism, unable to equate the adjuncts of fallen human life—desire, embodiment, and death—with a truly good God. In the concrete present, so Julian argued, Augustine's teaching functioned to abuse the good of marriage by conflating it with the repression of concupiscence, redeemable only by the procreation of children as an ancillary good. Against Augustine's by now established theology of creation and grace, Julian advanced a confidence in the persistent goodness of the created state, endowed with the capacity to choose the good and follow the example of Christ in virtuous and meritorious living: both of these constituted functions of 'grace'.[101] Added to this, Julian was not slow to note Augustine's apparent inability to account for the role of the origin of the human soul in the transmission of sin. What kind of creature was the soul, to be infected by sin committed once in the body of Adam? Fredriksen argues that Julian's debate with Augustine reduces to sheer incomprehension at Augustine's insistence on the historical transmission of sin while also rejecting a materialist conception of the soul: for Julian, this failure to account for the soul's origin invalidated Augustine's whole system.[102] Because Augustine's discourse with Julian involved very many of the issues at stake at the beginning of the Pelagian controversy, it comes as no surprise that he continued to deploy the Christological exegesis of Romans 8:3 alongside reiterations of his mature position on Original Sin in these late treatises. In the works against Julian, Augustine has been described as, 'if anything more sure of his ground, more trenchant, less open to self doubt and given to exploratory digression than ever before',[103] a feature evident not least in his confident handling of the Christological implications of Julian's teaching.

(p.101) Romans 8:3 and the works against Julian

Augustine countered Julian's anthropology with repeated reference to Romans 8:3. By far the most interesting and significant of these instances is found in *Contra Iulianum* 5, in a protracted passage answering Julian's criticism of the Christological extrapolation of his teaching on Original Sin. In examining it, it will be useful to bear in mind the structure of the whole work. In the first two of his six books against Julian's *Ad Turbantium*, Augustine reviewed the problem of Pelagianism at a general level, responding to Julian's accusation of the latent Manichaeism of his position by citing the writings of both Greek and Latin Fathers in his defence. In the third book, Augustine replied to the first book of *Ad Turbantium*, restating his belief in the goodness of God, and the good purpose of marriage for reproduction, the abiding presence of carnal concupiscence excepted. In book 4, Augustine moved to considering the second of Julian's books, in which he had set out a theory of virtue based on the grace of creation, grounding the present moral life in imitation of Christ. Augustine counters this: virtue cannot be exercised apart from the gift of belief, which must first be infused by God; an exemplarist Christology is likewise dangerously reductive. In the two final books, Augustine turned to examine the examples of virtuous living in Scripture, particularly between the married, and finally argued for the necessity of a belief in Original Sin on the grounds of the universal practice of infant baptism.

Book 5 of the work contains an extended treatment of all the major issues at stake in Augustine's debate with Julian in closely related succession: the origin of the soul, the nature of sex, marriage, and Adamic propagation all find their proof in a Christological formula tightly wrapped around Romans 8:3. At 5.17.4, Augustine discounts the importance of Julian's questions about the soul's origin with a repetition of his standard, ambivalent position: whether the soul is derived from the material constitution of man or tainted by its inevitable connection to man's material nature, the perpetuation of sinful flesh in humankind is dependent on the divine decree above anything else. At 5.46.12, Augustine considers Julian's insistence that, in order to have been joined in true marriage, Mary and Joseph must have had

intercourse. Augustine defends the perpetual virginity of Mary with reference to Matthew 1:20, in which the angel encourages Joseph to take Mary as his wife in spite of her having conceived by the Holy Spirit. The bond of marriage lies first in the vow, not in its physical consummation.

At 5.62.12, Augustine reviews Julian's Christology and finds it to be a direct equivalent of the Christology of classic Pelagianism, in the terms I have already noted in his Sermon 183: Julian threatens to remove the uniqueness of Christ's humanity by denying its separate status in the possession of the likeness of sinful flesh. Romans 8:3, which Julian claims Augustine has **(p.102)** misunderstood,[104] must surely function as the proof of Augustine's central position: 'the flesh of Christ is not the flesh of sin, but is like the flesh of sin; what remains but for us to understand that, his flesh excepted, all of the rest of human flesh is the flesh of sin?'[105] Anyone who insists that Christ and all share a flesh of the same purity is *detestandus haereticus*.[106] Julian's contention that a God who creates every soul separately at the moment of conception would not permit it to be tainted by the sins of its earthly parents does not stand up: the existence of those with bodily deformities proves that God does not create each person in a perfect state, but rather permits the transmission of deformity by parental descent.[107]

Once again, Augustine uses the example of Christ to prove his argument, referring Julian to *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 1.10, and repeating his point clearly. By means of his virginal conception, Christ assumes a nature that both is and is not shared with all: it represents humanity in the stasis of mortality, but without participating in the flow of sin's transmission and its effect on his human will:

> The flesh of Christ drew its mortality from the body of his mortal mother, because he found her body to be mortal. He did not draw the contagion of Original Sin from it, because he did not find there the concupiscence of one who lies with another. However, if he had taken only the substance of flesh from his mother without her mortality, not only would his flesh have been the flesh of sin, but it could not have been in the likeness of the flesh of sin.
>
> *Caro itaque Christi mortalitatem de mortalitate materni corporis traxit, quia mortale corpus eius inuenit: contagium uero peccati originalis non traxit, quia concumbentis concupiscentiam non inuenit. Si autem nec mortalitatem, sed solum substantiam carnis de matre sumpsisset, non solum caro eius caro peccati, sed nec similitudo carnis peccati esse potuisset*.[108]

Augustine's argument is startling: Christ's assumption of the substance of flesh alone stands as a theoretical possibility. However, such a human nature would not be a response to the condition of man in need of salvation.

Julian can only understand Augustine's Christology to be a version of Apollinarianism: excluding carnal sensibility from Christ he can equate only with a denial of the assumption of a fully human soul. Augustine rejoins: 'The senses of the flesh are one thing, without which no one has been, is, or will be human living in a body; concupiscence, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, is quite another.'[109] Uncontrolled lust is not synonymous with **(p.103)** animate life as it ought to be, and as it was so constituted in the first humans. It is vital, however, that Christ assume a mortal human nature in order to give humans an example of suffering to which Christians can be ecclesially joined, thus, 'he experienced pains for us, but not lusts'.[110]

Augustine and Julian begin from different theological–anthropological assumptions. Julian, wishing to defend the continuity of the goodness of human nature throughout history, cannot accept a Christology that depends on a belief in the radical discontinuity in human nature brought about through sin. Augustine's Christ appears to be fully human: but which human? He does not spell out in the *Contra Iulianum* what is his underlying thought: Christ possesses a human nature that is composed of elements of humanity both before and after the Fall. Like Adam before the Fall, he is not born into the succession of transmitted, sinful desire. In the same passage cited above, Augustine makes this clear: just as Adam was made from the virgin ground, so Christ was born of the virgin womb. As a result, he has a perfect human will. By his divine will, he freely chooses to take a mortal, postlapsarian nature, and the example he leaves of dying rightly is

effective because it is transmitted by grace and appropriated by the Church through incorporation into himself. By Augustine's reading, Julian's Christ functions in a vacuum, offering an example of virtue to a humanity already capable of right living, which does not require incorporation into the mystical Body of the Church.

Yet Julian's criticism carries some weight. Augustine's theological anthropology knowingly fractures human nature into progressive stages of sanctification. At both a salvation–historical and individual level, humans must endure the denaturing of God's punishment for sin in mortality and the incapacity of the will to acquire its own good. In the life of grace, the defectiveness of the human will is rectified by God's self-giving, manifested in baptism and increased in the continual outpouring of divine love; nonetheless, mortality and the fixed datum of incapacity remain, even though sin's guilt is removed. The repeated dictum 'sin and the penalty of the sin are the same' runs throughout the anti-Pelagian treatises, exemplified by *De Natura et Gratia* 24.22:

> Of course, this darkening was both their penalty and punishment; but through this punishment, this blindness of the heart that comes after the light of wisdom has departed, they fell into more numerous and worse sins still ... As the punishment of sin ... they too were sins ...
>
> *utique ista obscuratio uindicta et poena iam fuit; et tamen per hanc poenam, id est per cordis caecitatem, quae fit deserente luce sapientiae, in plura et grauia peccata conlapsi sunt ... et quia poena est iniquitatis, cum sit et iniquitas ...*

(p.104) In all of this, Romans 8:3 is central to Augustine's anti-Pelagian Christology because it seemingly provides a rationale by which Christ's flesh—as flesh received from a mortal mother—can itself be mortal, while his will—conceived without concupiscence—can be free from the moral blindness concomitant with mortality. Christ thus accepts only half the penalty of sin; he is like fallen humanity, but unlike it in the possession of a perfect will to which neither the guilt nor the *difficultas* or *ignorantia* of the Fall attach.

Throughout this chapter, I have noted Augustine's increasing tendency throughout the 390s to conflate the voluntary aspect of sin with the corporeal language of Scripture: pure *ignorantia* becomes *desideria carnis*, itself later glossed as the *concupiscentia carnis* of the *caro peccati*. For the fallen human of Augustine's anti-Pelagian works, guilt for Adam's sin and the present addiction to sin are both inextricably bound to the death of the flesh. In spite of Augustine's protestations to the contrary, his doctrine of Original Sin finally characterizes the condition of embodiment as the punishment for sin: being a dying thing is synonymous with being a sinner. Julian's apparently left-field criticism of Augustine as an Apollinarian manqué lands in the central inconsistency of his Christology. For Augustine, the fallen human *is* the guilty soul that desires its own inevitable death. For Julian reading Augustine, a Christ who assumes mortality without this will-to-death assumes an unrecognizable, anomalous humanity, akin to neither the pristine Adam, his damned descendants, or the saints in glory, as Augustine depicts them. Without accounting for the relationship between Christ's human soul and that inherited from Adam by all sinful flesh, a Christ without a carnally concupiscent soul appears not, Julian suggests, to have any soul at all.

Conclusion

This chapter began from the observation that Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3 constitutes the Christological refrain of his anti-Pelagian anthropology. In order to access Augustine's understanding of Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh', I have moved backwards into his theological anthropology, to examine his prior understanding of the nature of 'sinful flesh'. Working from the assumption that the anti-Pelagian works are built on the foundations laid in the *Ad Simplicianum*, I began by offering a close reading of the works that lead up to it: *De Libero Arbitrio*, the Pauline commentaries, and the Pauline exegesis found in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*. This showed Augustine move away from an abstract definition of sin as a turning from the eternally good God to inferior temporal goods, towards a more concrete and historicized account, centred on the *concupiscentia carnalis* of the *massa peccati*. The *Ad Simplicianum* reveals the fruition of Augustine's reflection: humankind, **(p.105)** propagated from Adam, shares in his double punishment of

mortality and uncontrollable desire. Likewise, these early works show Augustine apply Romans 8:3 as the direct corollary of his definition of sinful, concupiscent, flesh. Initially focusing on the soteriological implications of the passage in which a sinless Christ is 'made sin' on the cross as a worthy sacrifice, Augustine shifts to an emphasis on the origin of Christ's sinlessness, his conception from a woman without the taint of concupiscence. From her, he takes mortal flesh, without a sinful will; thus he inherits only part of the divine punishment for Adam's Fall.

The works of the second period, from 412 to 420, show Augustine deploy his earlier vocabulary of the concupiscent *massa* to Pelagianism. Initially focusing on Caelestius' denial of Original Sin in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, after 415 *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originale* shows Augustine's shift of focus. Now a synthetic and single heresy, Pelagianism's denial of both sin and grace threatens to annul the order of salvation history and evacuate the Incarnation and death of Christ of both purpose and meaning: it removes the wounds that require divine healing. Thus, in the former work, Romans 8:3 argues for the uniqueness of Christ's humanity, whose mortal sinlessness forms the median locus between sinful mortality and God's perfectly good eternity. The latter extends the salvific potency of Christ's flesh into the Old Testament past, trusting in which the Patriarchs stood as witnesses to a redemption from Original Sin that leads to grace and peace. In both instances, the character of Christ's virginal conception remains a fixed and consistently handled datum, the origins of which Augustine partly reveals by reference to Ambrose of Milan.

In the third period, Augustine's attention divides, responding to the Semi-Pelagians with an extended treatment of grace and its relationship to predestination, and to Julian of Eclanum with lengthy repetitions of his position on Original Sin. While the works for the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles accordingly move away from a discussion of the sinlessness of Christ, those against Julian occasion further exposition of Romans 8:3. Julian's criticism that Augustine had failed to account for the transmission of sin to the soul by accounting for its origin revived the charge of the *Liber de Fide*, along with the friendly enquiries of his allies. To this, Augustine would reply only with refutations and a retreat into the profession of ignorance. A major question mark therefore remains over his understanding of Christ's soul as a component of his saving humanity, and its relationship to the indeterminately formed souls of the *massa peccati*.

In the next chapter, I shall argue that Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3 is substantially indebted to his reading of Origen. Whether Augustine adopted more of Origen's Christology than simply his exegesis of Romans is the question that will form the backdrop of the two final chapters of this book, discussing Augustine's understanding of the nature and origin of Christ's soul.

Notes:

([1]) This should be taken as one indication of the composite nature of the work. Drecoll (2007b) suggests a neat division between book 1, composed 387–8, and books 2 and 3, composed 391–5. Green (1970: 207–8) suggests that book 2 was left half-finished at Rome; only later did Augustine complete the second half of book 2 and compose all of book 3 in Africa. However, the harmony of style and content between book 1 and much of book 2, and the considerable discontinuity evident within book 3, appear to argue against both analyses. Thonnard (1941: 131) posits a continuous composition of book 2, describing it as 'very logically constructed', thus coupling it more happily with book 1. Finaert (1939: 167–71) presents an attractive solution: book 2 was at least half finished in Rome, and sketched out in note form, to be finished later. This would both explain the consistency of argument between books 1 and 2, while also accounting for the new language and ideas employed at the end of book 2, which are carried through into the final book.

([2]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.53.19: *Ad proprium [uoluntas] conuertitur, cum suae potestatis uult esse, ad exterius, cum aliorum propria uel quaecumque ad se non pertinet, cognoscere studet, ad inferius, cum uoluptatem corporis diligit*.

([3]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.53.19.

([4]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.54.20: *sed quoniam sicut sponte homo cecidit non ita etiam surgere potest*.

([5]) Neither of the two speakers in the dialogue is named in the earliest MSS. For an exploration of *De Libero Arbitrio* as a fully impersonal experiment in philosophy on the basis of this observation, see Simon Harrison (1999).

([6]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.4.2.

([7]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.28.9: *admonemur aduertere mortalitatem carnis huius et primum hominem ornasse, ut peccato poena congrueret, et dominum nostrum, ut peccato misericordia liberaret*.

([8]) Rom. 7:18; *Lib. Arb.* 2.51.18.

([9]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.52.18.

([10]) *Lib. Arb.* 2.52.18.

([11]) Plumer (2003: 3).

([12]) Drecoll (2007b: 255).

([13]) *Prop. Rom.* 13–18.12f.

([14]) *Prop. Rom.* 13–18.12f.

([15]) Rom. 7:14: *Scimus quia Lex spiritualis est, ego autem carnalis sum.*

([16]) *Prop. Rom.* 44.37: *peccatis uincitur, dum uiribus suis iuste uiuere conatur sine adiutorio liberantis gratiae dei.* Cf. *Lib. Arb.* 2.53.19: *Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis uult esse.*

([17]) *Prop. Rom.* 45–6.38.

([18]) *Prop. Rom.* 13–18.12.

([19]) Mosher (1977: 2–20); Mutzenbecher (1975: pp. xxix–xlii).

([20]) *Retr.* 1.26.

([21]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 66.3: 'From this we understand that there are four different [persons] in each human through whom he passes gradually, after which he will be preserved in everlasting life' (*Ex quo comprehendimus quattuor esse differentias etiam in uno homine, quibus gradatim peractis in uita aeterna manebitur*).

([22]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 66.5.

([23]) *Retr.* 1.25: *sed huius operis, si perficeretur, plures libri erant futuri … cessavi alia volumina adiungere exponendo epistolam totam, ipsius autem operis magnitudine ac labore deterritus et in alia faciliora delapsus sum.*

([24]) Fredriksen Landes (2007: 293).

([25]) Carol Harrison (2006).

([26]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.1.4.

([27]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.1.2.

([28]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.1.7.

([29]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.1.11: *Non enim est haec prima natura hominis, sed delicti poena, per quam facta est ipsa mortalitas, quasi secunda natura …*

([30]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.1.10: translated as 'addiction' by Burnaby (1955).

([31]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.1.5: 'Sin deceives with a false sweetness' (*fallit peccatum falsa dulcedine*).

([32]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.2.10.

([33]) *Ad Simpl.* 1.2.16.

([34]) Rom. 9:21; *Ad Simpl.* 1.2.17: 'Does not the potter have power over the clay, to make from the same lump one thing a vessel for honour, another a vessel for destruction?' (*Aut non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem conspersione facere aliud quidem uas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam?*).

([35]) *Prop. Rom.* 54.62.

([36]) Löhr (2007b: 502) argues that Rom. 5:12 is connected with 1. Cor. 15:22 here; however, it does not seem that the content of the Corinthians passage is truly reflected in the *Ad Simplicianum* at this point. This passage therefore stands as Augustine's earliest mature exegesis of Rom. 5:12.

([37]) *C. Faust.* 14.5.

([38]) *S.* 27.2.2; Rebillard (1999) places the sermon between 397 and 401; its extended exegesis of Rom. 9:14–20, very much after the style of the *Ad Simplicianum*, suggests a composition date close to that work.

([39]) *Prop. Rom.* 40.48.

([40]) *Prop. Rom.* 40.48.

([41]) Cf. *Retr.* 1.19.8; I will discuss his move away from this important expression in detail in Chapter 6.

([42]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 66.5.

([43]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 66.6.

([44]) *Conf.* 7.25.19.

([45]) Rébillard (1999: 773–2) and Hill (1993: 22 n. 2) independently date this sermon to 21 Jan. 396.

([46]) *S.* 273.9.9.

([47]) *Retr.* 2.27: *laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia; nec nisi ad illud potuit perueniri, ut liquidissima ueritate dixisse intelligatur apostolus: quis enim te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti?*

([48]) The negative assertions, claimed to be Caelestius' own, run as follows in *Gest. Pel.* 23.11: *[i]Adam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. [ii] quoniam peccatum Adae ipsum solum laeserit et non genus humanum. [iii] quoniam lex mittit ad regnum quemadmodum evangelium. [iv] quoniam ante adventum Christi fuerunt homines sine peccato. [v] quoniam infantes nuper nati in illo statu sint, in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem. [vi] quoniam neque per mortem vel praevaricationem Adae omne genus hominum moriatur neque per resurrectionem Christi omne genus hominum resurgat.*

([49]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.2.2.

([50]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.5.5.

([51]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.7.7.

([52]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.10.9.

([53]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.20.15.

([54]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.21.16.

([55]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.26.20.

([56]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.29.21–30.21.

([57]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.31.21–32.21.

([58]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.40.27–54.27.

([59]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.57.29.

([60]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2. 2.2.–5.5.

([61]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.38.24.

([62]) *Ep.* 139.3.

([63]) *Pecc. Mer.* 3.1.1: *qui dicunt adam, etiamsi non peccasset fuisse moriturum nec ex eius peccato quicquam ad eius posteros propagando transisse.*

([64]) *Pecc. Mer.* 3.2.2.

([65]) *Pecc. Mer.* 3.4.2.

([66]) *Pecc. Mer.* 3.22.13–23.13.

([67]) *Grat. Chr.* 2.2: *non solum per singulos horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros.*

([68]) *Grat. Chr.* 6.6.

([69]) *Grat. Chr.* 7.6.

([70]) *Grat. Chr.* 10.9.

([71]) *Grat. Chr.* 11.10.

([72]) *Grat. Chr.* 17.18–24.22.

([73]) *Grat. Chr.* 42.38.

([74]) *Grat. Chr.* 47.44.

([75]) *Grat. Chr.* 52.47.

([76]) *Pecc. Orig.* 1.1–25.22.

([77]) *Pecc. Orig.* 28.24.

([78]) *Pecc. Orig.* 30.26–33.28.

([79]) *Pecc. Orig.* 34.29: *nemo itaque, nemo prorsus inde liberatus est aut liberatur aut liberabitur nisi gratia liberatoris*.

([80]) *Grat. Chr.* 43.39: *ubicumque gratiae nomen sub ambigua generalitate commemorat*.

([81]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.60.31.

([82]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.60.31: 'Indeed, through the unity of the person, by which both of the two substances are one Christ, the Son of God was walking upon the earth, whilst the same Son of Man remained in heaven' (*per unitatem uero personae, qua utraque substantia unus christus est, et filius dei ambulabat in terra et idem ipse filius hominis manebat in caelo*).

([83]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.60.31.

([84]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.55.28.

([85]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.55.28.

([86]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.57.29: *quod igitur in membris corporis mortis huius inoboedienter mouetur totumque animum in se deiectum conatur adtrahere.*

([87]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.57.29.

([88]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.61.32: *a serpente quippe mors uenit, qui peccatum, quo mori mereretur, homini persuasit. dominus autem in carnem suam non peccatum transtulit tamquam uenenum serpentis, sed tamen transtulit mortem, ut esset in similitudine carnis peccati poena sine culpa, unde in carne peccati et culpa solueretur et poena.*

([89]) *Ep.* 143.

([90]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.68.37.

([91]) *Ep.* 143.5: *quod certum habeo, post peccatum primi hominis natos esse atque nasci ceteros homines in carne peccati, cui sanandae uenit in domino similitudo carnis peccati.*

([92]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.59.36: *magna quaestio est aliamque disputationem desiderat*.

([93]) *Pecc. Orig.* 32.17.

([94]) *Pecc. Orig.* 33.18.

([95]) *Pecc. Orig.* 34.29.

([96]) *Pecc. Orig.* 36.30.

([97]) *Pecc. Orig.* 36.31: *ad massam perditionis et iuste intellegitur ex adam natus antiqui debiti obligatione damnatus, nisi inde fuerit non secundum debitum, sed secundum gratiam liberatus*.

([98]) *Pecc. Orig.* 47.41.

([99]) Cf. Hill (1990: 334 n. 1).

([100]) *S.* 183.12.8.

([101]) Cf. Lamberigts (1991: 343) nicely paraphrasing Julian: 'Christ's gift of grace is found related to our moral way of living: Christ's grace forgives our personal sins, inspires our moral activity, helps us in realizing what we must do and gives us eternal life as a reward. But this grace is in no way a correction of the created nature of human beings.'

([102]) Fredriksen (1988).

([103]) Evans (1981: 242).

([104]) *C. Iul.* 5.52.15: *Hanc apostolicam sententiam me non intellexisse, dixisti.*

([105]) *C. Iul.* 5.52.15: *caro Christi non est caro peccati, sed similis carni peccati; quid restat ut intelligamus, nisi ea excepta omnem reliquam carnem esse peccati?*

([106]) *C. Iul.* 5.52.15.

([107]) *C. Iul.* 5.52.15.

([108]) *C. Iul.* 5.54.15.

([109]) *C. Iul.* 5.54.15: *Aliud est sensus carnis, sine quo nullus fuit, aut est, aut erit in corpore vivens homo: et aliud est concupiscentia qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum.*

([110]) *C. Iul.* 5.55.15: *Ut ergo nobis patiendi praeberet exemplum, non habuit ille mala sua, sed pertulit aliena; in doloribus pro nobis, non in cupiditatibus fuit.*

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

поменять прокси

The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430
Dominic Keech

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Augustine, Origen, and the Exegesis of Romans 8:3

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Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 4 analyses Augustine's Christology of Romans 8.3 as a reception of Origen's exegesis of that text. The methodology for this argument is established by reviewing the debate over Augustine's use of the term *massa peccati* as a reception from Ambrosiaster. Discounting Ambrose as the primary source of Augustine's theology of Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh', the chapter identifies parallels to Augustine's treatment of the text in Origen's homilies on Luke, exposition of Psalm 28, and commentary on Romans. This leads to the conclusion that the Christology Augustine uses to combat Pelagianism is in fact Origen's, and functions as a subtextual apology for Origen from within his anti-Pelagian project. The chapter closes by suggesting that Augustine may have received an early draft translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans from Simplicianus, or from a close circle of readers gathered around him at Milan.

Keywords: Ambrosiaster, mass of sin, virginal conception, Ambrose, Ambrose, Expositio in Psalmum 37, Origen, Homilies on Luke, Origen, Commentary on Romans, C. P. Hammond Bammel, Simplicianus, Rufinus of Aquileia

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through a grace internal to created nature, Augustine's Christ bore the punishment for Original Sin in his mortality, avoiding its guilt by being born of a passionless Virgin. Augustine's consistent use of the motif against an exemplarist Christology illuminates his construction of Pelagianism as a 'total heresy', whose core doctrine promised to poison the whole of Christian teaching. While Augustine's agenda vis-à-vis the possibility of *impeccantia* would shift in the midst of his anti-Pelagian efforts, his fundamental position on Original Sin and its effects, countered in the 'likeness of sinful flesh', did not. Both points remain insufficiently recognized in scholarship on both Pelagianism and Augustinian Christology to date. However, I promised that the real significance of Augustine's exegesis of the verse lies in his receiving it not only from the work of Ambrose of Milan, but also—and more importantly—from Origen of Alexandria. With one eye on Chapter 2, the implications of this conclusion should be clear. Augustine continued to uphold the orthodoxy of the Origenian tradition within his attack on a heresy reputed to be the bastard of Origenism, even after his own treatment of Original Sin and *impeccantia* had come close to the anti-Origenist fire of Rufinus the Syrian and Jerome.

This chapter will show the parallels between Augustine's exegesis of the verse and that found in the corpora of Ambrose and Origen. On the basis of close textual analysis, I will argue that the influence of Origen is both predominant and prior to that of Ambrose, and put forward a case for **(p.107)** Augustine's reading of Origen's commentary on Romans well in advance of its publication by Rufinus of Aquileia in the first decade of the fifth century. As a methodological prelude to this, I will explore the scholarly discussion of Augustine's reading of Ambrosiaster, eliminating his commentaries on the Pauline epistles as a potential source for Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3, at the same time laying out the criteria for a sound reception-critical hermeneutic to be applied to the central case at hand.

Ambrosiaster and the Massa Peccati

It has been widely accepted that Augustine's understanding of the Fall, and particularly his use of the term *massa peccati*, was influenced by his reading of Ambrosiaster's commentary on Romans. The two most recent, authoritative *Lexika* in Augustinian studies both endorse this affirmative view. In the *Augustin Handbuch*, Eva Schulz-Flügel writes: 'Of particular importance is [Ambrosiaster's] exposition of Romans 5:12, which Augustine cites as the underlying argument for his teaching on Original Sin (cf. *C. Ep. Pel.* 4.7), although he attributes it to the commentary of Hilary.'[1] This is seconded by David Hunter in *Augustine through the Ages*.[2] However, neither indicates the history of scholarly controversy behind the repetition of what appears to have become an unquestioned, consensus opinion, except for providing the relevant bibliography. Before surveying this debate, I shall lay out the internal textual evidence in support of Hunter's and Schulz-Flügel's position.

In *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* Augustine sought to prove his teaching on the fallen state by reference to the common tradition, a technique frequently repeated elsewhere in the anti-Pelagian works. At 4.7.4, he writes:

> For thus Saint Hilary understood what was written: 'In whom all have sinned', for he said, 'in whom (that is, Adam), all have sinned.' Then he added, it is quite clear that all have sinned in Adam as though in a single mass; as he was corrupted through sin, so all whom he bore are born under sin.
>
> *nam sic et sanctus hilarius intellexit quod scriptum est: in quo omnes peccauerunt; ait enim: in quo, id est adam, omnes peccauerunt. deinde addidit: manifestum in adam omnes peccasse quasi in massa; ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, omnes quos genuit nati sunt sub peccato.*

Though Augustine frequently cites Hilary of Poitiers in the anti-Pelagian treatises, there is no formulation of this sort in his extant works. Ambrosiaster's commentary on Romans, however, does explain Romans 5:12 in these terms, and it has been established that a number of his commentaries have been preserved in **(p.108)** the earliest manuscripts under the name of Hilary.[3] They also exist under the name of Ambrose (whence later the distinguishing expansion Ambrosiaster) and Augustine himself. The text, as found in his commentary, runs:

> In whom—in Adam—all sinned. He said 'in whom' when he spoke of the woman, because it refers not to the species, but to the race. It is therefore clear that all have sinned in Adam as in one mass. Being himself corrupted through his sin, all whom he bore are born under sin. Thus from him all are sinners, because we all come from him.
>
> *in quo—id est in Adam—omnes peccaverunt. ideo dixit in quo, cum de muliere loquatur, quia non ad speciem retulit, sed ad genus. manifestum est itaque omnes in Adam peccasse quasi in massa. ipse enim per peccatum corruptus quos genuit, omnes nati sunt sub peccato. ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex ipso sumus omnes.*[4]

The second piece of evidence for an Augustinian reception of Ambrosiaster is found in the *Ad Simplicianum*, where Augustine's application of the term *massa peccati* to his exegesis of Romans 9:21 closely reflects Ambrosiaster's parallel interweaving of Romans 5:12 and 9:21 around the same term:

Therefore all humans are a kind of single mass of sin (since, as the apostle says, all die in Adam, from whom is drawn the origin of humanity's offence toward God); and they are in debt to the divine and most high justice. Whether that be exacted or remitted, there is no unrighteousness on God's part.	Therefore, since we all come from one and the same mass in our substance, and all are sinners, God righteously has mercy on one but disdains another. For the potter has a will only; but God has both a will and righteousness.
sunt igitur omnes homines—quando quidem, ut apostolus ait, in adam omnes moriuntur, a quo in uniuersum genus humanum origo ducitur offensionis dei— una quaedam massa peccati supplicium debens diuinae summaeque iustitiae, quod siue exigatur siue donetur, nulla est iniquitas.	ita et deus, cum omnes ex una atque eadem massa simus in substantia et cuncti peccatores, alii miseretur et alterum despicit non sine iustitia. in figulo enim sola voluntas est, in deo autem voluntas cum iustitia.(Ambrosiaster, Ad Rom. γ, 9.21)

(Ad. Simpl. 1.2.16)

In turn, Ambrosiaster's exegesis appears to be reflected in the even earlier *Quaestio* 68 of *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*:

> **(p.109)** Ever since our nature sinned in paradise, that same divine providence forms us by a mortal birth: not after the form of heaven, but after the form of earth; not according to the spirit, but according to the flesh; and we have all been made one mass of clay, which is the mass of sin.
>
> *ex quo ergo in paradiso natura nostra peccauit, ab eadem diuina prouidentia non secundum caelum sed secundum terram, id est non secundum spiritum sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una massa luti facti sumus, quod est massa peccati.*[5]

As the *Expositio Propositionum* bears no trace of the term *massa*, it seems logical to date *Quaestio* 68 to the short space of time between writing that commentary and the completion of the *Ad Simplicianum*—that is, during 396.

A number of possible scenarios seem to arise from this evidence. In the first, Augustine read Ambrosiaster in 396, found the phrases *in Adam quasi in massa* and *una atque et eadem massa* attractive, and compressed them into his own term *massa peccati*. Ambrosiaster's neat conflation of Romans 5:12 and 9:21 further contributed to his own closely interconnected exegeses of the two passages. Having found a useful cipher that encapsulated his own theology of the Fall, Augustine deployed *massa peccati* with consistency thereafter, only circumstantially revealing its origin in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* in an effort to prove his theological credentials. In a second scenario, *massa peccati* is to be attributed originally to Augustine, whose later reading of Ambrosiaster confirmed his coincidental insight and provided him with those credentials, to be produced against the Pelagians. A third finds the older Augustine with a weak memory, having read Ambrosiaster in the 390s but, by 420, forgetting the precise roots of a phrase that had by that time become a naturalized part of his vocabulary. Finally, a fourth sees him reading a lost work of Hilary during the 390s that contained the phrase, thus substantiating the accuracy of his later quotation. With the exception of the last possibility, these all constitute a valid case of reception; at some point in each, Augustine interacts with the text of Ambrosiaster's

commentary on Romans, with greater or lesser concentration. By examining the scholarly debate of this question in the first half of the twentieth century, I intend to fix on a number of critical judgements by which one or more of these scenarios, or another all together, can be privileged over the others.

In 1762, Jacques Morel published the earliest discussion of Ambrosiaster's influence on Augustine in his *Dissertation*. Claiming that Augustine nowhere else cites Ambrosiaster, he argued that the *massa* passage must come from a now lost work of Hilary of Poitiers, on which Ambrosiaster also drew. However, a true beginning was made at solving the question with a wholescale review of the person and work of Ambrosiaster at the turn of the twentieth **(p.110)** century; here, the monographs of Alexander Souter (1905) and Wilhelm Mundle (1919) were decisive. Unfortunately, their combined lack of conclusion about the identity or dates of Ambrosiaster's life offered no immediate solution to questions of his reception.[6] Indeed, Souter's monograph contains no treatment of Ambrosiaster's influence whatever. However, the integrity of the Ambrosiastran corpus—including commentaries on all the Pauline letters and that to the Hebrews—was upheld by both.[7] That the Pauline commentaries express a negative attitude to Damasus (366–84) suggests that Ambrosiaster flourished or was at least alive during his papacy, and on this basis Souter and Mundle conjectured that he might have been writing in Italy, or perhaps even North Africa.

The first argument for Augustine's reception of Ambrosiaster built purely on linguistic parallelism is that of Giorgio Bonaiuti. His conclusion is succinct:

> I think that it is exactly in his theories of original sin that Augustine depends closely and in a decisive way upon Ambrosiaster, from whom he derived, 1) The formula in which he embodies the notion of our responsibility in the sin of Adam. 2) The interpretation of the most discussed Pauline passages, especially Rom. 5.12. 3) The fundamental notion of man 'servus culpae servus gratiae.' 4) The general method of positive and realistic Scriptural interpretation, which is peculiar...to Ambrosiaster.[8]

The two criteria for Bonaiuti's position are the parallel treatment of Romans 5:12 under the term *massa* and its conflation with Romans 9:21:[9] Ambrosiaster's use of the word, unlike its appearances in the Vulgate, is unique in connecting it to the sin of Adam. While he argues for broader anthropological and soteriological commonalities between the two writers, he offers no further evidence in support of the claim, so that Augustine's theological shift of 396 evident in the *De Diversis Quaestionibus* and *Ad Simplicianum* rests on a single word: *massa*. Bonaiuti's conclusion was repeated in parenthesis in 1927, in N. P. Williams' Bampton Lectures on *The Fall and Original Sin*, without detailed examination.[10]

Apparently unaware of Bonaiuti's work, in 1918 Alfred J. Smith published the first in the series of articles on 'The Latin Sources of the Commentary of **(p.111)** Pelagius on St Paul's Letter to the Romans'. Here he plotted Pelagius' use not only of Origen–Rufinus' commentary, but also of Augustine's *Expositio Propositionum* and Ambrosiaster's work. While he found a 'strong family resemblance' between Pelagius, Origen–Rufinus, and Ambrosiaster, his study drew no fast conclusions about Augustine's use of the latter.[11] Five years hence, James Baxter argued for Augustine's reception of Ambrosiaster from Epistle 82, of 405.[12] Challenging Jerome's exegesis of Galatians 2:11–14 in which Peter's occlusion of his Jewishness to eat with Gentiles is viewed as a just deception (*simulatio utilis*), Augustine supported his variant reading by reference to his predecessor, correcting Jerome with the reminder: 'if you look up—or remember—what our Ambrose thought about this.'[13] As Baxter points out, Jerome's treatment of the text is consistent with that of Origen and, unsurprisingly, Ambrose of Milan as well. By contrast, Ambrosiaster is consistent with Augustine. Therefore Augustine must have had access to his commentary, believing it to be a work of Ambrose, by 405. The usefulness of this observation aside, whether Augustine had the text in the 390s remained unresolved. Returning to his study of Ambrosiaster in 1927, Souter made the same point: even granting Baxter's analysis of the letter of 405: 'We have no certain evidence that he possessed Ambrosiaster on Romans at the time he wrote his commentaries on that epistle.'[14]

With Souter's article the discussion appears to reach an impasse, the majority position reflecting the absence of substantive evidence in the reticence of Souter and Smith, the difficult theological neologism of *massa peccati* supported

only by Bonaiuti's grand argument built on slim foundations. The year 1930 brought with it the apparent denouement of Bernard Leeming's article 'Augustine, Ambrosiaster and the Massa Perditionis', the first attempt thoroughly to examine the question alongside a full survey of prior scholarship. He begins by finding Morel's argument wanting: it is scarcely conceivable that Augustine lifted *massa peccati* from a lost Hilarian work, as the term is far from being in his style, and there is no evidence whatever that he wrote extensively on Paul. However, he concedes Morel's observation, that it is odd that Augustine quoted nothing else from Ambrosiaster's commentaries. Turning to arguments in favour of an Augustinian reception, he admits the prevalence of the term in the Ambrosiastran corpus and the similarity of Augustine and Ambrosiaster on the subject of sin's transmission, quoting Mundle: 'Ambrosiaster goes as far as to connect the sinfulness of the flesh with reproduction.'[15] Leeming then airs an intermediate solution: Augustine might have been sent the relevant extract of Ambrosiaster's commentary on Romans by a well-meaning friend wishing to support his fight against the **(p.112)** Pelagians in the late 410s. However, the majority of Patristic quotations in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* come from a variety of texts already well evidenced in the Augustinian corpus, making such a citation of Ambrosiaster an unlikely novelty. Turning to the parallels between Ambrosiaster and the *Expositio Propositionum* noted by Smith, Leeming simply declines to recognize the validity of his evidence.[16] Moreover, Smith's claim that Augustine had read Ambrosiaster in advance of the *Expositio* contradicts Bonaiuti's argument that this reception occurred after the completion of that work, but before the *Ad Simplicianum*. All of this, therefore, argues against a case for reception. Thankfully, Leeming makes the prior assumptions for his conclusion very clear:

> Augustine insisted that his doctrine on Original Sin was held by all Christians, handed down as part of the faith, so that not even heretics and schismatics held anything else. If he spoke the truth—and who can doubt it?—then we have an explanation for the origin of his opinions…He derived it…from the common teaching…[17]
>
> The fact is that there are very many resemblances or parallels to be found in almost all Catholic writers of approximately the same date when they touch upon similar questions.[18]

All of this is related to a prior suspicion of Ambrosiaster, aired in the articulation of the 'affirmative' position at the beginning of the article: 'Augustine derived his fundamental ideas of the Fall and Original Sin not from the general tradition of the Church, but from this unknown and, as Harnack calls him, ' "not unsuspected theologian".'[19]

As the treatment of the issue that considers most fully the methods for proving (or disproving) a textual reception, Leeming's article is crucial. It did not, however, seal the case. Martini's 1944 monograph on Ambrosiaster's life and works states confidently: 'It is certain that Ambrosiaster exercised the primary influence on both Pelagius and Augustine', regarding which *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* 4.7.4 shows how 'the argument from tradition confirms his doctrine of original sin'.[20] The Corpus Christianorum Latinorum edition of the *Ad Simplicianum* likewise footnotes 1.2.6 with its correlate in Ambrosiaster's Romans commentary.[21]

As with so many of the scholarly trails concerned with establishing authorship, dating, and influence that dominated Patristics in the first half of the twentieth century, a critical methodology remains only implicit and fragmented in these works. None addresses what might constitute a valid reception, or **(p.113)** whether there might be multiple varieties of it. I begin with Leeming's critical priorities. It is clearly anachronistic to base a case for or against reception on the grounds of a standard of 'Catholic' orthodoxy made much later (if at all) than the authors in question. Even working from a definition of orthodoxy contemporary with Augustine (however that might be construed), the case falls down, as, for example, his reception of Tyconius shows. A perception of where orthodoxy ends and heterodoxy begins would not stop any one of them from reading and thus to some extent receiving heretical texts. In any case, Ambrosiaster is nowhere pilloried as a heretic; Leeming's reference to the judgement of von Harnack is, to say the least, ironic in this regard, and contradicted by his later claim that heretics and schismatics themselves supported the 'traditional' doctrine of the Fall. This aside, the more important flaw in Leeming's article is to assume that valid verbal reception has to be coupled with the conscious and systematic adoption of the ideas surrounding the words. The obverse problem undermines Bonaiuti's article, in its presumption that the ideas surrounding an adopted verbal motif must themselves also be rooted in a source

text. Neither oversimplification does justice to how people read texts.

Reception occurs on a sliding scale. Vergil's reconstruction of Homeric themes in the *Aeneid* is clearly different from the reception of *Pride and Prejudice* in the film *Bridget Jones's Diary*. One is deeply engaged with a text and its translation into renewed ideas, the other is less so. Closer to home, Augustine's lengthy quotations of the Latin Fathers in the polemical anti-Pelagian treatises are different from his elaboration, often uncited, of themes from Ambrose's *Hexaemeron* over forty years of preaching and writing on Genesis. Readers consciously and unwittingly allow the texts they read, hear, or catch by hearsay to make variously deeper or shallower impressions on them. This internal judgement is in part formed by the traditions of reception within which any one reader has been formed (also a largely unconscious process), by which texts are harboured as more or less resonant upon reaching a safe intellectual haven. The same conditions apply to the receiver of a receiver *ad nauseam*: my reading of Leeming reading Augustine reading Ambrosiaster goes on inside a dense braid of interpretations within readings. This need not end in an interpretative nihilism, as long as an interpreter makes some of her intellectual allegiances visible. I have tried to do some of this in my foreword and first chapter. Previous chapters make clear that I do not believe Augustine was an 'exclusive' reader of theological texts, ignoring those considered by his colleagues as *scripta non grata*, were this actually a consideration applicable to Ambrosiaster.

On a reading of the texts in question it seems uncontestable to me that there is a very marked verbal parallel between their application of the term *massa*. Likewise, both Augustine's and Ambrosiaster's conflation of Romans **(p.114)** 5:12 and 9:21 around the same term is beyond coincidence. When this reception occurred is impossible to say. Smith's case for a reading of the Romans commentary before the *Expositio Propositionum* was written is reasonable, accepting his further verbal parallels. This does not contradict Bonaiuti's argument for a reception of the *massa* complex just before the *Ad Simplicianum, pace* Leeming. A return to an already read text often brings with it the discovery of something that had been lost on a first (or second, or third) reading. This may be the result of simultaneous engagement with other texts that corroborate fresh discoveries in old books. In this case, it may be that Augustine's use of the term *massa peccati* was verbally dependent on Ambrosiaster, but theologically prompted from elsewhere. This is supported by the fact that Ambrosiaster's creationist protology is markedly different from Augustine's developing conception of the origin of humanity 'in Adam', and, unlike Augustine, he has no theology of sin's transmission by *concupiscentia carnalis* in the sexual act.[22]

Augustine's references to Hilarius and Ambrosius are complicating factors. I do not believe Augustine would have mistaken Ambrosiaster's very *un*Ambrosian commentaries for works by the bishop of Milan. However, I think it likely that he could creatively forget the real authorship of a work in sharp argument with Jerome, in an effort to prove his position from within a tradition they both shared. Ambrose's own reception of Hilary, coupled with Augustine's belief that the Pauline commentaries were by the bishop of Poitiers (not unreasonable, given the manuscript attributions), would have made such an elision easier still. Thus discrete identities were collapsed within a chain of readership, only to be reapportioned later at different points on the chain when circumstance demanded. In short, Augustine's twinned exposition of Romans 5:12 and 9:21, along with the term *massa peccati*, are his own; but his reading of Ambrosiaster, however concentrated or slight, influenced their development.

This discussion of scholarship, along with the texts of Ambrosiaster and Augustine, paves the way for the reception study of this chapter. Central to it is the conviction that 'receptions' are pluriform. An idea; an image; a collection of words; the application of a proof text: all constitute valid cases **(p.115)** for reading and inwardly digesting the thought of another author. The philologist should look not for evidence of consistent textual epiphanies to prove a case for theological dependence, but rather for a slow and often shadowy incorporation of unassigned fragments into new forms of thought. In what follows, I will reject some instances of potential reception because of a lack of extensive textual parallelism and accept others on the basis of what is, by comparison, a very slight parallelism. I believe this is reasonable because readers are inconsistent, and influenced by more than just the texts they receive; the traditions of reception in which they operate have to be explored alongside a basic comparison of texts.

Ambrosiaster on Romans 8:3

Having established that Augustine's reading of Romans 5:12 was worked out in dialogue with Ambrosiaster's Romans commentary, I shall begin by investigating the same work for the roots of his exegesis of Romans 8:3. I first submit a reminder of the three-step development of Augustine's exegesis. In the *Expositio Propositionum* Romans 8:3 is treated soteriologically, attention being given to the second half of the verse, *et de peccato damnauit peccatum in carne*. Here, because he dies in the 'likeness of sinful flesh', Christ becomes a redemptive example of a mortality put to a holy and redeeming end. In *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, the emphasis shifts: Christ is born *sine carnali delectatione*, the means whereby his death can have exemplary, and thus redemptive, power. Sermon 273, given in 396, paves the way for Augustine's mature reading. His now pervasive use of the term *concupiscentia carnis* is applied to the text, so that the sexless conception of Christ sets his flesh fully apart:

> For he was not born from the seed of man, or from the concupiscence of male and female. But how then? By the annunciation of the Father.
>
> *Sed tamen ille carnem in similitudinem carnis peccati, nos carnem peccati. Non enim ex virili semine, aut ex masculi et feminae concupiscientia: sed quid? Nuntio Patris*.[23]

Christ is born without seed and without parental passion. *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, written sixteen years later, repeats the consistent refrain:

> He alone was born without sin, whom the Virgin conceived without the embrace of man and without the concupiscence of the flesh, but by the obedience of her mind.
>
> *solus sine peccato natus est, quem sine uirili complexu non concupiscentia carnis, sed oboedientia mentis uirgo concepit*.[24]

(p.116) Ambrosiaster interprets the passage as follows:

> This is the 'likeness' of flesh, because, although it is the same flesh as ours, it was not made in the womb and born like our own: it was sanctified in the womb and born without sin, and he never sinned in it. For thus the virgin womb was chosen to give birth to the Lord, so that his flesh might differ from ours in its holiness. On account of this [Paul] says the same thing: because he was not born from the same substance of flesh as us, therefore the body of the Lord was not subject to sin. The flesh of the Lord was thus purified by the Holy Spirit so that he could be born in the kind of body Adam had before his sin, the judgement against Adam alone remaining on it.
>
> *haec est similitudo carnis, quia quamvis eadem caro sit quae et nostra, non tamen ita facta in utero est et nata sicut et caro nostra; est enim sanctificata in utero et nata sine peccato, et neque ipse in illa peccavit. ideo enim virginalis uterus electus est ad partum dominicum, ut in sanctitate differret caro dominica a carne nostra. in causa enim similis est, non in qualitate peccati substantiae. propterea ergo similem dixit, quia de eadem enim substantia carnis non eandem habuit nativitatem, quia peccato subiectum non fuit corpus domini. expiata est enim caro domini a sancto spiritu, ut in tali corpore nasceretur, quale fuit Adae ante peccatum, sola tamen sententia manente data in Adam.*[25]

While Ambrosiaster, like Augustine, makes the connection between the virginal conception and Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh', there is no mention of the role played by reproduction in the transmission of sin to infants, or any counter-example to it found in the conception of Christ. Further, where Augustine is careful to apply only the punishment of sin in mortality to Christ, Ambrosiaster is less circumspect: his Christ remains under the (unspecified) *sententia* against Adam. Whether this applies to his humanity before or after its purgation is left unspecified.[26] The clearest apparent parallel between the language of Augustine and Ambrosiaster occurs in their respective descriptions of the election of the Virgin. While Augustine first treats of the creation of Mary as a unique 'grace' from the mid-390s, it is not until 412 that he

employs the language of election to describe this. In *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, he writes:

> Therefore it was given to the Virgin Mother to bring forth a holy seed by her pious faith, not according to the law of the flesh of sin (which is to say, without conceiving by the movement of carnal concupiscence); he created her in order to choose her, so that he could choose to be created from her.
>
> *Ideo uirginem matrem non lege carnis peccati, id est non concupiscentiae carnalis motu concipientem, sed pia fide sanctum germen in se fieri promerentem, quam eligeret creauit, de qua crearetur eligit*.[27]

(p.117) The formula *quam eligeret creauit, de qua crearetur eligit*, also appears in a sermon from after 425, showing the persistence of the phrase.[28] In any case, the parallel between Ambrosiaster and Augustine runs only to a shared use of the verb *eligo* with reference to Mary; for Augustine, her election is intimately connected to her role in conceiving Christ outside of the carnal bond, which, as I have indicated, is absent from Ambrosiaster's thought. Moreover, Augustine applies the word to her simultaneous creation and election to fulfil this role; Ambrosiaster refers only to the election of her womb. To posit a creative reworking of Ambrosiaster therefore hinges on a single verb attached to the Virgin's role in Christ's conception and birth: *eligere*. Neither the early (soteriological) nor mature, Christological exegeses of the verse given by Augustine substantially concur with Ambrosiaster at the level of either verbal or theological parallelism. I therefore believe Ambrosiaster's Romans commentary should be ruled out as a source for Augustine's reading of Romans 8:3.

Ambrose of Milan

Augustine's debt to Ambrose is beyond doubt. By his own admission, encountering the figurative exegesis of the bishop of Milan formed a milestone in his gradual reconciliation to the Church.[29] The relationship between Augustine's early interpretation of Scripture and the method of Ambrose has been extensively researched; likewise, Ambrose's attention to Mariology and Christology is well documented.[30] In the words of Huhn: 'Ambrose expressed the causal connection between the virginal conception and the sinlessness of Christ more often in his writings, with such clarity and determination, than any other Church Father before him.'[31] We might, therefore, expect to find some relationship between Ambrose's exegesis of Romans 8:3 and that of Augustine, which views the text in precisely the terms of the relationship between the virginal conception and Christ's sinlessness 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' as a basis for attacking Pelagian anthropology.

It has been impossible for me to investigate the entire Ambrosian corpus for Mariological and Christological references focusing on Christ's sinlessness and the mode of his conception. Instead, I have relied for this on the exhaustive third volume of the *Corpus Marianum Patristicum*.[32] This approaches the works of Ambrose thematically, finding in them 203 separate, **(p.118)** Mariological passages. This method naturally elides the fact that many of these apparently isolated pericopes are fragmented from longer, continuous texts. Nonetheless, on my reading only one passage makes reference to Romans 8:3, Ambrose's *Explanatio Psalmi* 37.5. In addition to this, I have searched the Ambrosian corpus for exegeses of Romans 8:3 using the *Patrologia Latina* database, finding a further five detailed and considered treatments of the verse made outside a directly Mariological context. I will briefly detail these here.

Ambrose's treatment of Romans 8:3 shares a common objective with that of Augustine, in distinguishing the unique human nature possessed by Christ from that owned by humanity in general. Augustine's refrain throughout his treatment of the text in his explicitly anti-heretical writings appears prefigured in Ambrose's *De Poenitentia* 1.3.12: 'He does not say it was the "likeness of flesh", for Christ took up true human flesh, not its likeness.'[33] This affirmation of the reality of Christ's humanity, in contradistinction to a Docetic Christology, is elementary and well established in other Patristic treatments of the verse.[34] In a further two texts, Ambrose refers to Romans 8:3 in contexts entirely alien to anything found in Augustine's work. First, at *De Fide* 3.4.30, Ambrose describes Elijah as a prefiguration of Christ on account of his power to resurrect the dead. Secondly, at *De Ioseph Patriarcha* 3.9, he counts Joseph as a type of Christ, as both were sent by their Father to their brothers. With both, the fulfilment is distinct from the prefiguration: the forerunners possess

sinful flesh, their fulfilment only its likeness.

In the *Expositio Psalmi 118*, Ambrose exposits Romans 8:3 in a similarly distinctive manner: 'His flesh was "sin" because it was condemned by a hereditary curse; it was "sin" as the allurement to and servant of sin. The Lord Jesus came in a flesh subject to sin, and exercised in it the warfare of virtue.'[35] Although he makes clear at an earlier stage of the *Expositio* that the Father sent Christ in flesh that is not sinful like that of other humans, Ambrose's expression 'in a flesh subject to sin' (*in carne peccato obnoxia*) is infelicitous, and stands in marked contrast to Augustine's much clearer definition of carnal nature, contrasted with the likeness of sinful flesh; and the insistence throughout his treatment of that text that only the residual punishment for sin in mortality extends to the humanity of Christ. The same can be said for the final words of Ambrose's exegesis of the verse at *De Incarnatione* 6.60: 'he assumed for us the taking up of the carnal body of **(p.119)** sin, subject to its weakness, not by the nature or working of sin when he was made the likeness of the flesh of sin, but so that our sin might be crucified in his flesh' (*non natura operationeque peccati, utpote in similitudinem carnis peccati factus, sed ut peccatum nostrum in sua carne 'crucifigeret', susceptionem pro nobis infirmitate obnoxii iam 'corporis peccati' carnalis adsumpsit*). While this text suggests a family likeness between Augustine and Anbrose in their understanding of the relationship between the *similitudo carnis peccati* and the atonement, and in Ambrose's subsequent reference to Luke 1:35, Ambrose tends towards identifying the flesh of Christ with the attributes of sinful flesh. As even short citations from these works show, Ambrose's exegesis stands within a broader Patristic handling of the text in its anti-Docetic application, is typically 'Ambrosian' in its systematic allegorical application, and is somewhat imprecise in a specifically Pauline Christological context. None of these examples significantly reflects Augustine's treatment of the verse.

By far the most substantial Ambrosian interpretation of Romans 8:3 occurs in his *Explanatio Psalmi 37*. In chapter 5 of the sermon, Ambrose introduces the Pauline quotation with the usual distinction: Christ has a true human nature, in addition to the likeness to sinful flesh. I include here the continuation of the text, tabulated against its Augustinian correlates:

(5.2) Our flesh is the flesh of sin because it has been filled with the deceit and poison of the serpent. After it was made subject to sin, it was also made the flesh of death, because it was in debt to death. Christ has taken up the likeness of the guilt of this flesh and the judgement under which it stands because, although he took up the natural substance of this flesh, he did not however take up any contagion with it,	Death came indeed by the serpent, who persuaded humanity to sin, and for which he merited death. However, the Lord did not carry over sin into his flesh like a serpent's poison, but only death, so that there might be in the likeness of the flesh of sin a punishment without guilt, whereby both guilt and punishment would be dissolved in his flesh. (Pecc. Mer. 2.61.32.)
nor was he conceived in iniquities or born in sin; for he was born not from blood nor from the will of the flesh or by the will of man, but by the Holy Spirit from the Virgin.	His flesh, not born of carnal delight, was not the flesh of sin, although there was in it the likeness of the flesh of sin because it was mortal. By sin alone did Adam deserve death.
(5.3) What therefore does it mean, "He condemned sin by sin, in the flesh?" Whether from the likeness of the flesh of sin, or because Christ took up the quality but not the practice of our sin (thus it was not by misdeeds but by the mystery of his mercy that he was made sin for us, who himself never committed sin); or indeed because in that flesh of sin, our flesh, subject to sin and the judgement under which it stands, he condemned sin in the flesh, teaching us how we ought to walk: not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit, although we are situated in the flesh?	What then did the Lord do? He condemned sin in the flesh by sin itself, by taking the flesh of man the sinner, and teaching now we should live; he condemned sin in that very flesh, so that it might not be lead captive into conspiracy with libido, but instead burn with a love of things eternal. In this way, he says, the righteousness of the law may be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit.
(5.6) Therefore his taking up of sins was done out of mercy, not because of any misdeed of his own.	(Div. Quaest. 83 66) But indeed, that death of the Lord came about out of loving condescension, not because of any debt. (Prop. Rom. 48)
(5.2) facta enim erat fraude et ueneno infusa serpentis caro nostra caro peccati. postquam est obnoxia facta peccato, facta erat caro mortis, quia erat morti debita. huius carnis iam reae, iam praeiudicatae similitudinem	a serpente quippe mors uenit, qui peccatum, qui mori mereretur, homini persusasit. dominus autem in carnem suam non peccatum transtulit tanquam uenenum

Christus in sua carne suscepit, quia, etsi naturalem substantiam huius susceperat carnis, non tamen contagia ulla susceperat	serpentis, sed tamen transtulit mortem ut esset in similitudine carnis peccati poena sine culpa, unde in carne peccati et culpa soveretur et poena. (Pecc. Mer. 2.61.32.)
nec in iniquitatibus conceptus et natus est in delictis, qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex uoluntate carnis neque ex uoluntate uiri, sed de spiritu sancto natus ac uirgine est.	non enim caro peccati erat, quae non de carnali delectatione nata erat, sed tamen inerat in ea similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat. mortem autem non meruit adam nisi peccato.
(5.3) quid ergo est: de peccato peccatum damnauit in carne? utrum de similitudine carnis peccati an quia peccata nostra Christus non usu, sed qualitate suscepit: non crimine, sed suae misericordiae sacramento, et peccatum pro nobis factus	sed quid fecit dominus? de peccato damnauit peccatum in carne,
est qui peccatum ipse non fecit; an uero quia etiam de ista carne peccati, hoc est, nostra hac obnoxia et praejudicata damnavit peccatum in carne,	id est suscipiendo carnem hominis peccatoris, et docendo quemadmodum uiueremus, peccatum in ipsa carne damnauit, ut aeternorum caritate spiritus flagrans non duceretur captiuus in
docendo quemadmodum in carne positi non secundum carnem ambulemus, sed secundum spiritum?	consensionem libidinis. ut iustitia, inquit, legis impleretur in nobis, qui non secundum carnem ambulamus, sed secundum spiritum. (Div. Quaest. 83 66)
(5.6) Ergo pietatis est susceptiopeccatorum ista, non criminis.	At illa uero mors domini dignationis fuit, non debiti. (Prop. Rom. 48)

(p.120) (p.121) The clearest whole-text to whole-text parallel appears in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83* 66, where the flow of Augustine's argument, his verbal structures (*quemadmodum uiueremus*), his vocabulary (*de delectatione…nata erat*), and his use of Scripture (*non secundum carnem…*) indicate at least an acquaintance with, though more likely a close reading of, the *Explanatio*. The text from *Expositio Propositionum* 48 appears to be structurally similar to Ambrose, although the vocabulary is decidedly different and, once again, Ambrose's Christ assumes sins (*susceptio peccatorum*), where Augustine's assumes death (*mors*). Similarly, the apparent parallels between the homily and *De Peccatorum Meritis* reveal a kinship of thought, without sharing significant vocabulary or verbal structure. In different texts, Augustine exhibits both a theological and a verbal reception of the *Explanatio*.

While I would argue for the significance of the correlation between the two writers in connecting Romans 8:3 with both the virginal conception and the sinlessness of Christ, the single sermon of Ambrose cannot fully account for the prevalence of this motif in the Augustinian corpus. Huhn's study of Ambrose's Mariology proves useful in unpicking this conundrum once again. While Ambrose was the first Father to state the connection between Christ's sinlessness and his conception outside the bond of sex with 'clarity and particularity', his own formulation was itself dependent on a reading of Origen, whose work provides the *locus classicus* of this motif in his Romans commentary when interpreting Romans 8:3. Huhn acknowledges an apparent relationship between Origen and Augustine in the exegesis of this passage, and explains it thus: 'The agreement between the two passages can only be explained by a dependence on Ambrose.'[36] I believe that, far from absorbing Origen through Ambrose alone, Augustine independently read a number of Origen's works in which he handles the virginity-sinlessness motif, in some cases with clear reference to Romans 8:3.

Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine

Ambrose's statement of the relationship between the virginal conception and Christ's sinlessness in his *Explanatio Psalmi 37* is found in very similar form in his work, the *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*.[37] The passage in question **(p.122)** is recognized as a direct borrowing from Origen's fourteenth homily on Luke.[38] The two texts are comparable, as follows:

It was not the embrace of a man which opened the mysterious hiddenness of the Virgin's womb; rather,	Then the Mother's womb was opened, from which she brought forth a child; it was a holy womb and held in reverence before the birth of Christ because a

the Holy Spirit poured a spotless seed into it. The Lord Jesus alone is holy among those born of woman, who did not feel the contagion of earthly seduction in the novelty of his spotless birth, and expelled it by his heavenly majesty.	male had in no way touched it. I dare to say that what is written in Scripture applies to it: The Spirit of God will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; He will be the cause of insemination and conception, and he will cause a new infant to grow within the womb, without opening it first.
non enim uirilis coitus uuluae virginalis secreta reserauit, sed immaculatum semen inuiolabili utero spiritus sanctus infudit; solus enim per omnia ex natis de femina sanctus dominus Iesus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae immaculati partus nouitiate non senserit et caelesti maiestate depulerit. (Exp. Evang. Luc. 2. 55--6)	Matris uero Domini eo tempore uulua reserata est, quo et partus editus, quia sanctum uterum et omni dignatione uenerandum ante natiuitatem Christi masculus omnino non tetigit. Audeo quid loqui, quia et in eo, quod scriptum est: Spiritus Dei ueniet super te, et uirtus altissimi obumbrabit te, principium seminis et conceptus fuerit, et sine uuluae reseratione nouus in utero foetus adoleuerit. (Hom. Luc. 14.8.)

The quotation is short, but forms part of a larger re-appropriation of Origen's homilies on Luke in Ambrose's commentary.[39] Weighing up the level of Ambrose's actual dependence of on Origen, Eusebius and Hilary in that work, Tissot writes, 'He records and retains their expressions, but in the meantime he has followed his own thought and arrived —with the same words, but constructing quite a different argument.'[40] However, as should be clear in this instance, Ambrose follows Origen's phrasing and his theology very closely.

It is therefore highly significant that Augustine also cites the homilies on Luke in their original Origenian form found in Jerome's translation, quoting text which does not feature in Ambrose's commentary, and in support of the **(p.123)** Christological extrapolation of his anti-Pelagian theology focussed on the sinlessness of the virginally conceived Christ. These quotations relate closely to his exegesis of Romans 8:3, and can be the result of nothing other than a close and persistent reading of the Lucan homilies over a considerable period of time. In turn, this conclusion draws sharply into question the supposition that Augustine's exegesis of the verse is dependant solely on a reading of Ambrose's *Explanatio Psalmi 37*.

Before proceeding to these passages, I submit a note about dating. Jerome translated Origen's homilies on Luke partly in a flourish of one-upmanship in response to the publication of Ambrose's commentary. The prologue to his translation contains his famous mean-spirited aside against the bishop of Milan, reporting that he could 'hear that ill-omened crow croaking; in wonderful style it gleams with colours taken from all the other birds, but in reality it is black all over'.[41] He dedicated the work to two of his Roman patronesses, Paula and Eustochium; its final publication has been dated to 390 by Quasten, and by Fournier to some time before 392.[42] We cannot know the precise date of Augustine's reception of any of Jerome's translations of Origen, except to note the letter of 394 (Epistle 28), in which Augustine tried to persuade Jerome to continue his work of translating the Greek Fathers, and Origen in particular.

De Consensu Evangelistarum (400) and Homily 28

Augustine's earliest adaptation of the Lucan homilies is found in *De Consensu Evangelistarum,* which freely reworks Origen's treatment of the genealogy of Christ in Homily 28. Origen draws attention to the difference between the respective lineages of Christ found in Matthew and Luke. In contrast to the latter, Matthew is specifically concerned to highlight Christ's descent from a family of sinners, exemplifying his coming to redeem sinful humanity:

> Because our Lord and Saviour came in order to take up the sins of humanity, he was also 'made sin for us, who committed no sin'. On account of this, God came down into the world and assumed a person from sinful and corrupt humanity...
>
> *Quia enim Dominus noster atque Saluator ad hoc uenerat, ut hominum peccata susciperet, et eum, qui non fecerat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit. Deus, propterea descendens in mundum assumpsit peccatorum hominum uitiosorumque personam...*[43]

(p.124) This idea is repeated in Augustine's work of about 400, *De Consensu Evangelistarum*, neatly tied into an

exegesis of Romans 8:3.:

> In the genealogy of Matthew, the taking up of our sins by the Lord Christ is signified; in that of Luke, the wiping-out of our sins by Christ our Lord. Thus the former relates his genealogy in descending order, the latter in ascending order. For the apostle says, 'God sent his son in the likeness of sinful flesh', which is the taking up of sins. To this he adds: 'In order that he might condemn sin in the flesh', which is purification from sin.
>
> *quapropter in generationibus matthei significatur nostrorum susceptio peccatorum a domino christo, in generationibus autem lucae significatur abolitio nostrorum peccatorum a domino christo. ideo eas ille descendens enarrat, iste ascendens. quod enim dicit apostolus: misit deus filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati, haec est susceptio peccatorum; quod autem addit: ut de peccato damnaret peccatum in carne, haec est expiatio peccatorum.*[44]

In an inversion of Tissot's analysis of Ambrose, Augustine here repeats Origen's thought, if not his precise words, in an interpretation of Romans 8:3 prior to, but in continuity with, his use of the text in the anti-Pelagian works.

Epistle 140 (De Gratia Novi Testamenti) (412) and Homily 14

Epistle 140 was written at the beginning of 412 in response to a letter from Augustine's friend Honoratus. The letter handles a number of exegetical queries as a prelude to an exposition of the nature of grace; in part, this forms a theological reflection on the place of the recent Sack of Rome in the divine providence.[45] In chapter 8, Augustine quotes directly from Origen's fourteenth homily on Luke, in close connection with the virginal conception–sinlessness motif he has built around Romans 8:3:

On account of this he likens himself to a worm and says, 'I am a worm, not a human.' Humankind is accustomed to birth from a man and a woman, but I was not born of male and female, according to the rite of humans and of nature; I was born after the pattern of the worm. Their origin comes not from the seed of another, but from themselves and of themselves, and in their own bodies are their offspring formed.	From this [text] comes the more discriminating interpretation of our predecessors: Christ wished to be foretold under the name ['worm'], because the worm is born without fleshly intercourse; and in this way also Christ was born of the Virgin…
unde assimilat se uermi et dicit: ego sum uermis et non homo. Ex mare quippe ac femina homo nasci solet, ego uero non ex masculo et femina, secundum ritum hominum atque naturam, sed in exemplum uermis natus sum, cuius non aliudne semen, sed in ipsis et ex ipsis, in quibus coalescit corporibus, origo est. (Origen, Hom. Luc. 14.8)	dictus est hinc sensus elegantissimus a prioribus, ideo se hoc nomine christum praenuntiari voluisse, quia uermis de carne sine concubitu nascitur, sicut ille natus est de uirgine… (Augustine, Ep. 140.21.8)

(p.125) I have been unable to find a parallel exegesis of Psalm 21:6 in the writings of Ambrose, a fact all the more surprising given its memorable vividness. Describing the exegesis as the 'most judicious sense given by our forebears' (*sensus elegantissimus a prioribus*),[46] Augustine privileges it as both theologically and aesthetically (that is, hermeneutically) authoritative; it is consciously deployed as a reception at the level of both words and ideas.[47]

While this is the only direct citation from Homily 14 in the works of Augustine, the broader theological content of Homily 14 cannot have been lost on him, so complete and synthetic is its reflection on the relationship between the humanity of Christ, the sinfulness of all, and the necessity of baptismal grace. Its similarity to Augustine's anti-Pelagian theology demands brief consideration.

Origen's text is Luke 2:21–4, the account of the purification of the Virgin in the Temple. He begins his sermon by observing that, while sinless, Christ died for sinners so that, having fallen in Adam, they might hope to rise with him. Likewise, sinners partake in him of a spiritual circumcision prefigured by his own circumcision in the flesh. After this event, he and the Virgin both went up to be purified together at the Temple, as the evangelist records it as 'the day of *their* purification' (*dies purgationis eorum*).[48] Everyone in the body is counted as soiled, and Jesus of his own will was 'soiled, because he had assumed a human body for our salvation' (*sordidatum propria uoluntate, quia pro salute nostra*

humanum corpus assumpserat).[49] By contrast, some people attempt to deny the embodiment of Christ, advancing instead the theory that his body was constituted of heavenly matter. However, it was quite fitting—as the **(p.126)** evangelist shows—that Christ should offer himself for the salvation of all dressed in the *sordidis uestimentis* of the body. The effects of this are offered in the sacrament of baptism, to be administered to infants, as he goes on:

> Little children are baptized for the remission of sins. Whose sins? When have they sinned? How can that washing apply to infants, except in that sense in which Paul spoke beforehand: 'Nobody is clean of filth, not even if his life on earth lasts but one day?' Since this filth is put off through the mystery of the birth of baptism, children also are baptized; for unless one is reborn of water and the Spirit, one cannot enter the Kingdom of Heaven.
>
> *Paruuli baptizantur in remissionem peccatorum. Quorum peccatorum? Uel quo tempore peccauerunt? Aut quomodo potest illa lauacri in paruulis ratio subsistere, ni iuxta illum sensum, de quo Paulo ante diximus: nullus mundus a sorde, nec si unius quidem diei fuerit uita eius super terram? Et quia per baptismi sacramentum natiuitatis sordes deponatur, propterea baptizantur et paruuli: nisi enim quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non poterit intrare in regnum coelorum.*[50]

However, it should be borne in mind that, just as the humanity of Christ was purified only through his self-offering, so the purification of all will be accomplished only after the resurrection: baptism entrusts to its recipients a promise to be fulfilled eschatologically. From this baptismal excursus, Origen returns to the Lucan narrative. Typifying the Christian reply to the deniers of Christ's flesh, Jesus is offered under the Law; as Paul says, God 'sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the Law'.[51] In contrast to the command of the Law that sons born of the conjugal bond should be brought to be offered to the Lord, the womb of Mary was opened only by the exit of Christ and not by the entrance of a man; Christ grew from the seed of the Spirit alone, and thus can be compared to the self-sowing worm. This novelty can be seen reflected in the birds offered before the altar to redeem the Christ child, as they constitute scriptural figures of the presence of the Spirit and the human contemplation of the divine respectively.

Although Origen nowhere cites Romans 8:3 in the course of the homily, the characteristic features of Augustine's treatment of this text are all present, not least in the clear connection of baptism to the purification of Christ's own representative humanity through the sacrifice of the cross. Origen's description of the humanity of Christ identified with that of all humans under sin is instead configured around Galatians 4.4, with its two propositions 'born of a woman' and 'born under the Law' corresponding to 'sent' and 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' in the passage from Romans. And, where Origen verges on equating the possession of a sinful nature with embodiment itself, his exegesis is evidently amenable to an Augustinian interpretation of the same passage in (equally ambiguous) terms of the 'flesh of sin', with its implication that bodiliness and sinfulnessness are synonymous. All these **(p.127)** features suggest that Augustine received the text into his thought on the relationship between the humanity of Christ and the baptism of infants, a conjecture supported by direct citation from the homily immediately before the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy, in Epistle 140. It can be no coincidence that chapter 6 of the same letter contains an extended reflection on Romans 8:3.

Sermons 361 and 192 and the Commentarioli in Psalmos

One further example of Augustine's use of Origen deserves brief analysis. In 396, Augustine dictated the first thirty-two *Enarrationes in Psalmos*. In the first *Enarratio* on Psalm 18, he treats the verse briefly with reference to the virginal conception of Christ:

> He is like a groom coming forth from his chamber, coming forth from the virginal womb, where God has coupled himself to a human nature, like a groom to his bride. He has leapt like a giant to run his course. He has leapt with great strength, outrunning other humans by his incomparable power, not to dwell on, but to run his course...
>
> *et ipse tamquam sponsus procedens de thalamo suo et ipse procedens de utero uirginali, ubi deus naturae humanae tamquam sponsus sponsae copulatus est. exsultauit sicut gigas ad currendam uiam. exsultauit sicut*

fortissimus, et ceteros homines incomparabili uirtute praecedens, non ad habitandam, sed ad currendam uiam.[52]

In Sermons 361 (winter 410–11) and 192 (after 412) Augustine exposits the verse of the psalm in a similar vein, but much more fully, and with reference to Romans 8:3:[53]

Therefore our Lord Jesus Christ bore his divinity with him, but assumed mortality from us. This he received in the womb of the Virgin, joining himself, the Word of God, to a human nature; like a groom to his bride in the virginal chamber, so he came forth from her chamber… Mortality came to all from sin; in the case of the Lord, it came from mercy, but even then it was real: for as such it was real flesh, and truly mortal, being the likeness of the flesh of sin.	Lest anyone disparage the truth, because it arose from the earth, when he came forth like a groom from the chamber (which is to say, from the Virgin's womb), when the Word of God coupled himself to a human creature by an inexpressible kind of marriage; lest anyone disparage this, and not believe that, although Christ was marvellously born, and marvellous in his words and deeds, he was no more than a human on account of possessing the likeness of the flesh of sin: when the psalm says, 'Like a groom coming forth from the chamber, he leaps out like a giant, to run his course,' this is subject to the meaning of the following line: 'From the highest heaven is his going out.'
Ergo Dominus noster Iesus Christus divinitatem secum attulit, mortalitatem autem a nobis assumpsit. Hanc accepit in utero virginis Mariae, coniugens se ipsum Verbum Dei humanae naturae, tanquam sponsus sponsae in thalamo virginali, ut ipse tanquam sponsus procederet de thalamo suo…Mortalitas de peccato venit in omnes homines: in Domino autem de misericordia erat, et tamen vera erat; quia talis caro vera erat, et vere mortalis erat, similitudinem habens carnis peccati. (S. 361.17)	Ne vero quisquam contemneret veritatem, quia de terra orta est, cum sicut sponsus processit de thalamo suo, id est, de utero virginali, ubi Verbum Dei creaturae humanae quodam ineffabili coniugio copulatum est: ne hoc ergo quisquam contemneret, ne quamvis mirabiliter natum, et dictis factisque mirabilem, tamen propter similitudinem carnis peccati nihil amplius Christum quam hominem crederet: cum dictum esset, Tanquam sponsus procedens de thalamo suo, exsultavit ut gigas ad currendum viam. (S. 192.3)

(p.128) Both sermons were delivered in the early stages of the Pelagian controversy, around the time Augustine began to write *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*. The close reproduction of the exegesis of the psalm in both is noteworthy. On first sight, it is tempting to read these passages as a reception of Ambrose, whose exegesis of Psalm 18:6 (*tanquam sponsus procedens de thalamo suo, exsultavit ut gigas ad currendam viam*) resulted in the compression 'the giant of twinned substance' (*geminae gigas substantiae*). As an anti-Arian catchphrase stressing the two complete natures belonging to the person of Christ, this was popularized in the fourth century by Ambrose's hymn 'Intende, qui regis Israel', of which strophe 5 runs:

> He comes forth from his chamber,
> the regal hall of modesty,
> a giant of twinned substance
> swift as he runs his course.[54]

Confessiones 9.15.7 reports Augustine's experience of Ambrosian hymnody in Milan during a period of Catholic persecution by the Arian royal family, and the phrase appears in several works of Augustine thereafter.[55] However, **(p.129)** Ambrose's Christological shorthand is not present in the *Enarratio* or Sermons 361 and 192, and a closer reading reveals that these two latter texts are particularly concerned with the first half of Psalm 18:6, the spousal procession of Christ from the bridal bed or chamber (*thalamus*): the point emphasized is not a confusion or reduction of Christ's two natures, or his 'leaping forth', but his conception of virginal flesh.[56]

The only extant exegesis that consistently reflects these sermons, and to a lesser extent the *Enarratio*, is found in another of Jerome's works, the *Commentarioli in Psalmos* of 390. This is counted among his translations of Origen, as a highly compressed summary of his homilies on the psalms that are no longer extant except in fragmentary form. Sadly, no Greek fragment exists of Psalm 18:6, against which the content of Jerome's translation might be checked. It runs:

> God has pitched his tabernacle in the sun, and like a groom he comes forth from the chamber. 'In the sun': in the

> womb of the Virgin. Mary [*Maria*] is interpreted as the star of the sea [*maris*], for the light of the sun shines more brightly than that of the stars…That sun has lit up the star, which is to say, Mary, so that she may be like the sun. Therefore he placed his tabernacle in the sun, when he assumed a body from her womb…The groom is the Word of the Father, the bride, human flesh; since by it he went forth from the chamber, the womb of the Virgin.
>
> *Deus in sole posuit tabernaculum suum, et ipse tanquam sponsus procedens de thalamo suo. 'In sole' in utero sanctae Mariae virginis. Maria interpretatur stella maris. Lumen solis magis lucet quam stellarum…Illuminavit sol iste stellam, id est, Mariam, ut esset sicut sol. Ideo posuit tabernaculum suum in sole, quando corpus assumpsit de utero suo…Sponsus, Verbum Patris, sponsa caro humana: cum qua de thalamo processit, id est, de utero virginis.*[57]

Once again, the parallel with Augustine is uncanny, although difficult to prove conclusively. Granted, Augustine does not repeat Origen's meditation on the relationship between the sunlight of Christ and the derivative starlight of the Virgin. Yet, there is a clear compression of *in utero sanctae Mariae virginis* into *in utero virginis Mariae* (*S.* 361) and *de utero virginali* (*En. Ps.* 18.I.6; *S.* 192); similarly, *Sponsus, Verbum Patris, sponsa caro humana* surfaces in *sponsus sponsae copulatus est* (*En. Ps.* 18.I.6) and *sponsus sponsae in thalamo virginali* (*S.* 361). An early acquaintance with the broad outline of Origen's treatment of the psalm in the 390s laid the foundation for a later and more exacting interpretation, once in possession of, or rereading, the *Commentarioli* **(p.130)** *in Psalmos*. Delivering Sermons 361 and 192 in the 410s, Augustine tied the psalm text to the text of Romans 8:3, suggesting that he found in Origen's articulation of the doctrine of the virginal conception of Christ a vital complement to his own understanding of Christ's humanity in relation to the economy of sin.

All these examples reveal Augustine receiving and redeploying the work of Origen after 400, in a close reproduction of verbal motifs and a creative reworking of their theology. All of them are connected to texts in which Augustine gives consideration to the humanity of Christ, in some cases with explicit reference to the text of Romans 8:3, in others reflecting the theology he had developed around that text elsewhere. His exegesis of this verse is partly rooted in a reception of Ambrose's *Explanatio Psalmi 37*. However, the earliness of the works in which verbal parallels with this text are most apparent, coupled with the persistence of Romans 8:3 in Augustine's early Christological and later anti-Pelagian writings, together argue against a dependence solely on the *Explanatio*. On the contrary, I believe Augustine's exegesis of the passage is directly lifted from Origen's Romans commentary, and that this took place in the mid-390s. As a prelude to establishing this claim, I will survey the extant scholarship dealing with Augustine's reception of the commentary in the 410s, before making an alternative case for my earlier dating.

Augustine and Origen's commentary on Romans

According to the scholarly consensus, Rufinus of Aquileia translated Origen's great work on Romans in around 405–6. In spite of challenging the established chronology of Rufinus' translations in her important article of 1977, C. P. Hammond retained this dating for the commentary, while admitting it to be 'conjectural.'[58] A sign of the ineffectiveness of Pope Anastasius' proscription of the works of Origen, the translation was made in response to the genuine interest of a broader readership.[59] Hammond errs on the side of caution, suggesting the lapse of some time between Rufinus' circulation of the translation among his friends and its eventual leakage outside his circle. However, it is known that Pelagius used the translation in the construction of his own commentary on the epistle,[60] whose composition De Bruyn has most recently dated from 405–6 to 410.[61] Hammond argues that Pelagius **(p.131)** must have received Rufinus' translation at some point between its completion and his flight to North Africa in 410.[62] As I observed in Chapter 2, Pelagius and Rufinus were connected by bonds of acquaintance in Rome, and on this basis it seems reasonable that he might have been among the first to receive Rufinus' most recent work in 405–6.

In 1992, Bammel (née Hammond) advanced the thesis—developed during her work on a new edition of Rufinus' translation—that Augustine directly quoted from Origen's commentary on Romans in *De Peccatorum Meritis* and *De Spiritu et Littera*.[63] In this she went beyond the research of Altaner, Theiler, and Courcelle, whose analyses of the

relationship between Origen and Augustine had jointly been accepted as the standard orthodoxy. She offers four passages from *De Peccatorum Meritis* and two from *De Spiritu et Littera* that show traces of dependency on six passages from the commentary on Romans. One supports my thesis that Augustine had read closely Origen's fourteenth homily on Luke, and integrated it into his anti-Pelagian position: at *De Peccatorum Meritis* 2.15, Augustine supports his argument for the sinfulness of all with reference to Job 14:4–5;[64] advancing the same point in the commentary at book 5.9.12–13, Origen not only cites the same text from Job, but also refers to the purification in the Temple as an act of representative offering, and connects it to the apostolic tradition of baptising infants. His exegesis here closely complements *Homilia in Lucam* 14, and it is difficult not to see Augustine appreciating the convergence between the two texts, reworking the theology of the homily alongside a verbal citation of the Romans commentary in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*.

With regard to their respective interpretations of Romans 8:3, Bammel highlights the following passages:

That he said, 'In the likeness of the flesh of sin' shows us that we have the flesh of sin, but that the Son of God had the likeness of the flesh of sin, not the flesh of sin itself. For all of us who are conceived from the seed of man, coming together with a woman, necessarily say with David: 'I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother conceived me.' Truly, he who came to a spotless body (who was not born of the contagion of a man but from the coming of the Holy Spirit over the Virgin, who overshadowed her with the power of the Most High), he indeed possessed the nature of our body; but he did not possess in any way the pollution of sin which is passed to those who are conceived by the motion of concupiscence.	He held a certain 'middle place' also in his birth of flesh. On this account, we are born in the flesh of sin, but he is born in the likeness of the flesh of sin; we, not only from flesh and blood, but also of the will of man and the will of the flesh…Therefore it was given to the Virgin Mother to being forth a holy seed by her pious faith, not according to the law of the flesh of sin (which is to say, without conceiving by the movement of carnal concupiscence); he created her in order to choose her, so that he could choose to be created from her.
Quod dixit: 'in similitudine carnis peccati;' ostendit nos quidem habere carnem peccati, filium uero Dei similitudinem habuisse carnis peccati non carnem peccati. Omnes enim nos homines qui ex semine uiri cum muliere conuenientis concepti sumus illa necessario utimur uoce qua dicit David: 'quoniam in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in peccatis concepit me mater mea.' Uerum qui ex nulla uiri contagione sed solo Spiritu Sancto super uirginem ueniente et uirtute alitissimi obumbrante uenit ad corpus immaculatum naturam quidem corporis nostri habuit, pollutionem tamen peccati quae ex concupiscentiae motu conceptis traditur omnino non habuit. (Comm. Rom. 6.12.4)	tenuit quondam et in carnis natiuitate medietatem, ut nos quidem nati essemus in carne peccati, ille autem in similitudine carnis peccati, nos non solum ex carne et sanguine, uerum etiam ex uoluntate uiri et uoluntate carnis…ideo uirginem matrem non lege carnis peccati, id est non concupiscentiae carnalis motu concipientem, sed pia fide sanctum germen in se fieri promerentem, quam eligeret creauit, de qua crearetur elegit. (Pecc. Mer. 2.38.24)

(p.132) The characteristic features of Augustine's interpretation are all present in Origen's text: Christ possesses a humanity that is in a median position between sinful flesh and the flesh both before sin and after the resurrection; he possesses this on account of his being born outside the carnally concupiscent bond, for which the Virgin was 'electively created' to bear him. Words and ideas are both here reproduced in a dense reception of Origen's commentary.

I want fully to accept the substance of Bammel's findings, but also to question whether Augustine did in fact receive this text only in the months running up to the composition of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*. The caveat at the beginning of her article is worth pondering: 'The translations of Jerome and other writers only became available to [Augustine] after his own earliest writings, and perhaps paradoxically his thought is closest to Origen in this early period.'[65] Augustine uses Romans 8:3 in the second book of *De Peccatorum Meritis* within a continuum of exegesis that I have tried to show stretches back to his very early engagement with Paul. Indeed, several examples of this earlier exegesis are closer in vocabulary to Origen–Rufinus than the **(p.133)** passage cited from that work. This is most obvious in the unexpected peroration of Sermon 273,[66] with its close connection of the virginity–sinlessness motif to Romans 8:3 and suggestion of Luke 1:35, all highly reminiscent of the above passage from Origen-Rufinus. The sermon dates from 21 January 396:

> He had flesh in the likeness of the flesh of sin; we however have the flesh of sin. He was not born of the seed of men, or from the concupiscence of male and female. But how then? By the annunciation of the Father.

Sed tamen ille carnem in similitudinem carnis peccati, nos carnem peccati.

Non ex virili semine, aut ex masculi et feminae concupiscentia: sed quid? Nuntio Patris.[67]

Elements of Origen's text are reproduced here with only very slight alteration: his *carnis peccati non carnem peccati* becomes *carnis peccati, nos carnem peccati*; *semine uiri* becomes *virili seminae*; *ex semine uiri cum muliere conuenientis; ex nulla uiri contagione*, and *ex concupiscentiae motu conceptis* become *non ex uirili semine, aut ex masculi et feminae concupiscentia.* Origen's citation and expansion of the text of Luke 1:35 are compressed into the neat *Nuntio Patris*. By contrast, the text of Ambrose's *Explanatio Psalmi 37* refers to the process of reproduction elliptically by echoing John 1.13 ('nor was he conceived in iniquities or born in sin; for he was born not from blood nor from the will of the flesh or by the will of man, but by the Holy Spirit from the Virgin'),[68] entirely lacking the crucial term *concupiscentia* common to both Augustine and Origen, and recalling the text of the creed of Nicaea more closely than that of Luke 1:35.

A number of significant implications arise from my reading of this early sermon as a reception of Origen's commentary on Romans. The first is that all Augustine's exegeses of Romans 8:3 after 396, focusing on the virginal conception of the sinless Christ in a consistently Origenian manner, should also be considered a result of this primary reception. Whether Augustine's broader conception of *concupiscentia carnis* is also a consequence of reading the commentary I leave as an open possibility; Origen's treatment of the relationship between reproduction and sin may or may not have influenced an idea already nascent in Augustine's thought. However, applying the term to the humanity of Christ with reference to Romans 8:3 without doubt constitutes an Origenian borrowing. It can, therefore, be argued that Augustine's mature conception of the humanity of Christ, formulated after 396, is in good part Origenian.

Secondly, this requires a reconsideration of the standard dating of Rufinus' translation of the commentary. Unfortunately, the evidence available for constructing a new publication history for that work is very sparse indeed. It **(p.134)** is simply impossible to uncover the stages of translation and editing through which Rufinus put the text prior to its public circulation in the first ten years of the fifth century. I offer one initial reflection before proceeding to examine circumstantial evidence for a translation in the mid-390s. Rufinus translated the fifteen books of Origen, condensing them into a still substantial ten, the arduousness of which he remarks on in the work's preface. Irrespective of specific dating, this would have taken a considerable time. The circulation—against his will—of parts of Augustine's *De Trinitate* illustrates the appetite of enthusiastic readers for parts of lengthy works still unfinished; in the case of the Romans commentary, and bearing in mind Rufinus' standing as the gatekeeper of the Origenian corpus in the West at the turn of the fifth century, it is not difficult to imagine him indulging his audience with fragments of a 'work in progress'.

Making a reasonable case for an Augustinian reception of parts of the commentary in the 390s brings with it a new perspective on the motivation behind the *Ad Simplicianum*, also of 396/7. By his own account, Augustine's anti-Pelagianism was occasioned in part as a defence of the theology of sin and grace laid out in that work.[69] In Chapter 2, I argued that Augustine would have read Rufinus the Syrian's *Liber de Fide* as an attack on his protology as a permutation of Origenism; this protology finds classic expression in the *Ad Simplicianum*. The suggestion that this important work might have been occasioned by a reflection on Origen's Pauline theology therefore further strengthens my broader argument, that Augustine's construction of the Pelagian heresy in response to the attack of Jerome and Rufinus the Syrian is both a self-vindication and a defence of his reception of Origen of Alexandria. Establishing the possibility that Origen's commentary on Romans could have been available to Augustine well in advance of 410 will, therefore, occupy the remainder of this chapter.

György Heidl and Augustine's secret library

That Augustine could not have had access to any work by Origen before the 390s, in virtue of his lack of good Greek and the paucity of Latin translations within his ambit, was the standard argument of those investigating this issue throughout the twentieth century. In his study of 2003, Heidl has argued that Augustine must have had access to Origen's homilies and commentary on the Song of Songs in the mid-380s, in their translation by Jerome made in 383. Through an

analysis of Augustine's allusions to the text of the Song of Songs in **(p.135)** his early works written at Cassiciacum and Milan, he argues further that the *libri pleni* described by Augustine as the impetus to his reading of Paul and subsequent conversion at *Contra Academicos* 2.2.5 included these works of Origen, and not solely the writings of Porphyry or Plotinus. Heidl detects allusions to Origen's works in the *Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita*, and *De Ordine*; most significantly, he argues that Augustine's account of 'picking up and reading' Paul at *Confessiones* 8.29.12 is a pastiche of Origen's interpretation of Abraham's vision at the oaks of Mamre, given in his commentary.[70] By this time, however, Augustine had come to realise the danger of quoting too frequently or clearly from Origen, as Heidl writes, 'The silence of the Confessions about Origen and the Origenian books which made a great influence on Augustine in Milan is understandable. Augustine was cautious and wanted to avoid accusations of being an Origenist.'[71] His argument reflects very closely my general observations about Augustine's passive but nonetheless evident interest in the Origenist controversy in his correspondence with Jerome in Chapter 2, as does his observation that the exchange between the two men reveals a feigned and ironic ignorance of Origen on the part of Augustine, deployed to challenge Jerome into stating his position in the controversy more clearly.

Of considerable importance to my thesis is Heidl's argument that Augustine may have had access to Latin translations of Origen circulating in Italy before those made by Jerome and Rufinus. He notes as evidence for this the *Tractatus Origenis*,[72] and posits the credible possibility that *selecta* of Origen's works suffered from the Anastasian anathema alongside the vagaries of book publication and conservation in Late Antiquity. One possible source of some of these translations, Heidl proposes, was Simplicianus of Milan. Augustine records having visited the Milanese cleric at *Confessiones* 8.3.2, giving an account of his approval of Augustine's reading of the *libri Platonicorum* translated by Victorinus, but also encouraging him to remember the humility of Christ, exemplified in the life of Victorinus himself. Heidl continues:

> Is it possible that Augustine had not merely heard about Origenian ideas from Simplicianus, but that the respected master and possible admirer of Origen had also given the young man some of the writings by the Alexandrian? On the one hand, reconstructing the stages of the conversion, I have pointed out that the encounter with **(p.136)** the *libri pleni* followed the reading of Plotinus' books and Scripture. On the other hand, the meeting with Simplicianus can be dated between the two events, since both *De Beata Vita* and the Confessions place it after the comparative reading of the Plotinian/Platonic books and the Scripture. After conferring with Simplicianus, Augustine may not have left empty-handed. Presumably, either Simplicianus or someone else from the master's circle gave Augustine a collection from Origen's writings which a certain Celsinus termed *libri pleni*.'[73]

Heidl's consciously speculative argument, while attractive, requires that Simplicianus' identity first be established as fully as possible. What little is known about him comes to us through the works of Ambrose, Augustine, and Paulinus of Milan. The four letters in the Ambrosian corpus to Simplicianus all discuss exegesis, and reveal little about their recipient.[74] In Epistle 2, Ambrose refers to Simplicianus' travels 'throughout the whole world' (*totum orbem peragraueris*),[75] raising the possibility that Simplicianus knew the Greek East and its literature. Elsewhere Ambrose refers to him as his spiritual father,[76] which might indicate some influence on Ambrose's own reading of Greek authors. Unfortunately, the exegetical discussion in these letters is not traceable to any prior problem in Greek or Latin scriptural interpretation.

Augustine draws a picture of Simplicianus as an authoritative and sympathetic figure in *Confessiones* 8, calling him a 'father in the reception of grace' (*pater in accipienda gratia*),[77] for his role in the baptism of Ambrose; Augustine turned likewise to him for counsel in his progress towards baptism. A close friend of Marius Victorinus, Simplicianus had read both Scripture and Christian literature with him and attended his final, public profession of Christianity. In addition, he praised Augustine's reading of the *libri Platonicorum*, congratulating him 'that [he] he had not fallen in with the writings of other philosophers, which are full of falsehood and deceits, according to the elements of this world; whereas in [the Platonic books] God and his Word are everywhere implicit'.[78]

On the death of Ambrose in 397, Simplicianus succeeded him as bishop of Milan, remaining in office until his own death in late 400;[79] the installation is recorded by Paulinus in his *Vita Ambrosii*.[80] In his continuation of Jerome's *De Viris Illustribus* (*c*.495) Gennadius includes a mysterious entry on Simplicianus, comparing his relationship with Augustine to that of Origen with his patron, Ambrose: 'Simplicianus…exhorted Augustine…to stir up his **(p.137)** natural gifts, and to free up time for the exposition of Scripture; thus he seemed to be for Augustine like a new Ambrose, the task-master of Origen.'[81] The comparison is a suggestive one, bringing Simplicianus and Origen into literary relationship with one another.

On the basis of Simplicianus' acquaintance with Marius Victorinus, Mutzenbecher situates him within the theological camp represented above all by Clement of Alexandria, which affirmed Neoplatonic philosophy as the pagan 'preparation' for the Christian gospel: 'All we can establish is that Simplician, because of his close relationship to Victorinus, was a direct witness to the "combination of genuine Neo-Platonism and ultra-orthodox Christianity, under the banner of Paulinism," as Harnack calls it.'[82] Origen might well be counted among the same milieu. Madec goes further, taking Augustine's claim that he discovered 'God and his Word' everywhere in the Platonic books (*Conf.* 8.2.3) as an indication of Simplicianus' own interests and subsequent influence on Augustine's reading: 'They permit us to guess that Simplicianus not only highlighted the singularity of Platonism in comparison with other practices of philosophy, but also attracted the attention of Augustine to the Prologue to John, which offers at the same time a synopsis of Christian doctrine and a foundation for discernment about Platonism.'[83] Simplicianus' attachment to the Prologue to John is further detailed in *De Civitate Dei* 10, where Augustine records his injunction that the opening words of the gospel should be inscribed in a prominent place in every church.[84] As an exponent of a dialectical 'Johannine Platonism', Simplicianus could well have situated himself in the tradition of exegesis mastered by Origen's Commentary on John.

The most substantial text that indicates Simplicianus' theological interests remains the *Ad Simplicianum*. Unfortunately, this gives no detailed account of precisely what preconceptions about the text of Romans Augustine's petitioner was entertaining in order to seek a second opinion. Mutzenbecher asserts that Augustine's response has a clear 'indirect relationship' to Origen's exposition of Romans 7–9 in his commentary, so heavily did this work influence all further treatments of the epistle. While I would argue for a closer engagement with the commentary than Mutzenbecher might allow, her assertion raises the possibility that an interest in Origen's exegesis of Romans was shared by both men, prompting Simplicianus' request for a fresh exegesis of the epistle.

(p.138) Other factors remain that serve to strengthen this otherwise somewhat elliptical case for Simplicianus' role as a mediator of Origen to Augustine. The first lies in the figure of Paulinus of Milan. A notary of Ambrose, he was asked by Augustine to write a memoir of the bishop after his death.[85] Described as deacon of Milan by Augustine,[86] he remained in episcopal service after Simplicianus' accession to the seat in 397 before his move to Florence. Paulinus describes Simplicianus' accession to the episcopate in the simplest terms, adding nothing to our picture of his character or interests. However, the eighth chapter of the *Vita* praises Ambrose in the following way: 'God, who set up the wall of his Catholic Church against his enemies, and raised up David to be a tower against the face of Damascus (that is to say, the treachery of the heretics), hindered [Ambrose's] flight.'[87] As Angelo Paredi has pointed out, Paulinus is here quoting from Rufinus of Aquileia's continuation of Eusebius' *Historia Ecclesiastica*, in which he describes Ambrose as a strong wall.[88] Paulinus expands this by citing Song of Songs 4.4, 'he raised up David to be a tower' (*turrem erigebat David*). The wall of the catholic Church which resists heretics and is associated with Ambrose is, put in other words, the teaching of orthodoxy which resists falsehood. It can be no coincidence that, in his *Commentarius in Canticis Canticorum*, Origen writes of the wall of the house of God as the 'steadfastness of dogmas' (*dogmatum firmitas*).[89] I believe the *Vita* thus reveals a double reception, not only of the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, but also of Origen's commentary in Rufinus' translation. It therefore appears that Paulinus should be counted among the Rufinian circle in Italy, of which Augustine was also a part in Africa. Ambrose's reading of Origen is well known; Paulinus' is indicated here. Given both these factors and Simplicianus' association with Christian Platonism, it becomes reasonable to extrapolate his place in the same community of Origenian readership. Augustine's friendship with Simplicianus, built in part on common literary

interests, was clearly continued by letter after Augustine's move to Africa. Given the possibility that both men were part of the same community of readers, it becomes conceivable that Simplicianus would have kept Augustine appraised of Rufinus' recent works in the 390s, even sending him texts in which both shared a common interest.

Supporting this sketch of Simplicianus' place in Augustine's circle of friends is the single most important datum of my case: the synodical proscription of **(p.139)** Origen's books issued by Anastasius of Rome in 400[90] was published in a letter to Simplicianus. Although the letter is outwardly polite and unexceptional, it can be no coincidence that the head of the diocese of Milan should have been the immediate recipient of the condemnation in the West.

All of this points to a new picture of Augustine's reception of Origen. Beginning in Milan, Augustine's acquaintance with Ambrose brought him into contact with the allegorical exegesis that was to be instrumental in his acceptance of scriptural authority. Ambrose's debt to Origen would have been no secret to Augustine. Augustine found a second spiritual patron in Ambrose's friend Simplicianus, which further embedded his reconciliation to the Church in a network deeply sensitive both to the interaction of Catholic Christianity with the traditions of Platonism, and also to the pre-eminent figure of Origen within that dialogue. Whether at the initiative of Ambrose, Simplicianus, Paulinus, or someone else, the cathedral at Milan tapped into the literary activity of Rufinus of Aquileia in the 380s, providing Augustine's entrée into his network. After leaving Milan, Augustine continued to correspond with Simplicianus, and maintained his acquaintance with other members of Rufinus' readership—among them Pinianus, Melania the Younger, and Paulinus of Nola. In response to the reinvigorated study of the Pauline corpus in the last twenty years of the fourth century in the Latin world, Augustine's approach to the epistles was eclectic. Freely drawing on Ambrosiaster in his early commentaries, Augustine changed his approach in 396. Reviewing the theology of Original Sin, election, and predestination, the *Ad Simplicianum* laid out the classic Augustinian formulation: the Fall of Adam involves all humanity in a common guilt and debt to God; the divine judgement justly decrees the punishment of all, but gratuitously elects for salvation a set number irrespective of their incapacity for good. In turn, this election endows the elect with merit, by which they are saved. The eschatology of the work is not characteristic of Origen, but was worked out in dialogue with his commentary on Romans. Both the *Ad Simplicianum*, and the Origenian material behind it, have their roots in Simplicianus of Milan. From him, I believe Augustine received extracts of Rufinus' commentary on Romans, including his translation of Origen's exegesis of Romans 8:3. Identifying this with the familiar exegesis of Ambrose of Milan in his *Explanatio Psalmi 37* ensured its adoption into Augustine's Christological vocabulary, while also further increasing his interest in the works of Origen. On receiving the *Liber de Fide* when pursuing the prosecution of Caelestius, Augustine identified in his work a veiled criticism of his doctrine of Original Sin as a reworking of Origen's belief in a fall of souls from a pre-mundane life. To bolster his self-defence, and to ensure the silence of Caelestius on matters doctrinal, Augustine turned once **(p.140)** again to his Milanese friends, enlisting Paulinus to push his case at the council of Carthage. The choice was a shrewd one: not only was Paulinus sympathetic to Augustine through their mutual acquaintance, but he also understood which aspects of Augustine's intellectual development he preferred to leave in the shade. This was a success, until the publication of Jerome's Epistle 133, in 415.

Conclusion

This chapter began by asking what constitutes a valid case of reception in the work of a Patristic author. This followed on from my argument in Chapter 2 for a maximal assessment of Augustine's knowledge of the writings of Origen, and its implications for his construction of Pelagianism in the wake of the Origenist controversy. I focused on the scholarly discussion surrounding his reception of the Pauline commentaries of Ambrosiaster, in order to lay out a more detailed methodology for a study of reception focusing on Augustine's exegesis of Romans 8:3, the subject of Chapter 3. Ruling out critical judgements on reception arising from a prior (and anachronistic) conception of 'orthodoxy' by which the Fathers would have directed their reading, and similarly discounting accounts of reception that leave the distinction between verbal and theological parallels unclear, I presented an alternative. Reception, I suggested, occurs on a sliding scale: a reader of a text can be more or less engaged with its words, ideas, or both. Wholescale quotation, minor allusion, and the repetition of verbal motifs all indicate real reception. On this basis, I accepted that Augustine's treatment of Romans 5:12

in the light of 9:21, and his use of the figure *massa peccati*, came to him through a reception of Ambrosiaster. Turning to Romans 8:3, I found that Augustine's exegesis of the verse in both the early and the later works lacks a necessary verbal or theological common ground with that of Ambrosiaster. I therefore rejected his commentaries as the source of Augustine's much repeated reference to the 'likeness of sinful flesh'.

The commonplace of Augustine's debt to Ambrose prompted an examination of his exegeses of Romans 8:3 that refer explicitly to the virginal conception of Christ as the instrumental cause of his human sinlessness. Finding this only in his *Explanatio Psalmi 37*, I highlighted both verbal and theological parallels to it in Augustine's early works, the *Expositio Propositionum* and *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*. Noting the kinship between *Explanatio Psalmi* 37.5 and Ambrose's commentary on Luke 2:55–6, I looked for a common source for both in Origen's Homilies on Luke. Finding that Augustine cites these homilies in a number of works in support of other aspects of his Christology, I argued that his apparently 'Ambrosian' exegesis of Romans 8:3 should rather **(p.141)** be situated within a broader reading of Origen on Luke, which a reception of *Explanatio Psalmi 37* merely served to confirm. Of prime importance in this process was Origen's treatment of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin in Homily 14, in which he argues for the baptism of infants from the representative cleansing of the infant Christ in the Temple. While Origen comes close to suggesting that an actual sinlessness inhered within the human nature of Christ in this homily, the phrasing of Romans 8:3 provided Augustine with the necessary distinction between sinfulness and its likeness by which he could receive the text, and its concomitant insistence on the necessity of baptism for salvation.

This reception, I suggested, took place in the early to mid-390s. In order to support my contention that the same period saw Augustine absorb a genuinely Origenian reading of Romans 8:3, I turned to Bammel's work of 1992. While this found parallels between *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* and Origen's Romans commentary, it left unattended the consistency of Augustine's treatment of Romans 8:3 from 396 through to 412. Taking Bammel's description of the publication date of the commentary in 405–6 as 'conjectural' at face value, I probed evidence for other sources by which Augustine might have received the text of the commentary. Developing the suggestion of Heidl, that Simplicianus of Milan was responsible for providing Augustine with a set of Origenian *libri pleni*, I examined Simplicianus' literary interests and his situation within an Origenian readership in Milan. From this, I believe it is possible to reconstruct Augustine's early reception of Origen as an inheritance of his time at Milan; and to construe his *Ad Simplicianum* as a broadly conceived response to a reception of parts of Origen's commentary on Romans. Within this reception stands his exegesis of Romans 8:3, and its description of the sinlessness of Christ following on the virginal conception. A constant of his Christology after 396, the deployment of the text and its interpretation against Pelagian Christological exemplarism result in a surprising picture: Augustine fought the heresy of Pelagius with the orthodox exegesis of Origen.

Notes:

([1]) Schulz-Flügel (2007: 118–19).

([2]) Hunter (1999: 19–20).

([3]) Souter (1927: 40). In addition to the commentary on Romans discussed here, there remain commentaries on all of the Pauline epistles with the exception of Hebrews (usually considered Pauline in Patristic exegesis); in *A Study of Ambrosiaster* Souter (1905) argued for Ambrosiaster's authorship of the *Quaestiones Novi et Veteri Testamenti*, previously considered a spurious work of Augustine, and bound together with his work in the supplement to the Patrologia Latina. The Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (50, 1908) reissued the work, edited by Souter, under the name of Ambrosiaster.

([4]) *Ad Rom.* γ 5.12. 2–3.

([5]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 68.3.

([6]) As many as five known authors were at different times identified as Ambrosiaster, including Decimus Hilarianus Hilarius, governor of Africa and later prefect of Rome; Tyconius the Donatist; Isaac the Jew, a convert and opponent of the Damasian papacy; Nicetas of Ramesiana, and Evagrius of Antioch. Souter began (1905) by supporting his suggestion of Decimus, but moved in his work of 1927 to approving Evagrius as the author.

([7]) The corpus is exceptionally well preserved, the commentary on Romans being extant in three full recensions.

([8]) Bonaiuti (1917: 168).

([9]) Bonaiuti (1917: 169).

([10]) Norman P. Williams (1927: 328): 'By virtue of its intimate saturation with "concupiscence" and "original guilt", the human stock constitutes a single *massa peccati* or "lump of sin" (this terrible phrase was presumably suggested by Ambrosiaster's words, "all have sinned in Adam as in a lump").'

([11]) Smith (1918: 168).

([12]) Baxter (1923: 187).

([13]) *Ep*. 82.34: *si quaeras uel recolas quid hinc senserit noster Ambrosius*.

([14]) Souter (1927: 198).

([15]) Mundle (1919: 66) cited Leeming (1930: 69).

([16]) These find parallel treatments of Rom. 1:7, 1:24, 2:5, 4:15, 5:20, 8:19–23, 8:29, and 8.38 in Augustine's *Expositio Propositionum* and Ambrosiaster's commentary. To deny seeing a parallel noted by another is obviously facile without also providing criteria to substantiate such a judgement, as Leeming fails to do.

([17]) Leeming (1930: 74).

([18]) Leeming (1930: 89).

([19]) Leeming (1930: 59).

([20]) Martini (1944: 45).

([21]) Mutzenbecher (1970: 31 n. 201).

([22]) Hunter (1989) has provided a useful corrective to reading Ambrosiaster on Romans in too Augustinian a manner, by exposing the sexual politics of Ambrosiaster's *Quaestiones veteris et novi Testamenti*. Q. 127, *De peccato Adae et Evae*, reveals Ambrosiaster's suspicion of the asceticism represented by Jerome in its 'sophisticated defense [*sic*] of human relations' (p. 287): they are part of the 'unified order of creation' (p. 288). Against a picture of Eden as a pristine and sexless state, Ambrosiaster 'wishes to sever any connection between sexual relations and sin. He does so by arguing that human reproduction neither caused nor was affected by the first sin…Although he does refer to the body as having been "stained" (*maculatum*) by sin, there is no reference to the presence of any disordered desire or concupiscence' (pp. 291–2). In his vocabulary, *massa* figuratively indicates the identity of humanity under the divine judgement; the association of the term with copulation and childbearing belongs to Augustine.

([23]) *S*. 273.9.9.

([24]) *Pecc. Mer*. 1.57.29.

([25]) *Ad Rom.* γ 8.3.

([26]) In both points, Ambrosiaster's Christology is consistent with his theology of original sin; see n. 22 above.

([27]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.38.24.

([28]) *S.* 69.3. For a fuller examination of this theme, see Ch. 6.

([29]) *Conf.* 5.24.14.

([30]) An excellent introduction to this issue with bibliography can be found in Huhn (1988).

([31]) Huhn (1954: 80).

([32]) Alvarez Campos (1970: 74–146).

([33]) *Poen.* 1.3.12: *non in similitudinem carnis ait, quia Christus ueritatem suscepit carnis humanae, non similitudinem.*

([34]) Cf., e.g., Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 5.5.14; Hilary of Poitiers, *Cont. Const.* 21; cf. Schelkle (1956: 273).

([35]) *Exp. Ps. 118* 21.6: *peccatum erat caro secundum illud, quia haereditario erat damnata maledictio, peccatum erat inlecebra et ministra peccati. uenit dominus Iesus et in carne peccato obnoxia militiam uirtutis exercuit.*

([36]) Huhn (1954: 87).

([37]) Quasten (1986: 164) suggests as the most conservative dating of the contents of the work 377–89, a period spanning most of Ambrose's episcopate; other proposals include 377–8 and 385–9. Whether Ambrose wrote the commentary before or after the homily on Ps. 37 seems largely irrelevant, as we know that Ambrose maintained his engagement and interest in Origen consistently over a long time span.

([38]) Schenkl (1902: 72, note to l. 12); Crouzel (1962: app. 563–4), quoting in turn Tissot (1955).

([39]) Tissot (1955 (1): index) notes forty-two parallels between the Ambrosian commentary and the text of Origen's homilies in Jerome's translation alone; there are a further twenty-one parallels between the commentary and the homilies in their Greek fragments. The standard reference work on the Commentary and its influence on Augustine remains that of Rollero (1958), which contains a similar register of Ambrosian–Origenian parallels.

([40]) Tissot (1955 (1): 17).

([41]) *Hom. Luc. Prol.*: *oscinem coruum audiam crocitantem, et mirum in modum de cunctarum auium ridere coloribus, cum totus ipse tenebrosus sit.*

([42]) Quasten (1986: 230); F. Fournier in Crouzel (1962: 78).

([43]) *Hom. Luc.* 28.3.

([44]) *Cons. Ev.* 2.12.4.

([45]) *Ep.* 140.13.5.

([46]) *Elegans* has a double sense: discerning or discriminating in conjunction with matters of intellectual judgement, and

elegant in connection with matters of taste; in both, rightness of choice (namely, the root *lego, lectio*) is the defining factor. For an Augustinian Platonism in which truth and beauty both derive from the transcendent goodness of God, the concept of 'elegance' has considerable potential.

([47]) Altaner (1967e: 241–2) notes Augustine's use of Origen, *Hom. Luc.* 14.8 in *Ep*. 140; however, he offers no suggestion as to the date of Augustine's reception of the homilies, merely agreeing with Quasten on the date of their completion.

([48]) *Hom. Luc.* 14.3; emphasis added.

([49]) *Hom. Luc.* 14.4.

([50]) *Hom. Luc.* 14.5.

([51]) Gal. 4:4.

([52]) *En. Ps.* 18.I.6.

([53]) Ps. 19:6 in Hebrew numbering.

([54]) *Procedat de thalamo suo, | pudoris aula regia, | geminae gigas substantiae | alacris ut currat viam*; cf. Fontaine (1992: 273–5).

([55]) *En. Ps.* 18.6 1 and 2; *En. Ps.* 44.3; *En. Ps.* 77.10; *Cons. Ev.* 1.46.30; *Tr. Ioh.* 1.2; *Tr. Ioh.* 2.3; *Tr. Ioh.* 59.3; *Tr. Ioh.* 78.3; *C. Ser. Arr.* 8.6; cf: Ghellinck (1914: 419) and Daley (1993). Madec (1989: 191–2) points out that Augustine uses the phrase *geminae gigas substantiae* alongside an exegesis of the 'bounding' of the giant (*exsultavit*), read from both Ambrose on Ps. 118 and Hippolytus on the Song of Songs; that focus is soteriological and, once again, not fully engaged with the virginal conception.

([56]) Madec (1989: 191–2) gives a useful survey of the *geminae gigas* motif in Augustine's work, with a short bibliography, tracing its dependence on Ambrose; he does not note variant readings of the psalm text that concentrate on the virginal conception, and are better connected to Origen.

([57]) *Comm. Ps.* 28.

([58]) Hammond (1977: 399).

([59]) Hammond (1977: 400): 'He was making available only what was generally acknowledged to be valuable', and thus, by implication, in some kind of demand.

([60]) This has been accepted since at least 1919; cf. Smith (1918: esp. 56); this was further affirmed by Souter (1927: 225–30).

([61]) De Bruyn (1993: 11).

([62]) Hammond (1977: 426 n. 64).

([63]) Bammel (1992: 341–6).

([64]) Bammel (1992: 366).

([65]) Bammel (1992: 341).

([66]) Cf. Ch. 3, pp. 84–5.

([67]) *S.* 273.9.

([68]) Cf. the Latin text, p. 120 above.

([69]) *Praed. Sanct*. 8.4.

([70]) *Comm. Cant*. 2.4.28–30.

([71]) Heidl (2003: 73).

([72]) A collection of twenty homilies preserved under the name of Origen; they were discovered in 1900 by Wilmart and Battifol and subsequently reclassified as the work of Novatian or Gregory of Elvira. On the basis of parallels between Origen's commentary on Genesis extant in the Greek and the *Tractatus*, Heidl (2003: 237–72) argues that its content must be dependent on a reading of Origen in Latin translations other than those of Rufinus and Jerome.

([73]) Heidl (2003: 35).

([74]) *Ep*. 7, 10, 2, and 3.

([75]) *Ep*. 2.

([76]) *Ep*. 7.2.

([77]) *Conf.* 8.3.2. quoting Col. 2:8.

([78]) *Conf.* 8.3.2: *quod non in aliorum philosophorum scripta incidissem plena fallaciarum et deceptionum secundum elementa huius mundi, in istis autem omnibus modis insinuari deum et eius uerbum.*

([79]) Paulinus of Nola's *Ep*. 20.3, of 27 Nov. 400, refers to the *nouus episcopus* of the diocese.

([80]) *Vita* 49.

([81]) *Uir. Ill*. 52.36: *Simplicianus…hortatus est Augustinum…agitare ingenium, et expositionibus Scriptarum uacare, ut etiam nouus quidam Ambrosius, Origenis ἐργοδιωκτης uideretur*.

([82]) Mutzenbecher (1970: pp. xxii–xxiii).

([83]) Madec (1989: 42).

([84]) *Civ. Dei* 10.29.2: *quod initium sancti euangelii, cui nomen est secundum iohannem, quidam platonicus, sicut a sancto sene simpliciano, qui postea mediolanensis ecclesiae praesedit episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis litteris conscribendum et per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat*.

([85]) *Vita* 1 and 56.

([86]) *Pecc. Orig*. 3.3.

([87]) *Vita* 8: *Deus enim qui ecclesiae suae catholicae murum parabat adversus inimicos suos, et turrem erigebat David contra faciem Damasci, hoc est, contra perfidiam haereticorum, fugam illius impedivit*.

([88]) Paredi (1963); cf. Eusebius, *H.E.* 11.15.

([89]) *Comm. Cant.* 3.14.14: *Sic ergo et 'paries' nunc pars quaedam domus huius est, quae potest indicare dogmatum firmitatem, sub qua 'stare' dicitur sponsus et in quibus tam magnus et excelsus est, ut emineat omne aedificium et 'prospiciat' sponsam, id est animam.*

([90]) Anastasius, *Ep.* 2, preserved as Jerome, *Ep.* 95.

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

поменять прокси

The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430
Dominic Keech

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Apollinaris Redux? Augustine and the Psychology of Christ

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Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 5 examines Julian of Eclanum's accusation that Augustine's definition of inherited sin must deny his Christ a fully human soul. First surveying Augustine's understanding of Apollinarianism, it then finds his broader conception of human will and knowledge problematic, where it repeats Origen's confusion between fully intentional acts and the first stirrings of sinful desire; and where his conception of concupiscence pushes these stirrings into the bodily realm, of the autonomy of the genitals and ecstasy of orgasm. This results in an uneven Christology: Augustine characterizes Christ as a human with a perfect divine will, omniscient throughout his earthly life; yet he also suggests that Christ exercises a distinctively human will that requires salvation, and is similar to the will of sinful humanity in the life of grace. Julian's claim is found to have some weight, leading to the question of the origin of Christ's soul in Augustine's thought.

Keywords: Julian of Eclanum, Apollinarianism, Stoicism, De Civitate Dei, carnal concupiscence (concupiscentia carnalis), impassibility (ἀπαθεια), passions, human knowledge, first movements (κινηματα), Arianism

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connection between the Fall of Adam, present sinful desire, and the propagation of infants. Behind this lies the confusion

of Augustine's mature designation *caro peccati*, combining the language of the will (*concupiscentia*) with that of the body (*carnalis*); Julian therefore reads Augustine's description of sinfulness as an account of embodiment, a reification of a category of the will amounting to a latent Manichaeism. From this, Julian proceeds to question the logic of Augustine's claim that Christ has a mortal body characteristic of fallen humanity, assumed together with a sinless soul. Augustine had defined the twofold punishment for sin as bodily mortality, together with the will's addiction to self. As a result, his 'sinless mortal', manifestly dying on the cross, cannot be in possession of a soul that is truly human. His Christ is an anomaly, approximate neither to Adam in his unfallen state, immortal and sinless, nor to that of humanity, in need of redemption and in love with its own inevitable death. On this basis, Julian labels Augustine an Apollinarian, who must necessarily place the Word in the position of Christ's absent soul to account for his experience of the affections.

In order to assess Julian's claim, I first investigate the understanding of Apollinarianism that Augustine inherited from his Latin predecessors, finding it to be primarily concerned with the error of monophysitism and characterized by a lexicon that confuses the terms *mens, anima*, and *animus*. I then turn to his treatment of the soul in its pre- and postlapsarian states, as described in both *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14, and *Confessiones* 10. Here Augustine is at his most expansive, technically precise and fully engaged in the emotional theory of Stoicism, in order to reconfigure it around a Christian Platonist scheme in **(p.143)** which the emotions are redeemed by the activity of grace. However, alongside this Augustine takes from the Origenian tradition the conflation of prepassion with passion, whereby culpability for sin is projected back into the first stirrings of immoral desire. This finds its logical outworking in his definition of *concupiscentia carnalis*, in which the flesh itself overpowers the conscious and semi-conscious world of desire, enslaving humanity as its agent in the act of reproduction. Moving into Augustine's depiction of the inner life of Christ reveals multiple layers of inconsistency. The first lies in a failure to apply his general theory of mind and the affections to the humanity of Christ. The second arises in his seeming inability to decide on the source of Christ's perfect will in either his human or his divine natures. The third is rooted in his insistence on the full, beatific knowledge of Jesus, which exceeds the vision of even the saints. In the absence of any clear statements to the contrary, Julian's allegation of a latent Apollinarianism appears from these observations to stand on worryingly solid ground. Finally uncovering the relation of the soul of Jesus to the indwelling Word must await the following chapter, in which I examine Augustine's understanding of the genesis and embodiment of the soul, sinful in the *massa peccati* but sinless in the human Christ.

Julian and the issue of seeds

In Chapter 2, I surveyed Augustine's developing exegesis of Romans 8:3, noting its crucial importance in providing a Christological counter-attack on both the theological anthropology and the exemplarist Christology of Pelagianism. I noted that the prevalence of this exegesis declined in the early to mid-420s, in response to the different theological questions raised by the Semi-Pelagian monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles; and that it returned to prominence once Augustine had resumed the debate about the Fall and its effects in dialogue with Julian of Eclanum. Reviewing this literary contretemps, I referred to Fredriksen's observation that Julian simply could not understand Augustine's theology of Original Sin: for him, there is no logic in twinning sex with dispositional vice. As she remarks: 'Sex to Julian is reproductive biology; sex to Augustine is eroticism';[1] hence Julian's insistent question, exemplified at *Contra Iulianum* 6.24.9: 'How can you muddle a matter of the will with the circumstances of insemination?' (*Qui fieri potest, ut res arbitrii conditioni seminum misceatur?*). Put more fully, how can a historic act of sin committed by an individual be transmitted to humanity in perpetuity, at the level not only of a vitiated human flesh, but also of an **(p.144)** incapacitated will? Twinning the one with the other must imply a view of human biology that embraces both the flesh and the soul in a single movement of propagation. Augustine had himself wrestled with the problem of the justice of infants being inflicted with the deserts of sin, of which Julian was aware; but his own central criticism stepped back behind the problem of divine justice to ask whether Augustine's theology of creation could sustain his ethics. Augustine's response to Julian on the matter has clear implications for any judgement made on the consistency of his anti-Pelagian theology. More importantly in the context of this study, Augustine's articulation of the relationship between the physical and appetitive aspects of reproduction either promises to consolidate his axiomatic treatment of the sinlessness of Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh', or threatens to undermine it. Upholding the fate—and hope—of the *massa peccati* requires Augustine to provide both a biological and a theological account of the origin and character of Christ's sinless soul. This chapter therefore

begins by looking at Augustine's reply to Julian, as a prelude to examining his claim that Augustine's theology of Original Sin necessarily implicates his Christology in the heresy of Apollinaris of Laodicaea.

Throughout the *Contra Iulianum Libri Sex* and *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectus*, Augustine's most common response to this frequently repeated question is figurative. He finds a suitable analogue to human reproduction in the propagation of olive trees: even when a new tree is propagated from a cultivated olive, a wild olive is initially the result; in just the same way, the children of baptized parents are brought to birth in a state of sin.[2] In *Contra Iulianum* 5, Augustine attempts a philosophically informed reply. In a passage of questionable logic, he affirms with Julian that the evil adhering to a parent has the status of an Aristotelian accident, and that accidents cannot be passed on from one person to another by propagation.[3] However, the authority of Romans 5:12 trumps that of Aristotelian category theory, with the result that Augustine confects a curious theologoumenon: 'What you have heard on this matter is indeed true. Those things that are in a subject are like qualities; they would not exist apart from the subject in which they inhere; thus there is in a body of the subject colour or form. But those things are passed on by working upon their subject, not by crossing over into it.'[4] However, he leaves the distinction between 'working upon' a thing (*afficiendo*) and 'crossing over into it' (*emigrando*) unexplained. His subsequent illustrations are, to say the least, inconclusive: the blackness of Ethiopians 'works upon' their children; it **(p.145)** is not passed on in the manner of a tunic given from one person to another. Corporeal qualities can be seen to work upon incorporeal states, as when they are held in the memory; likewise, the opposite process is proved in the striped sheep born of Jacob's ewes when exposed to the striped rods he placed before them when mating (Gen. 30. 37–40).[5] Reporting from the doctor and 'most noble writer' Soranus, he cites the story of a certain king—Dionysius—who had placed an image of a handsome man in front of his wife when impregnating her, in order to avoid passing on his own ugliness to the child conceived. Augustine's method here is confused, lacking the forensic examination of the body–soul relationship in the process of reproduction Julian demands.

The immediate corollary of Julian's question lies in his designation of Augustine as a Traducianist, repeating the condemned error of both Mani and Tertullian that understands the soul as a physical entity, transmitted with flesh from parent to child. His point has been given a generous hearing in recent years, not least in the important articles of Gillian Evans and Elizabeth Clark.[6] Augustine was well aware of the problem of trying to incorporate a Traducianist account of procreation into Christian discourse, and had discussed this openly with friends in letters and tractates.[7] By his own account, he had had to overcome a materialist conception of God on his passage back to the Church, aided finally by the reading of the *libri Platonicorum*.[8] Had he been guilty of subconsciously retaining a materialist notion of the soul, a confused inheritance of a Manichaean past? Julian puts the question in the following way: 'If you do not believe that a part of the soul is joined to the seed, how can you write so brazenly that all humans were once simply Adam, not least because a human cannot exist without having a body and a soul at the same time?'[9] Augustine's response is unconvincing, turning from the example of Adam to that of Christ. In a seemingly diversionary tactic, Augustine reminds Julian he is bound to confess that, although he possessed a rational soul, Christ is called man when he was laid in the tomb, where he was only as a body. Likewise, Adam is said by Scripture to have been man, although God had just formed him from the dust of the earth (Gen. 2.7). He rounds off the thought with a curious disavowal: 'Well then; in whatever way or in whatever part all have been born from him, they were one in him; whether just in the body, or some other part of his humanity. I confess I don't know; nor does it embarrass me **(p.146)** to admit that I don't know, as it does you.'[10] The result is disappointingly blunt; equivocating on all sides, Augustine seems either unable or simply unwilling to tackle the question with the seriousness demanded by his opponent. To state that a soulless human remains definable as a human says nothing for or against the passing of the soul from parent to offspring.

The central point of Julian's critique here had been known to Augustine long before his composition of the *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectus* in 430. As I argued in Chapter 2, writing *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* to Marcellinus in around 412, Augustine had read Rufinus of Syria's *Liber de Fide*, the document later admitted by Calestius to have been formative in his own opinion on the doctrine of Original Sin.[11] In the course of denouncing a series of 'false' protologies, Rufinus comes close to Julian's own criticism, though without the benefit of either a philosophical vocabulary competent to deal with the distinction between material and spiritual natures, or a knowledge of Augustine's mature

position. Scripture, Rufinus insists, makes no mention of the transmission of the soul (materially understood or otherwise) from Adam to any of his descendants. Quite to the contrary, Genesis 2.23 is explicit: Eve is bone from Adam's bones and flesh from his flesh: 'If human flesh had not been created from underlying matter, as the flesh of Adam and Eve was; and if the soul was not made for humans thereafter from underlying matter, as was also the case of Adam and Eve, the prophet Zachariah would not have said: "He creates the human spirit within him."'[12] With regard to the ethics of Original Sin, his thought is even clearer: those who propound the transmission of sin 'either proclaim that God is unjust, or certainly reckon that the devil is stronger than God, that he had the power to make that nature bad through the transgression of Adam and Eve, which God created good'.[13] While Augustine wrestled extensively with the latter issue, the former remained cloudy to him. In the treatise prompted in part by the *Liber de Fide*, he alluded to the difficulty of offering an account of the transmission of sin that was both biologically sound and did justice to the righteousness of God:

> **(p.147)** Concerning the soul the question arises whether it also is propagated in the same way [as the flesh] and constrained by the same guilt, for which it receives forgiveness. For we cannot say that it is only the flesh of the infant, and not his soul as well, which has need of a Saviour and Redeemer…If it is not propagated in the same way as the flesh, we may ask whether, by the very fact of it being mingled with and weighed down by the flesh of sin, it still needs the remission of its own sin, and a redemption of its own, God being judge through his great foreknowledge which infants deserve to be absolved from that guilt which we are discussing (even though they are as yet unborn and have done nothing good or evil anywhere in a life which properly belongs to them). The question also arises, how we would avoid seeing God as the author of that guilt, on account of which redemption by the sacrament is necessary for the soul of the infant, even if He did not create souls by natural propagation. That is a great question…
>
> *de anima uero, utrum et ipsa eodem modo propagata reatu, qui ei dimittatur, obstricta sit—neque enim possumus dicere solam carnem paruuli, non etiam animam indigere saluatoris et redemptoris est…an etiam non propagata eo ipso, quo carni peccati aggrauanda miscetur, iam ipsius peccati remissione et sua redemptione opus habeat, deo per summam praescientiam iudicante, qui paruulorum ab isto reatu non mereantur absolui, etiam qui nondum nati nihil alicubi propria sua uita egerunt uel boni uel mali, et quomodo deus, etiamsi non de traduce animas creat, non sit tamen auctor reatus eiusdem, propter quem redemptio sacramenti necessaria est animae paruuli, magna quaestio est…*[14]

In the light of the unclear evidence offered by the Scriptures on this point combined with the sensitivity of the issue, Augustine mused, a separate treatise on this very topic ought to be attempted, some other time. This finally appeared in 419–20, in the form of *De Anima et eius Origine*; yet, as I shall show in the following chapter, the work raises more questions than it resolves. Ten years after its publication, Augustine would still be repeating his uncertainty of 412, that souls are 'either drawn from a person already tainted, or corrupted as one thing by another—as if in a tainted vessel' (*aut utrumque vitiatum ex homine trahitur, aut alterum in altero tanquam in vitiato vase corrumpitur*).[15]

Julian's Christological critique

As I observed in Chapter 2, Augustine's Christological defence of his position on Original Sin lay in his exegesis of Romans 8:3: the Saviour responds to the needs of humanity in sinful flesh by coming, dying, and rising in its likeness. Julian's criticism, that Augustine had failed to reconcile the vitiation of a transmitted flesh with that of an uncertainly propagated soul, found a counterpart in his accusation that Augustine's Christology amounts to plain **(p.148)** Apollinarianism. By Julian's reading of Augustine, humans receive their souls by propagation through a reproductive act that necessarily implicates them in the sinful agency of the flesh: their embodiment is synonymous with their sinfulness. If, as Augustine himself conceded, Christ has truly human flesh, in what sense can his humanity have evaded the double punishment of mortality and concupiscence, as much one in the other as body and soul? Merely to cite the virginal conception as the mode by which Christ's soul bypassed propagation along with the flesh ignores the fact that, once embodied, it must inevitably be implicated in the confines of fleshly *concupiscentia carnalis*. Augustine must either explain the unique origin and character of this soul, or admit that the Word himself, as bodily agent, overcame the mortal

will of its body.

Julian's extended criticism of Augustine's Christology is found in chapters 45–65 of *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectus* 4. Julian begins by referring to *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2.14.5, where Augustine had contrasted the general state of humanity, in thrall to the concupiscence of the flesh, with a Christ untainted by such concupiscence. Consistent with his own opinion that such desire, rightly used, is an inherently good part of created nature, Julian argues that excluding Christ from concupiscence must be to say his body also lacked physical sensibility: 'Having bound up the body in the terminology of concupiscence, you want to remove the sense of the eyes from Christ as much as you do that of his innards!'[16] Differently put, to remove one part of Christ's desire impairs every other part, reducing his affections and physical desires together in one move. Augustine, by Julian's reading, is thus a crypto-Apollinarian:

> Apollinaris is reported to have thought at first that the Incarnation appeared to be an assumption of the body alone from human substance, and in the place of the soul there was only divinity; and that Christ did not appear to have taken up a human, but only a cadaver. Once he was compelled by authority…he said that there was indeed a human soul in Christ, but that there was no sense in his body; and he announced that Christ had existed impassible to each and every sin.
>
> *Apollinaris quippe primo talem incarnationem Christi induxisse fertur, ut diceret solum corpus de humana substantia assumptum videri, pro anima vero ipsam fuisse deitatem; Christusque non hominem, sed cadaver videretur hominis suscepisse…Cum ergo auctoritate…eversus fuisset…dixit, animam quidem humanam in Christo fuisse, sed sensus in eo corporis non fuisse, atque impassibilem eum pronuntiavit universis exstitisse peccatis*.[17]

In order to isolate Christ from sin, Augustine (in company with Apollinaris) has had to sever the reproductive capacity of the flesh from Christ's human affections. In effect, this denies him a full human soul by separating his **(p.149)** appetitive and affective capacities.[18] Consequently, Christ's exemplary character collapses, so that Julian questions what would be the salvific power of his resisting temptation, when the nature of his humanity precluded the reality of temptation.[19] This extends not only to his chastity but also to his fasting, as the desire to nourish oneself and to satisfy the sexual impulse are both, from Julian's perspective, integrated for the good in human nature. In addition, Augustine's Christ is in no sense passive as a human would usually be, where passivity is the corollary of both the affections and physical appetite. Julian therefore draws Augustine's understanding of the crucifixion (and thus also the resurrection) into question.[20]

In his response to Julian, Augustine initially fails to grasp his central point: that his own understanding of the fallen, concupiscent will, propagated to the whole human race, is biologically problematic. Instead, he quotes the *Anakephaleosis*, his major source in the writing of *De Haeresibus*:

> Epiphanius, of blessed memory bishop of Cyprus, in the little book he published about heresies, wrote that certain Apollinarians had said the body of Christ was consubstantial with his divinity; others denied that he had taken up a soul at all; still others argued that he had not taken his flesh from created flesh, which is to say from Mary, but (citing 'and the Word was made flesh'), they argued that the Word was made into flesh. After all that, I really do not know what they thought by saying that he had not taken up a mind. What you claim the Apollinarians asserted —that there was no 'sense' in Christ, and that they proclaimed him to be impassible—I have read that nowhere but in your book, nor have I heard it ever, from anyone.
>
> *Sanctae memoriae Cyprius episcopus Epiphanius in opusculo quod de haeresibus edidit, dixit Apollinaristarum quosdam in Domino Jesu Christo divinitati corpus consubstantiale dixisse; alios autem negasse quod animam sumpserit; alios propter quod dictum est, Verbum caro factum est (Joan. I, 14), contendisse non eum carnem sumpsisse de creata carne, id est, Mariae, sed Verbum carnem factum; postea vero nescio quid cogitantes dixisse quod non sumpserit mentem. Quod ergo affirmas Apollinaristas asseverasse in Christo sensus corporis non fuisse, eumque illos pronuntiasse impassibilem; nec uspiam legi, nisi in hoc libro tuo, nec aliquando ab aliquo audivi*.[21]

As I observed in Chapter 2, Augustine's attitude to the *Anakephaleosis* was a careful and critical one, typified by his rejection of Ps. Epiphanius' description of Origenism. The *Anakephaleosis* proposes two models of Apollinarianism: the first amounts to a version of monophysitism, the second posits an assumption of a truncated humanity, bereft of any soul (*anima*). Augustine counters a third variant, in which Christ is conceived as having no mind (*mens*), by suggesting that a flesh consubstantial with divinity, though without **(p.150)** an *anima*, would still possess a *mens*.[22] Turning from the *Anakephaleosis* to Julian, Augustine applies the point: even a monophysite Christ without an *anima* would still have bodily sense, presumably because he would still have a *mens*. Yet Augustine misses Julian's fundamental criticism, that a Christ who is genuinely mortal but whose soul is actively sinless cannot be truly human, where humanity is defined as a mortal creature, and whose death proceeds from its possession of a soul condemned to persistent, sinful desire.

Throughout his response to Julian in *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectum* 4, Augustine fails to meet Julian's argument: Christ could have experienced concupiscent carnality had he willed it; coming in the likeness of sinful flesh, he simply did not.[23] Without doubt, he sensed the physical realities of the world and was able to desire the objects available to all other humans—including that of generation—but his desire was not 'against the spirit' as it is for fallen humanity.[24] Augustine cannot concede that this situates Christ in a human nature—and having a human soul—which no longer has any relation to that possessed by all other people, either before or after the Fall. Augustine's reply is further undermined by the looseness of his vocabulary, in which the terms *mens, anima*, and *sensus* are used inconsistently. Offering no detailed treatment of the denaturing effects of the Fall on the soul further hinders the effectiveness of his counter-attack. This is not a novelty to the anti-Julianic works: all the anti-Pelagian treatises advance the punishment of sin in mortality and *concupiscentia carnalis* from a catena of scriptural texts, observations from nature and pure theological speculation. Because of this, Julian's startling accusation of an Apollinarianism latent in Augustine's Christology, together with Augustine's technically ambiguous response, demands analysis. If accurate, his criticism stands to draw the whole of Augustine's mature theological agenda into question. I shall, therefore, proceed to examine Augustine's treatments of this important heresy elsewhere in his corpus, before returning to Julian's criticism.

Augustine against Apollinaris

Before setting out, I want to underline the obvious: whatever Augustine's perception of Apollinarianism, it need not have been a historically accurate one. The same is true of Epiphanius, the compiler of the *Anakephaleosis*, and Julian himself. In a sense, the precise content of Apollinaris' writings is irrelevant to a survey of the reception of his heresy by ecclesiasical writers of **(p.151)** the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Their understanding of whatever was left of an Apollinarian corpus will have been formed in the light of its conciliar condemnation.[25] While this frees the commentator on Augustine from investigating the nuances of Apollinaris' actual thought, it confronts her with a variety of highly fluid understandings of Apollinarianism in circulation around Augustine. Floating free of Apollinaris' works, these are accountable to no one, and are consequently more difficult to compare with one another.

To date, a full appraisal of Augustine's reception of the Apollinarian heresy remains to be written; Studer's recent *Augustinus Lexikon* article attempts to demarcate his developing perception (and by extension, description) of the heresy and his sources for both.[26] However, it makes no substantial attempt to measure the engagement of Augustine's own Christology with the issue of Christ's sinlessness, which Apollinarianism raises by excising the voluntary and therefore peccable aspect of Christ's humanity. We are left with the open-ended appraisal: 'On the question of the sinlessness of Jesus he not only holds fast…to Christ's full humanity and its connection by reproduction with Adam; he also surpasses his predecessors in discussions of human freedom and the true righteousness of humanity.'[27] More interesting still is Studer's lack of certainty about Augustine's early acquaintance with a definition of Apollinarianism. Damasus, Ambrose, Hilary, Ambrosiaster, and possibly Jerome are cited as potential sources, together with general Milanese and Roman oral traditions on the topic, which are particularly indebted to Damasus. He suggests that Augustine's soteriological evaluation of the distinction between *anima* and *mens* in Christ finds its origin in the writings of Damasus, while the perception that Apollinarians argued for a conflation of divinity and human soul is drawn from Ambrose's *De Incarnationis Dominci Sacramento*. I begin with Studer's first source-critical claim.

Damasus' two repudiations of Apollinarianism are found in his Epistle 9 and the *Tome* issued after the council of Rome in 382. The former, written against Vitalis' perpetuation of Apollinaris' heresy, anathematizes those who hold the Word was 'changed in the flesh of the Lord, taking the place of human sense',[28] and states the positive teaching of the Church in counter-attack:

> We are to confess that Wisdom, the Word and Son of God took a human body, soul and sense: that is, Adam in his entirety; and, if I may say more emphatically, the whole of our 'old man' without sin. Thus confessing that he took a human body, we do not thereby connect the human passions of vice with him; in the same way, saying that he took the soul and sense of humanity, we do not say that he was subjected to the sin of human thoughts.
>
> **(p.152)**
>
> *Confitendus ipse sapientia, sermo filius Dei humanum suscepisse corpus, animam, sensum, id est, integrum Adam, et, ut expressius dicam, totum veterem nostrum sine peccato hominem. Sicuti enim confitens eum humanum corpus suscepisse, non statim ei et humanas vitiorum adjungimus passiones: ita et dicentes eum suscepisse et hominis animam et sensum, non statim dicimus et cogitationum eum humanarum subjacuisse peccato.*[29]

The *Tome* details more specifically what is lacking in the Apollinarian Christ: 'We anathematize those who say that, in place of a rational and intelligible human soul, the Word of God was changed in human flesh; for the Son and Word of God was not in his body in place of that rational and intellectual soul, but took up our soul (rational and intellectual) without sin, and saved it.'[30] Viewing the two texts together, Apollinarianism posits a change in the nature of the Word when Incarnate, in order to take the place of a human soul in Christ's human nature. It is therefore difficult to see how Augustine's soteriological estimation of the *mens/anima* distinction could be rooted in these texts as Studer maintains, since they say nothing about it that is explicit. Grillmeier further confirms my argument:

> What Damasus does not realise is that the Apollinarian teaching is intended to be a solution to the problem of... sinlessness in Christ...Damasus merely stresses that for Christ to have taken a human rational soul does not mean that he was exposed to the sins of the rational soul. For the taking of a body by no means signifies subjection to its vices and passions. Here Western anthropology has its place in the picture of Christ and allows the problem of sinlessness to be put in a still more pressing way. No attempt is made at a solution.[31]

Thus, even if Augustine had taken from Damasus a clear delineation of *anima* from *mens* (and I do not believe he did), this would not have advanced his grasp of the Apollinarian approach to Christ's sinlessness or any alternatives to it.

I turn next to Studer's claim that Augustine's perception of Apollinarian monophysitism is rooted in the works of Ambrose. While *De Incarnationis Dominici Sacramento* does not name the Apollinarians as the object of its discussion, it is clear from its account of monophysite heretics that they are in mind. By contrast with them, Ambrose describes the Arians as 'more tolerable', as Apollinarianism reduces to theopaschy when God suffers on the cross **(p.153)** in the one nature of Christ.[32] Without understanding the precise configuration of Word, soul and flesh proposed by Apollinaris, and in the light of the Nicene settlement, it is not difficult to see how Ambrose can misconstrue Apollinaris' very different understanding of the relationship between Christ's person and his one nature. Ambrose's second attack on Apollinarianism deserves full quotation, as an attempt to address the problem neglected by Damasus:

> If you take it literally, so that you think 'The Word was made flesh' means 'the Word was changed into flesh', can you deny what is also written about the Lord, that 'he committed no sin, but was made sin for us'? Was the Lord then changed into sin for us?...You marvel that it is written, 'The Word was made flesh', that flesh should be assumed by God the Word, when it is also written that he was made sin, which he did not possess? This is to say: he assumed for us the taking up of the carnal body of sin, subject to its weakness, not by the nature or working of sin when he was made the likeness of the flesh of sin, but so that our sin might be crucified in his flesh. They

should desist from saying that the nature of the Word was changed into the nature of the body, lest the nature of the Word should seem to have been changed into the contagion of sin by a parallel logic. It is one thing that does the assuming, and another that is assumed. Power came into the Virgin, and for this reason the angel told her, 'the Power of the Most High will overshadow you'. His body was born from the Virgin, and thus there was a certain heavenly descent; but it was a human conception. For he could not otherwise have been simultaneously of the nature of the flesh, and of divinity.

Quod si secundum litteram vos tenetis, ut putetis ex eo quod scriptum est quod verbum caro factum est, verbum dei in carnem esse conversum, numquid negatis scriptum esse de domino quia peccatum non fecit, sed peccatum factus est? Ergo in peccatum conversus est dominus?...Miraris ergo quia scriptum est verbum caro factum est, cum caro adsumpta sit a deo verbo, quando de peccato, quod non habuit, scriptum est quia peccatum factus est? Hoc est: non natura operationeque peccati, utpote in similitudinem carnis peccati factus, sed ut peccatum nostrum in sua carne 'crucifigeret', susceptionem pro nobis infirmitate obnoxii iam 'corporis peccati' carnalis adsumpsit. Desinant ergo dicere naturam verbi in corporis naturam esse mutatam, ne pari interpraetatione videatur natura verbi in contagium mutata peccati. Aliud est enim quod adsumpsit et aliud quod adsumptum est. Virtus venit in virginem, sicut et angelus ad eam dixit quia virtus altissimi obumbrabit te. Sed natum est corpus ex virgine et ideo caelestis quidem descensio, sed humana conceptio est. Non ergo eadem carnis potuit esse divinitatisque natura.[33]

Ambrose's defence of the Catholic position is striking. He uses the interwoven exegesis of Romans 8:3 and Luke 1:35 established by Origen to address the **(p.154)** problem of Christ's sinlessness.[34] The central point of his attack is clear: any suggestion that Christ has only one nature leads to a suffering God. However, his criticism focuses on the nature/person configuration that is the outcome of Apollinarianism, without investigating its root cause, in Apollinaris' understanding of the nature of Christ's soul.

Early treatments of Apollinarianism: De Diversis Quaestionibus 83 and De Agone Christiano

Augustine's earliest critique of Apollinarianism is found in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, the collection of miscellaneous philosophical and theological questions and answers begun in around 388 and collated in 396. Although *Adversus Apollinaristas* (*Quaestio* 80) is placed at the end of the collection, there is no certain indication of its composition date. At the outset, he identifies the Apollinarian error as a denial of the *humanam mentem* and *rationalem animam* of Christ, which distinguishes the human from other animals. Whilst the distinction between *anima* and *animus* here is clear (the latter being non-rational), the dividing line between *anima* and *mens* remains opaque. On the basis of their reading of John 1.14, Augustine goes on, the Apollinarians seek to make a compound (*concretum*) of the Word with the flesh of Christ.[35] Quite apart from grounding their position on poor exegesis (*caro* in John 1.14 refers to the whole human person, not only human flesh), they neglect the intermediary position of the *anima* in relating the Word to the body,[36] and the essential assumption of passivity within the Incarnation in virtue of it. He leaves the position of the *mens* in this mediatorial relationship unexplained. He continues:

Their empty and inept accusation does not give us cause for fear, when they spitefully resist and say: 'If he truly had the affections of the soul, therefore he was placed under necessity.' We may swiftly respond: he was indeed placed under necessity, because he **(p.155)** was bound, whipped, crucified, and died. Thus they may understand at the same time and without stubbornness that he also had the passions of the soul, which is to say, real affections, as it pleased him to take them up by the will of the dispensation, when he took up the passions of the body without any necessity by the same will.

nec illa nos terret inanis atque inepta calumnia, qua inuidiose resistentes aiunt: ergo sub necessitate positus fuit, si has affectiones animi ueras habuit. facile quippe respondemus: ergo sub necessitate positus fuit, quia conprehensus, flagellatus, crucifixus et mortuus est, ut tandem sine pertinacia si uolunt intellegant sic eum passiones animi, hoc est affectiones, uoluntate dispensationis ueras tamen ut placuit suscepisse, quemadmodum

passiones corporis eadem dispensationis uoluntate sine ulla necessitate suscepit.[37]

Without a soul, the saving suffering and death of Christ becomes unintelligible; however, the real passions and affections experienced by Christ and recorded by the evangelists prove its presence.[38] In spite of an apparent confusion over the technical vocabulary to be applied to the soul (the previously animal and irrational *animus* replaces *anima* as the seat of the affections in the text cited), Augustine's core criticism seems clear: the Apollinarian error is motivated by a desire not to involve the Word in human passivity, which can be effected only by removing his soul, both affective and intellectual. This is precisely what the Catholic position sets itself against, by proclaiming an Incarnate God who assumes a human nature capable of real suffering.

In around 396–7, Augustine wrote *De Agone Christiano* as a short rule of faith for those with only an elementary grasp of Latin. The text contains two short paragraphs, each of which appears to handle Apollinarianism without naming the heresy explicitly. Augustine's treatment of the issue here is interesting, as 21.19 and 23.21, which focus on Apollinarianism, are separated by an analysis of Adoptionism at 22.20, clearly describing the Photinian position Augustine admitted to holding in his youth.[39] While it may be dangerous to infer too much from this uneven composition, it is notable that two articles dealing with one heresy should be severed from one another. The first reproduces only half of the argument of *Quaestio* 80.1: Apollinarianism excludes the *mens humana* from Christ, and amazingly so, as this is the highest part of man. Augustine adds, 'much more is the human mind to be mourned, if it is conquered by its body; and if it is not reformed in that humanity, in which the Lord's human body has received the dignity of the heavenly form',[40] providing the soteriological rationale for the Catholic position. However, in the second article, Augustine describes the error in the full terms of *Quaestio* 80.1, in which the whole soul of Christ is denied. This is berated as being even more ridiculous than the previous position, and is **(p.156)** coupled with the example of the misinterpretation of John 1.14, which in *Quaestio* 80 is connected with the denial of Christ's *mens*. While Augustine appears to remain uncertain here whether the Apollinarians deny the lower or higher part of the soul (or both), the soteriological result of either option is clear to him and rejected.

It should be clear that, if Augustine did recall the texts of Damasus and Ambrose dealing with Apollinarianism, he did not reproduce their arguments verbatim in his own early works. His confusion concerning precisely what Apollinarianism denied (whether Christ's *anima, animus* or *mens*) might very plausibly be rooted in Damasus' own inexact treatment of the matter, *pace* Studer; likewise, Ambrose's emphasis on the danger of theopaschy inherent in the heresy appears to surface in both *Quaestio* 80 and in *De Agone Christiano*, albeit only as an underlying theme. Studer's reference to 'general' Milanese and Roman traditions on the topic, coupled with Altaner's vague assessment of the texts ('One can assume…that he has *a* textual source in mind'[41]) leaves the question of his sources open.

Mature works: Enchiridion, De Haeresibus, De Dono Perseverantiae

Augustine's subsequent treatment of Apollinarianism in a heresiologically explicit manner is found in the *Enchiridion* of the early 420s.[42] Again, Apollinaris is not named here, though it is clear that his heresy is being discussed. Augustine says nothing of the absence of *mens* or *anima* in his depiction of Christ; he merely states the Catholic position that 'it is absolutely wrong to say that anything of human nature was lacking in that taking up of humanity; but it was a nature free in every way from every bond of sin',[43] because it was born of a virgin who conceived by faith and not desire. John 1.14 is glossed here with Romans 3:20 ('Since all flesh will not be justified by the works of the Law'), supporting Augustine's central point, that the Incarnation posits a humanity (*caro*) assumed by divinity, not a divinity transformed into humanity (*caro*).

Studer follows Altaner in dating Augustine's reception of Ps. Epiphanius' *Anakephaleosis* of Epiphanius' *Panarion* to 423 or after. Augustine reproduces very closely its treatment of Apollinarianism in refuting Julian's attack on his own Christology.[44] While the source may have been new to Augustine in 423, **(p.157)** its content was not, providing material in substantial continuity with his prior understanding of the heresy. However, it reduces Apollinarianism to a threefold complex of errors, beginning with the denial of Christ's human soul and ending in monophysitism. I repeat in summary:

some Apollinarians denied Christ a human soul; others proposed that his body was consubstantial with his divinity (the logical result of excluding his soul and positing a single-natured Christ); while others held that the Word was transformed into flesh (the obverse outcome of the two previous assertions).

Altaner detects the use of the *Anakephaleosis* slightly before its deployment against Julian, at *De Haeresibus* 45.[45] By my reading, this text lacks the 'some…others' ambiguity of *Contra Iulianum Liber Imperfectus* 4.47, and turns rather on the shift in Apollinaris' mind from a dichotomous flesh–spirit (σαρξ-πνευμα) to a trichotomous flesh–spirit–mind (σαρχ-πωευμα-νους) anthropology; added to this, the threefold variation of Apollinarianism detailed in Ps. Epiphanius is not so evident. Importantly, where Augustine moved between the vocabulary of *mens* and *anima* without analysis in his early works, he makes sense of this in *De Haeresibus* by recounting a historical division between the former and the latter in Apollinaris' thought. To begin with, Apollinaris confessed that 'Christ our God took up flesh without a soul' (*deum christum carnem sine anima suscepisse*); however, 'defeated on this matter by the witness of the evangelists, the Apollinarians said that the mind, which makes humans rational, was lacking in Christ, and that in place of it was the Word'.[46] Augustine lifts this explanation directly from Rufinus' continuation of Eusebius' *Historia Ecclesiastica* 11.20.[47] Given his use of the History in *De Haeresibus*, it is strange that Augustine does not redeploy this useful narrative solution in refuting Julian's attack on his own 'Apollinarianism'. This notwithstanding, the explanation continues to evade a metaphysical explanation of what *mens* and *anima* actually are.

(p.158) The threefold description of Apollinarianism presented by the *Anakephaleosis* appears more clearly in another very late work, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, although once more without the 'some…others' equivocation of Ps. Epiphanius; rather, the varieties are set out as interrelated permutations of the same fundamental error, the denial of the fullness of Christ's humanity. Catholics confess that this was complete; Apollinarianism permits his soul *or* rational mind to be omitted, and the Word to be changed. While the *Anakephaleosis* says nothing about the consubstantiality of the Word with his human body in its account of Apollinarianism, the denial of either Christ's *mens* or his *anima* (which is found here) must necessarily amount to it, by a change in the Word when conflated with human physicality. Studer argues that *De Dono Perseverantiae* 67 is drawn from a source other than the Anakephaleosis, although this seems difficult to maintain; if anything, the clear reduction of the heresy into three correlated propositions (albeit three of a possible four) seems to rely even more heavily on Ps. Epiphanius than on the text of *De Haeresibus*.

Overview

From these five major treatments of Apollinarianism in the Augustinian corpus, I draw the following conclusion. From his earliest encounter with anti-Apollinarian teaching, Augustine was aware of the soteriological implications of the heresy: if Christ has no human soul, the Word must undergo change in the Incarnation in order to provide a rational subject for the evident suffering and affections of Jesus. To say that the Word is transformed into the human or that he becomes consubstantial with the flesh thus reduces to the same thing: God is no longer truly God in the Incarnation. While this aspect of the problem does not appear to change over some forty-five years, Augustine remained confused throughout the same period about the precise thing Apollinaris began by denying, which is only partially solved by recourse to Rufinus' chronological account of the development of the heresy. Augustine shares this confusion with others. In large part, this must be put down to the fluidity of language used in the West to describe the variety of intellectual, appetitive, affective, and voluntary human faculties. In all his rejections of Apollinarianism (and perhaps because of this fluidity), Augustine falls into the trap of Damasus; not once does he supply a close examination of the nature of Christ's soul in such a way as to justify its being both immune to sin and also of a nature common to all. Thus Julian finds Augustine's Achilles' heel. Simply citing the virginal conception of Christ, as in the *Enchiridion*, does not make the problem any clearer. All the elements of a textbook refutation of the heresy are present in his work (albeit accompanied by a confused technical language), without any extrapolation of a positive, Catholic alternative, made all the more **(p.159)** necessary by Augustine's insistence that every human is in Adam in his slavery to sin. While he clearly affirms the reality of Christ's human will and affections, he provides no explanation of how these can be good while exercised in a mortal, and thus concupiscent, body.

In the light of this, Augustine's final reply to Julian on the topic of his own 'Apollinarianism' deserves some further and final consideration. Where Augustine responds, 'I really do not know what they thought by saying that he had not taken up a mind' (*postea vero nescio quid cogitantes dixisse quod non sumpserit mentem*),[48] I want to suggest that he is fundamentally in sympathy with the basic premiss of Apollinarianism, that the divine Word would, in fact, be the *mens* of Christ, were he to lack a human one. Their system is problematic not in this respect, but because it involves the divine mind in a passivity fitted only to creaturely minds; in short, it changes God. This explains why the emphasis in Augustine's treatments of Apollinarianism is always on the error of monophysitism, and remains inexact about the place of the *mens/anima* distinction in their system. This is given further confirmation in his subsequent comment: 'What you claim the Apollinarians asserted—that there was no 'sense' in Christ, and that they proclaimed him to be impassible—I have read that nowhere but in your book, nor have I heard it ever, from anyone.'[49]

For the Apollinarian, the divine mind changed into a creaturely condition would inevitably have bodily *sensus*. For Augustine, this is precisely where it is erroneous; not to recognize this is a major fault on Julian's part. If, as Studer maintains, Augustine was aware of Damasus' Epistle 9, he would have been acquainted with the application of the term *sensus* to the humanity of Christ.[50] As I observed from Grillmeier, this is exactly where Damasus fails in his text to produce a convincingly positive account of Christ's human soul and *sensus*. In exactly the same vein, Augustine's reaction to the issue of Christ's *sensus* raised by Julian is to turn Damasus' apparently constructive phrase around to fit an Apollinarian mould, in which a changed God would, of course, have bodily sense. He has effectively sidestepped Julian's criticism, by applying the obverse of a dead-end Catholic solution to the Apollinarian position without addressing the problem it fails to solve: he offers an Apollinarian answer to a Catholic question. This is mere muddle in the midst of polemic, as long as Augustine can be shown to give due weight to the genuine humanity of Christ's animate life. I therefore open what follows by examining the most important surveys of Augustine's Christological 'psychology', before moving into an investigation of his broader theological anthropological framework for depicting the human **(p.160)** emotions and intellect; this will lay out the apparatus for analysing his Christological statements on the matter.

Christ's sensus humanus

In their respective surveys of Augustine's Christology, both van Bavel and Geerlings raise the question of the anachronism of analysing the psychology of Christ in the context of Augustinian, and broader Patristic, thought.[51] This part of my study, therefore, begins with a justification: no other writer in the history of the early Church offers so much material for this task as Augustine, and any examination of his Christology must seek the connections between his understanding of the human person, worked out in such detail over some forty years, and his understanding of Christ. In one of the most quoted maxims from his time spent at Cassiciacum, Augustine reduced his entire theological project to a quest to know God and the soul.[52] Within a few years of the claim, he had begun the *Confessiones*, his founding contribution to the construction of the Western person in its relationship to itself and its creator. Not only did Augustine remould individual words in the service of his own psychology;[53] his integrated thought about the human self stands as an achievement of the highest synthetic subtlety and novelty.[54]

Added to this, van Bavel's and Geerlings's cautiousness pays insufficient attention to the important role played by the psychology of Christ in the great Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries. Yet, since it is only with Augustine that an 'inner' theological anthropology is made a public presence in Christian discourse, his predecessors seem by comparison to handle the issue with comparative clumsiness and lack of self-awareness. Writing of the whole Alexandrian tradition, Grillmeier summarizes: '[The danger of distortion]...can be seen [here]. There can be no doubt that the decline in teaching about the soul of Jesus had a detrimental effect on **(p.161)** the picture of Jesus in the Eastern church wherever the Word–flesh (λογος-σαρχ) framework came to occupy a dominant place.'[55] Nestorianism, in another generation, would supply the same problem in the opposite form. Williams provides a single explanation for the simultaneous unbalancing and obfuscation of the debate: 'The abandonment of Origen's cosmology in the third century is the chief cause of the abandonment of belief in Christ's soul by "mainstream" Christian writers.'[56] The nature and functions of the soul could take their proper place in the theological imagination of the Church, he goes on, only once Augustine had revived it by making the pathetic and erotic fundamental to Christian self-perception within the context of

religious praxis. Whether or not one agrees with this analysis, the 'inner' life of Christ as an animate human, viewed within Patristic writing, *is* a pertinent topic for present enquiry.

Finally, Augustine's account of Alypius' misgivings about the teaching of the Catholic Church on this issue highlights his own awareness of its importance, for himself as well as for the broader community of enquiring lay Christians, in his near past. Having recounted his own tendency to Photinianism in *Confessiones* 7, he goes on:

> Alypius, however, thought that Catholics believed God was clothed in flesh, so that there was nothing in Christ but God and flesh; and he thought they did not confess he had a mind and soul. And because he was well persuaded that those things that are committed to writing in the memorials of Christ could not be done, except by a living and rational creature, he moved towards the Christian faith the more slowly.
>
> *alypius autem deum carne indutum ita putabat credi a catholicis, ut praeter deum et carnem non esset in christo, animam mentemque hominis non existimabat in eo praedicari. et quoniam bene persuasum tenebat ea, quae de illo memoriae mandata sunt, sine uitali et rationali creatura non fieri, ad ipsam christianam fidem pigrius mouebatur.*[57]

Recounting the thoughts of Alypius, Augustine underlines the importance of Christ's soul at the level of even basic Christology: in the gospel account Jesus is unequivocally a human, yet acts in a way also identifiable with God; doing away with his soul does service neither to his divinity nor to his humanity, so what kind of soul can he have? Lending strength to Williams's argument, Augustine casts a critical eye back to the Catholic community of the Church of the 380s, which was in no strong position to offer resounding guidance on the issue.[58] As he wrote around the year 397, the importance of correctly estimating and expressing the inner life of Christ was more than clear to Augustine.

(p.162) Establishing a method

The fullest exposition of Augustine's treatment of Christ's soul written to date is found in the last two chapters of van Bavel's *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin*. It is indicative of the quality of this work, and also of the relatively slow pace of progress within this field of research, that its findings were largely reproduced by Geerlings, albeit in highly condensed form, as well as in the recent *Augustinus Lexikon* article touching on the affective life of Christ by Adolar Zumkeller.[59] Van Bavel's method, informing all these studies, divides the emotional or affective life of Christ's soul from its intellectual functions, handling the one after the other.[60] This is not a distinction made by Augustine in his descriptions of Christ's human nature, not least as a result of the (frequently) exegetical context in which they arise. In the light of the thoroughness of van Bavel's work (and its legacy in current scholarship), I intend to use his analysis as a point of entry into the topic, before moving into an exposition that attempts greater faithfulness to Augustine's own anthropological priorities; in turn, this should yield a clearer picture of the compatibility of his Christology with his theological anthropology.

Van Bavel opens his analysis of the emotions of Christ in Augustine's thought by drawing a distinction between the Stoicism (here minimally defined) of early works such as *De Ordine* and *De Beata Vita*, and those written after 391. The former works from the assumption that the wise man gives no place to the passions in his moral life, having excluded them in his ascent to knowledge and perfection; accordingly, Augustine depicts Christ as entirely apathetic and is thus deemed 'dangereusement dualiste'.[61] After 391, Augustine's wholesale acceptance of the Stoic theory of the emotions wanes, and after 393 he begins explicitly to defend the reality of Christ's human emotions, although van Bavel offers no reason for this apparent volte-face. Instead, he takes Augustine's treatment of the passions in *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 as normative for the whole of Augustine's thought from 393 onwards, categorizing the emotional theory of this work as an explicit rejection of his previously held Stoicism. Here, the passions of the soul—both emotional and **(p.163)** physical—are defined as the result of sin; while not morally culpable in themselves, that from which they proceed is: 'It is here that the will of the human, good or perverse, renders the passions morally good or bad.'[62] To account for the scriptural record of Christ's emotions, Augustine develops the most readily recognizable trope of his Christological psychology: Christ

voluntarily assumes the human passions, and experiences them in total concord with both his human will and his reason. While Christ's affective life is both real and fully voluntary in Augustine's mature thought, van Bavel highlights his persistent treatment of certain passions experienced by Christ as a form of pedagogic exemplarism: they are experienced as real human passions, but are willed into existence by Christ to be an example for humanity. Augustine further nuances his treatment of the passions of Christ by subsuming them in the *totus Christus*; here, the passions of the members of Christ are transferred figuratively to Christ the Head, revealing the nature of the one Body in spite of its bifurcation between eschatological fullness and present hope. In his summary comments, van Bavel considers the charge that this aspect of Augustine's Christology amounts to Docetism (again, he leaves this undefined), without fully conceding the point. Rather, Augustine is consistent with himself, and the charge of Docetism falls down as anachronistic.

Van Bavel moves into his survey of Christ's knowledge with the proviso that this remains the most difficult area of Augustine's Christology. In contrast to his analysis of Christ's passions, he does not furnish his reader with even a brief summary of Augustine's understanding of human intellection, instead treating Christ in isolation. In his humanity, Augustine's Christ does not experience ignorance or weakness of reason. Rather, from his infancy he enjoys both an unlimited knowledge of temporal things, including future events, and possesses the full beatific vision promised to the saints. The apparent ignorance of Christ displayed in the gospels is once again treated by Augustine under the headings of voluntary participation in the present human condition, pedagogic exemplarism, and the exegetical *totus Christus* device. The besetting ambiguity (and thus difficulty) of Augustine's position here arises from not ascribing this exceptional knowledge to either one of Christ's natures. Reading from the subtext, however, van Bavel's final opinion is that, for Augustine, 'the human Christ is not on the same level as other humans: he is omniscient'.[63]

While van Bavel's work is extremely thorough, it requires expansion by revisiting Augustine's theory of the affections in close conjunction with his understanding of the intellect and will. A chronological survey of every Augustinian text that handles Christ's inner life and its relationship to his developing anthropology is not possible in the confines of this context. **(p.164)** As a result, I want to accept van Bavel's choice of *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 as the axiomatic expression of Augustine's mature anthropology, adding to it the necessary condition that intellect and will are properly indivisible, from *Confessiones* 10. This should create a more holistic template against which Augustine's Christological psychology can be measured.

The human passions: value and process

Augustine synthesizes his reading of Platonist ethics and Stoic psychology in his treatment of the passions in *De Civitate Dei* to produce a formulation entirely his own. His reception of Platonist ontology and ethics of course forms one of the most vexed questions of Augustinian scholarship, which I will not attempt to unwrap here. His understanding of the Stoic theory of the passions, inasmuch as it is found in both *De Civitate Dei* and the earlier *Confessiones*, is in the first instance lifted from the third book of Cicero's *Disputationes Tusculanae*. To provide the simplest sketch of each as it functions behind the work, I supply two vignettes.

The first is that of the conscious subject, placed within a sliding scale of objects (both conscious and unconscious) to which it stands related. By means of the motor of desire, this subject can draw itself to any of these objects in a movement that is evaluated by the relation of both the subject and the object to the eternal and immutable Good on which their relative values are based. Drawing itself to objects nearer the Good in order to know them constitutes a good movement; the opposite drive towards lower objects constitutes a bad one; moral perfection, in turn, is defined as attainment of the full knowledge of the eternal Good by the conscious subject.

The second begins with a consciousness whose environment is considerably more limited: its 'genuine good'[64] lies in the attainment of its own essential character as a rational being, which is virtue. This is achieved by navigating those objects —both concrete and notional—to which it is related. In themselves, they are properly thought of as indifferent; the process of evaluating them, which in turn constitutes the rational perfection of the conscious subject, is not. In this scheme, emotions are not involuntary, but incorrect value judgements of the relationship of the conscious subject to the objects that

surround it; thus wisdom suspends emotion (incorrect value judgements), allowing right judgement to prevail.

On a first viewing, the vignette of Platonism broadly considered places the subject in a moral cosmos whose temporal goods are navigable only in relation to their defining source, the eternal Good, the ultimate object of knowledge **(p.165)** and moral desire. My vignette of Stoicism places the subject in a more limited, solipsistic domain. Here virtue is the 'only unconditional good', and it is 'wholly under the province of the will'; the temporal benefits that surround the subject willing its virtuous self-realization might have 'selective value' as things to be preferred or ignored as temporal benefit might accrue to them.[65]

In *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine collapses the distinction between these two models by renaming the objects related to the subject as 'indifferents' in Stoicism as Platonic 'goods'.[66] Where the Stoic sage exercises a virtuous reason in using the indifferents by which he is surrounded to attain full rationality and thus virtue, Augustine's human must use a reason whose movement towards fulfillment is powered by love to attain goods and, finally, the God who is arbiter and source of goodness. In his scheme, the false judgments of the Stoic are therefore redefined as wrongly directed loves. In three passages, Augustine reduces the mechanics of the Stoic system to his own requirements. The first lays out the essentials of Stoicism as Augustine understands it:

> The will, the Stoics say, longs for the good, and the wise person has such a will. Gladness arises from the attainment of the good, which the wise person attains wherever he is. Caution avoids evil, just as the wise person ought to avoid evil. Grief arises from evil that has already taken place. Because they do not think any evil can happen to a wise person, they say that there can be nothing like grief in his soul. Thus they say the following: only a wise person can have a will that results in gladness and **(p.166)** caution, and only a fool can have desires that result in joy, fear and grief. The former three are called 'constancies'; the latter four are 'disturbances' according to Cicero; but most other writers call them passions.
>
> *uoluntas quippe, inquiunt, appetit bonum, quod facit sapiens; gaudium de bono adepto est, quod ubique adipiscitur sapiens; cautio deuitat malum, quod debet sapiens deuitare; tristitia porro quia de malo est, quod iam accidit, nullum autem malum existimant posse accidere sapienti, nihil in eius animo pro illa esse posse dixerunt. sic ergo illi loquuntur, ut uelle gaudere cauere negent nisi sapientem; stultum autem non nisi cupere laetari, metuere contristari; et illas tres esse constantias, has autem quattuor perturbationes secundum ciceronem, secundum autem plurimos passiones.*[67]

By Augustine's account, Stoic theory divides the capacity of the subject to approach its object into two types, depending on the rational judgement that has been made in advance of the move: right reason wills (*uelit*), wrong reason desires (*cupit*). The *constantiae* of the wise man proceed from judgement through willing and into the calm attainment of the object, whose ultimate value consists in confirming the rightness of the subject's reasoning will; by contrast, the *perturbationes* or *passiones* of the fool result in a passivity to objects that painfully slip from his grasp and are mourned when lost. This frustration confirms the poverty of his initial judgement, a choice of flawed reasoning.

Augustine moves from this pure Stoic prototype by collapsing the distinction between will and desire, along with the Stoic insistence that the will must follow reason:

> The will is found in all of the passions; indeed, all of them are nothing but forms of will. For what is desire and joyfulness but the will agreeing with what we want? And what is fear and sadness except the will disagreeing with the things we want?...And, universally, a person's will is either attracted to or offended by the various things he longs for or flees from, and as a result it is turned or changed into this or that emotion.
>
> *uoluntas est quippe in omnibus [passionibus]; immo omnes nihil aliud quam uoluntates sunt. nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi uoluntas in eorum consensione quae uolumus? et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi uoluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus?...et omnino pro uarietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur,*

sicut allicitur uel offenditur uoluntas hominis, ita in hos uel illos affectus mutatur et uertitur.[68]

In the process of this discussion, Augustine simultaneously abolishes the Stoic division of emotional movement into *constantia* and *pertubatio/passio*: all the emotions are fundamentally alike, and differentiated only by the direction of the will that underlies them.[69] The synonymity of love and will, whose **(p.167)** direction determines the value of their movement and its outworking in emotion, is brought out further in what follows:

> Thus a right will is a good love, and a perverse will is an evil love. Love that strives to possess what it loves is desire; love that possesses and enjoys what it loves is joyfulness. Fleeing from what is opposed to it, is fear; and love that perceives what is opposed to it when it occurs, is grief. In all of this, these things are evils if the love is evil, and goods, if the love is good.
>
> *recta itaque uoluntas est bonus amor et uoluntas peruersa malus amor. amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei aduersatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est. proinde mala sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus*.[70]

Where Stoic passion is the condition of the rational subject consequent on wrong choice, worked out through desiring or withdrawing from a particular object, Augustinian passion equates with perverse love. Both create a situation of passivity within the reasoning, appetitive subject where it ought to be active and self-controlling; hence *passio*. Stoic passivity in emotional disturbance lies in the abolition of right reason, when desire executes a poor judgement. Augustinian passivity in emotion results in a wholescale ontological diminution of the reasoning-loving person when she pursues apparent goods that are in fact ills.[71]

De Civitate Dei 9 and 14 therefore expand Stoic passion theory to fit Augustine's understanding of the state of man, slipping into nothingness as a result of perverse love. The foundations of this understanding can already be seen in the *Confessiones*' account of the circumincession of memory, will and intellect and its later counterpart in *De Trinitate*. Albrecht Dihle summarizes the Augustinian shift:

> In the traditional view of Greek philosophy intention appeared either as the result or byproduct of cognition, as the mode of its application, or as its potential. St Augustine separated will from both potential and achieved recognition. Arguing strictly psychologically, he explained the act of vision as a result of the following process: the faculty of seeing is joined with the object of visual perception by the will of the perceiving individual. The same relation subsists…in the case of thought, i.e. purely intellectual **(p.168)** cognition, with the only difference being that the object of cognition is presented by the perceiver's own memory…the triad *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* accounts for the whole of the human self.[72]

As a result, the description Augustine offers of the passions in *Confessiones* 10 is different from that found in *De Civitate Dei*. Where the latter views the passions in the specific analytical context of 'the quality of a man's will',[73] the former is a subjective investigation of the mind's unity 'in a step by step ascent to him who made me'.[74] The intended direction of Augustine's love in *Confessiones* 10 is towards the highest good; as a result, he is able internally to perceive the reality of the passions, though in abstraction from the direction of will by which they were initially experienced:

> Memory also contains the affections of my soul, not in the way the soul possesses them when it suffers them, but in a very different manner, in the way the power of the memory possesses memory itself…For even when I am unhappy, I can remember myself being happy in the past; and even when I am not sad, I can recall my past sadness; I can recollect that I was once afraid without fear, and be mindful of an earlier desire without desire…To be sure, memory is like the stomach of the mind; joyfulness and grief like food, sweet and bitter in turn.
>
> *affectiones quoque animi mei eadem memoria continet non illo modo, quo eas habet ipse animus, cum patitur eas, sed alio multum diuerso, sicut sese habet uis memoriae…nam et laetatum me fuisse reminiscor non laetus et*

> *tristitiam meam praeteritam recordor non tristis et me aliquando timuisse recolo sine timore et pristinae cupiditatis sine cupiditate sum memor…nimirum ergo memoria quasi uenter est animi, laetitia uero atque tristitia quasi cibus dulcis et amarus*.[75]

The prior direction of Augustine's will in which he experienced these passions is no longer present, so that remembering them does not repeat them in their prior form. They can be experienced as fresh passions through the power of memory, under the designation of the righteous will, and consequently do not hinder the ascent of the remembering, loving, and intelligent self to God.

Love and reason either side of the Fall

All of this is fully intelligible only when placed in the context of the distinction between human nature as it exists before and after the Fall. In Paradise, Adam and Eve were incapable of feeling *perturbationes,* as there was no threat of **(p.169)** losing any good or any experience of its loss;[76] in the absence of any conditions in which perverse love could arise, the pair were capable only of right affections. The state of peace and that of Paradise share the common factor that humans operate with ἀπαθεια in both. Where Augustine mutates the distinction *constantia/perturbatio* into a Christian Platonist right/wrong love, he likewise redefines *apatheia* (ἀπαθεια) as the contented possession of the object of right loving:

> Moreover, if we are to describe ἀπαθεια as the inability of the soul to be touched by any affection, who would not judge this to be a stupor worse than all vices? Therefore it can be said without absurdity that our future beatitude will be without the impulse of fear, and free from any sadness; but who would say that there will be no love and gladness there to come, unless he were thoroughly estranged from the truth?
>
> *porro si* ἀπαθεια *illa dicenda est, cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus affectus, quis hunc stuporem non omnibus uitiis iudicet esse peiorem? potest ergo non absurde dici perfectam beatitudinem sine stimulo timoris et sine ulla tristitia futuram; non ibi autem futurum amorem gaudiumque quis dixerit, nisi omni modo a ueritate seclusus?*[77]

Augustine's distinction appears at first to owe a debt to the Stoic division of the affective life into *constantiae* and *passiones*, so that, in both Eden and heaven, humans experience only the former. However, it should be remembered that this latter distinction does not exist in Augustine's formulation: for him, the passions are morally right or wrong only in their orientation towards, or away from, God. Furthermore, on its own terms, he does not understand Stoic ἀπαθεια to be a complete evacuation of emotion from the self; rather, it is what the etymology of *constantia* denotes: 'the stability of the emotional life under rational control, one where right reason has excluded irrational passions and brought about a state of ἀπαθεια, fixity and tranquillity of mind.'[78] By contrast, Augustine affirms the place of affective life in both the original and final state, as the end of man is participation in the divine will by his love and desire as much as by the vision of reason. Here, again, is the inversion of the Stoic theory of the passions: passivity to an outside object is entirely approvable if that 'object' is God. Where the *Ad Simplicianum* speaks of the irresistible pull of divine love and the *Confessiones* dwells on its weight, *De Civitate Dei* formalizes the point: obedience to the divine will is the proper end of the **(p.170)** passions, and they function correctly in putting humanity in the posture of a recipient. This constitutes the end of human agency, in which the active human will stands in passivity to the divine command. Augustinian ἀπαθεια is the end of love, not its negation.

Because *passio* fundamentally describes the 'directionality' of the human will, it is from the capacity of humans for right affection that Augustine can argue for the Fall—and its subsequent opportunities for wrong affection—without being inconsistent. Dinkler puts the point clearly:

> On the way to happiness, two possibilities lie before the soul: its will can follow *amor* and ascend to the *bona et beata vita*, to the *summum bonum*; or it can run after *libido* and *cupiditas* (which was theoretically possible even for Adam). If it pursues the first way to the *beata vita*, the affection is first the 'direction', and then the object of the

> will. If it enters the second way to *concupiscentia,* the affection as *cupiditas* immediately becomes its subject and its potentiality, and places itself as a power against the will.[79]

As part of the paradox of the affections, obedience to God makes the affective passage to him into an object itself, because it is love, and God is love; disobedience, by contrast, reduces the affection to the level of its source and subject (mere creatureliness *ex nihilo*) in a cycle of narcissism.

While the affections are open to the pursuit of the good as much as evil in a prelapsarian world, Augustine places them at the heart of the divine punishment for sin after the Fall. For this he laid the early foundations in *De Libero Arbitrio*, coupling the experience of affective difficulty and intellectual ignorance together under the same heading.[80] In exchange for disobedience to God, fallen man must struggle with his disobedience to himself; with a will working against itself, desiring what he cannot and truly does not wish to have, his subjection to himself by immoral passions ceases to be his own act: 'For even against his will his mind is troubled often, and his flesh endures pain, grows old and dies, and suffers other things still; we would not suffer them against our will if, in every way and in all its parts, our nature would obey our will.'[81] Augustine's conception of the divine punishment for sin has been read as a state of legal guilt (in virtue of which humanity under Adam is in Original Sin), over and against the capacity of man formally to sin out of his created freedom, as Adam did in the beginning.[82] If there is any ambiguity in the **(p.171)** account offered in *De Civitate Dei* (and I do not believe there is), it is entirely absent by the time Augustine takes up the debate with Julian of Eclanum. Here, sin is punished by Sin not in the abstract, but in an unhaltable cycle of sinning; the ensuing sin is the punishment for the preceding sin, as Augustine terrifyingly suggests. It encompasses both the will (the heart), and also the mind (the faculty of vision, now become blind), both of which entwined are the proper domain of the affections:

> Sin is like a blindness of the heart, which God the illuminator alone can remove. It is also the punishment of sin, by which a worthy reproach punishes the proud heart. Sin is also the cause of sin, when something evil is committed by the error of a blind heart. And thus concupiscence…is both sin…the punishment of sin…and the cause of sin.
>
> *Et sicut caecitas cordis, quam solus removet illuminator Deus, et peccatum est, quo in Deum non creditur; et poena peccati, qua cor superbum digna animadversione punitur; et causa peccati, cum mali aliquid caeci cordis errore committitur; ita concupiscentia carnis…et peccatum est…et poena peccati est…et causa peccati est.*[83]

Only by the gift of grace, both baptismal and the hidden quantity God may or may not choose to grant the individual, can this cycle of compromised emotion be undone.

Prepassion and concupiscentia carnalis

The account I have so far laid out is internally consistent, quite apart from any question of its faithfulness to one or other variety of Stoicism or Platonism. This review of Augustine's theory cannot be complete, however, without surveying his ambiguous treatment of prepassion. The earliest Latin text that draws the distinction between an initial response to a given situation in a prepassion and its endorsement by mental judgement in passion is Seneca's *De Ira.* Here he lists pallor, tears, sighing, and sudden change of expression as the pyschophysical signs of prepassion, to be contrasted with its full outworking in passion proper:

> Thus that first motion of the soul, when some kind of injury strikes it, is no more anger than the kind of injury is that strikes it to begin with. The movement that follows it, **(p.172)** which does not receive the injury but approves it, is properly called anger: the rousing of the soul to revenge by the will and judgement of the one who proceeds with it.
>
> *Ergo prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species; ille sequens impetus, qui speciem iniuriae non tantum accepit sed adprobavit, ira est, concitatio animi ad ultionem*

> *voluntate et iudicio pergentis*.[84]

Seneca's point is clear: instinctive responses such as these are not emotions, because they are not rational accessions to mental passivity in a given situation of threat, loss, and so on. As I noted above, Augustine's knowledge of Stoic psychology was largely formed by the *Disputationes Tusculanae*, in which the distinction found in Seneca appears only in passing (and not very clearly at that).[85]

Augustine's own discussion of prepassion is instead lifted from Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*. At *De Civitate Dei* 9.4.2,[86] he relates Gellius' account of a seafaring Stoic who, when he grew pale on deck with the coming of a storm, was teased for failing to live up to his ideal of ἀπαθεια. Quoting Epictetus,[87] the Stoic rebuked his critics by explaining that the soul experiences

> mental images, which they call *phantasiae*; and that it is not in our power to control whether or when they strike the soul. When they arise as a result of terrifying and awesome things, they necessarily move the soul even of a wise man, so that he fleetingly either begins to quake with fear, or is drawn into sadness…However, this neither causes a disposition to evil in the mind, nor an approval of, or consent, to it.[88]

As Sorabji points out, Augustine's text is clumsy: in the central narrative, the Stoic 'grew pale' (*expalluit)*; in the exposition of the incident that follows it, Gellius (and Augustine after him) glosses this purely physical response with 'began to quake with fear' (*pauescat metu*). Unwittingly, Augustine follows Gellius into a blurring of the distinction between passion and prepassion, in the very process of attempting to define it.[89]

(p.173) More important than this textual slip-up, Sorabji argues, is the gradual erosion of the distinction between prepassion and passion by earlier Christian authors—Origen in particular—which Augustine inherits and reads into *Noctes Atticae*. The *locus classicus* for Origen's 'mistake' is found in *De Principiis* 3.2; at chapter 2.2, he distinguishes between the first movements or seeds of sin, and their full outworking in vice;[90] however, at 2.4 he develops the point to define these first movements as λογισμοι (thoughts, *cogitationes,* in Rufinus' Latin). Earlier in the text, discussing the temptation of a man by the allurements of female flesh,[91] Origen argues apparently with the Stoic tradition that a man would be capable of quelling the impulse by the application of reason; however, he names these κινηματα (movements) παθη (passions), making the passage consistent with 3.2.2–4. Origen's application of the shift throughout his exegesis would have a lasting effect on later discourse;[92] as Sorabji puts it: 'Instead of the very sharp distinction between first thoughts which are not your fault at all, and emotions for which you are totally responsible, the Christian talk of bad thoughts allows for many intermediate degrees of sin.'[93]

(p.174) Augustine's own discussion of prepassion appears first in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, where the passage of sin is firmly rooted in the corruption of the first stage of passion. Sin comprises both suggestion and consent. Suggestion is launched from the sensation of receiving an inner image, whether held in the memory or produced in the moment of sensation; either way, it 'slides in the more secretly, in order to affect our reasoning'.[94] He goes on:

> As I was beginning to say, these three steps are like the events recorded in Genesis: a suggestion and certain amount of persuasion comes about by the serpent; in the carnal appetite, as in Eve, there is pleasure, and in reason, as in the man, there is consent. When these things have taken place it is just as when humanity was expelled from Paradise, which is to say the most blessed light of justice, into death.
>
> *tria ergo haec, ut dicere coeperam, similia sunt illi gestae rei quae in genesi scripta est, ut quasi a serpente fiat suggestio et quaedam suasio, in appetitu autem carnali tamquam in eua delectatio, in ratione uero tamquam in uiro consensio. quibus peractis tamquam de paradiso, hoc est de beatissima luce iustitiae, in mortem homo expellitur*.[95]

Although only the final stage of consent is explicitly ascribed to reason, it is clear that the whole process Augustine

describes is a single movement of the intellect, and, along with Origen, he pushes sin back into the awakening of the prepassion, though as such it goes unnamed.[96]

De Sermone Domini in Monte dates from 393–6; in around 394, Augustine had almost certainly received a number of Jerome's scriptural commentaries (including those translated from Origen's Greek). Jerome's commentary on the same passage of Matthew, while making no connection with Genesis, expands Origen's scheme in detail. Unfortunately, the loss of the earlier sections of Origen's own commentary on Matthew makes impossible the ultimate ascription of Jerome's exposition to this text. Here, prepassion is defined as the beginning of sin, which is 'not fully comprehended in the crime', whereas passion is 'meditated on in the vice':[97]

> Whoever sees the woman and finds his soul has been titillated, he has been struck by prepassion. If indeed he consents and makes a disposition from the thought of it, this is **(p.175)** like what is written in the words of David: 'They have gone over into the disposition of the heart'; it has gone over from prepassion to passion. Here the will to sin is not absent, only the occasion for sinning.
>
> *ergo qui uiderit mulierem et anima eius fuerit titillata, hic propassione percussus est; si uero consenserit et de cogitatione affectum fecerit sicut scriptum est in dauid: transierunt in affectum cordis, de propassione transiuit ad passionem et huic non uoluntas peccandi deest, sed occasio.*[98]

At first glance, Jerome appears to reproduce the clear distinction of Stoicism: the occasion for wrongdoing arises after the progress from prepassion to passion. However, the detail of Jerome's vocabulary calls this into question: a soul both titillated upon seeing a woman and also 'struck' by prepassion (as befits the passivity of the affections) can never be that of the Stoic sage. It seems likely, therefore, that, in addition to receiving an Origenian understanding of prepassion as part of the broader tradition, the early formation of Augustine's own position on the issue arose from a direct reading of Jerome, and Origen through him.[99]

Consistent with that of his Christian predecessors, Augustine's theory of the passions thus pushes the rational (and therefore culpable) element of sin into the initial awakening of wrong desire. This is bolstered by my observation that will and reason are circumincessive in Augustine's anthropology. However, Augustine goes further still, in his account of *concupiscentia carnalis*. This lust of the flesh completely circumvents the passions and exerts its power over the genitals directly; it emerges from behind the realm of even the first stirrings of voluntary desire.[100] By contrast, erotic desire in paradise proceeded from a reasonable will exerting full and peaceable control over its bodily members. Just as carnal concupiscence is arrived at without reason, so the enjoyment of it almost entirely overwhelms the vigilance of the mind:[101] it results in an ecstasy of pure passion, the antithesis of a love that unites desire and reason in **(p.176)** the enjoyment of its proper object. Of all the limitations wrought on the will by the sin of Adam, this occupies the exemplary position:

> That disobedience, which puts the genital members at the liberty of their own movements alone and detracts from the power of the will, shows amply what is the retribution given to humanity for its primal disobedience. It was fitting that, particularly in that part of the body where the nature of sin is reproduced, those things should appear that, on account of that first and great sin, have been changed in our nature for ill.
>
> *in eius quippe inoboedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus subdidit et potestati uoluntatis eripuit, satis ostenditur, quid sit hominis illi primae inoboedientiae retributum; quod in ea parte maxime oportuit apparere, qua generatur ipsa natura, quae illo primo et magno in deterius est mutata peccato.*[102]

As I hope to have shown in the foregoing exposition, taking *De Civitate Dei* and the *Confessiones* together reveals a fully integrated, distinctly Augustinian theological anthropology. Its primary datum lies in the *Confessiones*' conflation of will and reason, by which loving and possessing the thing loved arise from a complex but unified movement of intellect and volition: this is what constitutes the uniqueness of human nature. From this, *De Civitate Dei* launches its critique of Stoic emotional psychology as reductive. Taking the vocabulary of this discourse, Augustine remoulds it in Christian Platonist

form: human affections are to be judged not in isolation, but in relation to their transcendent goals. Thus Stoic *cupiditas* (for example) is redeemed when engaged in the desire for its heavenly counterpart and ultimate source: Love Itself, or God. In this scheme, ἀπαθεια is similarly redefined as the untroubled human possession of the good God. From this sanctified affections flow, in a joy that is simultaneously at peace. In all right love, the grace of God (the love that makes him lovable) is an assumed *sine qua non*. However, Augustine's scheme contains what is, at one level, an inconsistency. Because it escapes the control of both desire and reason, carnal concupiscence imposes a limit on the degree to which human affection can be healed in this life; the seedy underside of human propagation must await an eschatological therapy. The groundwork for this lies in the gradual erosion of the distinction between prepassion and passion Augustine inherited from the Origenian tradition. Having pushed the culpable into the realm of the very first stirrings of desire, this inheritance allows Augustine to remove sinfulness even further from the realm of both love and intellect, its 'denature' operating underneath and in concealment from the faculties of the soul. *Concupiscentia carnalis* finally reifies sin, condemning humanity for an embodiment it cannot avoid or rectify of itself.

(p.177) Julian's challenge to Augustine lands in this fissure. For him, the desire attendant on reproduction is one impulse among many; it is not automatic, of a unique character in permanently deforming the desires of the soul that its body houses. By his reading, the privilege Augustine grants carnal concupiscence results in a Christological disaster: excluding Christ from it by his conception of a virgin necessarily brings into question the reality of his mortal flesh. In order for Augustine to maintain Christ's affective life, he must, therefore, fall into the error of Apollinarianism, situating the eternal Word in the body of sin as its triumphant possessor, immune to its deformities but capable of its well-ordered affections. In the next section, I shall attempt to uncover Augustine's treatment of the voluntary and intellectual faculties of Christ, to Julian's rebuttal—or vindication.

The inner life of Christ: a human will?

It is not my intention here to evaluate every statement of Augustine on the inner life of Christ. Van Bavel's monograph offers a more than adequate survey of a very large number of texts, to which I would refer the forensically minded reader. Instead, I want to look again at the broad lines of Augustine's treatment of the topic, and offer a fresh evaluation. I begin with a proviso. In harmony with his consciously orthodox (albeit uninventive) rejection of Apollinarianism, Augustine is on first inspection clear that Christ underwent the ordinary movements of the soul. The plain historical account of the gospel leaves the Catholic in no doubt on this matter. By contrast, the Apollinarian position is the more ridiculous for admitting that Old Testament references to God's soul (cf. Lev. 26:11) refer to his will, while they doubt the words of Christ, 'My soul is sad, even unto death', refer to his human soul (Matt. 26:38).[103] However, while Augustine affirms the plain truth of the *historia evangelica* on this point throughout his work, his exegesis is almost always accompanied by careful qualification.

The most frequent refrain found in Augustine's passing treatments of Christ's experience of the passions is that he felt them entirely at the command of his will. The discussion of the passions in *De Civitate Dei* 14 falls back on the obverse example of Christ to prove the general point that the emotions are not presently under full human control; added to this, his experience of the passions illustrates that they can be put to good use in the moral life:

> For this reason also the Lord deigned to live a human life in the form of a slave and, although he had no sin at all, he displayed [the emotions] when he judged that they ought to be displayed. For his human affections were not false, whose body was real **(p.178)** and whose soul was truly that of a human…Indeed, he took up those movements in his human soul when he willed by the grace of the sure dispensation, just as he was made human when he wished it to be so.
>
> *quam ob rem etiam ipse dominus in forma serui agere uitam dignatus humanam, sed nullum habens omnino peccatum adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicauit. neque enim, in quo uerum erat hominis corpus et uerus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus…uerum ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita cum uoluit suscepit animo humano, ut cum uoluit factus est homo.*[104]

The gospel narratives cannot be denied: Christ wept real tears. The point at issue, however, is whether the passions experienced by Christ were controlled by a perfect *human* will or not. As I have attempted to show, Augustine is clear that humanity in its prelapsarian state was capable of a complete hegemony over the emotions by the will, and its love could desire the eternal good and experience the 'passion to' and 'for' God. Casting Christ in the same mould would make perfect Christological sense; Augustine, however, denies his audience the satisfaction of a clear-cut statement on the issue.

Where it would be helpful to see an explicit ascription of the perfect will of Christ to his human nature, Augustine frequently supplies an ambiguous reference to the Word as the 'place' in which Christ's personal agency is to be located. In a lengthy discussion of John 10.5 ('I lay down my life, and I take it again'), Augustine defines ordinary human death as the yielding-up of the soul by the flesh, in a way that is outside voluntary control. His implicit point here must be that the punishment of death attached to Original Sin places the decay of the body over the power of the will to animate it. By contrast, only the deaths of the martyrs are excepted from this process, as they are empowered by the indwelling of Christ, and give up their souls through his will, not their own.[105] Turning to consider Christ himself, Augustine remarks that he died 'when the Word willed it, for power was in the Word'.[106] The same tendency appears in the discussion of Christ's minor physical passions and emotions in *Tractatus in Ioannem* 60: his sleep, hunger, sadness, and anger are explained in terms reminiscent of the passage from *De Civitate Dei* 14 cited above: 'He engendered human affections in himself by his power when he judged it fitting, who by that power took up a whole humanity.'[107] In the same passage, the potential danger of such a position becomes clear: 'how much good from partaking of his divinity we ought to expect and hope for, whose disturbance calms us, and weakness strengthens us?'[108] Granted, the communication of **(p.179)** idioms is assumed here with some rhetorical licence; but similar references to the Word as the power motivating Christ's emotional life confirm, rather than explain, this ambiguity:

> The soul and flesh of Christ is one person with the Word of God; it is one Christ. By this Word where the highest power is, was weakness made use of at the very nod of his will; that explains, 'He troubled himself'.
>
> *anima et caro christi cum uerbo dei una persona est, unus christus est. ac per hoc ubi summa potestas est, secundum uoluntatis nutum tractatur infirmitas; hoc est: turbauit semetipsum.*[109]

Precisely where is the *summa potestas* in Christ? It is difficult not to situate it solely in his divine nature. In spite of Augustine's assurance that Christ is one person in two natures, that personality appears to be predominantly characterized by the nature of the Word who assumes it.

The difficulty of assigning the source of the acts or experiences of Christ to either one of his natures is, of course, not a novelty unique to Augustine. And, while it would be unreasonable to expect Augustine to consider the Incarnation in Cyrilline or Chalcedonian terms, the absence of any sustained consideration of the relationship between Christ's human and divine natures in the make-up of his personal will remains strange, not least when Augustine is so commonly credited with establishing a new concept of the human will and its operation.

The Totus Christus motif

Further complicating Augustine's position is his ascription of the passions of Christ as an individual to his ecclesial members and vice versa, the unmistakable feature of his construal of Christology in terms of the *totus Christus*. His language here is discursive rather than technical, and found alongside his similarly unclear presentation of the Word's power in performing the functions of the soul. By a 'wonderful transmutation…a divine transaction…a celebrated transformation of things' (*mira commutatio…diuina commercia…mutatio celebrata rerum*), the passions of the human Church, clinging to its Head in love, are assigned to that Head.[110] However, this says nothing about Christ's passions as a human individual. Accordingly, where *Tractatus in Joannem* 47 raised the difficulty of finding a role for the soul of Christ in his own human death, the *Enarratio in Psalmum* 43 neatly bypasses the allied problem of Christ's cry of anguish from the cross by ascribing it to his members crying out their death throes in him.[111] *Tractatus in Joannem* 60 sees the *totus Christus* motif used together with the notion of the Word **(p.180)** summoning the affections at will. It should be

noted, however, that these are changed before being experienced by the Head: 'he transfigured in himself the affections of our weakness, suffering with us in the affections of his soul.'[112] Importantly, this 'transference of the passions' is not reciprocal. The *Enarratio in Psalmum* 40 comes close to suggesting a two-way movement: 'What Christ suffered, his Church suffers too; what the Head suffered, those things suffer also his members.'[113] Developing the point, however, Augustine makes clear that he is referring to the persecution of Christ by Judas, which finds a corollary in the mixture of wheat and chaff in the Church. This is theological synecdoche, and there is no sustained suggestion that the members of Christ participate in the passions of Christ's individual soul.

Clearly the *totus Christus* motif in Augustine's writing is a theological metaphor, and does not imply anything concrete about the 'metaphysical biology' of the Incarnate or risen Christ. Augustine admits this himself in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3, written in around 426–7. In interpreting Scripture, he explains, the reader must be aware of literary motifs that recur throughout the text and threaten to overturn its meaning if taken literally.[114] Citing Tyconius' *Liber Regularum* as a text useful for decoding these motifs, Augustine lists his chapter *De Domine et Corpore Eius* as the first significant scriptural metaphor to need careful handling. Interpreters should not be puzzled when Scripture moves from head to body while still dealing with the same person, because Christ nonetheless remains a single being. Augustine does not state explicitly that speaking of the *totus Christus*, head and body, is a theological–literary device, but his point is clear. However, in book 2 of the same work, Augustine underlines the rule that metaphors work only if there is a proper and intelligible correspondence between the figure and what it signifies.[115] With this in mind, we might ask whether the *totus Christus* metaphor is intelligible and appropriate, when viewed in the light of Augustine's treatment of the human passions in the works cited above. Can a head feel the feelings of its members, or is this a nonsense in the terms of Augustine's broader theological anthropology? Quite apart from this stands the question whether the transference of the passions implied in the motif does not in fact function to distract attention away from Augustine's otherwise minimal handling of the topic proper, the affective life of Jesus of Nazareth.

Of the passages in the corpus that do handle the human will of Christ directly, several complicate Augustine's position further by suggesting the **(p.181)** coexistence of a number of 'wills' in the person of Christ derived from both his two natures and human nature in pre- and postlapsarian form. An early example of this tendency is found in Augustine's second *Enarratio in Psalmum* 31.II, in which Christ's cry 'Let this cup pass from me' (Mark 14:36) indicates that he 'shows his human will' (*ostendit humanum uoluntatem*). By contrast, his ensuing obedience to the divine will reveals his 'right heart' (*rectum cor*).[116] This distinction is more fully developed in Augustine's much later works against Arianism.

Arianism and Apollinarianism

The connection between Arianism and Apollinarianism was a commonplace of post-Nicene orthodoxy in the West, and would have been familiar to Augustine from Ps. Epiphanius' *Anakephaleosis*;[117] even before this, Augustine showed himself aware of the heresies' shared understanding of the soul of Christ. With the arrival of the Gothic commander Vitalis and his Arian troops in Africa Proconsularis after 410, and upon receiving the 'Arian Sermon' (in reality a collection of Western Homoian Christological propositions in the form of a coherent florilegium), Augustine issued his *Contra Sermonem Arianorum* in around 419. To my knowledge, this text contains the fullest discussion of the divine and human natures of Christ in their relation to his will in the Augustinian corpus, and as such requires citing at length.

Immediately before the passage in question, Augustine has derided the Arian sermon for construing the obedience of Christ Incarnate as an indication of his subordination to the Father as divine Word. He offers a different interpretation of the same piece of Scripture:

> That Jesus says, 'I came down from heaven, not to do my will, but to do the will of him who sent me', can be taken to refer to the fact that the first Adam…by doing his own will and not the will of his Creator, made the entire human race subject to guilt and punishment through a corrupted form of generation…On the contrary, he through whom we were to be liberated did not do his own will, but the will of him by whom he was sent. And therefore in this passage it is said to be his will, so that it is understood to be his own as opposed to the will of God…Such a will had

> Adam and, on that account, we died in him. Christ did not have such a will, so that we might have life in him. This can be said correctly of the humanity in which there existed a will of its own through disobedience, which was opposed to the will of God. What pertains to the **(p.182)** divinity of the Son is different: the will of the Father and the Son is one and the same; nor can it be in any way different, where the nature of the Trinity is wholly immutable. But so that the Mediator of God and humanity, the human Christ Jesus, should not do his own will (which is opposed to God), he was not that kind of human: he was God and human. Through that wonderful and singular grace there could be a human nature in him without any sin whatever…On account of this, he said, 'I came down from heaven, not to do my will, but to do the will of him who sent me.' Because of this, he could be the cause of such obedience, which was altogether without any sin in the humanity he assumed, because he came down from heaven.
>
> *quanquam et hoc ipsum quod dicit iesus, descendi de coelo, non ut faciam uoluntatem meam, sed uoluntatem eius qui me misit; ad illud referatur quod homo primus adam…faciendo uoluntatem suam, non eius a quo factus est, uniuersum genus humanum propagine uitiata culpae et poenae fecit obnoxium…unde a contrario, per quem liberandi fueramus, non fecit uoluntatem suam, sed eius a quo missus est. ita quippe hoc loco dicitur uoluntas sua, ut intelligatur esse propria contra uoluntatem dei…hanc habuit adam, ut in illo moreremur: hanc non habuit christus, ut in illo uiueremus. de natura quippe humana hoc recte dici potest, in qua exstitit per inobedientiam uoluntas propria, quae dei uoluntati esset aduersa. caeterum quod attinet ad diuinitatem filii, una eademque uoluntas est patris et filii: nec potest ullo modo esse diuersa, ubi est natura trinitatis immutabilis uniuersa. ut autem mediator dei et hominum homo christus iesus non faceret propriam, quae deo aduersa est, uoluntatem, non erat tantum homo, sed deus et homo: per quam mirabilem singularemque gratiam humana in illo sine peccato ullo posset esse natura…propter hoc ergo ait, descendi de coelo, non ut faciam uoluntatem meam, sed uoluntatem eius qui me misit: ut ea causa esset tantae obedientiae, quae omnino sine ullo peccato esset hominis quem gerebat, quia de caelo descenderat.*[118]

In the notes accompanying his translation of this text, Roland Teske glosses the above passage:

> Augustine clearly affirms that Christ could only not sin by reason of the union of the assumed human nature to the person of the Word. On the other hand, the human nature he assumed is able to be free from sin only by reason of that grace, since he assumed fallen nature…Augustine seems to imply that the human nature of Christ could have and would have sinned, were it not for its union with the Word. It is, however, only a person who can sin, and not a nature.[119]

I take his final observation first. Teske confirms my repeated insistence that Augustine's conception of the Fall and its punishment effectively redefines human will as necessarily sinful: possessing sinful flesh will always result in sinful desires, because the will is in thrall to the body through *concupiscentia carnis*. Eschatological release alone redeems this fault of present embodiment. Accepting Teske's claim that only persons can sin, the passage nonetheless presents a Christ whose 'normal humanity' is drastically reformed by the **(p.183)** presence of the Word, to a degree more characteristic of the divine nature than the life of either presently graced humans or the spiritually embodied saints. Furthermore, this sits very uncomfortably alongside Augustine's phrasing in the following chapter, referring to 'the Son of Man who was assumed out of time' (*filius hominis qui ex tempore assumptus est*), giving the impression (as Teske concedes of this passage) that the Word assumes a person, not a nature. The implication of this is surely that Christ must retain the sinful will common to human persons. Augustine's language of grace in the passage above does not greatly resolve the problem: the grace of adoption, by which the fallen will is enabled to function rightly and still maintain its integrity as human willing, is different from the grace of the Incarnation, as his reference to the 'singularity' of the Incarnation underlines. In any case, the grace of adoption is complete only in the eschatological life *in pace*, as Augustine's reading of Romans 7:25 insists, and redeemed humanity is not the state the Word takes flesh to address.

The *Contra Sermonem Arianorum* thus reveals two apparently conflicting tendencies. The first centres on Augustine's use

of seemingly 'Antiochene' categories, in which the assumption of a human person in the Incarnation, combined with his definition of fallen human nature, implicates the assuming Word in inevitably sinful desire. The second centres on the text's more characteristically 'Alexandrian' suggestion, that the Word restores the faults of humanity in taking up its nature. In the light of the passages I have highlighted elsewhere in this chapter, I would go further: Augustine's Word appears rather to undermine and deconstruct the humanity assumed, where humanity is defined as essentially sinful in bondage to the flesh.

In Chapter 2, I attempted to show that Augustine's conception of Christ 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' invites readings in which aspects of both fallen and prelapsarian humanity are assumed in the Incarnation. However, once his suppression of Christ's human will comes into view, the picture is considerably simplified: Christ's human nature is fallen; his flesh is in fact sinful flesh. It is designated 'like' sinful flesh in virtue of the indwelling Word that is the locus and power of its agency. But, by Augustine's own lights, this makes no sense, as sinful flesh is defined as that which is dominated by a corrupt will (that is, agency). 'Sinful flesh under sinless agency' amounts to a nonsense, as even graced humanity is required to battle against sin until its attainment of the eschatological state, which accompanies release from the flesh of sin. It would seem that, in addressing the requirement that the Incarnation respond to the state of fallen humanity, Augustine has been thwarted by his own definition of man: he cannot allow the Word to be united to the entirety of fallen human nature, so that he abstracts the static effects of sin from humanity, in order to unite it to the nature and person of the Word. Geerlings makes a similar point:

> **(p.184)** When Augustine describes the Incarnation as *sine peccato, non sine conditione peccatoris* [lacking sin but not the condition of the sinner] (Mus. 6.4.), he separates that condition from its essential connection [*Sachzusammenhang*] with sin, and makes from it an idealized body for the Saviour; and this tends to abrogate the bodily existence of the Mediator. Here Augustine comes close to the Christology of Apollinarianism...The weighting towards the Logos within the hypostatic union, and the separation of the infirmities of the body from their connection to the soul, surely betray this tendency.[120]

Following on Julian's argument, we indeed seem to be left with an apparent neo-Apollinarianism, in which the Word must necessarily take the place of the soul in a decapitated humanity.

Further proof? Christ's human knowledge

I argued above that, for Augustine, the will and the intellect cannot properly be separated except in the process of verbalizing their co-relationship with one another, because they constitute a dual faculty in the human person. To be consistent with this, I would expect Augustine to account for Christ's knowledge in a similar manner, as a synthetic corollary of his will. The expectation is not disappointed, but lends credence to the charge of Augustine's neo-Apollinarianism stated above: Christ's human knowledge, such as it is, is that of the divine Word.

The number of texts in which Augustine discusses the character of Christ's human knowledge is relatively small. In his earliest exegesis of John 11:1–44, in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, Augustine interprets Jesus's apparent ignorance of Lazarus' grave as a figurative indication of human predestination, the 'hidden calling' not known to humans in this present life. Lazarus is finally loosed from his shroud only after leaving the tomb. By contrast, Christ leaves his on his grave slab, showing 'how much difference there is between the human that the Wisdom of God put on, through whom we are liberated, and other humans;'[121] Christ, who committed no sin and was ignorant of nothing, was likewise not bound by the tomb or entwined in the wrappings of death so as to hinder his rising from both.[122] In a further discussion of predestination in the same text, Augustine is still more explicit: the understanding possessed by Christ, the human child who grew in age and Wisdom, is not held in common with the other humans whose nature he possesses. His exceptional **(p.185)** knowledge is that hoped for by his heirs in their heavenly life.[123] In the *Enarratio in Psalmum* 15, Augustine expands the same theme: the beatific vision promised to the saints is 'restored' to them, whilst Christ in his human nature never lost it.[124] His treatment of Psalm 4 runs a number of these themes together:

> [The Psalmist's claim 'You have enlarged my heart' (Ps. 4:1)] is rightly applied to the person who believes in Christ and is illuminated by him; but I do not see how this can in any way be fittingly said of that humanity of the Lord, which the Wisdom of God took up, for it was never deserted by Wisdom. But in whatever way this was his prayer, it is a better index of our weakness, and thus the same Lord can be taken as speaking for his faithful ones about this sudden enlarging of the heart.
>
> *in persona eius qui credens in christum illuminatus est, recte accipitur; in ipsius autem dominici hominis, quem suscepit dei sapientia, non uideo quemadmodum hoc possit congruere. non enim ab ea aliquando desertus est. sed quemadmodum ipsa eius deprecatio, nostrae potius infirmitatis indicium est, sic etiam de ista repentina dilatatione cordis potest idem dominus pro fidelibus suis loqui.*[125]

The latest, and for my purpose here most interesting, text in which Augustine raises this issue is *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*. His position here is consistent both with the theology of the examples already given, and also with one of the central purposes of the anti-Pelagian treatises: to demonstrate the sinfulness of the newborn from both Scripture and common observation. Together with the anger of infants towards their mothers, Augustine cites their resistance of baptism as a symptom of the *ignorantia* that forms part of the punishment for sin.[126] By contrast, the Saviour of infants and adults was born without any such disposition:

> How plain it is we should believe that there was no ignorance of any sort in that infant, in whom the Word was made flesh to dwell among us; nor should we believe that there was that weakness of the soul in the Christ-child, which we observe in other children. For through that weakness, when they are disturbed by irrational movements of the soul, they are without reason or self-control. Rather they are oppressed by a certain pain, or fear of pain. Because of this, you can see that they are sons of that disobedience, which is put to motion in their members. Repugnant to the law of the mind, it cannot be quieted, even when reason wills it.
>
> *quam plane ignorantiam nullo modo crediderim fuisse in infante illo, in quo uerbum caro factum est, ut habitaret in nobis, nec illam ipsius animi infirmitatem in christo paruulo fuerim suspicatus, quam uidemus in paruulis. per hanc enim etiam, cum* ***(p.186)*** *motibus inrationabilibus perturbantur, nulla ratione, nullo imperio, sed dolore aliquando uel doloris terrore cohibentur, ut omnino uideas illius inoboedientiae filios, quae mouetur in membris repugnans legi mentis nec, cum uult ratio, conquiescit.*[127]

To account for the infancy of Christ, Augustine resorts to a formula which is difficult not to interpret as a subtle form of docetism: 'Because there was in him the likeness of the flesh of sin, he willed to endure the changes of age beginning from his infancy. This was so that we might see him capable of reaching death by growing old in his own flesh, had he not been murdered in his youth.'[128] Once again, the passage tends to the ambiguity of evacuating the human soul from Christ as an agent within his person, subtextually replacing the Word as its divine 'performer' in a manner that does full justice to Augustine's anti-Pelagian teaching on Original Sin, but leaves a question over his conception of Christ's human nature. A later exposition of the raising of Lazarus sees Augustine describe Christ's ignorance of Lazarus' tomb as something Christ 'fabricated' (*finxit*).[129] Finally, in one of Augustine's latest works, this ambiguity is resolved in the startling admission that Christ's knowledge of the Father pertains specifically to his divine nature, which is a proof of his eternal generation. The basis of Augustine's dispute with the Arian Maximinus at 9.1 is the interpretation of 1 Tim 1:7, 'Honour and glory be only to the invisible God.' Where Christ says, 'No-one sees the Father unless he is from God', this must be taken as proof of Christ's divinity; his words contain the promise of the vision of the blessed in heaven, and are spoken by him 'in the flesh', *in carne*.[130]

As is manifest in all the examples given here, Augustine unequivocally affirms the divine vision of Christ in his earthly life, to the detriment of any real growth in human knowledge or sharing in the weakness of human intellect. Christ's exceptional knowledge of the divine nature is itself transferred from that nature to his humanity, seemingly without accounting for the limitations of the human mind as it would subsist in humanity either in its fallen state, or on its

pilgrimage of grace to the life *in pace*.[131]

(p.187) Conclusion

This chapter began by attending to Julian's bewilderment at Augustine's doctrine of the Fall and its effects on human nature. Distinguishing reproductive biology from acts of the will, Julian challenged Augustine to justify how the propagation of the species could simultaneously result in the transmission of a vitiated nature to seemingly innocent infants. My purpose here has not been to answer this charge from within Augustine's theology directly (indeed, I do not believe it can be answered satisfactorily). Instead, I turned to the corollary of the question, in Julian's criticism of Augustine's Christology. Viewing concupiscence of the flesh as one among many misorientations of the will, Julian accordingly asks how Augustine's Christ can possess a real soul if his humanity is conceived without *concupiscentia carnis*. The outcome of such a conception, so he argues, is a Christ whose moral life lacks effective exemplary content for the redemption of the faithful. By thus truncating Christ's soul, Augustine has fallen into the heresy of Apollinarianism.

In order to unpack Julian's accusation, I first examined Augustine's major, formal treatments of the Apollinarian heresy in his doctrinal works. These revealed both confusion and clarity. While Augustine remains unsure of the precise faculty being denied by Apollinarianism (Christ's *mens* or *anima*, both of which he fails to define consistently), he nonetheless shows an acute awareness of the danger of monophysitism and theopaschy inherent in any denial of Christ's human soul. From a broad Latin inheritance, he takes the terms for his definition along with his metaphysical confusion. In the manner of his predecessors, he likewise fails to answer the Apollinarian model of a Christ who is Word and flesh with an articulate Catholic alternative, which does justice to the very different natures of God and man subsistent in one person. As I observed, this shortfall is understandable in the heat of polemic, and acceptable in dogmatic works that explicate doctrine by negating heretical alternatives. However, it is problematic where expressions reminiscent of Apollinarianism surface elsewhere in doctrinal and exegetical works.

In order to assess whether the latter is applicable to Augustine, I stepped back from his Christological pronouncements to survey his broad conception of the human will and intellection. In this, I took the lead from van Bavel's summary comments on Augustine's Christological psychology, and unexamined choice of *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 as the *locus classicus* of his theory of the mind and its affections; to these texts, I added that of *Confessiones* 10. This resulted in a new reading of Augustine's theological anthropology, in which *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 are seen as a critique of Stoic emotional theory while simultaneously absorbing their technical vocabulary. Thus the *constantiae, passions*, and ἀπαθεια of Stoicism are transferred into a Christian Platonist **(p.188)** scheme in which the emotions are redeemed by their graced orientation towards God. This simultaneously transforms the intellective and voluntary faculties into the nature of their object: love loving Love. While real moral progress subsequent on the gift of grace is expected in such a conversion to the Good, Augustine's definition of *concupiscentia carnis* hinders the degree to which he can permit humans to travel this road before death and eschatological life. Behind this lurks the unclear distinction between prepassion and passion, the child of the Origenian tradition, whereby the first stirrings of sinful thoughts are judged on a par with their outcome. Augustine goes further still, pushing sinfulness behind even semi-conscious desire, so that sinful flesh controls and dominates the life of the mind in the overpowering movement of lust.

Finally returning to Christology, I surveyed Augustine's explicit treatments of Christ's human will, affections, and intellect. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that his extensive handling of these issues in a theological anthropological context promised to reveal a similarly detailed consideration of the inner life of Christ. However, this is far from the case. The number of texts in which Augustine explicitly or implicitly reflects on the psychology of Jesus is small. Furthermore, they show no close relationship to his broader conception of human inwardness. Rather, his Christ possesses an ambiguous will, imprecisely apportioned between his divine and human natures; where human, it remains unclear to what degree it is thwarted by the effects of the Fall. By contrast, his Christ lives without ignorance of any kind: his knowledge is that of God. In all of this, Augustine fails to define exactly how a will and intellect that is divine can be held by a single person who also fully possesses human nature.

What compromises Augustine's treatment of the humanity of Christ is, as Julian recognized, his theology of the Fall. In his claim that concupiscence of the flesh cannot be healed by grace in this life, and that it remains outside the power of even the sanctified will, he simultaneously removes it from the Incarnation. What cannot now be healed could not then be assumed. While this inconsistency in Augustine's Christology cannot finally be classified as 'Apollinarian' (in whichever way that is understood), it does amount to an absence of clear pronouncement on the nature of Christ's full, human soul. As I shall show in the following and final chapter, this is a side effect of Augustine's reluctance to synthesize his theology of the Fall with his speculation about the soul's origin. Julian's question 'How can you muddle a matter of the will with the circumstances of insemination?' goes to the heart of the problem: by failing to account for the relationship between the voluntary Fall of Adam, the physical act of concourse, and the process of bodily ensoulment at conception, Augustine is left without an explanation for the manner in which Christ receives a sinless soul through his virginal conception. Behind **(p.189)** this stands his latent but persistent belief in the premundane life and fall of the soul, the elephant in the room in all his engagement with Pelagianism. As will become clear, the apparent imbalance of divinity and humanity in the inner life of his Christ is the result not of the predominance of the Word in his one person, but of the ontological continuity of the Word with his heavenly and unfallen humanity.

Notes:

([1]) Fredriksen (1988: 112).

([2]) *Ep*. 184a.3.1; *Ep*. 194.44.10; *Pecc. Orig*. 45.40; *Nupt. Conc*. I.21.19, 37.32, 38.33.

([3]) *C. Iul*. 5.51.14.

([4]) *C. Iul*. 5.51.14: *Verum enim est quod ibi accepisti, ea quae in subjecto sunt, sicut sunt qualitates, sine subjecto in quo sunt, esse non posse, sicut est in subjecto corpore color aut forma; sed afficiendo transeunt, non emigrando.*

([5]) *C. Iul*. 5.51.14.

([6]) Gillian R. Evans (1981); Elizabeth Clark (1988).

([7]) I discuss this further in Chapter 6.

([8]) *Conf*. 7.1.1.

([9]) *C. Iul. Imp*. 2.178: *Si enim non credis partem animae seminibus illigatam; quo ore scribis, omnes homines Adam solum fuisse; cum homo utique nisi anima et corpus simul esse non possit?* It does not appear to occur to Julian that Augustine may have conceived all humans to have been in Adam as a spiritual creature, quite without any body, a point to which I shall return later.

([10]) *C. Iul. Imp*. 2.178: *Et qualibet ergo, et quantalibet parte, omnes qui ex illo nati sunt, ille unus fuerunt, sive secundum solum corpus, sive secundum utramque hominis partem; quod me nescire confiteor, nec me pudet, ut vos, fateri nescire quod nescio.*

([11]) Cf. *Pecc. Orig*. 3.3; as *C. Iul. Imp*. 2. 178 indicates, Julian himself knew *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*.

([12]) *Lib. Fid.* 28: *Nam si non ex supposita materia crearetur hominis caro sicut etiam Adae et Evae, et sic postea in ipso anima non ex supposita materia, tanquam pariter Adae et Evae, nunquam propheta Zacharias ita dixisset, Et creans spiritum hominis in ipso.*

([13]) *Lib. Fid*. 5.39.4: *aut injustum Deum pronuntiant, aut certe Deo diabolum aestimant fortiorem, eo quod naturam, quam Deus creavit bonam, eam diabolus per praevaricationem Adae et Evae malam potuerit efficere.*

([14]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.59.36.

([15]) *C. Iul.* 5.4.17.

([16]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4. 46: *Tu vero nomen ipsum concupiscentiae amplexatus, vis a Christi corpore tam oculorum sensum abfuisse, quam viscerum.*

([17]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.47.

([18]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.48.

([19]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.49.

([20]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.50.

([21]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.47.

([22]) It should be noted that at no point does Augustine define clearly what any of these terms means.

([23]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.48.

([24]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.49.

([25]) Principally at Alexandria (362) and Rome (377/8).

([26]) Studer (1984).

([27]) Studer (1984: 395).

([28]) *Ep.* 9.2: *pro humano sensu in Domini carne versatum.*

([29]) *Ep.* 9.2.

([30]) *Tomus* 284, l. 32: *Anathematizamus eos qui pro hominis anima rationabili et intellegibili dicunt Dei Verbum in humana carne uersatum, cum ipse Filius et Verbum Dei non pro anima rationabili et intellegibili in suo corpore fuerit, sed nostram (id est rationabilem et intellegibilem) sine peccato animam susceperit adque saluauerit.*

([31]) Grillmeier (1975: 350).

([32]) *Inc. Dom. Sac.* 6. 49. Theopaschy here denotes the suffering of God through the mutation of his own nature in the Incarnation, to be distinguished from the divine participation in human suffering through the hypostatic union. This is to say that it is primarily an error about God *qua* God, not the Incarnation.

([33]) *Inc. Dom. Sac.* 6. 60–1.

([34]) I have marginalized this text from the list of Ambrosian sources from which Augustine might have drawn his exegesis of Romans 8:3 in Chapter 3, on the basis of its suggestion that Christ possesses a flesh that is subject to sin; supporting this, I indicate below that its handling of Apollinarianism is not closely reflected in that of Augustine.

([35]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 80.1.

([36]) This appears to be the thought behind 80.2: 'The evangelist wished to commend to us the love of the humility of God with which he humbled himself, and emphasizing how far he humbled himself, he spoke only of the Word and the flesh,

omitting the nature of the soul which is lower than the Word, but superior to the flesh. For he commends that humility to us more by saying "The Word was made flesh", than if he were to say, "The Word was made human"' (*uolens itaque euangelista commendare pro nobis dilectionem humilitatis dei qui sese humiliauerit, et quousque humiliauerit exprimens, uerbum carnem que nominauit praetermittens animae naturam, quae uerbo est inferior, carne praestantior. magis enim commendat humilitatem, quia dictum est: uerbum caro factum est, quam si diceretur: uerbum homo factum est*').

([37]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 80.4.

([38]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 80.3.

([39]) Cf. *Conf.* 7.19.

([40]) *Agon.* 21.19: *multum enim lugenda est mens humana, si uincitur a corpore suo: si quidem in illo homine non reformata est, in quo ipsum corpus humanum iam dignitatem formae coelestis accepit.*

([41]) Altaner (1967a: 288); emphasis added, highlighting Altaner's lack of suggestion on this point.

([42]) That is to say, outside the context of scriptural exegesis or homiletics and in the course of defining other heresies against the Catholic faith.

([43]) *Ench.* 10: *nihil naturae humanae in illa susceptione fas est dicere defuisse, sed naturae ab omni peccati nexu omni modo liberae.*

([44]) Cf. *Anak.* T.2 Lib. 3.1, in its Latin translation: 'The Apollinarians are those who confess in a very limited way the perfect Incarnation of Christ. Some of them affirm that his body was consubstantial with his divinity; others have dared to defend their position, that Christ never assumed a soul, and they have insisted on denying it. Some have supported their claim with the words of the evangelist, "The Word was made flesh", and have denied created flesh—from Mary—was taken up by him; but they have stubbornly asserted that the Word was made into flesh. After all this, I do not know for what reason they fail to say that he assumed a mind' (*Apollinaristae, qui perfectam Christi incarnationem minime confitentur: quorum alii consubstantiale divinitati esse corpus affirmant, alii vero defendere istud etiam ausi sunt, Christum nequaquam animam assumpsisse; idque negare instituerunt. Quidam his Evangelii verbis innixi, Verbum caro factum est: ex creata carne, hoc est Maria, carnem ab illo susceptam esse negarunt; sed solum Verbum carnem esse factum pertinaciter asseverarunt. Postea vero quam ob causam nescio, mentem illum non assumpsisse dixerunt*). Cf. *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.47.

([45]) Altaner (1967a: 289).

([46]) *Haer.* 45: *in qua quaestione testimoniis euangelicis uicti, [Apollinaristae] mentem, qua rationalis est anima hominis, defuisse animae Christi, sed pro hac ipsum Verbum in eo fuisse dixerunt.*

([47]) So Studer (1984: 394).

([48]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.47.

([49]) *C. Iul. Imp.* 4.47.

([50]) I raise the possibility that this letter is behind both Julian's and Augustine's texts at this point.

([51]) Van Bavel (1954: 180) makes the issue one of doctrinal development: 'If in his thought omniscience, the beatific vision and progress in wisdom are not yet harmoniously elaborated, he nevertheless left to posterity all of the elements to

systematise this teaching.' Geerlings (1978: 138), lacks the soft focus: 'The question of the psychology of the person of Jesus Christ is a question of modernity.'

([52]) *Sol.* 1.7.2.

([53]) Cf. Bonner (1962), on Augustine's assimilation of the (once very broad) meaning of the widely used word *libido*, to that of the specifically Christian, technical term *concupiscentia*.

([54]) Cf. Dihle (1982: 127): 'The Confessions abundantly testify to the intensity of St Augustine's introspection, and many famous passages from this book on will, memory, sense of time, sensuality, cognition, emotions and other psychological topics have been extensively commented on in modern scholarship. It is mainly through this entirely new concept of his own self that St Augustine superseded the conceptual system of Greco-Roman culture.'

([55]) Grillmeier (1975: 342).

([56]) Rowan D. Williams (1985: 137). The suggestion is a tantalizing one, but cannot be the whole solution.

([57]) *Conf.* 7.25.19.

([58]) O'Connell (1967: 209–10) points out the misreading of the text in which Alypius is construed as the Apollinarian, most notably found in Courcelle (1950: 214 n. 2): 'Perhaps Alypius was one of those Milanese who was indoctrinated as an Apollinarian a little after 385, to the fury of Ambrose.' O'Connell's note has permanently corrected the error, although his doubts about the consistency of Milanese teaching against Apollinaris require a further and fuller hearing.

([59]) Zumkeller (1986: 174–5), as part of his article on *Affectus*.

([60]) The Thomist basis for the analytical division is evident. The *Summa*'s Prima Pars covers the divine intellect and humans created in its image; Secunda Pars moves on to cover the moral life of man in relation to his affections and passions. Similarly, in his treatment of the Incarnation, Thomas treats first of Christ's knowledge in the broader discussion of his possession of grace (T.P. 3a. Q.9–12), then of his passions and affections (T.P. 3a. Q.15); T.P. 3a. Q.18 handles his will, and Q.46 the place of his passions in the Passion.

([61]) Van Bavel (1954: 123).

([62]) Van Bavel (1954: 121).

([63]) Van Bavel (1954: 161).

([64]) The expression is that of Sorabji (2000: 8).

([65]) Wetzel (1992: 46).

([66]) *Civ. Dei* 9.4 *passim*. James Wetzel (1992) provides one account of this redefinition of 'indifferents' as 'goods' in Augustine. Alongside the pure Stoicism found in Cicero, Wetzel detects a second 'paradigm' in Cicero's *De Finibus*, the 'Stoicized Aristotelianism of Antiochus of Ascalon' (p. 47). In his moral philosophy, happiness might be 'augmented by external blessings', giving fortune a role in the attainment of an individual's final happiness through the addition of preferable temporal goods in his journey towards virtue. This paradigm is 'Stoic in founding happiness on virtue, but Peripatetic in its refusal to exclude external goods from the definition of happiness' (p. 48). Thus, 'following Cicero's lead, Augustine reduces philosophy's pretensions to secure beatitude to a single strategy: Secure virtue, then under the auspices of virtue supplement beatitude with the enjoyment of what the world has to offer' (p. 49). The closeness of the two varieties of Stoicism may well have been lost on Augustine, allowing him to caricature the shortcomings of Stoicism in this way,

and to 'refuse to accept the intrusion of fortune into beatitude' in his own moral thought, because of the evident reality of the world's hostility to virtue and the enjoyment of temporal goods under sin (pp. 50–1). Wetzel usefully points out that, by bringing a Peripatetic understanding of preferable goods under a Stoic umbrella, Augustine can attack them together for claiming that reason alone can control the passions in their response to the enjoyment of temporal goods and frustration by temporal ills. Augustine's acceptance of the place of temporal goods *per se* in the ascent to transcendent goodness, illustrated in the excerpts from *Civ. Dei* below, owes its basis to his Christian Platonism in the first instance, and is somewhat distinct from the question of fortune in augmenting the happy life. This is also Wetzel's view of Augustine's moral psychology: 'We might say, with some justice, that some amalgam of Stoic ethics and Platonic metaphysics continues to inform the expression of Augustine's theology of grace, even when that theology starts to draw its sustenance primarily from the Pauline epistles' (p. 113). In their language, grace is what forms reason in humanity's affective response to the world in time.

([67]) *Civ. Dei* 14.8.1.

([68]) *Civ. Dei* 14.6.

([69]) This move allows him to include grief (*tristitia*) in the emotional life of the wise Christian: her frustration at the absence of beatitude is a right and reasonable response not only the state of creation under sin in the present, but also to the fragmentation of the past. So Wetzel (1992: 109): 'When the Christian saint grieves, it is not for the loss of material well-being, but for personal failures of vision and love, for having robbed the creation of its creator, for having usurped God's dominion.' Memory, the vessel of temporality in the individual, is therefore the crucial vehicle for the sanctification of this emotion.

([70]) *Civ. Dei* 14.7.2.

([71]) Cf. Sorabji (2000: ch. 2), for his central argument that Chrysippus developed Zeno's Stoicism to accommodate all emotions as judgements of the intellect, so that Seneca can later consider them 'merely one type of cognition: assent to a proposition about how it is appropriate to react' (pp. 328–9, glossing *De Ira* 2.4.1.). This is to be contrasted with Augustine's Neoplatonic conception of inner entropy following on the alienation of personal being from the order of being by the power of the will; cf. Dihle (1982: 128).

([72]) Dihle (1982: 125).

([73]) *Civ. Dei* 14.6.

([74]) *Conf.* 10.12.8.

([75]) *Conf.* 10.21.14. Thonnard (1952b) argues that, even in Augustine's synthesis, the passions are strictly only undergone by the body, the *affectiones* being the soul's response to them. I cannot find the distinction in any of the texts analysed here; further, the 'recalled passions' (only ever mental) re-experienced here in the *Confessiones* appear to argue against him. The passions are problematic precisely because they disable the mind.

([76]) *Conf.* 14.10.

([77]) *Conf.* 14.9.4.

([78]) Wetzel (1992: 102). He comments further: 'Except in his more hyperbolic moments, Augustine does not equate the Stoic ideal of *apatheia* with insensitivity.' As I have argued earlier in this book, that hyperbole is more typical of Jerome's rhetorical attacks on Origen's moral theology, in which ἀπαθεια is also translated *impassibilitas*. Neither 'insensitivity' nor 'impassibility' fully translates Augustine's conception of ἀπαθεια, either in Stoicism as he understands it, or in his Christianization of it; it is rather the attainment of a tranquillity that comes from a sanctification of the passions, oriented

to the love of God.

([79]) Dinkler (1934: 74).

([80]) *Lib. Arb.* 3.53.19.

([81]) *Civ. Dei* 14.15: *ipso namque inuito et animus plerumque turbatur et caro dolet et ueterescit et moritur, et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inuiti, si uoluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo atque ex omnibus partibus oboediret.*

([82]) This leads Bonner (1962: 310) to make the following assertion: 'Such a distaste for sexual passion is not easily comprehensible to the modern reader, who may be led to believe that Augustine regarded sexual concupiscence, in itself, as a sin. A careful examination of his teaching, however, shows that this is not the case. Concupiscence is not a sin; but it is a wound and a vice in human nature; can be the occasion of sin, even in the baptized; and is the means whereby Original Sin is committed...Concupiscence is a defect, a vice, an hereditary propensity to sin, without necessarily being a sin in the strict sense of the word.' Of course, considered in the abstract, Augustine does not think that concupiscence is always a sin; after the Fall, however, it is; and it is precisely Augustine's point that God punishes man by a propensity that is not under his own control: it is a requirement that man sin, under the decree of justice. Bonner highlights a number of other texts in support of his case; as far as I can see, they argue to the contrary, cf. *Nupt. Conc.* 115–17; *C. Ep. Pel.* 1.27.12; C. *Iul.* 5.8–13.3.

([83]) *C. Iul.* 5.8.3.

([84]) *De Ira* 2.3.1.

([85]) Tusc. Disp. 3.83.34: 'When we have taken away what is all together voluntary, that mournful sickness will be removed; however, a slight gnawing and a certain sort of depression of the soul will still remain.' *Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiunculae quaedam animi relinquentur.*

([86]) Augustine also repeats the narrative at Q. Hept. 1.30.

([87]) Epictetus' text no longer survives; c.f. Schenkl, H: Epicteti Dissertationes Frag. 9. (Leipzig, 1916).

([88]) *Civ. Dei* 9.4.2: *animi uisa, quas appellant phantasias nec in potestate est utrum et quando incidant animo, cum ueniunt ex terribilibus et formidabilibus rebus, necesse est etiam sapientis animum moueant, ita ut paulisper uel pauescat metu, uel tristitia contrahatur...nec ideo tamen in mente fieri opinionem mali, nec adprobari ista eisque consentiri.*

([89]) Sorabji (2000: 372–5). Wetzel (1992: 51–3) offers a slightly different reading of this passage, consonant with his picture of *Civ. Dei* 9 as dependent on a conflation of Stoic and Peripatetic attitudes to temporal goods. Augustine's point in relating Gellius' story (so Wetzel) is that the Stoic fears the loss of temporal goods as the sea begins to threaten: 'the very experience of the disruptive emotion presupposes that to some significant degree the sage values material well-being and so fears its loss.' His inner Peripatetic thus hoists the pure Stoic-manqué by his own petard.

([90]) *Princ.* 3.2.2: 'There is therefore evident reason for thinking that, just as in good things the human will on its own is imperfect to accomplish the good (for it is by divine help that it is led to perfection in each thing); so also, in things of a contrary nature we receive certain things, like seeds of sins, from what we possess for natural uses. But when we have indulged in them beyond what is enough for us and do not resist the first movements towards intemperance, we make space for the first stage of transgression. The hostile power incites and urges us on in every way, encouraging us to expand

our sins more abundantly, offering us the occasions and beginnings of sins, which the hostile powers spread more widely and far, and if they can, beyond all limits' (*Evidens igitur ratio est quia, sicut in bonis rebus humanum propositum solum per se ipsum inperfectum est ad consummationem boni (adiutorio namque divino ad perfecta quaeque perducitur): ita etiam in contrariis initia quidem et velut quaedam semina peccatorum ab his rebus, quae in usu naturaliter habentur, accipimus; cum vero indulserimus ultra quam satis est, et non restiterimus adversum primos intemperantiae motus, tunc primi huius delicti accipiens locum virtus inimica instigat et perurget omni modo studens profusius dilatare peccata, nobis quidem hominibus occasiones et initia praebentibus peccatorum, inimicis autem potestatibus latius ea et longius et si fieri potest absque ullo fine propagantibus*).

([91]) The scriptural passages behind the text are surely Matt. 7.27–30 and Mark 10.2–12.

([92]) Layton (2000) offers a contrasting reading of Origen as more sympathetic to the Stoicism of Chrysippus, not least on the basis of his ascription of prepassion to Christ (cf. the Latin *Comm. Matt*. 92, in which Christ 'began to be sad and to feel weary' (*coepit tristari et taedari*)). Origen 'insists that the verb "begin" in this case does not signify the initiation of a disposition, but rather defines the boundary beyond which an incipient movement did not pass' (Layton 2000: 269). However, he goes on to highlight Didymus' 'intellectualization' of prepassion, with the result that it becomes morally ambiguous. What appears to begin with Didymus (so Layton) appears to end with Jerome and Augustine (so Sorabji and myself), a testimony to the stronger treatment of the whole issue in *De Principiis*, to be received as normative by later readers.

([93]) Sorabji (2000: 8–9). Following his own argument, I suspect he actually means 'between first *movements*…and emotions…Christian talk of bad *thoughts*…'. He appears to have fallen into Origen's trap!

([94]) *Serm. Dom.* 1.34.12: *inlabitur occultius, ut cogitationem contingat*.

([95]) *Serm. Dom.* 1.34.12.

([96]) Sorabji (2000) reads the text as an example of Augustine's early faithfulness to Stoicism, partly on the grounds of the 'consent lies in the reason' phrase, and partly because there is no explicit condemnation of titillation as a sin. It seems to me that Augustine is making exactly Origen's point: sin is progressive, present even in the very beginnings of rational reflection on an opportunity for vice. Further, cf. *Serm. Mon*. 1.35.12: 'Hence, just as we arrive at sin by three steps—suggestion, pleasure, consent,—so of sin itself there are three varieties—in heart, in deed, in habit' (*sicut ergo tribus gradibus ad peccatum peruenitur: suggestione delectatione consensione, ita ipsius peccati tres sunt differentiae: in corde in facto in consuetudine*). The sin of the heart/prepassion is still sin. In any case the text dates from after the reception of Jerome's work.

([97]) *Comm. Matt*. 1, ll. 605–18.

([98]) *Comm. Matt*. 1, ll. 605–18.

([99]) I have been unable to locate a passage in Origen that conflates the Fall narrative of Genesis with Christ's teaching on adultery. Again, the loss of his commentaries on both Matthew and Genesis is to be regretted. I raise the possibility that the roots of the snake motif in *Serm. Dom.* might have been lifted from Origen, *Hom. Gen*. 1.7: 'As from the waters, both good and bad thoughts are brought forth from our heart. But with the command of the Word of God and by his illumination, we can discern between good and evil; this is to say, that we should separate ourselves from those things which creep upon the earth and cause earthly concerns, and accustom ourselves to fly with those things which are better, not only over the earth, but also into the firmament of the heaven…If we behold a woman to desire her concupiscently, that is the poison of the creeping thing within us…'(*De corde namque nostro velut de aquis proferuntur et bonae cogitationes et malae. Sed nos verbo praecepto Dei, ut cum ipsius illuminatione discernere possimus a bono quod malus est: id est, ut ea quae super terram repunt, et terranas sollicitudines gerunt, separemus a nobis; illa vero quae meliora sunt, id est*

volatilia, sinamus volare non solum super terram, sed etiam secundum firmamentum coeli…Si viderimus mulierem ad concupiscendam eam, illud est in nobis reptile venenatum …).

([100]) *Civ. Dei* 14.23.2.

([101]) *Civ. Dei* 14.16.

([102]) *Civ. Dei* 14.20.

([103]) *Q. Hept*. 3.93.

([104]) *Civ. Dei* 14.9.

([105]) *Tr. Ioh.* 47.11.

([106]) *Tr. Ioh.* 47.13: *quando uerbum uoluit. principatus enim in uerbo erat.*

([107]) *Tr. Ioh.* 60.5: *affectum quippe humanum, quando oportuisse iudicauit, in seipso potestate commouit, qui hominem totum potestate suscepit*.

([108]) *Tr. Ioh.* 60.5: *quantum itaque bonum de participatione diuinitatis eius exspectare et sperare debemus, cuius nos et perturbatio tranquillat, et infirmitas firmat?*

([109]) *Tr. Ioh.* 49.18.

([110]) *En. Ps*. 30.II.1.3.

([111]) *En. Ps*. 43.3.

([112]) *Tr. Ioh.* 60.2: *transfigurauit etiam in se affectum infirmitatis nostrae, compatiens nobis affectu animae suae.* The translators of the NPNF edition have rendered 'transfigurauit' 'transferred', in greater faithfulness to a *totus Christus* theology than Augustine's own language here permits.

([113]) *En. Ps*. 40.8: *quod passus est christus, patitur et ecclesia; quod passum est caput, patiuntur et membra.*

([114]) *Doct. Christ*. 3.41.29.

([115]) *Doct. Christ*. 2.24.16.

([116]) *En. Ps*. 31.II.26.

([117]) Cf. *Anak*. T.2, Lib. 2.5: 'The Arians, or Ariomanites, say that the Son of God was created and that the Holy Spirit is the creature of a creature, and they affirm that our Saviour merely took flesh from Mary, but not his soul' (*Ariani, sive Ariomanitae Dei Filium creaturam esse dicunt, Spiritum vero sanctum creaturae esse creaturam, Salvatorem nostram carnem duntaxat a Maria, non animam accepisse confirmant*).

([118]) *C. Serm. Ar*. 7.

([119]) Teske (1995: 169).

([120]) Geerlings (1978: 136–7).

([121]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 65: *quantum autem intersit inter hominem quem dei sapientia gestabat per quem liberati sumus, et*

caeteros homines.

([122]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 65. Again, the problem of positing two wills in Christ is present here.

([123]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 75.

([124]) *En. Ps.* 15.5: *non enim restitues mihi quod non amisi, sed restitues his qui amiserunt eius claritatis notitiam; in quibus quia ego sum, mihi restitues*.

([125]) *En. Ps.* 4.2. That Christ 'learns' in his members is also found in *Tr. Ioh.* 21.7, although from the context it is not clear whether Augustine is referring here to Christ in his earthly life or in his eschatological state.

([126]) *Pecc. Mer.* 1.65.35–66.36.

([127]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.48.29.

([128]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.48.29: *Sed quia in eo erat similitudo carnis peccati, mutationes aetatum perpeti uoluit ab ipsa exorsus infantia, ut ad mortem uideatur etiam senescendo illa caro peruenire potuisse, nisi iuuenis fuisset occisus*.

([129]) *Mend.* 27.13: *Ac per hoc nescire se finxit, ut aliquid aliud illa velut ignorantia sua significaret*.

([130]) *C. Max. Ar.* 9.1.

([131]) Cf. Richard (1922: 86): 'For Augustine, Christ during his mortal life had the knowledge of [the beatific] vision, and knowledge gained through human experience…It is this doctrine which the great Scholastic doctors analyse; but it is explicitly there in St Augustine, and remains explicit in the great Greek doctors.'

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

The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396–430
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поменять прокси

The Election of the Dominical Human: Augustine and the Unfallen Soul of Christ

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Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 6 addresses the issue of the origin of the soul in Augustine's thought, and its impact on his Christology. It observes with R. J. O'Connell that Augustine never gives a definitive answer to this question, and never fully discounts the Platonist (thereafter Origenist) theory of a fall from souls to earthly bodies from a premundane realm. It revisits Augustine's description of Christ as 'dominical human' (*homo dominicus*) and 'assumed human' (*assumptus homo*), reading both as suggestive of an Origenist Christology. This is further substantiated by examining his depiction of humanity, created seminally 'in Adam'; and his identification of Christ assuming a humanity 'without foregoing merits', and by implication pre-existent. An analysis of his Christological exegesis of Wisdom 8.19 ('I received a good soul by lot') concludes these fragments, which, when pieced together, point to a latent understanding of the humanity of Christ drawn from the thought of Origen of Alexandria.

Keywords: soul (origin of), soul (fall of), R. J. O'Connell, De Peccatorum MeritisDe Anima et eius Origine, dominical human (dominicus homo), assumed human (assumptus homo), creation in Adam, grace Christology, Origen, De Principiis

My investigation in the previous chapter began by attending to Julian's criticism of Augustine's Christology as crypto-Apollinarian, a charge made against the backdrop of his more commonly cited attack on the biology of Original Sin. By Augustine's failure to account for the transmission of sin in the soul from one person to another in the act of sexual reproduction, Julian could only construe a sinless Christ in such a system as a soulless human. I argued that Julian's case

begins on a strong footing, where Augustine's understanding of Apollinarianism is seen to be both conventional and unpenetrating, reflecting the inability of his Latin predecessors to comprehend the core point at issue in this essentially Greek debate. Added to this, Augustine's scattered comments on the inner life of Christ appear to place him firmly in an Alexandrian mode of thinking, in which the active presence of the Word in the Incarnate Christ obfuscates the properties characteristic of human nature, which, according to the rule of *communicatio idiomatum*, should be accounted for in his

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carnalis, which omes 'in the likeness of the e nature' he comes to ms externally to the pattern of fallen humanity, while apparently lacking a fully human soul, which would necessarily require him to have 'sinful flesh' proper and not merely its likeness.

I want here to return to Julian's question of the origin of sin in the reproductive act as a new avenue for resolving the problem of Christ's soul in Augustine's theology. A concomitant part of his attack on Augustine focused on his inability—or unwillingness—to pronounce clearly on the soul's origin. At *Contra Iulianum* 5.17.4, Augustine gave Julian short shrift on the issue, reiterating a long-standing refrain: 'Why do you retreat to that most obscure question, about the soul? What remains hidden concerning the **(p.191)** soul can either be learned with some effort or, like many other things in this life, can remain unknown without detriment to salvation.'[1] Yet the interconnectedness of the two issues is undeniable: if a moral fault can be explained as affecting a psychophysical nature in some way, and if human ensoulment can be exactly situated in the physical conditions and process of reproduction, Augustine's model of Original Sin can be allowed to stand. For Julian, Augustine had managed to justify neither, and, to Augustine's detriment, his commonplace denial of a solution to the question of the soul's origin weakened his own defence.

This chapter is, therefore, an attempt to uncover Augustine's understanding of the origin of Christ's soul, in order to resolve the inconsistencies in his account of human sinfulness in general and Christ's sinlessness in particular. At the outset I will make clear that I do not believe Augustine was conscious of the unevenness of his portrayal of the sinless humanity of Christ, or the reasons for it. Neither do I believe that the Augustinian corpus as a whole yields clear-cut statements about the origins of Christ's soul that will afford this book an easy conclusion. My approach will, therefore, be eclectic and to a degree speculative, all the time looking for latent clues from which Augustine's position on Christ's soul can be pieced together to form a coherent narrative of the development of his Christological thought.

I will begin by tracing Augustine's reflection on the origin of the soul, particularly in his anti-Pelagian works. With Robert J. O'Connell, I shall argue that Augustine maintained a discreet ambivalence about the topic alongside a subtextual belief in its fall from an original, premundane existence. Augmenting O'Connell's thesis from within my foregoing reception-critical survey, I suggest this can be ascribed to his reception of the works of Origen as well as those of Plotinus. Looking for evidence that Augustine applied a 'fall' protology within his Christology, I turn first of all to his description of Christ as 'the human of the Lord,' *homo dominicus,* and the 'assumed human', *homo assumptus*. By advancing a new reading of Augustine's theory of the seminal causes (*rationales causae*) at the basis of all created beings, and the creation of man in Adam, the 'seminal nature' (*natura seminalis*), I will suggest that both Christological terms indicate the assumption of a fully individual person in the Incarnation. Analysing Augustine's description of the process by which such a humanity is assumed, I will suggest that his characterization of the Incarnation as a divine gift, effected without regard to Christ's prevenient merits, confirms this reading, as only human persons can be said to 'merit' salvation. Questioning the logic of the abstract concept 'meritless human', I offer two passages in which Augustine gives ample hearing to the proposition that Christ uniquely merited the Incarnation, only to reject it with confused and **(p.192)** uncomfortable alacrity. Taken together, all of these factors contribute to my final conclusion, that Origen's idea of the unfallen soul of Christ was a key element of Augustine's early Christology. Constrained first by the Origenist and later by the Pelagian controversy, this picture of the pre-existent human life of Christ would remain undeveloped in Augustine's mature thought, to the detriment of his treatment of the sinlessness of Christ, and the eventual collapse of his argument against Pelagianism.

Robert J. O'Connell and scholarship on the soul's origin

All of the most recent surveys of Augustine's theology of the soul's origin have necessarily had to engage with the work of Robert J. O'Connell, which has been set in the midst of Augustinian study to some as cornerstone and to others as stumbling block since the publication of *Augustine's Early Theory of Man* in 1968. I do not wish here to review the response of the entire scholarly community to the work of O'Connell, nor to detail his findings in full.[2] It will, however, be useful in this context to lay out the broad strokes of his argument stated in *The Origin of the Soul in St Augustine's Later Works,* the fruition of O'Connell's earlier monograph.[3]

The central thesis of the book reduces to the claim that, in spite of Augustine's apparent vacillation on the issue, he persistently maintained a discreet belief in a fall of the soul into the body from a heavenly state after the model articulated by Plotinus, principally in *Ennead* 4, only at the end of his career modifying his opinions to cohere with his earlier reading of Romans 9–11. Underlying O'Connell's book is the assumption that Augustine's attraction to a Platonist mysticism of 'ascent' from a fallen to a restored heavenly state existed alongside an initially quite separate theology drawn, first from Pauline exegesis, and then the exigencies of the Pelagian controversy. In all of this, O'Connell relies heavily on Anne-Marie de la Bonnadière's reclassification of the publication timelines of Augustine's major works, advancing on her conclusions and positing major revisions of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, De Trinitate* and *De Genesi ad Litteram.* On the basis of these revisions, O'Connell argues that early references to the fall of the soul were excerpted by **(p.193)** Augustine from later editions of these works as the difficulty of the issue became clearer to him. While he notes the importance of the topic in the Origenist controversy, O'Connell maintains the consensus view of Augustine's engagement with its dominant players, as he makes clear with reference to the exchange between Augustine and Orosius: 'The refutations [of Priscillanism and Origenism] in the *Ad Orosium* do not, as Courcelle has observed, suppose any direct "personal knowledge" of Origen on Augustine's part prior to Origen's teachings [represented] in the *Commonitorium.* If he himself had shared, up to this time, any of Origen's views, he would have done so unwittingly and innocently.'[4] Thus his discussion of Augustine's protology is a question subordinate to and dependent on the broader issue of his reception of Plotinus.

O'Connell singles out *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 as the *locus classicus* and earliest example of Augustine's statement of his 'fallen soul' protology, extant alongside a later revision of this position in the same text. At 3.57.20, Augustine writes of the descent of souls from their heavenly home with God, in order to animate and govern the bodies born of the first man, now infected with mortality by sin. Having forgotten their past life, these souls must struggle against the twin punishment of *ignorantia* and *difficultas* in order to regain their prior state and redeem their bodies:

> If, however, souls, existing in some secret place made by God, are sent to inspire and rule the bodies of each individual person who is born, they are sent for this purpose: to take proper charge of the body, which is born from the punishment of sin (which is to say, the mortality of the first human). This consists in chastening it by the virtues, and subjecting it to its appointed and lawful servitude, so that those virtues may prepare a place of heavenly incorruption for it in due order and time.
>
> *si uero in dei aliquo secreto iam existentes animae mittuntur ad inspiranda et regenda corpora singulorum quorumque nascentium, ad hoc utique mittuntur officium, ut corpus, quod de poena peccati, hoc est mortalitate primi hominis nascitur, bene administrando, id est castigando per uirtutes, et ordinatissimae atque legitimae seruituti subiciendo, etiam ipsi comparent ordine ac tempore oportuno caelestis incorruptionis locum.*[5]

A second and more specific variation on this theme, in which souls fall through their own sin, follows shortly after:

> If souls which exist elsewhere are *not* sent by the Lord God, but come to inhabit bodies of their own accord, it is quite simple to see that the creator can in no way be held responsible for whatever ignorance and difficulty results from their own will.

si autem alibi animae constitutae non mittuntur a domino deo, sed sua sponte ad inhabitanda corpora ueniunt, facile est iam hoc uidere, quicquid ignorantiae **(p.194)** *difficultatisque secutum fuerit earum propriam uoluntatem, nullo modo creatorem hinc esse culpandum.*[6]

In the following chapter, O'Connell detects what he believes to be a later revision: Augustine admits here that it would be rash to affirm any one of the four possible protologies that appear plausible to him:

> It is not fitting for us rashly to affirm any one of these four propositions concerning the soul: that they come from propagation; that they are made newly in individuals, in whom they are born; that they are sent by God into the bodies of those who are to be born having existed elsewhere, or that they fall into them of their own accord.
>
> *harum autem quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine ueniant an in singulis quibusque nascentibus nouae fiant an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes uel mittantur diuinitus uel sua sponte labantur, nullam temere adfirmare oportebit.*[7]

As Carol Harrison notes: 'He makes no attempt here to judge between the different theories, but simply demonstrates how they are congruent with his basic conviction that humanity's present penal state is not unjust, but part of God's equitable providence.'[8] The four equivocal options of Traducianism, Creationism, and a sending or falling of souls would remain standard in Augustine's response to the question throughout his maturity.

Of central importance to the evolution of Augustine's outward agnosticism on the origin of the soul, O'Connell argues, is his gradual rejection of the relationship between the merit gained by an individual soul in the celestial state and its final election to eternal life; such merit would by extension account also for the condition of any one soul's bodily life on earth. This shift is negotiated in the mid-390s. Having in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83* accounted for the salvation of individuals on the basis of their elliptically put *occultissimis meritis*[9] the *Expositio Propositionum* subsequently saw Augustine attribute it to God's foreknowledge of future human faith.[10] Reaching his mature position in the *Ad Simplicianum*, he came to designate faith itself as an unmerited gift of grace, all notion of merit being projected into the life of grace *post donum*, in the light of the commonly held demerit of Adam. From this stable and final position, Augustine would reject a fall–election connection but not a connection between the fall of the soul and its initial, earthly **(p.195)** embodiment. Only in the light of the Pelagian controversy did he realize the need to integrate his theology of merit with this tendency towards approving the soul's origin in a fall from premundane life. As a result, *De Trinitate* 13, *De Civitate Dei* 14, and *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10 propose a synthesis in which Adam as 'transindividual personage' contained the life of all subsequent souls together (*commune*) in himself, and from whose sin they descended to bodies to assume their individual (*propria*) lives: 'Qua contemplative soul…this would permit him to be the totality of "human nature" in which all once commonly participated; as such, his fall from the spiritual paradise of contemplative union with God could indeed be our common fall as well.'[11] This is a new formulation, fully in debt neither to Plotinus nor to the *maiores* on whose authority Augustine had defended his teaching on Original Sin. As O'Connell admits in summary: 'It seems doubtful whether Augustine's is any longer a theory of the "origin of the soul" in the conventional sense applied by both parties in the controversy; he may have come a good way toward explaining the origin of the whole man ("*totus homo*") who, body and soul, was the incarnate subject of original sin.'[12]

O'Connell's thesis is clearly controversial, and has been widely criticized. From a methodological perspective, it presupposes Augustine's philosophical dependence on Plotinus; that conclusion is by no means easily proven, as the very numerous studies arguing for Augustine's reception of Porphyry alongside or instead of Plotinus, have shown.[13] Furthermore, in the light of the argument of this book, O'Connell's exclusion of Origen's work from the sources available to Augustine in adopting a fall model of the soul's origin must be contested. However, his delineation of the sheer mass of ambivalent material in the Augustinian corpus relating to the origin of the soul does point to a significant lacuna: Augustine never denies knowledge of something **(p.196)** lightly, and his reasons for doing so are always complex. While I leave the detail of O'Connell's argument to the interested reader, I want to revisit Augustine's treatment of the soul's

origin in the context of his anti-Pelagian works, and with it his more specific handling of the origin of Christ's soul. As a preliminary to this, I shall briefly survey the context for Augustine's reflections on both issues in the years after 412, which are once again to be found in the Origenist controversy.

The origin of the soul in the Origenist and Pelagian controversies

The problem of the soul's origin was not new to Christian discourse at the beginning of the fifth century. Carol Harrison calls it a 'Late Antique obsession': 'Its spectral presence lies behind many of the debates concerning human sinfulness and the nature and transmission of Adam's sin in the early church, precisely because it remained a live question, bequeathed from one generation of Christian theologians to another, lurking unresolved and unanswered among some of the most sensitive issues of the faith.'[14] A standard conundrum of classical Physics, it had repeatedly drawn the attention of both Plato and Aristotle, and found its expositor *par excellence* in Plotinus.[15] In the West, Tertullian had attempted a Christian treatment of the question in his own *De Anima*; later, Ambrose would give characteristically allegorical attention to aspects of the issue in *De Isaac vel Anima*. At the end of the fourth century, Nemesius of Emesa offered a full-scale theological anthropology, paying due attention to the soul's origin and nature, in his *De Natura Hominis*. Augustine himself produced two works on the soul's characteristics (though not specifically its origin) in the 380s, the *De Immortalitate Animae* and *De Quantitate Animae*. Never a subject of foreground dispute at the early ecumenical councils, the nascence of the soul and the process of its embodiment remained an open question outside mainstream orthodoxy, allowing the writings of both Tertullian and Lactantius (erstwhile Traducianists) to be accepted into the Patristic canon by Western writers.

The rising tide of debate about the soul's origin in the West at the turn of the fifth century cannot be separated from the publication of Origen's *De Principiis* in Rufinus' translation of 398. For the first time, Origen's speculative treatment of the origin of the soul was available to a Latin audience in a complete edition. The subtleties of Rufinus' translation notwithstanding, **(p.197)** *De Principiis* frequently turns to this issue,[16] handling it in both an abstract and speculative vein, and in relation to the election of Jacob and Esau (Rom. 9), whose differing status under the divine judgement is ascribed to the sins of their respective souls in a premundane state.[17] Origen's most vivid (and perhaps most quoted) pronouncement on the origin of the soul in that work is found at *De Principiis* 2.8.3. Book 2 opens by arguing that all living animals have souls: cattle, men, and angels possess them as a special gift;[18] nor can it to be doubted that Christ possessed a soul, as all of these possess rational feeling and movement.[19] The evident imperfection of the soul raises the possibility that it is capable of falling away from God, a point corroborated by the etymology of the word ψυχη, as Rufinus translates: 'We must ask whether perhaps the word "soul", which is *psyche* in Greek, is not so formed because of the cooling down of the soul from its more excellent and divine state, from which the word has been translated: seeing that it has cooled from its natural, divine warmth, it is now situated—really and etymologically—in the place where it now exists.'[20]

Origen finds a partial proof for his theory in the figure of Esau, condemned in later life for prenatal sins, and thus born in unfavourable relationship to Jacob. While the mass of souls may have fallen from a heavenly life as a kind of communal mind, to many and diverse embodiments in present reality, this is not true of the singular soul of Christ, as 2.6 makes clear. This soul was made with the Word, 'one spirit, in pre-eminent degree' (*principaliter unus spiritus*)[21] through its love and virtue, whereas, 'on account of the faculty of free will, variety and diversity have taken hold of each and every soul'.[22] Like iron placed in a furnace, the union of love between the Word and this soul rendered the distinction between the two imperceptible. Likewise, the presence of the Word with the soul effected its complete sanctification: as fragrant oil, he allowed his human vessel to emit only sweet aromas. For all that such a Christology and its underlying theological anthropology is evocative and attractive, it should, however, be read in the light of the intentionally experimental remit of *De Principiis* as a whole. Origen makes clear in the preface of the work that his speculative reflections on doctrinal matters are always subordinate to the certain doctrine laid out in the Apostolic Teaching.[23]

(p.198) Following the publication of the translation, Rufinus was swiftly accused of holding the opinions he had laboured to bring to a Latin audience by Jerome's friends, Marcella and Pammachius, who took their complaint to

Anastasius of Rome. Rufinus' response contained the seeds of the entire debate to follow:

> But if anyone asks me what I think, I confess that I have read different things on this topic in the works of a great many writers. I have read some who say that the soul is poured out along with the body through the transmission of the human seed; and this they confirm with what declarations they can. I think that Tertullian or Lactantius among the Latins thought this, and probably quite a few more. Others claim that God makes souls daily and pours them into bodies when they are formed in the womb. Others still think that souls were made once long ago, when God created all things from nothing, and that he now distributes them to be born in bodies as his judgement decrees. Origen thought this, and not a few other Greeks. When I read each of these positions, I say—with God as my witness—that I do not hold anything about this matter to be immediately certain or definite; but I leave it to God to know what is true, and whether he will deign to reveal it to anyone himself.
>
> *Si autem et de me quid sentiam quaeritur, fateor me de hac quaestione apud quamplurimos tractatorum diuersa legisse. Legi quosdam dicentes quod pariter cum corpore per humani seminis traducem etiam anima defundatur, et hoc quibus poterant adsertionibus confirmabant. Quod puto inter latinos tertullianum sensisse uel lactantium, fortassis et alios nonnullos. Alii adserunt quod formatis in utero corporibus deus cotidie faciat animas et infundat. Alii factas iam olim, id est, tunc cum omnia deus creauit ex nihilo, nunc eas iudicio suo dispenset nasci in corpore. Hoc sentit et origenes et nonnulli alii graecorum. Ego uero cum haec singula legerim, deo teste dico quia usque ad praesens certi et definiti aliquid de hac quaestione non teneo, sed deo relinquo scire quid sit in uero et si cui ipse reuelare dignabitur.*[24]

Four years later in 403, Jerome made his final break with both Rufinus and Origen in his *Apology*, pouring scorn not only on Rufinus' work as translator and *traditor* of proscribed texts, but also for what he construed to be his prevarication about the origin of the soul: 'On Origen alone you do not equivocate. For you say, "Origen thought this." So, I will question you: did he think it rightly, or wrongly? I do not know, you say. Why then do you send me couriers and a ceaseless flood of heralds, to try to teach me to know what **(p.199)** you do not?'[25] Yet, as I shall show, Jerome's own position after the dust had settled was no less ambiguous or closed to criticism. Once the issue of the soul's origin had been claimed by Jerome for his anti-Origenist cause, it would admit even less of an easy solution under a theological lens.

De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione 2 and 3

In my analysis of *De Peccatorum Meritis* in Chapter 2, I observed that this book reveals an Augustine quite aware of the connection between the protology of the soul, the doctrine of Original Sin, and its implications for a theology of infant baptism. Sensing the threat of Rufinus the Syrian's conflation of the doctrine of Original Sin with an Origenist fall of souls to his own theological reputation, and confronted by the emissary of Rufinus' theology in the person of Caelestius of Carthage, Augustine set about defending the authority of his own teaching on the Fall. The closing chapter of the second book contains the first ambivalent reference to the problem of the soul's origin in the anti-Pelagian works, in terms that would be frequently repeated throughout the controversy. Offering a final exposition of Romans 8:3, Augustine observed that the 'likeness of sinful flesh' proves the reality of 'sinful flesh' possessed by all. Attempting to account for the soul's need of salvation along with its sinful flesh, he proposes two solutions: either the soul is propagated from and with sinful flesh, or it is 'mixed with the flesh of sin which weighs it down' (*carni peccati aggrauanda miscetur*).[26] However, this latter option risks impugning the justice of God, in sentencing an innocent soul to punishment in the body. Disappointingly, Augustine abruptly leaves the issue hanging, promising another treatise specifically about the soul at a later date, and advising caution when attempting to resolve questions on which Scripture remains silent. Having recalled the manuscript of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* 1 and 2 from Marcellinus in 412, he returned once again to the problem in book 3, completed some months later. His approach is curious, quoting from Pelagius only to sidestep the problem the text so clearly outlines:

> For [Pelagius] says, if only the flesh is given by transmission, and not the soul, the flesh alone possess transmitted sin, and it alone deserves punishment (for they think this); and they say it is unjust, for a soul born today to bear so

ancient a sin as Adam's, but not to be from the mass of Adam.[27]

(p.200) Pelagius rightly recognizes the difficulty of the issue, as Augustine observes: 'he does not say "the soul is not transmitted", but "*if* the soul is not transmitted"' (*non enim ait, quia anima non est ex traduce, sed si anima non est ex traduce*).[28] However, if it cannot be proven that the soul comes to the body by propagation, it likewise cannot be shown that it would not merit the punishment of sin through another mode of embodiment. He and Pelagius should rather keep silence on such a mysterious matter, which would in any case require a discrete treatise of its own. Although both passages end with this promise, Augustine would not write *De Anima et eius Origine* until 421, and only then in response to the explicit and highly abrasive attack of Vincentius Victor. I shall return to this important work below.

In the intervening nine years, Augustine wrote reluctantly about the origin of the soul at the urging of his correspondents. Having returned the completed three books of *De Peccatorum Meritis* to Marcellinus in 413, he received a letter from him in the same year, inviting a more spacious discussion of the problem, and citing *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 to him: 'however, assigned to inferior bodies after sin, rational substance rules its body not only by choice, but as the laws of the universe are accustomed to permit.'[29] Augustine responded by stating his present position as consistent with that found elsewhere in his early work: he had never intended to prefer any one model of the soul's origin and embodiment, as the reasonable application of both a 'descent' and 'Creationist' account to Ecclesiastes 12.7, 'and the spirit returns to the God who gave it' (*et spiritus redeat ad deum qui dedit illum*) proves; however, Scripture says nothing clear on the matter.[30]

Epistles 164, 143, and 166

Shortly afterwards, Augustine received a flurry of letters from his old friend Evodius, now bishop of Uzalis. The resulting exchange is interesting not least for the light it throws on Augustine as an unwilling correspondent, ignoring letters[31] and clearly showing his irritation at Evodius' criticism of his Christology in Epistle 137.[32] Evodius' letter (Epistle 163 in the Augustinian corpus), sent in 414, indicates an awareness of Augustine's earlier correspondence with Marcellinus, and suggests that the question of the soul's origin was **(p.201)** widespread, in asking which of the theories of the soul could rightly be applied to Christ. Replying in Epistle 164, Augustine addressed the issue through Evodius' prior request that he explain the harrowing of hell.

It is incorrect to believe that Christ's soul died when he went to liberate the departed from bondage, he writes; on the contrary, the soul dies only through sin, from which Christ was entirely free, and the devil is discharged as the overlord of humanity only when a sinless soul trumps his rights in dying without sin. In what follows, Augustine applies only two of his four preferred protologies to Christ. If all souls are derived from that of Adam, that of Christ must have been cleansed in the assumption of his human nature; conversely, if souls are created and inserted into bodies from which they are infected with the contagion of sin, Christ's soul evaded a sinful nature by taking a body in the likeness of sinful flesh. Augustine adds a final disclaimer, excluding any suggestion that souls are placed penally into bodies to atone for sins committed elsewhere and making clear that this position has no bearing on the question of Christ's soul.[33] While apparently answering Evodius' enquiry, Epistle 164 is evasive and fails to comment on Evodius' (and Augustine's own) 'four options' in their entirety. Furthermore, the problem of ascribing to Christ an unbalanced human nature, possessing a sinless soul within fleshly confines that very closely reflect ordinary, sinful nature, is left unaddressed. The difficulty of not indicting the justice of a God who inserts new and sinless souls into sinful bodies either fails to occur to Augustine, or again falls victim to his own confusion on the issue, in spite of his clear understanding of the problem expressed in *De Peccatorum Meritis* 2 and 3. And, while he rejects the idea that embodiment is effected as the divine punishment for premundane sin, other varieties of a fall or descent protology go unmentioned.

In the same year, Augustine's first correspondent, Marcellinus, pursued Jerome for an answer to his question, apparently unsatisfied with Augustine's Epistle 143. In 415 Jerome replied briefly but courteously: Marcellinus' relative Oceanus has a copy of his *Apology*, in which he lays out his opinions on the origin of the soul. In any case, Jerome tartly adds: 'To be sure, you have there Augustine the bishop, a holy and learned man, who can teach you *viva voce*, as they say, and explain his opinion; or I should rather say my opinion, put in his own words.'[34] Shortly afterwards Marcellinus was executed,

leaving Augustine to reply to Jerome's letter in his own Epistle 166, under the guise of commending to him Paul Orosius, now en route to Bethlehem.[35] Alluding to the recent debate *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 had provoked, Augustine opens with a restatement **(p.202)** of his equivocal position on the soul's origin, taken from the same book. However, the majority of the letter is given over to a careful critique of Jerome's own Creationist theology.

Augustine first lists the reasons for which this theory *cannot* be erroneous. Creationism, he writes, is not to be discounted on the grounds that God is said in Genesis to have finished his work on the sixth day, as the creation of souls from the prototype of humanity made in God's image is a work of continuing providence, not a new creation. Similarly, the apparent waste of infant souls through early death does not bring the goodness of their creation into question, as God administers all things with perfect wisdom. Likewise, the creation of souls in time is no obstacle to their being immortal, as the flesh of Christ proves that God is capable of making the temporal eternal by his will. Lastly, the embodiment of souls in the offspring of the evil is also to be considered a work of God's wisdom, which can readily bring good from evil.[36] The substance of Augustine's objection to Creationism is the more weighty, as it threatens to overturn his whole anti-Pelagian project if convincingly defended: 'I therefore ask, what is the reason for the condemnation of infants? For I do not see that any sin can be in souls while in infancy, if souls are newly made as individual entities for individual infants; nor do I believe that any one of them is condemned by God when he sees it has no sin.'[37]

Jerome replied in 416, characteristically avoiding the content of the letter. The delicacy of the question now required silence, and Augustine should attend rather to joining him in the fight against the Pelagians. He ends with an intriguing postscript, apologizing that, owing to lack of amanuenses, he cannot send Augustine 'that edition of the Septuagint that is punctuated by asterisks and obelisks' ([*editio septuaginta*] *quae asteriscis ueribus que distincta est*).[38] This cannot be anything other than the *Hexapla* of Origen, or a work derived from it. It would appear that Jerome wished to cease communicating not only on matters of contentious theology with his African correspondent, but also to remove himself from further censure as a supplier of suspicious texts to Augustine.

In his first anti-Pelagian treatise, and in correspondence with Marcellinus, Evodius and Jerome, Augustine repeatedly rejects a single solution to the problem of the soul's origin. Insisting that his opinions had remained consistent since the writing of *De Libero Arbitrio*, he publicly affirmed the possibility that any one of the four commonly discussed protologies might be correct. In the absence of direct scriptural authority privileging one over the others, he **(p.203)** accordingly refused to commit himself to any one theory. However, writing to Jerome, he excluded Creationism as incompatible with his own teaching on Original Sin and its punishment. In his letter to Evodius, he likewise ruled out a fall model connected to penal embodiment. As would soon become apparent in *De Anima et eius Origine*, Augustine's insistence on the incorporeality of the soul further removed Traducianism as a solution to the problem. None of the texts cited above seriously considers a 'descent' protology, nor do they articulate clearly a 'fall' model in which the sinful soul is joined to a body to redeem its tendency to vice, precisely the position suggested in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.20. This is all the more strange given that Augustine elliptically refers to the 'mixing and weighing down' (*quo carni peccati aggrauanda et miscetur*) of the soul with the sinfulness of the body at *De Peccatorum Meritis* 2.59.36, as a viable alternative to Traducianism.

De Anima et Eius Origine: the long-awaited treatise

Augustine had promised in the second book of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* to issue a treatise dealing specifically with the soul's origin. This he finally did in 421, though under the duress of further controversy distinct from, though related to, the recent Pelagian crisis. In 418, he had responded to a letter from Optatus, bishop of Mauretania Tingetana, asking for his current opinion on the issue of the origin of the soul. His tone was cordial and measured, repeating the refrain: I have never committed myself on this point, and it remains of secondary importance so long as the doctrine of Redemption is rightly held.[39] Nonetheless, he continued, the two most commonly approved theories remain problematic, as Creationism implies the unjust damnation of souls, sinful only because of the quality of their bodies, and Traducianism veers towards a corporeal conception of the soul.[40] In the absence of a clear solution to the problem,

Augustine repeated Jerome's advice: concentrate on the immediate threat of Pelagianism. Their heresy is dangerous, not because they deny the propagation of souls from Adam, but because on that basis they argue against the transmission of Original Sin. Bolstering the point, Augustine quoted Pelagius:

> He says, 'If the soul is not given by the transmission of the seed, but the flesh alone contains the transmission of sin, it alone deserves punishment. It is unjust that a soul, born today but not of the mass of Adam, should bear an ancient sin not its own; for it is **(p.204)** not credible that God, who remits the sins of each individual, should impute to an individual a sin which is not his own.'
>
> *Si anima, inquit, ex traduce non est, sed sola caro tantum habet traducem peccati, sola ergo poenam meretur. Iniustum est enim ut hodie nata anima non ex massa Adae, tam antiquum peccatum portet alienum, quia nulla ratione conceditur ut Deus qui propria peccata dimittit, unum imputet alienum.*[41]

All protological speculation, Augustine continues, must be founded upon what is surely known of redemption, as Zosimus has made clear in his letter: no one is called ransomed but he who was formerly made captive to sin.[42] However, Augustine offered Optatus one certain opinion, to be held whatever the general theory of the soul's origin might be: Christ contracted no sin from Adam. If souls are individually created, his was also, and placed in the likeness of sinful flesh; if propagated, his was cleansed in the taking or not received by sinful propagation.[43] This statement is identical with that made in Epistle 164; Epistle 190, however, contains the seeds of Augustine's final position as O'Connell depicts it, that 'when they existed originally in their parents, they were not yet the kind of creatures that exercised their own individual lives' (*cum essent originaliter in parentibus, adhuc ipsi nulli erant qui suas et proprias uitas agerent*).[44] Christ's soul as an individual creation or propagated and 'cleansed' entity aside, it remains unclear what it would mean for his soul to have been 'in Adam' before individuation, subsequently not to have contracted sin by propagation from Adam's fall. Even more mysterious is Augustine's claim that Christ's soul may not have come from the Adamic, pre-individuated soul at all; unfortunately, he does not pursue the point. Epistle 190 passed into the hands of one of Optatus' presbyters, Peter, at whose home it was found and read by Vincentius Victor. A recent convert from Rogatism,[45] **(p.205)** Vincentius took issue with Augustine's agnostic stance on the soul's origin, and wrote a two-volume critique of his position to Peter. Once detected by the bearer of Optatus' initial letter to Augustine, Renatus, it was sent to Augustine.

The resulting treatise of 421, *De Anima et eius Origine*, was published as a collection of four lengthy letters, to Renatus (book 1), Peter (2), and Vincentius Victor (3 and 4). The full content of the work is convoluted and repetitive. In part, this is due to the complexity of Vincentius' own position (arguably unintelligible taken as a whole), which combines a corporeal conception of the soul with an account of its emanation from God's own substance, together with a highly confused account of merit, in which the soul before embodiment deserves neither good nor bad, but once in the flesh is considered to have merited defilement through it.[46] Replying to Vincentius in book 4, Augustine applies a standard of intellectual limitation on his position, which can be read as a defence of his own agnostic stance on the origin of the soul throughout his mature works. Vincentius begins from the assertion that knowing the origin of the human soul falls within the remit of ordinary self-knowledge. Augustine counters this with the fact that knowledge of our present physical biology and even our infancy is itself bounded, apart from any question of the soul's primal state.[47] It may be the case that we have forgotten this knowledge, or never knew it to begin with, but the point is irrelevant, as we are as fully ourselves before we remember a forgotten datum as afterwards, even when in remembering we are restored to ourselves.[48] The extent of our present intellect and will is cloudy to us, and both faculties require the augmentation of grace to reach their full dimension. This is the essence of faith, the acknowledgement of our limits in openness to their expansion by God. In promising his life to Christ, Peter did not know the extent of the power of his own will, which would finally be led to martyrdom.[49] The resurrection itself comes under the heading of those things not yet fully known, and is not to be doubted as a central article of the faith.

Two related features of the treatise call for comment. First, in responding to Vincentius' own theory of the origin of souls, Augustine discusses only **(p.206)** Traducianism and Creationism. These, combined with a variety of Emanationism,

comprise Vincentius' stance. There is no explicit mention of either a fall or descent model, so common in Augustine's general approach to the topic, although the question of merit (crucial to both) is treated in the course of tackling Vincentius' understanding of the soul's condition following embodiment. Secondly, Augustine heads his consideration of the limits of human knowledge of the primal state with the proposition that it might have been forgotten or never known. However, while he devotes considerable space to an exposition of the nature of memory and forgetting, he does not fully explore the possibility that this knowledge was never possessed to begin with. The central reflection on memory is reminiscent of Augustine's meditation on the expanse—and limitation—of memory at the heart of *Confessiones* 10, itself an original reworking of *Enneads* 3.3.2:

> And whosoever tries to learn of this is told quite rightly: 'Do not seek the things that are too high for you, neither search for those things above your strength.' For it is not that these things are higher than our stature can attain, but that they are higher than our intelligence can reach; and they are beyond the strength of the power of our human capacity to penetrate. And yet, it is not the heaven of heaven, nor the measure of the stars, nor the limit of the sea and the earth, nor the depth of the deeps: it is we who have not the power to understand ourselves. We surpass the small measure of our own knowledge, who are higher than ourselves and beyond our own strength. We cannot grasp ourselves, even within who we are. However, we are not on that account to be compared to cattle, because we cannot discover who we are within: and you think to compare us to the cattle, if we have forgotten who we are, even though we knew it once.
>
> *Et quisquis fuerit conatus haec discere, non frustra ei dicitur, Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris. Neque enim altiora sunt quam potest nostra statura contingere, sed quam potest nostra coniectura comprehendere; et fortiora quam potest vis humani ingenii penetrare: et tamen non est coelum coeli, non dimensio siderum, non modus maris atque terrarum, non infernus inferior: nos sumus, qui nos comprehendere non valemus; nos modulum scientiae nostrae altiores fortioresque superamus; nos non possumus capere nos, et certe non sumus extra nos. Nec ideo comparandi pecoribus, quia id quod sumus non penitus invenimus: et comparandos nos pecoribus putas, si quod fuimus obliti sumus, si tamen id aliquando noveramus.*[50]

Augustine appears to be working out an ironic subtext here, recalling his own past work in an analysis of the limitations of memory, in a text whose 'primal state' is found in the works of Plotinus. Viewing it under O'Connell's critical lens, we may read the passage as a covert and very subtly ironic reminder of the two theories of the soul's origin, which go unmentioned elsewhere in the work. Reviewing Augustine's own promise of 412, we are, however, left with a text that is disappointingly inexplicit. Far from resolving his opinions in public **(p.207)** discourse, it makes only a fraction of the possible solutions to the problem public and defines his own position as essentially and permanently ambiguous. It would remain so throughout his final works against Julian, Augustine having by this time moved the terms of the debate by situating 'un-individuated' souls in Adam. Inevitably, his loose ends leave the question of Christ's soul hanging as well.

In all of his literary engagement with the question of the soul's origin, Augustine remained aloof and defensive. Where a secondary issue among the theologically literate had become an item of interest and lively debate in the closing years of the fourth century, Rufinus of Aquileia's translation of *De Principiis*, and his subsequent acrimonious row with Jerome, catapulted any discussion of the issue in Origenian terms to a position of acute controversy. In his early works, Augustine had been careful to couch his exploration of a Christian Platonist fall/descent protology in detailed disclaimers. After the exposure of Rufinus of Syria as the ultimate source of Caelestius' theology in 412, these disclaimers alone remained in Augustine's writing, along with a refutation of the importance of the issue *tout court*. While he maintained the formal possibility that souls are created afresh for each newly propagated body, his attack on Jerome in Epistle 166 effectively reveals his rejection of the theory. Similarly, although Augustine acknowledges the currency of Traducianism within historic Christian discourse, his suspicions of the theory (centred on its suggestion of the corporeality of the soul) rule it out as a 'live' solution to the question. What remains, by his own admission, are a variety of protologies in which the soul is held to have existed in a prior life, before falling, descending, or being divinely sent to embodiment. In a complex and ironic move, the superficially negative method of *De Anima et eius Origine* rather suggests that it is precisely the soul's

forgotten origin in a premundane life that makes its embodiment an unknowable mystery. Yet this remains a suggestion, to be weighed against his repeated rejections of the debate altogether.

In his anti-Apollinarian polemic, Augustine reiterated the orthodox truism: in order to save humankind, Christ must possess a fully human soul. His engagement with the issue of the soul's origin notwithstanding, a sustained treatment of the origin of Christ's soul is absent from his whole work. The closest Augustine comes to pronouncing on the topic in Epistle 180 is, once again, equivocal: if souls are created for each individual, Christ's was created sinless; if they are propagated, his was cleansed in the assumption, or not taken from the same source as sinful humanity. Having implicitly rejected both Traducianism and Creationism, Augustine cannot seriously apply the first two options to Christ. This leaves the tantalizing question: from where else but the fallen humanity of Adam can Christ's soul come?

Because it is impossible to answer this question directly from within the Augustinian corpus, the remainder of this chapter will be an attempt to piece **(p.208)** together several related aspects of Augustine's Christology, to find an implicit doctrine of Christ's soul beneath them. Inasmuch as the texts will permit such a reading, I want to argue that Augustine's early use of the phrase 'human of the Lord' or 'dominical human' (*homo dominicus*) should be reclassified as an Origenian designation for the humanity of Christ, and I will explore its relationship to the terms 'human assumed/taken up' (*homo assumptus* and *susceptus*) found elsewhere in Augustine's earlier works. In their suggestion that the Incarnation sees the taking-up of an already existing human person, these phrases are problematic, and have given rise to a rich seam of scholarship on the debt of Augustine to Antiochene Christology. While I shall attend to this question and its bearing on my broader reading of Augustine as (by contrast) the inheritor of an Origenian Christological tradition, my main focus will be on the precise character of the Incarnate humanity indicated by these terms. I shall then expand these observations by turning to Augustine's description of the process by which the *homo* of the Incarnation is taken up without regard to his prevenient merits. In the context of his broader theology of predestination and election, I shall investigate whether such a characterization of this humanity as one having no merit to gain salvation makes theological sense. The disjunction—and commonality—between these two varying accounts of the Incarnation will point towards the 'white elephant' in Augustine's Christology. This is not, after all, Apollinarianism, but rather an undeveloped and latent belief in Christ's human pre-existence, and with it his unfallen soul. I shall find confirmation of this in two crucial texts, taken from Epistle 140 and *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10.

A case of mistaken identities? Augustine and Christ, Dominicus Homo

As I indicated in my Introduction, making a neat survey of Augustine's Christology is hindered not only by the size and chronological spread of his works, but also by the wide variety of images he uses to describe the Incarnation. Among the more mysterious is his use of the term *homo dominicus*, the 'human of the Lord' or 'dominical human', found in seven works between the years 386 and 395. The swift disappearance of the term in 395, its ambiguous theological content, and its roots in a number of controversial streams of theology make it a fixed datum of scholarship on Augustine's Christology. Here, my interest centres on excavating what it can tell us about Augustine's attitude to the prehistory of Christ's humanity. Before looking in detail at his use of the term and plotting its origin in the tradition preceding him, it is worth noting once again the significance of this time span. The year of **(p.209)** Augustine's conversion—386—initiated his retirement from rhetoric and retreat to Cassiciacum. In 395, he was elected to the episcopate. Before this crucial event, Augustine had been immersed in scriptural study, writing his first full-length commentaries not only on Genesis, but also on the letters of Paul. After 395 would come the *Ad Simplicianum*, beginning the trajectory of Augustine's mature teaching on sin and grace. His use of the term *homo dominicus* therefore falls within his formative passage from neophyte to bishop; it ceases just as the Origenist controversy was beginning to accelerate.

Reviewing his use of the phrase at the end of his career, Augustine commented:

> I do not see how it is correct to refer to the Mediator of God and humanity, the human Christ Jesus, as 'the human of the Lord', since he is Lord in a unique way. Is it not possible to call him or her 'the human of the Lord', who is part of His holy family? And, as I have said, I have read this in Catholic authors who write with a most divine

> eloquence. But (and I have said this everywhere) I said I did not realize that then. Later, I saw that the phrase should not be used of Christ, although its use could be defended with a measure of reason.
>
> *sed non uideo utrum recte dicatur homo dominicus qui est mediator dei et hominum homo christus iesus, cum sit utique dominus. dominicus autem homo quis in eius sancta familia non potest dici? et hoc quidem ut dicerem apud quosdam legi tractatores catholicos diuinorum eloquiorum. sed ubicumque hoc dixi, dixisse me nollem. postea quippe uidi non esse dicendum, quamuis nonnulla possit ratione defendi*.[51]

By his own account, after 395 he had rejected the phrase for not being Christologically specific enough, even though it had been taken from sound sources; *homo dominicus* could be used to describe any baptized Christian, and not only the Incarnate Son.

The majority of the texts that refer to the *homo dominicus* present the term simply as a synonym for Christ, without significant doctrinal emphasis.[52] A minority are more unusual, and suggest that the Incarnation involves the assumption of an already existing, personal entity. I give them here more fully **(p.210)** as a result, beginning with the subject of the above *Retractationes* entry, *De Sermone Domini in Monte* 2.20.6:

> None will be permitted to disregard the Kingdom of God, when his only-begotten will come in the human of the Lord from heaven, not only in a way intelligible to the mind but also visibly, to judge the living and the dead.
>
> *nulli autem licebit ignorare dei regnum, cum eius unigenitus non solum intelligibiliter sed etiam uisibiliter in homine dominico de caelo uenerit iudicaturus uiuos et mortuos*.

Although the main point of concern here is undoubtedly the second coming, the final subclause is suggestively ambiguous, depending on whether *de caelo* is taken with *homine dominico* or *uenerit*. While the latter is evidently consistent with credal and scriptural language of the Word's descent from heaven, the former nonetheless makes grammatical sense and finds a parallel in 1 Corinthians 15:47 (*secundus homo de caelo caelestis* in Augustine's text). What the 'human of the Lord from heaven' might be, is left unamplified.

En. Ps. 4.2 comes demonstrably closer to inferring a 'person assumed' Christology. Augustine's text is Romans 5:5 ('God has poured his love into our hearts by the Holy Spirit'), which amplifies Psalm 4:1 ('In my tribulation you have enlarged me'). Exemplifying the hopeful cry of the graced human, these texts cannot, however, be applied to Christ:

> This text is correctly understood of the person who believes in Christ and is illuminated; but I do not see how it can be applied fittingly to that human of the Lord, which the Wisdom of God took up. For he was never, at any time, deserted by Wisdom.
>
> *quod in persona eius qui credens in christum illuminatus est, recte accipitur; in ipsius autem dominici hominis, quem suscepit dei sapientia, non uideo quemadmodum hoc possit congruere. non enim ab ea aliquando desertus est*.

It should be noted that Augustine directly compares the human *persona* crying out to God to the *homo dominicus*: *persona* here is a locus of experience and agency, a thing that God can desert with tangible results, a feeling thing. This, too, is seemingly what the Son of God assumes and has never (note the perfect tense) left.[53] More unexpected still is Augustine's exposition of Psalm 8. In paragraph 10 of the *Enarratio*, he distinguishes between 'human' and 'Son of Humanity', the former being the earthly man typified by Adam, the latter those who **(p.211)** 'bear the image of the heavenly human' (*portant imaginem caelestis hominis*). Thus the words of the psalm, 'What is the human, that you are mindful of him; or the Son of Humanity, that you visit him?' (*quid est homo, quia memor es eius, aut filius hominis, quoniam tu uisitas eum?*) are to be apportioned between the two types of humanity. This makes perfectly good sense where God's mindfulness of sinners and sanctifying visitation of the saints is in mind; its meaning is less clear when

Augustine turns to Christ: 'The Son of Humanity was first visited in that human of the Lord, which was born from the Virgin Mary' (*filius igitur hominis primo uisitatus est in ipso homine dominico, nato ex maria uirgine*).

If the divine visitation is attendant on a prior attainment of the 'image of the heavenly man', and the *homo dominicus* is the first to be graced with such a visitation, the moment of his prior sanctification arises as an open question. Is Augustine referring to the Incarnation from the Virgin itself as the occasion of God's self-presentation to Christ's humanity, or to some time before it? The text is too elliptical to judge accurately. At which point the humanity of Christ might have approximated that of the Adamic man alone is likewise left open, although Augustine's treatment of Romans 8:3 elsewhere reveals his correlation of Christ's humanity with both fallen, graced, and saved humankind.

As this brief examination of the texts shows, the phrase *homo dominicus* in Augustine's early works is not put to consistent use, being either a broad cipher for 'Christ' or veering uncertainly towards a 'person assumed' typology. Drobner's 1986 study of the meaning of *persona* in Augustine's Christology admits some confusion about his abandonment of the phrase,[54] and glosses it (perhaps a little redundantly) as a reference to Christ as 'a human elevated out of the normal level of humanity'.[55] Its interest, however, lies as much in its origin as in its vague application, as Grillmeier highlighted in his seminal article on the history of the term: '[Augustine] took it over from others, and used it without independent reflection or analysis as an expression denoting the human reality of Christ.'[56] His now authoritative article on the designation κυριακος ἀνθρωπος */homo dominicus* shows clearly its changing fortunes throughout the fourth and fifth centuries in both the East and West, through Athanasius, Severus of Antioch, and Marcellus of Ancyra, Didymus, and Jerome.[57]

(p.212) The author whose use of the term appears most closely to anticipate that of Augustine is Didymus the Blind, who attributes the words of the psalmist to Christ the κυριακος ἀνθρωπος,[58] and who uses the phrase with specific reference to Christ's human sinlessness.[59] Altaner has argued that Didymus is to be identified with the plurally named *tractatores catholicos* of *Retractationes* 1.19.8, it being almost certain that Augustine knew *De Spiritu Sancto* in Jerome's translation of 389. Altaner argues this from Augustine's characterization of the Holy Spirit as the *digitus dei*, found in *De Spirito Sancto* 20 and reproduced in *Quaestiones in Heptateuchem* 2.25, of around 420.[60] However, Goulven Madec has since proposed that Augustine's use of *homo dominicus* in his early writing points decisively to a reception of Didymus shortly after the publication of Jerome's translation.[61] Of particular interest here is *De Spirito Sancto* 51, not only for its attribution of the words of the psalmist to the *domincus homo*, but also in its final reference to Luke 1:35:

> Indeed, that this voice comes forth from the person of the human of the Lord, which the only-begotten Son of God deigned to assume from the Virgin, is clearly confirmed out of this text: for he is the right hand of God, as it is written in the Acts of the Apostles. For he was made from the seed of David according to the flesh and born of the Virgin, after the Holy Spirit had come upon her, and the power of the Most High had overshadowed her.
>
> *Et certe vocem hanc ex persona Dominici Hominis proferri, quem unigenitus Filius Dei assumere dignatus est ex virgine, ex ipso loco manifeste comprobatur, quia ipse est dextera Dei, sicut scriptum est in Actibus apostolorum, quod factus sit ex semine David secundum carnem, genitus de Virgine, Spiritu sancto superveniente in eam, et virtute Excelsi obumbrante eam.*

As I have shown, the majority of Augustine's references to the *dominicus homo* occur in the context of expositing the Psalms, as is the case here. Likewise, Augustine appears to follow Didymus in writing of the *homo dominicus* as something the Word assumes in the Incarnation, together with its undertone of pre-existing personhood. Furthermore, Didymus treats the Christology of the virginal conception out of the text of Luke 1:35, in a manner that reflects that of Origen, and that became increasingly fundamental to Augustine's Christology through the 390s. Presuming that Augustine was in receipt of *De Spiritu Sancto* after 389, and that he recognized in it a Christology of the virginal conception bearing a family likeness with that of Origen, it is not unreasonable to conclude that he absorbed the shorthand *homo dominicus* **(p.213)** into his own work from it. Augustine's rejection of the phrase after 395 is further

explained by anchoring Didymus' use of the term in a prior work of Origen, a lineage about which Augustine became gradually more cautious after 395, as he observed Jerome distance himself from Origenism, and Didymus within it.

Grillmeier's history of *homo dominicus* Christology begins in Alexandria with Athanasius, the context that subsequently defines its homoousian, generally orthodox and eventually rather bland credentials.[62] However, I believe some further tinting can be added to the story of its development by returning once again to the Origenian corpus, to a text apparently unnoticed by Grillmeier. In the first book of his commentary on John, Origen writes:

> However, we hear of a man who is said to be coming after John, who was made before him and was in existence before him, so that we would also learn that the human of the Son of God, the man who was mixed with His divinity, was older than His birth from Mary. John says he did not know this man. But how did he not know Him when he leapt for joy when he was yet a babe unborn in the womb of Elizabeth, when the voice of Mary's salutation sounded in the ears of the wife of Zachariah? Ponder, therefore, whether the words 'I know Him not' may have reference to the period before the bodily existence.
>
> Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς τούτοις λέγεται ὀπίσω Ἰωάννου ἐρχόμενος, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ γεγενημένος καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὤν, ἵνα διδαχθῶμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν τῇ θεότητι αὐτοῦ ἀνακεκραμένον πρεσβύτερον εἶναι τῆς ἐκ Μαρίας γενέσεως, ὄντινα ἄνθρωπόν φησιν ὁ βαπτιστὴς ὅτι οὐκ ᾔδει. Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ᾔδει ὁ σκιρτήσας ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει ἔτι βρέφος τυγχάνων ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς Ἐλισάβετ, ὅτε ἐγένετο ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ ἀσπασμοῦ τῆς Μαρίας εἰς τὰ ὦτα τῆς Ζαχαρίου γυναικός; Ἐπίστησον οὖν, εἰ δύναται τὸ οὐκ ᾔδειν κατὰ τὰ πρὸ σώματος λέγειν.[63]

(p.214) In a piece otherwise unconcerned with the development of *dominicus homo* language, Vogt glosses τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ as 'the human of the Son of God; in Latin later rendered "homo domini" or "homo dominicus"'.[64] The thrust of both 'the human of the Son of God' and 'the human of the Lord' is undoubtedly in the same direction, in referring to a human (in some cases person, in others, nature) belonging to the eternal Son, the divine Lord. Although this is the only extant instance of the phrase in the Origenian corpus, it nonetheless provides a basis from which Didymus might have taken the term in his study of Origen's work, and perhaps the Alexandrian-educated Athanasius also. I would, therefore, argue that Augustine adopted the term on the basis of its broadly Alexandrian pedigree, perceiving the relationship between Didymus and Origen on the basis of their shared provenance and translation by Jerome, and confirmed by a reading of *De Spiritu Sancto*. His better knowledge of the politics—and potential watchwords—of Origenism from 395 must be included as a factor in his eventual rejection of the phrase. This further nuances a reading of his *Retractationes* entry, in which the term is not fully repudiated, but classified as Christologically inadequate.

Thus far, I have outlined Augustine's mixed use of the term *homo dominicus* in his works prior to 395, drawing attention to this date as the termination of his period of theological re-education and the beginning of his assumption of episcopal authority. I have also suggested that its source in the works of Origen provided the motive for his rejection of the phrase as the polemical discussion of the theology of Origen increased around him. Noting that several of the passages in which Augustine refers to the *homo dominicus* resonate with a 'person assumed' Christology, the question of his attitude to the pre-existence of Christ's humanity remains unresolved. I therefore turn to other evidence in the Augustinian corpus, which can be used to illuminate his teaching on the origin of the human nature (or indeed, person) of Christ, and with it his soul.

Homo Dominicus: Assumptus Homo?

Closely related to and enlarging upon the term *dominicus homo* is the problematic phrase *assumptus/susceptus homo*, common to both Eastern and Western writers through the fourth and fifth centuries. Its history culminates in Cyril of Alexandria's attack on Nestorius in the approach to the council of Ephesus. While I have no intention here of exploring in depth these later Eastern assessments of the terminology, it will be useful to sketch briefly the chief objections to the phrase: first, that it implies the existence of Christ's **(p.215)** humanity prior to the Incarnation, which, once assumed,

situates two persons within the hypostatic union; and, secondly, that the Trinity becomes a quaternity of persons once the Incarnation has taken place. In the mode of traditional Patristics, the fault of this Nestorianism is to be attributed to the literal exegesis of Antioch, in which the human experience of Christ was emphasized, and a Word–human model of the Christological union preferred. This is to be contrasted with an Alexandrian approach (of which Apollinarianism forms the extreme example), whose allegorical exegesis more readily interprets the human life of Christ in terms of the hidden divine activity underlying it, and privileges a Word–flesh model of the union, presuming the ontological continuity of the Word and the human soul. Clearly, the Alexandrian tradition was also capable of envisioning a pre-existent human life of Christ, as the work of Origen shows. However, such a life in this context is dependent on the eternally willed co-inherence of all spiritual humans in the life of the Trinity, united to it through the love of the Son; the human soul of Origen's Christ, therefore, has no existence apart from his union with the Word, which in turn forms the theological possibility of the Incarnation. The occurrence of *assumptus homo* language in the Latin Fathers before 431 has, therefore, been a point of acute concern to scholars seeking to reconcile the plurality of Christological language outside the councils to the flattening discourse of the ecumenical documents. Within this stream of scholarship, the question of Augustine's commitment to an 'Antiochene' 'person assumed' Christology has been thoroughly debated. Easy conclusions on the issue have once again been dispersed by his shifting, imprecise language and the difficulty of placing him within a clear tradition of theological reception.

I want to begin this examination of *homo assumptus* language in the Augustinian corpus with Augustine's own disclaimer: whatever his use of the term, in his maturity he understood fully the problem of assigning two persons to Christ and enlarging the Trinity as a result. In *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, he wrote:

> This is that unspeakably accomplished, unique taking-up by the Word of a human, so that he might truly and correctly be called Son of God and Son of Humanity at the same time: Son of Humanity according to the human taken up; and Son of God according to only-begotten God taking him up. On this account, we believe in a Trinity, not a Quaternity.
>
> *ipsa est illa ineffabiliter facta hominis a deo uerbo susceptio singularis, ut filius dei et filius hominis simul, filius hominis propter susceptum hominem, et filius dei propter suscipientem unigenitum deum ueraciter et proprie diceretur; ne non trinitas, sed quaternitas crederetur.*[65]

(p.216) Immediately following this treatise, in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, Augustine made the same point once again, correcting his vocabulary in the process:

> I say: the faithful believer who believes in him also confesses a true human nature, which is our own; however, it is uniquely taken up by God the Word and elevated into the only Son of God, so that he who takes up and what he takes up might be one person in the Trinity. For it is not made a Quaternity by the addition of the humanity assumed, but it remains a Trinity.
>
> *fidelis, inquam, qui in eo ueram naturam credit et confitetur humanam, id est nostram, quamuis singulariter suscipiente deo uerbo, in unicum filium dei sublimatam, ita ut qui suscepit et quod suscepit una esset in trinitate persona. neque enim homine assumpto quaternitas facta est, sed trinitas mansit.*[66]

The subtle change illustrates perfectly the problem facing any analysis of Augustine's use of the word *homo* in a Christological context: he rarely makes explicit whether it designates the individual or the collective, leaving only context to guide the reader.

The authoritative survey of *homo assumptus* language in the Patristic corpus remains H. M. Diepen's article of 1963, issued as a conclusive response to the long-running discussion of its orthodoxy among French and Belgian scholars through the first half of the century. Diepen distinguishes between three different kinds of *homo assumptus* Christology: that which truly asserts a dipersonal Christ and implies the pre-existence of his human identity; a 'mystical' Christology,

which associates the *homo* assumed with Christ's ecclesial Body, and a 'grammatical' approach in which *homo* is properly interchangeable with *humana natura*. Augustine, he argues, falls firmly in the third category, although he also uses the term in its ecclesial sense.[67] Noting the common undertones of both *homo dominicus* and *assumptus homo* language, he suggests that the former was rejected for seeming too like a formal name-designation for Christ, while the latter is merely a heightened form of ordinary vocabulary applied to the Incarnation. As should be clear from my argument above, this does only partial justice to the abruptness and chronological context of the term's disappearance from the Augustinian corpus. Crucial to his argument for a 'grammatical' use in Augustine is the observation of its application alongside a monopersonal, diaphysite Christology in which the communication of idioms is also emphasized. Epistle 187, of **(p.217)** 417, is taken to prove the first point: 'It is clear that by a certain unique taking-up of that human, it was made one person with the Word' (*Est plane, quod singulari quadam susceptione homine illius, una facta est persona cum Verbo*);[68] *De Agone Christiano* 25.23 substantiates the second: 'Thus we say that the Son of God suffered and died in the human whom he bore' (*sic Filium Deum passum et mortuum dicimus in homine quem portabat*). Although the first citation bears out Diepen's argument, the obvious absence of the verbs *assumere/suscipere* in the second should be noted. Epistle 219, of 418, in which Augustine commends Leporius to his own bishops in Gaul after having corrected the mistakes in his Christology, is taken to show a clear awareness of the pitfalls of dipersonalism well in advance of *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*:

> He was not judging certain things correctly, nor did he understand rightly when he denied that God was made man, lest an unworthy change or corruption should follow in the divine substance, which is equal to the Father; nor did he realize that he was covertly introducing a fourth person into the Trinity [because of this].
>
> *non recta quaedam saperet nec uera sentiret negans deum hominem factum, ne uidelicet substantiae diuinae, qua aequalis est patri, indigna mutatio uel corruptio sequeretur, nec uidens quartam se subintroducere in trinitate personam.*[69]

The risk of denaturing the Trinity through a deficient Christology is evidently uppermost in Augustine's mind here, yet this is something effected by a change to the divine substance, where the Son is fractured in his eternal (impassible) and Incarnate (passible) aspects; no mention is made of two persons subsisting in the Incarnation. Further evidence for the conflation of 'Antiochene' and 'Alexandrian' motifs is found in Augustine's letter to Evodius of 415, in which he refers to the 'human…who was fitted to the unity of the person of the Word of God, that is, to the only Son of God, by a wonderful and unique taking up' (*homo…in unitatem personae uerbi dei, hoc est unici filii dei mirabili et singulari susceptione coaptatus est*);[70] here, 'in Christ, the Word and the human is one person' (*in Christo uerbum et homo una persona est*).[71] However, in the same passage Augustine makes the curious assertion: 'the human comes into the Word; the Word does not come into the human as something that can be changed, and for this reason the Son of God is said to be together with the human that has been taken up' (*homo autem uerbo accessit, non uerbum in hominem conuertibiliter accessit; atque ita et filius dei simul cum homine suscepto dicitur*).[72] By 415, Augustine's teaching on the incapacity of the human to approach God was already established; what the 'human comes into the Word' might mean in this context is therefore doubly mysterious.

(p.218) For the few reservations I have levelled against Diepen's study above, his analysis of the lexical 'looseness' of Augustine's Christology cannot be faulted: Augustine certainly uses *homo assumptus* language alongside vocabulary that suggests a substantial union of two natures in one person. However, his summary comments lead to my substantive criticism. Observing that 'at a certain time in his life, Augustine was truly a theologian of the *assumptus homo*',[73] he goes on to remark on the predominance of the motif in the context of Augustine's early, Platonically inspired works. However, this vitiates against his overall conclusion, that 'our Doctor consented to use substantially inexact formulas, quite simply in order to conform to the customs received in the African churches'.[74] Any conscious reception of specifically African, Christological vocabulary cannot have begun in earnest until well into Augustine's ministry, the period that simultaneously sees a marked development in his critical reassessment of Christian Platonism. In this historical muddle, I believe Diepen is missing the theological mark. What he and other readers of the *homo assumptus* trope fail to consider

is the possibility that Augustine did not confuse the terms used to distinguish between an individual and a corporate identity, but declined to make the distinction a hard and fast one altogether. To expand my point, I want to turn briefly to Augustine's interpretation of Genesis, and his later characterization of human creation 'in' and 'as' the corporate Adam.

De Genesi ad Litteram and creation in Adam

In his work of 1987, O'Connell argued that Augustine attempted to resolve the question of the soul's origin in his maturity by pushing his exegesis of Romans 5:12 into his theology of creation. If the punishment for Original Sin committed in Adam is shared by all, all must first have been created in and with him, in a single, incorporated, and mystical identity. While Augustine articulates this position most clearly in his late works against Julian, it cannot be understood apart from his much earlier attempts to comment on the book of Genesis, and to resolve the apparent conflict between the two accounts of creation given in books 1–3. In the 380s, *De Genesi adversus Manichaeos* had advanced a figurative exegesis of the creation narrative, the creation of humankind as perfect spiritual beings in Genesis 1 being contrasted with the history of human embodiment in Genesis 2 and 3. While the priority of the work is the refutation of Manichaean dualism, its debt to Origen and Ambrose is evident not only in hermeneutical method, but also in direct textual reception, which I have indicated in Chapter 2. Because the work **(p.219)** substantially precedes Augustine's exegetical development of the mid-390s, and is in many ways anomalous among his readings of Genesis, I will pursue its contents no further here. Of greater interest to this study is *De Genesi ad Litteram*. Begun around the turn of the fifth century and published in 416, it developed in tandem with Augustine's conflict with Pelagianism.

In his early work *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, Augustine had attempted to outline a Christian development on the Platonic doctrine of pre-physical Forms, claiming their creation by and in the intelligence of God,[75] and the capacity of the soul to behold them in the intelligible realm within the beatific vision.[76] *De Genesi ad Litteram* returned to the theme, treating Genesis 1 as an account of the simultaneous creation of the *rationes causales*, the spiritual forms conceived within the Word from which the temporal creation of Genesis 2 and 3 would unfold. In book 5 of the work, he sums up his foregoing treatment of Genesis 1 by accounting for the change, development, and fruition of creation in the present as an act of divine providence, when God 'unfurled the ages which he put in place as a connected sequence when they were first established' (*explicat saecula, quae illi, cum primum condita est, tamquam plicita indiderat*) within his own mind, the eternal Son.[77] Resting from creation on the seventh day, God beholds the work of the creation effected through six prior days, which are, however, a single divine act, one creative day; he rested in himself, and 'he presented the day which he had made six times with those creatures he had made, not temporally, in alternating sequence, but in the order which is known according to their rational causes'.[78] Turning to the creation of man in time in book 6, Augustine carefully explains the distinction between the simultaneous and temporal creations:

> Now, however, it is the case that those things are in one way finished, and in another way unfinished, which God at the first created simultaneously and are being evolved **(p.220)** out of the succession of time. They are finished indeed, because they have nothing in their proper natures, by which they traverse their course through time, which was not made in them in their rational causes. They are likewise unfinished, because they were like seeds of future things which are to be uncovered in fitting places through the course of time, from darkness into light.
>
> *nunc autem, quia et consummata quodam modo et quodam modo inchoata sunt ea ipsa, quae consequentibus euoluenda temporibus primitus deus simul omnia creauit, cum faceret mundum—consummata quidem, quia nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis causaliter factum sit, inchoata uero, quoniam quaedam erant quasi semina futurorum per saeculi tractum ex occulto in manifestum locis congruis exerenda.*[79]

Humankind as a creature possessing both body and soul is to be included among these 'completed beginnings', any suggestion that the human *ratio causalis* contained only the soul is to be rejected, along with the proposition that souls are punished for the sins committed in the intelligible realm by being 'thrust down…into different bodies on account of the merits of their different sins' (*pro diuersorum meritis peccatorum in diuersa corpora…detrusas*).[80] However, while

Augustine shortly afterwards clarifies the distinction between the *animalis* body of Adam in paradise and the *spiritalis* body promised to the saints,[81] he leaves the quality of the body's *ratio causalis* unexplained. It is difficult to imagine how this would be different from the soul's potential to animate a body, making it in turn the body's rational cause.

This elision is further complicated in Augustine's later works, where the concept of the *rationes causales* is clumsily transferred into the discussion of the propagation of sinfulness. This is most clearly displayed in *De Civitate Dei* 13, in the course of describing the punishment for Adam's sin:

> We all were one in him, when all of us were the one of him, who fell into sin through the woman who was made from him before sin. Form was not yet created and distributed to us individually, in which we might live as individuals; but the seminal nature, from which we would be propagated, was already in existence. When this was vitiated by sin, constrained by the chains of death, and justly damned, there was no other condition of humanity from which the human could be born.
>
> *omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli uiueremus; sed iam erat natura seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccatum uitiata et uinculo mortis obstricta iusteque damnata non alterius condicionis homo ex homine nasceretur.*[82]

Where *De Genesi ad Litteram* depicts Adam as the inheritor and instantiation of the human *ratio causalis*, the later text speaks of Adam himself as the cause and 'seminal nature' from which human individuation follows. This attempt **(p.221)** to justify the doctrine of Original Sin results in a blurring of the division between the seminal and temporal creations, Adam's fall as *ratio causalis* in whom all are corporately present now implicitly taking place in a pretemporal Eden.

My first observation attendant on this shift in vocabulary is that Augustine does not sharply define the human individual in contrast to corporate, human identity in his discussion of the *rationes causales* and seminal creation in Adam. This is not the same as stating that human persons all possess human nature, and share an identical set of characteristics proper to it. Augustine goes further than this, first in the suggestion that all humans are derived from an intelligible prototype; and, latterly, in his depiction of Adam as a 'corporate individual' straddling both the intelligible realm and present history. In and from him, individuals are irreducibly corporate in character. Where Augustine writes of the Word taking up a *homo*, this therefore cannot mean that the divine nature instantiates (or hypostasizes) human nature in the abstract, because Augustine does not conceive of such a thing in isolation. His is not the common fault of Latin synecdoche, as Diepen would have it. Rather, *homo susceptus* appears to indicate the conjunction (to use Augustine's own word) of the Word with a human individuality that is always corporate, because all humans are Adam, and Adam is all humanity. By Augustine's own admission, this human pre-exists the present historical world, both as an abstract *ratio causalis* and as Adam, *totus homo*, the corporate Human in whom all persons subsist.

Before proceeding further, I want to register my own doubts about the logic of this position. In the writings of another theologian, an unexamined description of Adam as the source and seed of all humankind would be acceptable; it is, after all, warranted by Scripture. However, as I have tried to show, the conflation of such language by Augustine with a Christianized Form-theory simply makes no sense. In order to account for the total sway of Original Sin over humankind, Augustine collapses the narrative of Adam's historical Fall back into the intelligible realm where Adam is the human *natura seminalis*; by the lights of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, this would involve the Fall taking place within the mind of God, a position Augustine would clearly find untenable.

Augustine's problem, I believe, lies in explaining the propagation of sinful nature from an individual's historic act. Augustine cannot situate the Fall in ordinary history as an act of a truly individual Adam, because human persons do not presently contain the seeds of their children's souls; his rejection of materialist Traducianism makes that certain. Nor, however, can he fully maintain the individuality of Adam when characterizing him as a *natura seminalis*, making talk of

his culpability and its transmission to his offspring a nonsense. Transferred into a Christological context, this results in a mess: while Augustine uses the traditional terminology of the *homo susceptus* with his 'composite Adam' in mind, I do not believe he fully conceived where to **(p.222)** situate such a figure, or any 'assumed human' derived from him. This muddle only thickens when Augustine attempts to apply his theology of election and predestination to the Incarnation. Contrasting the demerit of the *massa peccati* with the sinless humanity of Christ, Augustine describes it as having no merits at all. However, he is also unable to account for the origin of Christ's soul, the subject of merit, and its recipient.

Christ, incarnate by unmerited grace

Augustine's insistence that grace is a gift unmerited by fallen humans, and which must first be present for the inspiration of their love, needs little introduction. Already present in the *Ad Simplicianum*, it came to prominence in *De Natura et Gratia* and received its fullest treatment in the works for the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono Perseverantiae*. Situated in tandem with Augustine's general teaching on the absolute necessity of grace is his depiction of Christ as one made a particular recipient of grace through the taking-up of his *homo*. While the extent of Augustine's doctrine of sanctification is unique, suggestions within his work of a 'grace Christology' are not. The gospel witness to Christ's special reception of the Holy Spirit only begins to indicate the scriptural resources available for describing the Incarnation in terms of a divine choice, election, and adoption. However, as even this basic vocabulary shows, such a description is open to a minimization of the Incarnation, where adoptionism (in its most extreme variant) dilutes the personal subsistence of divine and human in Christ. Augustine was well aware of the fault, admitting it as his own early position at *Conf.* 7.25.19.[83] As I have repeatedly shown, the multi-faceted nature of Augustine's Christology precludes it from classification in terms of 'grace Christology' alone, in turn removing it from the mainstream discussion of Nestorianism and its opponents. It is perhaps for this reason that the most recent survey of the topic, Donald Fairbairn's *Grace and Christology in the Early Church*, makes almost no mention of Augustine, concentrating instead **(p.223)** on Theodore, Nestorius, Cyril, and Cassian.[84] His justification for choosing Cassian over Augustine as the exemplar of Western Christology on the eve of Ephesus merits pause. While the overwhelming size of the Augustinian corpus provides the methodological reason for focusing on an author of slimmer letters, Fairbairn suggests that Augustine's teaching on predestination had begun to sully his reputation in Rome by the 420s, causing Leo to prefer Cassian as the exponent of orthodox, Western Christology. He therefore represents 'what the choir, rather than the soloist, was singing'.[85] For all of this, Cassian's *De Incarnatione* remains a classic source for the later Latin depiction of Christ as the *homo dominicus* and *susceptus*; Grillmeier describes his use of the terms as 'unproblematic' because they represent the conventional, confused vocabulary of theological Latin.[86] I want to suggest that another factor in Leo's preference for Cassian may have been a recognition that Augustine's teaching on predestination, closely correlated with Christology, had already led to unbalanced theological results.

Augustine's application of grace terminology to the Incarnation is highly varied and complex. In order to underline this, I want to begin from a Mariological perspective, observing the comparatively fixed and almost axiomatic language of grace Augustine applies to the Blessed Virgin. From the mid-390s, Augustine describes her creation as a special act of grace, a particular divine choice of the second person of the Trinity. Although the verb *eligo* is most inclusively translated as 'choose', here it is clearly connected to Augustine's theology of creation and Fall, predestination and election. The importance of this motif for his Mariology appears to have been noted only by Luigi Gambero, who classifies it as its 'central theme,' concluding emphatically that 'Mary, then, is a pure grace of the Lord, given to the incarnate Word and to all humanity'.[87] The year 395 sees its appearance in generalized form, where Augustine speaks of the 'female sex, through which he chose to be born' (*femineum sexum, per quem nasceretur elegit*).[88] *De Sancta Virginitate* of 400 comes closer to the individuality of Mary, referring to the 'Virginity…from which he chose to be born' (*uirginitas…de qua nasceretur* ***(p.224)*** *elegit*).[89] With the birth of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine refined his language further, as these examples from 411–12 reveal:

> He who made the human wished to become a human; to be created from a mother, who created his mother.
>
> *Voluit fieri homo qui fecit hominem, creari de matre, qui creavit matrem.*[90]

Therefore it was given to the Virgin Mother to bring forth a holy seed by her pious faith, not according to the law of the flesh of sin (which is to say, without conceiving by the movement of carnal concupiscence); he created her in order to choose her, so that he could choose to be created from her.

ideo uirginem matrem non lege carnis peccati, id est non concupiscentiae carnalis motu concipientem, sed pia fide sanctum germen in se fieri promerentem quam eligeret creauit, de qua crearetur elegit.[91]

He came into the Virgin, who was before the Virgin. She whom he created, he chose; he created her in order that he might choose her.

uenit in uirginem, qui erat ante uirginem. quam creauit elegit, quam eligeret creauit.[92]

While these citations combine the verbs *creare* and *eligere* in more or less chiastic fashion, Augustine also includes the Virgin in the predestining will of the Son in *Tractatus in Ioannem* 8.9, written in the first decade of the fifth century: 'Before he was born from her, he knew his mother in predestining her; and before God created her, from whom he would be created as a human, he knew his mother.'[93] Leaving the historically later question of Mary's complete exemption from Original Sin to one side, it should be noted that all these examples envisage a process of creation by God's elective will, a particular 'choosing into being'. Using the language of predestination alongside that of creation, Augustine contrasts the making of Mary with the creation of the *massa peccati*, whose possession of the grace of creation is fragmented and whose hope for the grace of salvation remains to be disclosed. In the case of the Virgin, these two graces are reintegrated in a single gift of life.[94]

(p.225) Augustine's treatment of the Incarnation in terms of God's special, elective, or predestining grace can be traced in gradual development from the mid-390s. The letter to the Romans (1:4) provided a convenient entrée for Augustine's handling of the topic, in Paul's description of Christ, 'predestined Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by resurrection from the dead' (*qui praedestinatus est filius dei in uirtute secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum*). Completely eliding the passage in the *Expositio Propositionum*, Augustine addressed it in the *Epistolae ad Romanos Expositio Inchoata* of 394–5. Christ, he writes, is not shown to be the Son of God because of his resurrection; others too have been raised from the dead; rather: 'He was predestined by a certain pre-eminence of resurrection, because he was predestined from the resurrection of all the dead; that is to say, he was designated to rise in front of and before all others.'[95] Augustine's theology of Christ the mediator is not far below his exegesis, with his humanity as the object of God's predestination firmly in view. While the majority of Greek authors prefer the reading ὁρισθεντος (*destinatus*) to προορισθεντος (*praedestinatus*), consequently glossing the passage with reference to the eternal Son,[96] Augustine follows the precedent set by the *Vetus Latina* and the Romans commentary of Ambrosiaster, which similarly relates Christ's predestination to the resurrection.[97]

(p.226) Although the connection between the Incarnation of Christ and the gift of the resurrection as parallel works of grace is left unamplified in Augustine's early works, the early *Enarrationes in Psalmos* show his growing interest in Christ's human experience of God's favour and help. Thus *Enarratio in Psalmum* 27 depicts Christ's human prayer to his own divine nature, beseeching the continuation of its sustaining presence;[98] *Enarratio in Psalmum* 16 refers to the *virtus* of the Word as that by which the Incarnation is enabled to bring in the Kingdom,[99] and *Enarratio in Psalmum* 3 states that the union of the Word with the *homo susceptus* by means of his soul empowers his endurance of the passion.[100] This attention to the lived experience of Christ, dependent on the indwelling divine Word, forms the precondition for Augustine's mature description of the Incarnation as an act of grace accomplished without regard to the prior merits of the human Christ. As might be expected, this motif comes to marked prominence in the course of Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings, and has been described as the 'most distinctive stage of the evolution of Augustine's Christology'.[101]

This Christological counterpoint to Augustine's teaching on the necessity of grace to salvation, and the incapacity of human will to effect its own sanctification, was already recognized by the fifth century. In his catena of Christological

citations from the Augustinian corpus collected to refute Arianism, Apollinarianism, and Nestorianism, Vincent of Lérins three times quotes passages in which the grace of the Incarnation is effected notwithstanding Christ's 'foregoing merits' (*praecedentibus meritis*).[102] Van Bavel notes the distinction made by Augustine between the habitual graces given to humankind and the singular grace of the Incarnation, alongside a reception-analysis **(p.227)** ultimately rooting Augustine's theology in the exegesis of Ambrose.[103] Bernard's survey of the relationship between Christology and sanctification in Augustine's thought notes the importance of the theme in passing, without further examination.[104] A more provocative line of enquiry about the motif has been pursued between McWilliam Dewart and McGuckin, focusing on its roots in Augustine's reception of the work of Theodore of Mopsuestia, and its connection to his *homo susceptus* Christology.

McWilliam's 1979 case for an Augustinian reception of Theodore's *De Incarnatione* proceeded from a number of bases. Observing first that Augustine had from the 390s resorted to *homo susceptus* language to describe Christ as 'a uniquely graced man, the exemplar of true wisdom because uniquely and personally united to the Wisdom and Word of God', she then finds its later corollary in his description of the Incarnation as a unique grace, which first appears in *De Peccatorum Meritis* of 412.[105] The text is an important one:

> To the human lifted up through pride, the humble God descends in mercy, displaying clear and manifest grace in that human whom he took up out of such great love for his members, who participate in that love. Conjoined to the Word of God, by which he was at once Son of God and the Son of Humanity, even he did not act by the foregoing merits of his own will. Without doubt, it was fitting for him to be unique: had there been two, or three, or more (if such a thing were possible), it would not have come about by the gift which properly comes from God, but by human free will.
>
> *ad elatum hominem per superbiam, Deus humilis descendit per misericordiam, gratiam claram et manifestamque commendans in ipso homine, quem tanta prae participibus suis caritate suscepit. Neque enim et ipse ita Verbo Dei conjunctus, ut ipsa conjunctione unus filius Dei et idem ipse unus filius hominis fieret, praecedentibus suae voluntatis meritis fecit. Unum quippe illum esse oportebat: essent autem et duo, et tres, et plures, si hoc fieri posset, non per Dei proprium donum, sed per hominis liberum arbitrium.*[106]

McWilliam notes that Augustine here also refers to the *homo* assumed, in continuity with his earlier terminology, and remarks: 'It should be noted, in view of possible misunderstanding, that Augustine was not here presenting a serious argument against Jesus having merited the incarnation, simply because no such argument seemed to him at that time necessary.'[107] The body of her argument centres on a reading of Augustine's Epistle 187 (the treatise *De Praesentia Dei* to Dardanus) in which he situates the Incarnation on a continuum of God's presence to his creatures. While God is in some way with those who yet do not possess him, he inhabits his saints and allows them **(p.228)** to draw near to him by means of the virtuous life.[108] This is not always something known by the indwelt person, as the divine adoption of baptized infants suggests,[109] and as is proved in the case of both John the Baptist[110] and (rather differently) Jacob and Esau.[111] While the presence of God in the saints is akin to his presence in the Temple, the case of Christ is unique, grace being the means whereby his humanity was taken up and made one person with the divine nature.[112] Concluding his argument, Augustine returned to the question he had raised at *De Peccatorum Meritis* 2.27.17: if human goodness were a factor in human redemption, could there have been more than one Christ? The answer is a resounding no:

> Who would be so sacrilegious to dare to claim that any soul could become another Christ through the merit of his free choice? How could one soul alone have merited to belong to the person of the only-begotten Word through free choice (which is given to all in common and by nature) had not this unique grace effected it? Such grace is rightly a matter for our preaching, but we may not rightly wish to stand in judgement on it.
>
> *quis enim tam sit sacrilegus, ut audeat adfirmare aliquam posse animam per meritum liberi arbitrii, ut alter sit christus, efficere? ut ergo ad personam uerbi unigeniti pertineret, quo pacto per liberum arbitrium communiter*

omnibus et naturaliter datum una sola anima meruisset, nisi hoc singularis gratia praestitisset, quam fas est praedicare, de qua nefas est uelle iudicare?[113]

While the point at issue is the singularity of the grace given in the Incarnation, it should be noted that Augustine does imply that the soul of Christ possesses merits, though these are fully the result of the divine grace preceding them.

McWilliam's main line of enquiry is not, however, theological but philological. Discerning seven textual parallels between Epistle 187 and Theodore's *De Incarnatione*, she proceeds to gather Augustine's use of *homo susceptus* language and his consideration of the Incarnation in terms of grace into a consciously adopted Antiochene framework. In his response to her argument, John McGuckin states baldly of these parallels: 'In none of them can I find any synonymity of language, only the commonality of the theme of God's presence in his saints',[114] a judgement with which I am inclined to agree. The doctrine of the degrees of the divine presence he situates rather in a general Neoplatonist milieu, being found in Plotinus, Porphyry, and particularly the Christology of Marius Victorinus' *Adversus Arianos*. While this appears to be a more likely source for Augustine's treatment of the theme in Epistle 187, I believe McWilliam Dewart and McGuckin both miss the central problem behind Augustine's description of Christ's humanity as an entity without any merits of its own to deserve the Incarnation.

(p.229) To begin with, it should be noted that, wherever Augustine describes Christ in this way, he implies that Christ's humanity is already under the divine discernment of merits *before* it is taken up in the Incarnation. A person cannot not have merits without first being a person; natures cannot deserve blessing or punishment. Christ's 'human', therefore, has some kind of existence before it is taken into union with the Word. This contrasts sharply with Augustine's seemingly parallel handling of the humanity of Mary, whose very creation is described as a discrete grace. Nowhere does Augustine draw such a connection in a direct Christological context. This can be explained for two related reasons. Augustine never supposes Christ's possession of humanity separate from the corporate Adam: he is an 'original' human in the fullest sense, to be assumed, not created into the Incarnation. Secondly, to propose the creation of a fresh human without any Fall-guilt (subsequently to be assumed *sine meritis praecedentibus*) would raise the question what relationship such a human would have to the fallen humanity it is sent to save.[115] However, because Augustine situates the humanity of Christ within the corporate Adam, he must explain how such a humanity is free from Adam's punishment. Simply repeating that Christ has no prevenient human merits, he advances the point but does not fully justify it. Leaning heavily on Romans 8:3 and the virginal conception as the means by which sin is not propagated to Christ's flesh addresses half of the issue; however, this does not account for the status of Christ's soul. As I highlighted above, in Epistle 190, Augustine had proposed a twofold solution to the problem: if souls are propagated from Adam, then either the Word cleansed it in the assumption, or he assumed it from some other source.[116] Unfortunately, the letter contains no further indication of what that source might be.

I believe this confusion in Augustine's Christology can finally be ascribed to his ambiguous reception of a broadly Origenist account of the pre-existent union of the human soul of Christ with the Word of God in the premundane realm. Augustine never fully committed himself to any one general theory of the origin of souls, and the spectre of their fall from a heavenly life persisted even into the works of his maturity; this much the ironic subtext of *De Anima et eius Origine* makes clear. More openly, Augustine fully maintained the existence of a prehistorical creation in the mind of God in his theory of the *rationes causales*. He attempted to integrate this with his teaching on Original Sin, but his confused depiction of the *totus Adam* gives the lie to his true position: that the prehistory of present existence is a place of shared, individual agency, where the vicissitudes of fallen life began. In order to maintain the **(p.230)** sinlessness of Christ's soul alongside the claim that it is truly an 'original' human of the Adamic stock, such a theory requires that Christ's soul never participated in Adam's sin, never to fall from its celestial life. I believe Augustine recognized this, but, in the aftermath of the Origenist controversy, was prevented from fully working out its implications in his writing. I offer two crucial texts in support of my theory, which reveal Augustine's quiet and uneasy deliberation on the topic.

The issue of lots: De Gratia Novi Testamenti and De Genesi ad Litteram 10

Augustine's Epistle 140, subtitled *De Gratia Novi Testamenti*, was written in the early months of 412. In the *Retractationes*, Augustine situated the work within his concern, not only for the rise of Pelagianism, but also for the receding Donatist controversy.[117] Occasioned at the request of his friend Honoratus (about whom little else is known), it addressed a series of five exegetical questions,[118] gathering them together in a synthetic exposition of the nature of grace, the gift of the New Testament. Augustine opens the letter by contrasting the promise of the Old Testament with its fulfilment in the New,[119] before focusing more closely on the Christological aspect of salvation history in paragraph 3. Trademark features of Augustine's Christology abound: the Word of God *suscepit itaque hominem* in order to make God intelligible to human understanding;[120] Christ in his humanity possessed both a true human *anima* and *ratio*, contrary to the Apollinarian heresy;[121] coming in the likeness of sinful flesh, his cry of dereliction on the cross embodied the suffering of his Church within him.[122] At 21.8, Augustine lifts his exegesis of Psalm 22:6 (*ego sum uermis, et non homo*) directly from Origen's *Homilia in Lucam* 15.[123] At 30.12, he turns to verses 10 and 11 of the same psalm: 'For **(p.231)** you have drawn me out of the womb; my hope on my mother's bosom. I have cast myself on you from the womb; from my mother's womb, you are my God' (*Quoniam extraxisti me de uentre, spes mea ab uberibus matris meae. In te iactatus sum ex utero; de uentre matris meae Deus meus est tu*). Initially treating the verse as a common human exclamation, in the following chapter Augustine notes that 'there are some who think…that this text applies to our Head' (*non defuerunt qui hoc…ad ipsum caput nostrum pertinere sentirent*). In the form of a servant, Christ can refer to his father as God; thus the psalm is spoken from his humanity, and *tu extraxisti* refers to the preservation of Mary's virginity after the divine delivery of her child. Augustine then raises the question: if Christ's *spes* in God pertained from the time of his earliest infancy (*ab uberibus matris meae*), might he also have hoped in God in his humanity while in the womb? The next verse appears to suggest that Christ hoped in God only after (*ex*) he had left the womb (*utero*). Yet, he doubts such a reading: even there, Christ would have lived, moved, and had his being in God; and he would surely have hoped in God while in the womb as well. Augustine offers a surprising alternative to resolve this textual ambiguity:

> Otherwise, perhaps we ought to believe that the infant only then received a rational soul, and that it was lacking while he was still within his mother's womb; and that the same soul that was then added to his flesh, was until that point clinging to God. In this scenario, we should consider the words, 'I have cast myself on you from the womb,' to have been said according to that same flesh, just as when he says, 'I have been given a soul by lot' from the womb, the soul which was cleaving to you.
>
> *nisi forte credendum est iam nato animam rationalem accessisse, quae intra uiscera matris adhuc ei defuisset, et, quoniam eadem anima, quae carni iam natae addita est, deo inhaerebat, ideo secundum eandem carnem dictum esse existimandum est: in te iactatus sum ex utero, tamquam diceret: eam sortitus sum animam ex utero, quae tibi cohaereret*.[124]

Glossing Psalm 22 with Wisdom 8:19–20 ('But I was a child of singular gifts, and received a good soul by lot', *Puer autem eram ingeniosus, et sortitus sum animam bonam*) results in the suggestion that the soul of Christ adhered to God, before being united to his flesh in childbirth. Augustine quickly withdraws from the idea, 'since the reason for the arrival or arising of the soul lies hidden in the depths of nature' (*cum ratio de aduentu uel exortu animae in tanto naturae profundo sic lateat*). Nonetheless, Augustine did not consider the question raised worthy of review or critique in the *Retractationes*.

In the course of discussing the origin of the soul in *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10, Augustine returned to the text of Wisdom. In characteristic fashion, chapter 3 sees three theories of the soul's origin set out sequentially: Traducianism, a kind of 'spiritual Traducianism' rooted in Augustine's early **(p.232)** suggestion that Adam himself be considered a *ratio causalis*, and Creationism.[125] At paragraph 11 chapter 6, Augustine looks for scriptural material in support of each. Wisdom 8:19–20, he admits, seems to affirm that souls come to bodies from above, and are not propagated from a single prototype (an option not included in chapter 3). However, the vocabulary of the text is problematic: *sortitus sum* suggests a kind of heavenly lottery, which deals bodies to souls on the basis of their respective merits.[126] From Paul's letter to the Romans, it is known that 'even before [Jacob and Esau] were born, they had done nothing good or bad' (Rom. 9:11),

which argues in any case against using the text in such a manner of any human. Augustine promises to deal with the passage later on, noting that 'we should not ignore those (whether they are in error or have thought quite rightly), who think that this was said specially and uniquely about that soul of human of the Mediator of God and humans, Jesus Christ'.[127]

Augustine finally takes up the text fully at 32.18, beginning with a caveat. Although other aspects of the book of Wisdom seemingly cannot be ascribed to Christ, the same can also be said of some of the psalms, which are commonly exposited as being said in his person. However, Wisdom 8:19's reference to the *puer…ingeniosus* certainly appears to cohere with Luke's depiction of Christ teaching the doctors in the Temple. Coming back to the problem of Traducianism in parenthesis, Augustine observes that such a theory would implicate Christ's soul in its parents' sin, a possibility clearly precluded by his evident wisdom even in infancy. His conception of the Virgin, in the likeness of the flesh of sin, deals with the sinfulness of his flesh: 'for he was not conceived in the way in which she had been conceived; nor was his flesh the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin';[128] yet the sinlessness of his soul remains unsolved. Augustine answers cryptically that he would rather think it came from the source of Adam's soul than from Adam himself (*unde adam quam de adam*). His final reflections are worth quoting in full:

> **(p.233)** Perhaps the author of the book of Wisdom said, 'I have received a good soul by lot' (provided that it is correct to apply these words to Christ), because things which are gifted by lot are usually given by God from on high. Or (and we can say this confidently), perhaps he said it lest anyone think that that soul was elevated to so high a summit, on account of some prior works of his; so when the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, the word 'lot' presented itself, and the writer used it to remove any suspicion of foregoing merits.
>
> *et fortasse ideo ait: sortitus sum animam bonam—si tamen hoc de illo oportet intellegi—quia solent quae sorte dantur diuinitus dari, aut, quod fidenter dicendum est, ne uel illa anima aliquibus operibus praecedentibus ad tantum apicem subuecta putaretur, ut cum ea uerbum caro fieret et habitaret in nobis, ad auferendam suspicionem praecedentium meritorum sortis nomen accessit*.[129]

This is a remarkable volte-face. Having initially found Wisdom 8 to be problematic because it is most easily accommodated to an Origenist doctrine of the soul's fall by merit, Augustine makes precisely the opposite observation when applying the verse to Christ. Here, the divine *sors* of Christ's soul comes by chance, without regard to prior merit at all. Augustine then abruptly changes the subject to an exposition of Hebrews 7.

I begin with a word on sources. While Augustine twice roots his exploration of Wisdom 8 in the opinion of prior exegetes, I have been unable to find any parallel treatment of the text by other authors in terms of the soul of Christ. Indeed, the only other Latin commentator on the verse prior to Augustine is Ambrose; his concern is, however, entirely different.[130] Because the overall handling of the text in *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10 is made in evident discussion of Origen's theory of the fall of souls, I believe it safe to conjecture that the Christological exegesis of the text should be situated in a now lost work of Origen, available to Augustine in translation. In the absence of parallel readings in other Latin authors, it is, of course, impossible to suggest which.

I believe the subtle shift in Augustine's exegesis of Wisdom 8, from Epistle 140 to *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10, points clearly to his reception of an Origenist Christology, alongside an inability to reconcile it to his developed teaching on Original Sin. Having already compromised his response to the question of the soul's origin by his confused depiction of Adam, the eternal form *and* the historical individual, Augustine found himself similarly unable to account for the origin of Christ's soul, and with it his human sinlessness. From his reading of *De Principiis* and Rufinus' *Apology*, the outline of Origen's protology was well known to him; many of its features were shared with Plotinus' theory of the fall of souls, to which he had given a warm hearing early in his career. In his early exegesis of Romans, he had tested Origen's conception of prenatal **(p.234)** merit, suggesting that the *occultissima merita* of Jacob and Esau explained their eventual destinies under the divine judgement. As an experiment, the interpretation had been abandoned. However, Augustine's use of

Origen's exegesis continued, not least in his treatment of the virginal conception. Elaborating his teaching on the punishment of sin in tandem with his depiction of Christ in its likeness, Augustine increasingly committed himself to an intransigent, hamartiological materialism, to which only a 'fall' theory of the soul's origin could form the logical counterpart. The exigencies of both the Origenist and Pelagian controversies prevented this, leaving the inner mechanics of Augustine's doctrine of Original Sin expediently obscure. Both Epistle 140 and *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10 represent an attempt to reconcile Augustine's subconscious Origenism to his mature doctrine of grace: the soul of Christ, adhering to God before his earthly life, was given by divine choice to Jesus's flesh. God performed this without regard to its merits; merit that only a person, a complete individual, can possess. All of Augustine's subsequent references to Christ, Incarnate regardless of his *praestantissima merita*, are founded upon his deeper inability to reconcile his Christology with his doctrine of creation and Fall. In the previous chapter, I attended to Julian's attack on Augustine's Christology as Apollinarian; I found apparent substance in his claim, where Augustine's Christ thinks, feels, and acts as the Word, to the exclusion of the human character he has assumed. On present second sight, Julian fails to see the picture in its entirety. Too careful a Platonist to be an Apollinarian, Augustine would always maintain the formal distinction between the soul and its creator. For the saint and the elect soul of Christ, however, this distinction might not always be so visible. The predominance of the Word in his Christological psychology is better explained by recourse to *De Principiis*, and its depiction of the unfallen soul of Christ.

> What was beforehand situated in the will was changed by the influence of lengthy custom into nature. And, therefore, we must believe that there was a human and rational soul in Christ, and not think that he had any capacity for sin, even as a possibility.
>
> *quod in arbitrii positum, longi usus affectu iam versum sit in naturam. ita et fuisse quidem in Christo humana et rationabilis anima credenda est, et nullum sensum vel possibilitatem eam putandum est habuisse peccati.*[131]

While Origen's admission of the eternal co-inherence of Christ's soul in the Word allowed him to affirm—and justify—Christ's sinlessness with integrity, it is unfortunate that the intellectual liberty was not given to Augustine to do the same.

(p.235) Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I offered an apparent vindication of Julian of Eclanum's criticism of Augustine's Christology, by highlighting the frequent passages in Augustine's work that emphasize the indwelling and active divine presence in Christ, at the expense of his human characteristics. Finding this to be consistent with Augustine's inability to pinpoint the precise fault of Apollinarianism in his anti-heretical works, I gave a positive hearing to Julian's contention that a Christ who inherits the flesh of sin cannot have a fully human soul, as this is fully denatured along with the flesh in Augustine's account of the Fall. In this chapter, I returned to the theme, changing my focus to Augustine's handling of the problem of the soul's origin. Working from the basis laid by R. J. O'Connell, I accepted his depiction of Augustine as privately committed to a fall model of the soul's origin, while maintaining a political ambivalence on the issue in public discourse. However, I took issue with his claim that such a protology can be explained only by Augustine's continuing adherence to the teaching of Plotinus into his maturity. By contrast, I suggested that Origen, just as much as Plotinus or Porphyry, must be counted among the sources available to Augustine in forming such a theology of creation. Concentrating my survey on Christology, I turned to Augustine's early descriptions of Christ as the *dominicus homo* and as *homo assumptus*. Newly classifying the former as the invention of Origen in his Commentary on John, I argued that Augustine's sensitivity to the rising politics of the Origenist controversy should be taken as the major reason for his abandonment of the phrase in 395. Viewing both terms together in the light of his theology of the *rationes causales* and the creation of humanity in Adam, *persona seminalis*, I suggested that they both presuppose a pre-existent, human as the recipient of the assuming Word. Further noting that Augustine's language of salvific merit is only ever applied to individual human souls, I questioned what it might mean for him to describe the Incarnation as a grace that takes place *sine meritis praestantibus*. Not very much, I suggested, until Augustine's tortuous interpretation of Wisdom 8 is taken into account. As both Epistle 140 and *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10 reveal, Augustine's talk of Christ, the human without merits, constitutes a late reversal from a prior reception of Origen's Christology. Here, the human soul of Jesus is elected

to become Incarnate precisely because of its foregoing goodness and love, on account of which he can assume the 'likeness of the flesh of sin' without subsequent defilement. Expediently moving away from only half this formulation in his own Christology, Augustine's mature theology would remain permanently disjointed, offering an incomplete Christ to a race condemned and incapable of its own salvation.

Notes:

([1]) *Quid fugis ad obscurissimam de anima quaestionem?...hoc quod de anima latet, aut ex otio discitur; aut, sicut alia multa in hac vita, sine salutis labe nescitur.*

([2]) But for one representative response: in an otherwise polite exchange of views with Frederick van Fleteren (1993), O'Connell's respondent referred to his entire academic project as a 'cul de sac', which had begun and ended with mistaken historical assumptions. For the same line of argument see also O'Daly (1974, 1984, and 1987: esp. 15–20, 199–207); also Fortin (1969), Madec (1970), and Mary T. Clark (1971). By contrast, Peter Cary's recent series of monographs (2000, 2008a, b) are clearly launched from the basis established by O'Connell.

([3]) O'Connell (1987).

([4]) O'Connell (1987: 141).

([5]) *Lib. Arb.* 3.57.20.

([6]) *Lib. Arb.* 3.58.20; emphasis added.

([7]) *Lib. Arb.* 3.59.21.

([8]) Carol Harrison (2006: 182).

([9]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 68.

([10]) *Prop. Rom.* 68: 'But, because the Holy Spirit is given only to those who believe, God does not therefore choose works (which he himself endows when he gives the Holy Spirit, so that he can work for the good through love); rather, he chooses faith' (*sed quoniam spiritus sanctus non datur nisi credentibus, non quidem dues elegit opera quae ipse largitur cum dat spiritum sanctum, ut per caritatem bona operemur sed tamen elegit fidem*).

([11]) O'Connell (1987: 318).

([12]) O'Connell (1987: 329).

([13]) The classic reading of Augustine's debt to both Plotinus and Porphyry remains that of Courcelle (1950); his suggestion of a Milanese readership of both authors configured around Simplicianus and Ambrose naturally finds a sympathetic hearing here. The case for a predominant Porphyrian influence was staked by O'Meara (1959), subsequently to be criticized by Hadot (1960). Theiler's monograph (1933) attempts a forensic reconstruction of Porphyry from the Augustinian corpus, and hinges less on the question of Augustine's own philosophical commitments. Beatrice (1989) situates Porphyry's *De Regressu Animae* and *Philosophy from Oracles* (taken as one work, the argument of O'Meara 1959) at the centre of Augustine's conversion to the Catholic faith; in places his argument is simply bizarre, as when he ascribes Augustine's early Photinianism to Porphyry's characterization of Christ as a human of superior wisdom, while simultaneously defaming Christians (p. 259). Almost as over-generous in its estimation of Augustine's dependence on Plotinus is Cary (2000), which includes seventeen of the *Enneads* in Augustine's reading of Plotinus (pp. 158–9 n. 11). Madec (1989: 44) maintains a welcome ambivalence about the issue: 'Augustine does not otherwise trouble himself to satisfy our curiosity about the contents of these mysterious "Books of the Platonists", of which he makes no other

mention.'

([14]) Carol Harrison (2006: 182).

([15]) Plotinus reviews Plato's pronouncements on the origin of the soul in the *Phaedo, Cratylus, Republic, Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus* at the beginning of *Ennead* 4.8.

([16]) Cf. *Princ.* 1.4; 1.6.2 ff; 1.8; 2.8; 3.1; 3.3.4 ff; 3.5.4; 4.2.7 (Koetschau).

([17]) *Princ.* 3.1, in particular.

([18]) *Princ.* 2.8.1.

([19]) *Princ.* 2.8.2.

([20]) *Princ.* 2.8.3: *requirendum est ne forte et nomen animae, quod graece dicitur ψυχη, a refrigescendo de statu diviniore ac meliore dictum sit et translatum inde, quod ex calore illo naturali et divino refrixisse videatur, et ideo in hoc quo nunc est et statu et vocabulo sita sit.*

([21]) *Princ.* 2.6.3.

([22]) *Princ.*: *pro liberi arbitrii facultate varietas unumquemque ac diversitas habuisset animorum.*

([23]) The treatment of the origin of the soul in the preface (1.5) deserves consideration under such an interpretative scheme: 'Now, regarding the soul: whether it comes from transmission in the seed, so that its principle of existence or substance inheres in those corporeal seeds; or whether it has a different beginning, begotten or not begotten; or if it is given to the body from without, or not: this matter is not very clearly spelled out in the [Apostolic] Teaching' (*De anima vero utrum ex seminis traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius vel substantia inserta ipsis corporalibus seminibus habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium, et hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne: non satis manifesta praedicatione distinguitur*). A similar approach is evident in *Comm. Cant.* 2.5, where a variety of options for the origin of the soul are laid out with equal measure as data for the soul to consider within itself, in the absence of clear scriptural information on the matter.

([24]) *Apol.* 6.

([25]) *Apol.* 2.10: *in solo origene non ambigis. dicis quippe: 'hoc sentit origenes.' interrogabo te: bene sentit an male? nescio, inquis. quid me igitur, missis tabellariis et creberrimis nuntiis, docere conaris ut sciam quid nescias?*

([26]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.59.36.

([27]) *Pecc. Mer.* 3.18.10: *ait enim: si anima non est ex traduce, sed sola caro, ipsa tantum habet traducem peccati et ipsa sola poenam meretur—hoc enim sentiunt—iniustum esse dicentes, ut hodie nata anima non ex massa adae tam antiquum peccatum portet alienum.*

([28]) *Pecc. Mer.* 3.18.10.

([29]) *Ep.* 143.5, paraphrasing *Lib.Arb.* 3.57.20: *in corporibus autem inferioribus post peccatum ordinata [substantia rationalis] regit corpus suum non omni modo pro arbitrio, sed sicut leges uniuersitatis sinunt*

([30]) *Ep.* 143.8–10.

([31]) Evodius' Epistle 158 begins with a complaint that his previous questions had gone unanswered.

([32]) *Ep*.162.

([33]) *Ep*. 164. 7.19–20.

([34]) *Ep*. 165.1: *certe habes ibi uirum sanctum et eruditum augustinum episcopum, qui uiua, ut aiunt, uoce docere te poterit et suam, immo per se nostram, explicare sententiam.*

([35]) That Augustine quickly dispensed with this difficult man cannot be insignificant; that he sent him to Jerome even more so. The politics of sending a rabid anti-Origenist to Jerome are, to say the least, open to a number of interpretations.

([36]) *Ep*. 166.11–15.5.

([37]) *Ep*. 166.21.7: *huius igitur damnationis in paruulos causam requiro, quia neque animarum, si nouae fiunt singulis singulae, uideo esse ullum in illa aetate peccatum nec a deo damnari aliquam credo, quam uidet nullum habere peccatum.*

([38]) *Ep*. 134.2.

([39]) *Ep*. 190.3: 'Should the origin of the soul be hidden from us, no danger lies in it, as long as the way of redemption remains clear to us' (*Unde si origo animae lateat, dum tamen redemptio clareat, periculum non est*).

([40]) *Ep*. 90.13–14.4.

([41]) *Ep*. 190.22.4.

([42]) *Ep*. 190.23.4.

([43]) *Ep*. 190.25.4: 'We may not doubt that the soul of the Mediator received no sin by way of transmission from Adam. For if souls are not propagated from others, where all are held in the propagation of the flesh of sin, how much less are we to believe that his soul could have come from the propagation of a sinful person, whose flesh came from the Virgin (not conceived by desire but by faith, so that it might be in the likeness of the flesh of sin, not the flesh of sin itself). But if, from the sin of the first sinful soul, others are held subject to sin because they are propagated from it, how certain is it that that soul, which the only-begotten made fit to be joined to him, either drew no sin from it, or was not derived from it at all' (*mediatoris tamen animam nullum ex adam traxisse peccatum dubitare fas non est. si enim nulla propagatur ex altera, ubi omnes tenentur propagata carne peccati, quanto minus credendum est ex propagine peccatricis animam uenire potuisse, cuius caro uenit ex uirgine non libidine concepta sed fide, ut esset in similitudine carnis peccati, non in carne peccati. si autem peccato primae animae peccatricis ideo ceterae tenentur obnoxiae, quia ex illa sunt propagatae, profecto illa, quam sibi unigenitus coaptauit, aut peccatum inde non traxit aut omnino inde non tracta est*).

([44]) *Ep*. 190.5.2.

([45]) A schism within the Donatist church, which arose after the election of Pimian to the see of Carthage on the death of Parmenian in 392; Rogatus was bishop of Cartennae.

([46]) *An. Orig*. 1.6.6. Augustine condensed Vincentius' position into eleven errors, namely: (1) creation is not *ex nihilo*, and the soul is created by emanation, although it is defined as corporeal; (2) the creation of souls is both eternal and endless; (3) the soul loses its antenatal merit through the flesh; (4) through the flesh, the soul recovers its primal merit, though it lost this state through embodiment; (5) before sinning, the soul merited to become sinful in the flesh; (6) the unbaptized may hope for God's pardon of sin; (7) accidental death is capable of thwarting God's predestination for the baptized, cutting short their growth in grace; (8) Wisdom 4:11 'He was taken away so that falsehood would not deceive his soul' can be applied to the death of unbaptized infants; (9) all of the many mansions in God's house (John 14:2) are

part of the Kingdom; (10) the sacrifice of the Mass may fittingly be offered for the unbaptized; and (11) the unbaptized may hope for the Kingdom after the general resurrection (*An. Orig.* 3.1.1–19.12).

([47]) *An. Orig.* 4.3.3.–5.4.

([48]) *An. Orig.* 4.9.7.

([49]) *An. Orig.* 4.9.7.

([50]) *An. Orig.* 4.8.6; cf. *Conf.* 10.26.17.

([51]) *Retr.* 1.19.9.

([52]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 36.2 speaks of the outstanding and unique *exemplum Dominici hominis* who demonstrated his power in great miracles. *En. Ps.* 1.1. ascribes to the *homo dominicus* the words of the psalm, 'Blessed is the one who has not walked in the counsel of the ungodly.' *En. Ps.*7.13 sees the *homo dominicus* as the sword of God, left sheathed at his first coming, to be drawn at his second; para. 20 of the same *Enarratio* attributes the words of the psalmist throughout to the *homo dominicus*. *En. Ps.* 8.11 describes the threefold temptation of the *homo dominicus* in *concupiscentia carnis, inanis iactans*, and *curiositas*, the classic Augustinian triad. With somewhat closer attention to the specifically human nature of Christ, *Prop. Rom.* 48 speaks of God's judgement on sin being 'destroyed and taken away in the human of the Lord' (*in homine dominico destructa et ablata*), on the cross. A single instance associates the phrase with the resurrected Christ, *En. Ps.* 4.1: the psalm is to be rightly interpreted either in the voice of the hopeful Christian or as *uerba Dominici hominis*.

([53]) On the basis of this observation, I would question the comprehensiveness of John McGuckin's judgement (1990: 49): 'When Augustine speaks of a union in *una persona*, he does not mean that the psychological human subject of Jesus of Nazareth has been absorbed in or replaced by the subject of the Word of God. He does not use the word "person" in this psychological sense. In modern thought the term "person" refers to an individual rational identity. For Augustine it meant straightforwardly a principle or function of the unity of separate elements…For example, in the composite of human nature, according to fifth century psychology, personal unity joins together a soul and flesh. To be a human person is to have this kind of unity.' Even for a fifth-century psychologist, a human person would also be the subject of the passions and the centre of a lived experience.

([54]) Drobner (1986: 157): 'Why he laid it to one side is not indisputably clear.'

([55]) Drobner (1986: 157).

([56]) Grillmeier (1977: 43).

([57]) *Apol.* 2.20 records an attempt by certain Apollinarians to sully his reputation while in the service of Damasus, by erasing the phrase from a work of Athanasius, only to reinscribe it as though it were an amendment made by Jerome himself. The implication here must be that the phrase was unacceptable to the Apollinarians in question, and that the erasure constituted an attempt to remove the term from a work authoritative in the tradition; what its content might have been for them, or for Jerome, is unfortunately left unclear.

([58]) *Sp. Sanct.* 51–2; *In Ps.* 86.1b; *In Ps.* 118.16–17.

([59]) *In Ps.* 20.4–5; *In Ps.* 21.30; *In Ps.* 31.2.

([60]) Altaner (1967b).

([61]) Madec (1999: 153): 'The influence of *De Spiritu Sancto* of Didymus the Blind, translated by Jerome in 389, should also be noted; it is the term *homo dominicus*...an expression that Augustine will criticize in the *Retractationes* (1.19.8), that suggests the relationship.'

([62]) Grillmeier (1977: 292): it is 'applied to Jesus by reason of his union with the pre-existent Son or Logos, whether the Incarnate Word be seen in his earthly or in his glorified state. Understood in this broad sense, the application of the term became enlarged as well as colourless'.

([63]) *Comm. Ioh.* 1.32, l. 236. Origen's treatment of the status of Christ's soul in the womb in the passage in question is ambiguous. Blanc (1966: 177 n. 2) takes it as a straightforward reiteration of his teaching on the pre-existence of souls: 'Origen imagines the soul of Jesus having a pre-existence like that of all human souls...', and glosses his footnote on the text with the general remarks of his introduction (1966: 29): 'The same soul which the Son of God assumed had possessed an entirely spiritual existence, attached fully to God and his Word, before being sent by him to earth.' John's admission that he did not know Christ is, therefore, taken to indicate a lack of subjective knowledge on the Baptist's part, although the soul of Jesus was present to be known before embodiment. Consistent with his rejection of a hard and fast doctrine of the pre-existence of souls in the unadulterated works of Origen, Edwards (e.g. 2002) reads John's utterance as a statement of fact: before coming to Mary's body, Christ was not there to be known. Origen's point is rather to underline the dignity of the rational soul in the womb (Edwards 2008: 33). Had Augustine known the text and detected the *lectio difficilior*, the furore surrounding the whole question of the soul's origin catalysed by overreading Origen may still have been a factor in his later aversion to the phrase *homo dominicus*, distantly rooted in the commentary.

([64]) Vogt (1984: 255).

([65]) *Praed. Sanct.* 31.15.

([66]) *Don. Pers.* 67.24.

([67]) Cf. *Quaest. Evang.* 1.31: 'The Lord says this: the Kingdom of Heaven is like a human king, who makes a marriage for his Son; he says that the marriage is the Incarnate Word, because in that human who is taken up, the Church is coupled to God' (*quod dominus dixit: simile est regnum caelorum homini regi qui fecit nuptias filio suo, nuptias dixit uerbum incarnatum, quia in ipso homine suscepto ecclesia deo copulata est*); and *En. Ps.* 3.9: 'For in that human the Church too is taken up by the Word which was made flesh, and dwelt among us; for he has made us also to sit with him in the heavenly places' (*nam in illo homine et ecclesia suscepta est a uerbo, quod caro factum est, et habitauit in nobis; quia et in caelestibus nos sedere fecit una cum illo*).

([68]) *Ep.* 187.4.

([69]) *Ep.* 219.1.

([70]) *Ep.* 169.2.

([71]) *Ep.* 169.2.

([72]) *Ep.* 169.2.2

([73]) Diepen (1963: 235).

([74]) Diepen (1963: 51).

([75]) *Div. Quaest. 83* 46: 'There exist "principal ideas", certain forms or rational causes of things which are stable and unchangeable; they themselves are not formed, existing eternally and ever in the same manner, being contained in the

divine intelligence' (*sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae uel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae diuina intellegentia continenturi*).

([76]) *Div. Quaest. 83*: 'But among those things that have been established by God, the rational soul exceeds all, and is closest to God, when it is pure. It clings to him in love, inasmuch as (in a certain way) it is soaked in that intelligible light from Him, and being illuminated, it perceives (not with corporeal eyes, but through that principal sense of its own by which it excels: that is, by its intelligence) those rational causes, in seeing which it is most blessed' (*sed anima rationalis inter eas res, quae sunt a deo conditae, omnia superat et deo proxima est, quando pura est; ei que in quantum caritate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo intellegibili perfusa quodammodo et inlustrata cernit non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principale quo excellit, id est per intellegentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum uisione fit beatissima*).

([77]) *Gen. Litt.* 5.41.20.

([78]) *Gen. Litt.* 5.46.22: *cum diem, quem fecit, eis, quae fecit, sexies praesentauit non alternante spatio temporaliter, sed ordinata cognitione causaliter.*

([79]) *Gen. Litt.* 6.18.11.

([80]) *Gen. Litt.* 6.15.9.

([81]) *Gen. Litt.* 6.31.20.

([82]) *Civ. Dei* 13.14; cf. also *C. Iul. Imp.* 2.177 and *Nupt. Conc.* 2.15.

([83]) 'Because the Scriptures are true, I acknowledged that in Christ there is a whole human, not simply the body of a human, or an embodied soul without a mind, but that he was a complete human. I thought that he was preferred above all others, not as the person of Truth, but on account of a kind of great excellence of his human nature, and more perfect participation in wisdom…However, I admit that some time later I learnt how much the Catholic truth of the words "The Word was made flesh" is to be distinguished from the false teaching of Photinus' (*quia itaque uera scripta sunt, totum hominem in christo agnoscebam, non corpus tantum hominis aut cum corpore sine mente animum, sed ipsum hominem, non persona ueritatis, sed magna quadam naturae humanae excellentia et perfectiore participatione sapientiae praeferri ceteris arbitrabar…ego autem aliquanto posterius didicisse me fateor, in eo, quod uerbum caro factum est, quomodo catholica ueritas a photini falsitate dirimatur*).

([84]) Fairbairn (2003).

([85]) Fairbairn (2003: 16).

([86]) Grillmeier (1977: 45). Cf. *Inc.* 2.3: 'You have taken up a human to liberate the world, and have not shrunk in horror before the womb of the Virgin' (*Tu ad liberandum mundum suscepisti hominem, non horruisti uirginis uterum*). *Inc.* 5.5: 'The prophet David speaks of him in the voice of His own person: "From the womb of my mother, you are my God", showing that the human of the Lord never existed apart from his union with God, in which in him the fullness of divinity would come all at once to dwell in the womb of the Virgin' (*de quo etiam Dauid propheta ex persona ipsius dicit: de uentre matris meae deus meus es tu, ostendens utique quod numquam homo ille dominicus sine unitate dei fuerit, in quo in ipso statim uirginis utero plenitudo diuinitatis habitarit*).

([87]) Gambero (1999: 218).

([88]) *S.* 12.12.

([89]) *Virg.* 4.4; cf. also *S.* 188.3, written some time before 410: 'The almighty Son did not take virginity away from his mother at his birth, whom he chose in order to be born from her' (*Matri omnipotens filius nullo modo virginitatem natus abstulit, quam nasciturus elegit*).

([90]) *S.* 359.9.

([91]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.38.24.

([92]) *S.* 69.3.

([93]) *et antequam de illa natus esset, in praedestinatione nouerat matrem; et antequam ipse deus crearet, de qua ipse homo crearetur, nouerat matrem.*

([94]) In spite of the vividness of this motif, I have been unable to anchor its use by Augustine in any one tradition of reception. Van Bavel (1954: 100 n. 87) argues that its predecessors are to be found in Hilary of Poitiers's *De Synodis* and Novatian's *De Trinitate* 23. Although the former is concerned with the eternal predestination of the Incarnation as a whole, it is scarcely identifiable with Augustine's tight phrasing; the latter contains almost no relevant content at all. A similar treatment of the creation of the Virgin is, however, present in Cassian's *De Incarnatione* of 427: 'Thus you see not only that Mary bore him as one who was older than her; not only older than her, but also her maker! Giving birth to the one who gave her birth, she was made the parent of her Parent, since it was as easy for God to bring about his own birth as the birth of a human, and as simple for him to make a human come to birth, as for him to be born of a human' (*uides ergo quod non solum antiquiorem se Maria peperit, non solum, inquam, antiquiorem se, sed auctorem sui, et procreans procreatorem suum facta est parentis parens, quia quam promptum utique fuit deo natiuitatem homini tribuere, tam promptum sibi, quam facile ut hominem nasci faceret, tam facile ut ipse ex homine nasceretur*) (*Inc.* 4.2). In the Patristic testimonies that conclude the work, Cassian hints at the source behind his earlier statement, in Ambrose's commentary on Luke: 'Again, he writes in his commentary on Luke, "She was chosen as the one most preferred to bear God, who was betrothed to a man. For he tells that God was born of a Virgin, and calls the Mother of God Mary" ' (*item in expositione euangelii secundum Lucam: quod ea potissimum lecta est ut deum pareret, quae erat desponsata uiro. natum certe ex uirgine deum praedicat, matrem Mariam dei nominat*) (*Inc.* 7.25). Whether Ambrose might likewise have been the source for Augustine's broad conception of Mary's special election must remain a point of conjecture.

([95]) *Inch. Exp.* 5.1: *praedestinatus est quodam principatu resurrectionis, quia ex resurrectione omnium mortuorum ipse praedestinatus est, id est, ut prae caeteris et ante caeteros resurgeret designatus.*

([96]) Rufinus makes the distinction clear in his translation of Origen's commentary on Romans: 'Those who do not yet exist can be foreknown and predestined; but he who is and always has been in existence is not predestined but destined' (*Praesciri ergo et praedestinari possunt illi qui nondum sunt, ille autem qui est et semper est non praedestinatur sed destinatur*) (1.7.1). For a fuller examination of the Greek exegesis of the verse, see Schelkle (1956: 22–3).

([97]) *Comm. Rom.* 1.4: 'He therefore who was made Incarnate, who hid what he was to become, was predestined according to the spirit of sanctification in power, to be revealed as the Son of God when he rose from the dead. As it is written in Psalm 84: "Truth has arisen from the earth." However, on that account Paul does not say, "predestined by the resurrection of Jesus Christ," but "by the resurrection of the dead", because the resurrection of Christ is attributed to the general resurrection' (*hic ergo qui incarnatus est, qui quod esset latebat, tunc praedestinatus est secundum spiritum sanctificationis in virtute manifestari filius dei, cum resurgit a mortuis, sicut scriptum est in psalmo octogesimo quarto: veritas de terra orta est…ideo autem non dixit 'ex resurrectione Iesu Christi', sed 'ex mortuorum', quia resurrectio Christi generalem tribuit resurrectionem*).

([98]) *En. Ps.* 27.2: 'To you, Lord, have I cried; my God, do not take away the union of your Word from that condition by which I am human…From that condition, whereby the eternity of your Word does not cease to unite himself to me, may I

not be human as others are, who are born in the deep misery of this world' (*Ad te, Domine, clamavi, Deus meus ne separes unitatem Verbi tui ab eo quod homo sum…Ex eo enim quod aeternitatis Verbi tui non intermittit unire se mihi, fit ut non sim talis homo quales sunt ceteri, qui nascuntur in profundam miseriam saeculi huius*).

([99]) *En. Ps.* 16.3: 'For my soul is your spear, which your hand takes up; that is to say, your eternal power, to subdue the reign of iniquity and divide the just from the unrighteous' (*Anima enim mea framea tua est, quam assumit manus tua, id est, aeterna virtus tua, ut per ipsam regna debellet iniquitatis et dividat iustos ab impiis*).

([100]) *En. Ps.* 3.3: 'That human mind so clung, and in a certain way grew into, the supereminent excellence of the Word which took up the human, that it could not be cast off even by the humility of the passion' ([*Mens ipsa humana*] *ita inhaesit et quodammodo coaluit excellenti supereminentiae Verbi hominem suscipientis, ut tanta passionis humilitate non deponeretur*).

([101]) McGuckin (1990: 45).

([102]) *Excerpta* 8.l.71, 8.l.78, and 8.l.90.

([103]) Where *En. Ps.* 44.19, 'God is anointed by God' (*Unctus est Deus a Deo*) corresponds to *Hel. Ieiun.* 10.36: 'This is the oil of gladness, by which Jesus Christ was anointed by God the Father' (*hoc est oleum laetitiae, quo unctus est Iesus Christus a patre deo*).

([104]) Bernard (1965: 1–16).

([105]) McWilliam Dewart (1979: 113).

([106]) *Pecc. Mer.* 2.27.17.

([107]) McWilliam Dewart (1979: 117).

([108]) *Ep.* 187.16–17.

([109]) *Ep.* 187.21.

([110]) *Ep.* 187.22.

([111]) *Ep.* 187.24.

([112]) *Ep.* 187.40.

([113]) *Ep.* 187.40.

([114]) McGuckin (1990: 49).

([115]) This is arguably a weakness in Augustine's Mariology, borne out by his discordant references to Mary's freedom from (and, conversely, possession of) actual and birth guilt; put to direct Christological use, such language would only intensify the problem.

([116]) *Ep.* 190.25.6.

([117]) *Retr.* 2.36.

([118]) Viz. Christ's cry of dereliction; Eph. 3:17–18; the parable of the wise and foolish virgins; the meaning of the 'outer

darknesses', *tenebrae exteriores* (Matt. 22:13); and of *Verbum caro factus est* (John 1:14).

([119]) *Ep*. 140.1–2.1.

([120]) *Ep*. 140.7.3.

([121]) *Ep*. 140.12.4.

([122]) *Ep*. 140.18.6: 'He says this out of the person of the weakness of the flesh of sin, which he transfigured into what he took from the Virgin: the likeness of the flesh of sin. He speaks these words as the groom from the person of the bride, because in a certain way he has united her to himself' (*Haec ex persona dicit infirmitatis carnis peccati, quam transfigurauit, in eam quam sumpsit ex uirgine, similitudinem carnis peccati. Haec sponsus ex persona sponsae loquitur, quia uniuit eam sibi quodam modo*).

([123]) Cf. Ch. 4.

([124]) *Ep*. 140.32.12.

([125]) *Gen. Litt*. 10.4.3.

([126]) *Gen. Litt*. 10.12.7: 'As if in that fountain of souls (if there is any such thing) some should be good souls, others not good, which come out from it by a kind of drawing of lots, which deals a soul to each human; or else God makes some souls good, others not good, at the very moment in which people are being conceived or born, and from these a human receives the soul by lot which comes to him' (*quasi aut in illo animarum fonte, si ullus est, aliae sint animae bonae, aliae non bonae, quae sorte quadam exeunt, quaenam cui homini tribuatur, aut alias deus ad horam conceptorum uel nascentium faciat bonas, alias non bonas, quarum quisque habeat sorte, quae acciderit*).

([127]) *Gen. Litt*. 10.12.7: *neque enim neglegendi sunt, seu errent seu uerum sapiant, qui hoc specialiter et singulariter de anima illa dictum putant mediatoris dei et hominum hominis christi iesu.*

([128]) *Gen. Litt*. 10.32.18: *quia non sic in ea conceptum est, quomodo fuerat illa concepta, nec ipsa erat caro peccati, sed similitudo carnis peccati.*

([129]) *Gen. Litt*. 10.33.18.

([130]) Ambrose, *Ep*. 13.12.

([131]) *Princ*. 2.6.5.

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

The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430
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Conclusion

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Abstract and Keywords

The Conclusion reviews the book's speculative method, and offers a summary narrative reconstruction of Augustine's theological development as argued in the foregoing chapters. Highlighting the intersection of personal and power politics in the construction of theological debate, it underlines the importance of the Origenist controversy in the negotiation of orthodoxy on the cusp of the fifth century. Noting Augustine's shifting appropriation of Origen's theology throughout his theological development, it identifies his attraction to Origen's Christology as a stable feature of his theological maturity. The book closes by raising questions of Augustine's Christology, and his doctrine of Original Sin, from a contemporary theological context.

Keywords: narrative, West, East, Christian philosophy, Simplicianus, Jerome, Origenism, Pelagianism, Christology, Original Sin

Every study of Augustine, whether of his life or thought, must confront two major challenges. The first lies in the vast amount of scholarly and popular material that continues to be produced about him, the quality of which is highly diverse. The second is the more pressing, and arises from the sheer subtlety of Augustine as man and thinker, to which his very many extant writings bear complex witness. I have suggested here that Augustine's account of Pelagianism must be seen as a single heresiological narrative among several within its own time. The same holds true of all of the many new investigations of Augustine in the present: they bear witness to but part of the reality of that man's achievement, motivations, and intellectual attractions. The danger in such writing lies either in reproducing established conventions

that convey nothing new of Augustine's freshness, or in straying so far from the realm of probability that Augustine disappears from reasonable view. I hope that I have kept here to the mean between the two extremes, offering a reading of Augustine's engagement with Pelagianism and the theology of Origen that is both surprisingly new and reassuringly familiar. In doing this, I have tried to be as attentive to the aporias in the available evidence as to contemporary (though always subjective) accounts of events, believing that silences may speak louder than words where broader historical contexts demanded discretion, self-protection, and an economical wisdom.

As a coherent narrative, my argument proceeds as follows. In the 380s, Augustine was to be found in Milan, learning the Catholic faith once again at the feet of Ambrose. For all that Ambrose's example as a powerful and intellectually acute bishop provided Augustine with a blueprint for the civilized Christian life, Milan served Augustine more favourably still as the centre of a network of like-minded men and women: educated, literary, and well connected. Here he came to know Simplicianus, to succeed Ambrose to the See of Milan, and Paulinus, who would champion Augustine's cause with vigour against Caelestius at the council of Carthage. In company with them, Augustine c[illegible]aintance with Rufinus and Melania the Elder; Melania the Younger and her husband Pinianus; Paulinu[illegible]s household, and Pelagius himself. In Ambrose, this circle possessed an **(p.237)** exemplar of dist[illegible]nd Roman catholicity, in which the Christian inheritance of the Greek East was absorbed and developed fo[illegible]y independent Western theological audience. What Ambrose wove into his preaching and dogmatic works for the defence of Nicene orthodoxy and the expansion of Roman Christianity, Rufinus would make explicit fifteen years later, by translating Greek theology for a largely non-Grecophone public. This was perhaps a time of creative chaos, in which the cleavage of Western and Eastern Christianity was made ever clearer by the attempts of Latin churchmen to teach in harmony with their oriental colleagues, yet from an established tradition of Western theology and in the very different nuances of the *lingua latina*. Further behind this lay the ongoing tension in the story of the Empire, the holding-together of two interdependent cultures under a single political *Pax*.

поменять прокси

Augustine's education at Milan embraced the pagan past as much as it looked to the Christian future, heralded by the live voice of the *traditio patrum*. This was a recapitulation of his earlier liberal education, taking in Porphyry and Plotinus along with Marius Victorinus, Hilary, Ambrosiaster, Origen, and others. His precise view of the relative status of each within the proclamation of the gospel would fascinate and frustrate both his contemporaries and his successors. In all of this, the figure of Origen was taken as normative, one of the many voices from the post-persecution age for whom the exposition of Scripture constituted Christian philosophy, the Catholic discipline in its fullest sense. Before the controversy over Origen's writings, Augustine could draw on the translations slowly appearing from the scriptoria of Rufinus and Jerome, applying them with a light touch to his own maturing thought.

Moving to Rome, Ostia, and finally Thagaste, Augustine maintained his formative friendships from Milan, continuing to communicate by letter across the sea. Once ordained in 391, he would find them invaluable to his new project: the systematic reading of Scripture. Initial attempts to square his present with a Manichaean past resulted in the early works on Genesis. His accession to the episcopate at Hippo ran in tandem with a repeated and forensic examination of the Pauline corpus. Here, Augustine carefully kept his eye on prevailing fashions abroad, in the attempts of other Western commentators to articulate the literal meaning of Paul for a Latin readership. By 396, the publication of his first commentaries on Romans had cast him into the spotlight. Receiving the invitation of Simplicianus to treat more fully Romans 7–9, Augustine committed himself to engage in the current reinterpretation of those crucial chapters. And, because Origen's speculative extrapolation of scriptural exegesis found its most intrepid application here, Augustine could not ignore his findings. Perhaps already familiar with the use of Romans in *De Principiis* by word of mouth, Augustine obtained drafts of Rufinus' translation of Origen's commentary on Romans. These were added **(p.238)** to his wider reading, taking in particularly Ambrosiaster as the polar opposite of Origen's allegorical hermeneutic. When Pelagius finally arrived at the exposition of Paul a very few years later, his method would be the same. Origen's stature could not be ignored even in this very Western movement.

For Augustine, responding to Simplicianus acted as a literary digestif. His vacillating treatment of Romans 7:25, his

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ection came finally to
his first Genesis
the work of God's seven
days found its corollary in his hidden judgement on the difficult ignorance of human experience. What Augustine had instinctively observed of the slightness of human power in *De Libero Arbitrio* was now recoded in the language of Scripture: the present indignity of human love proceeds from Adam's Fall, in which all are involved *as in one lump*. All the miserable confusion of history on the grand and small scale must be attributed to that one act of self-admiration, the thrill of autonomy afterwards propagated from parent to child in the most self-loving of acts, sexual concupiscence. Augustine had cast the die for his own endgame, to be shown most graphically in *De Civitate Dei*. Humanity has fallen, its identity in love now permanently debased by the flesh, in a punishment of God both just and good. In this, Augustine was once again the syncretist, drawing together threads from his Christian predecessors, among whom Origen must be counted.

In the hinterland of the *Ad Simplicianum* lie Augustine's conversations with Jerome, and his gradual understanding of the Origenist controversy in the East. This involved his episcopal brethren, raising acute issues about the nature of authority in the Church in matters of doctrinal development. More personally, it involved the works of Origen, which Augustine had been taught to receive with critical respect. As Jerome's conflict with Rufinus increased, it also placed Augustine in an intriguing position. As Jerome's junior and as yet early in his theological career, Augustine owed him a debt of gratitude for his service to Christian scholarship. As a bishop, Augustine could expect to be treated with commensurate courtesy. Augustine was a private ally of Rufinus, and so the tension between both dynamics could only be heightened. This explains the farce that ensued: Augustine's enquiries about the exposition of Scripture and the status of Origen were set to inflame Jerome from the beginning. In the middle of their correspondence Rufinus the Syrian left Jerome's monastery for Italy, taking Jerome's poison about the rise of dangerous Origenism in the West with him. This, he would suggest in his *Liber*, was now being repackaged in the Fall doctrine of the bishop of Hippo, the duplicitous sanitization of Origen's doctrine of the Fall of souls to embodiment.

(p.239) Whether Augustine knew of Rufinus' moves in Italy before Caelestius and Pelagius landed in Africa is uncertain. Once they were on his doorstep, their asceticism—and its theological basis—could not escape Augustine's scrutiny. At the council of Carthage, the Rufinian basis of Caelestius' teaching was exposed, in turn threatening to tar Augustine with the brush of Origenism. While that debate had been at least officially settled in Rome in 400, Augustine naturally wished to avoid the possibility of any such accusation. Thus began his lengthy preoccupation with Pelagianism. Pelagius' heresy was, initially, solely his own; but Augustine's later and closer reading of Pelagius' works permitted its elaboration into a system of errors, interconnected and perfidious as no heresy had been before. At the helm of the African episcopate, Augustine was anxious to evade the unsettled charges brought against Rufinus and Jerome himself. His tack was simply (though subtly) to change the name of the argument. Pelagianism may have been the new black, but the cut remained Alexandrine. Augustine marshalled his own allies to defend his teaching on sin and grace, but the publication of Jerome's Epistle 133 in 415 threatened to expose the elephant in the room once again: to approve the possibility of even theoretical *impeccantia* was pure Origenism reborn in Pelagian form. Augustine redoubled his efforts, hastily nuancing his position on the theoretical attainment of holiness in life before death. Augustine ensured his reputation by this manœuvre, until his death in 430; but this move also committed him to bear a burden of his own design in debate with Julian and the semi-Pelagians, as he insisted on the traditionality of his own darkened vision of a very elusive hope.

In all of this, I do not believe that Augustine was actively deceitful or calculating. While he was more than capable of misdirecting confrontation and avoiding full intellectual self-disclosure, he had none of the character of a Jerome or an Epiphanius of Salamis in using theology to abusive personal ends. In this book I have tried to read Augustine sympathetically, viewing him as the victim of his less scrupulous contemporaries and, indeed, his own intellect. Augustine's systematic treatment of the Fall of Adam, its integration with a reformed theory of the affections, and his dramatically new and consistent theology of history all command admiration. I am, however, convinced that this is a

dangerous theology, and this is why it is necessary to understand the historical processes involved in its development. The Origenist and Pelagian controversies both pivoted on the restlessness of theological discourse at the turn of the fifth century. Human nature was the topic of both; both revealed the uncertainty of churchmen about authority within the Church, and both highlighted the insecurity of the Church as a whole about its place within a variety of philosophical dialogues stretching back into antiquity. The Origenist controversy did not reach a consensus about the nature of doctrinal development, nor about how the increasing power of episcopal, synodical, and conciliar modes of theological discernment might deal with **(p.240)** challenging and open-ended Christian thought that nonetheless stood within the 'great tradition'. Where Theophilus and Epiphanius found fault with Origen's speculations about the Fall of the soul and the character of bodily life, they also highlighted the inability of the Church to provide a workable and broadly acceptable contemporary alternative to the same set of underlying questions. This is clearly displayed in Augustine's confusion on the issue, and his unwillingness to announce the possibility that Origen's solution might in fact have been the best, within the broader framework of the Christian Platonism to which he otherwise publicly contributed. In their turn, the central actors in the Pelagian controversy replayed the same issues around ecclesial authority and the limits of theological systematization.

Augustine styled Pelagianism as a heresy precisely in order to draw attention away from those elements of his own thought that might have been open to the charge of Origenism. As I have tried to show, his method in all of this was intentionally ironic: he used Origen's Christological exegesis of Scripture consistently throughout his anti-Pelagian works. This is a typically Augustinian cleverness, quietly questioning the nature of current definitions of orthodoxy and heresy from within an anti-heretical corpus by drawing on the work of one counted a heretic. The time for a thorough and open investigation of the relationship between ecclesial authority and theological orthodoxy had not yet come, but the need for such a discussion was not unknown to those who possessed a range of powers to decree the content of right belief.

The place of Origen on the Western theological stage through the fourth to sixth centuries is important, because it provides an expansive perspective on these crucial issues. His works were clearly enjoyed and admired by many of those who established the Latin theological voice across Western Europe, from Hilary of Poitiers to Quodvultdeus of Carthage. In some cases, the works of these writers were maligned because of their reception of Origen (Cassian's 'Evagrianism' being a case in point); in others, they were not. Behind this lack of consistency lie the vague terms under which Origen's thought was attacked at the end of the fourth century, by individuals distant from each other and with quite different theological priorities. However much imperial support provided the Church in the conciliar age with a new ideal of diffused but consistent authority, standards of orthodoxy remained local and, perhaps above all, personal. That Augustine pushed his case against Pelagius in spite of the indifference of both Rome and Jerusalem, while ignoring the papal ban on Origen, makes this clear. This has potentially far-reaching implications for our reading of the ecumenical councils and their decrees, presented in their own time and in a persistent tradition of ecclesiastical history as a golden standard of orthodoxy, held everywhere and always by all. My study here has focused on Augustine's reception of Origen in the context of his Christology. A truly thoroughgoing survey of all the verbal and mental echoes of Origen's theology in the Augustinian corpus might hope to shed significant light **(p.241)** on the character of theological discourse between the councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon, as well as enriching our understanding of Augustine. A substantial study of Origen's reception in the West within the same period might achieve considerably more, witnessing to the fragmentation, fluidity, and individuality of orthodox Christian thought in the high Patristic era.

I have made the case here that Augustine's Christology falls firmly within this depiction of Patristic diversity. It is already well known to scholarship that Augustine's teaching on the Incarnation is internally multi-faceted, abundant with a variety of imagery, and lacking a sustained, dominant pattern. As a result, no isolated investigation has fully encompassed it. I hope that the importance of Romans 8:3 and its exegesis from an Origenian base will have been sufficiently proven in what I offer here. It is without doubt a major Christological thread that runs from Augustine's early works into his works directed against Pelagianism. While other aspects of his early thought disappeared from view in his

mature works, this remained a constant, a sign that Augustine was capable of integrating the Incarnation within the development of his broader theological vision. The appeal to tradition must be counted as Augustine's primary motivation in perpetuating the same Christological exegesis of Paul throughout the anti-Pelagian works. It is, however, testimony to the internal weakness of Augustine's anti-Pelagian theology that his Christology finally failed to address the situation of humanity under sin as he conceived it.

As a consequence, this book joins the chorus of voices that continue to question the persistence of an Augustinian approach to sin and desire within Western Church and society. Even in its own time, his account of the Fall did not speak for the whole opinion of the Church. Related to the materialist Traducianism of his African predecessor Tertullian, not unconnected to the thought of Mani, and re-dressing elements of Origen's teaching, it is an eclectic synthesis produced at the behest of polemical imperatives. Deficient as Julian's understanding of grace might have been, his critique of Augustinian Original Sin was no heresy. It cannot be good enough to account for the transmission of sin in the seed by glossing from Scripture and texts from the Fathers. Whatever accounts for the persistence of cruelty and evil in human society cannot primarily be exemplified by the uncontrollable oblivion of orgasm. By the same token, however holiness is to be defined, it must be seen as a possibility for pilgrims on their way to the Kingdom in the world now, and not postponed to an otherwise imperceptible, future heavenly city. Augustine's anti-Pelagian Christology makes clear that a crooked theory of sin leaves the 'likeness of sinful flesh' powerless to save. In following Origen's theology of the Incarnation, woven around the enigmatic words of Paul, Augustine saw rightly that Christ must be both familiar and alien if he is to transform human deficiency into human fullness. That fullness must include the flesh and all the desires that proceed from bodily existence, once assumed by the eternal Word for the salvation of all, if it is to be hoped for at all.

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